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Abstract
Towards Normative Transformation: Re-conceptualising Business and Human 
Rights
This dissertation examines the ongoing problem of business actors violating 
human rights and the regulatory attempts to deal with the problem at the 
international level.  In particular, it considers the work of the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Representative on Business Human Rights, John Ruggie and the 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework as elaborated in the 2011 UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.  It also critically analyses the UN Global 
Compact, the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises as well as 
developments in the European Union in this area.  Each of these regulatory 
mechanisms demonstrates elements of new governance, hybrid or third way 
models of regulation such as voluntarism, wide participation through 
multistakeholder structures and subsidiarity, all of which are useful soft law 
techniques that contribute to a culture of human rights or human rights norm 
internalisation.  Nevertheless, they fall down in failing to provide a normative 
regulatory framework which would address human rights abuses by business 
actors which remain unresponsive to soft law models of regulation.  Specifically, 
there is a lack of redress for the victims of human rights abuses by business 
actors and the current regulatory models do not offer a deterrent to or 
punishment of such abuses.  This dissertation argues that the international 
community must thus re-conceptualise the business and human rights problem 
and move towards a mandatory international legal paradigm.
New governance models have emerged from a changing international legal 
paradigm and they represent a move away from State-centric regulation towards 
the complementary co-existence of hard and soft rules in one domain.  While 
many of the new governance techniques offer useful means of internalising a 
human rights culture within the business community and thus helping to prevent 
human rights abuses, nevertheless, the lack of normative rules means that no 
binding redress mechanisms or remedies are available.  A true new governance 
approach allows both normative and non-normative standards to co-exist.  Given 
that the voluntary business and human rights initiatives alone have failed to 
address the problem adequately, a new international normative approach is 
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necessary.  This thesis posits that re-conceptualising business actors as human 
rights dutyholders does not require a major paradigm shift.  International law 
has always recognised business actors as subjects of international law, or 
alternatively, participants at minimum, and there is no good reason why they 
cannot be subject to human rights obligations.  This thesis advocates the 
application of a horizontal approach to human rights which encompasses human 
rights violations by business actors.  At present, a conservative, positivist and 
State-centric perspective of international law prevails, which prioritises the 
maintenance of State sovereignty over the rights of individuals not to be abused 
by business actors.
The law is correct as of October 2011.
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Chapter 1
Defining the Business and Human Rights Problem: Actors, History, Context
The world has been challenging multinational companies on many fronts – the use of 
coerced labor, of child labor, and challenges to companies for encouraging a government 
to relocate a few million people so the company can build a pipeline.  These challenges 
require sorting out the relationship between the responsibility of companies and what the 
international system ought to do about it.1 
1.0 Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the effectiveness of some past and present 
international business and human rights or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives by measuring them against the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
(SGSR) John Ruggie’s standards of Protect, Respect and Remedy.2  After nearly four 
decades of disparate responses to the issue of private business actors and human rights, 
SGSR Ruggie’s work represents the most comprehensive, up-to-date and widely 
disseminated analysis in the field.  It therefore, makes sense to examine business and 
human rights initiatives in light of his work.  That is not to say that this dissertation agrees 
with SGSR Ruggie on all matters, quite the contrary, rather his exertions provide a useful 
yardstick against which to measure the endeavours of the United Nations, the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union.  As the pre-eminent 
inter-governmental organisation, the UN has been attempting to address the issues arising 
from transnational business activities since the 1970s with varying degrees of success.  The 
OECD and the EU represent opposite ends of the CSR spectrum with the former taking an 
active regulatory role in attempting to curtail bad business behaviour, while the latter has 
been content to rely upon industry self-regulation.
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1 L.Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’ 25 Brook.J.Int’l L. 17 
(1999) (hereinafter ‘Henkin’) at 23.
2 Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights,’ Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, John Ruggie A/HRC/8/5 7 April 2008 http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-7-
Apr-2008.pdf [last accessed 2.11.11] (hereinafter ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’) at 4 para.5; Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations’ ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy ‘ Framework,’ A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011 (hereinafter ‘Guiding 
Principles’) http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-
mar-2011.pdf [last accessed 2.11.11].
The dissertation assumes that business actors do have social responsibilities, human rights 
obligations in particular, and at the very least that they ought to do no harm to the 
communities upon which they rely.  It takes a traditional international legal methodological 
approach and relies predominantly on a conventional analysis of primary legal materials 
including international agreements, jurisprudence and academic opinion.  The nature of the 
topic means that it also draws heavily upon the work of international organisations, NGO 
reports, industry research, the views of civil society, the accounts of those affected by bad 
business practices, and of course, the representations of business actors themselves.  
To that end the dissertation asks several overarching questions.  To what extent do certain 
international business and human rights projects satisfy the Ruggie criteria for holding 
business to account for human rights violations?  To what extent do they ensure respect for 
and protection of human rights?  How do they provide redress for human rights violations 
committed by business, if at all?  Ultimately it concludes that the existing self-regulatory 
frameworks are inadequate and that a complementary and binding global legal framework 
is necessary to act as a deterrent and to provide redress for those affected by the violations 
of human rights by business actors.  It thus advocates a new governance or third way 
approach to business and human rights regulation where hard and soft regulatory options 
coexist and complement each other in a hybrid structure and which is characterised by 
broad participation, flexibility and subsidiarity.3  New governance represents a shift away 
from State-centric models of regulation.
This chapter, however, firstly defines the particular bodies which fall within the scope of 
this dissertation, that is, the private business actors who are alleged to be and are violating 
human rights standards.  Secondly, it explains how the advent of globalisation has 
facilitated the creation of a world where the rights of individuals come a poor second to the 
rights of private business actors.  Thirdly, it outlines the rise of the CSR paradigm.  Finally, 
it examines the business response to the CSR challenge, followed finally, by an assessment 
of State and institutional responses.
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3 On new governance see generally for example, D.M.Trubek & L.G.Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation’ 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 539 (2006-2007); Conley, 
J.M. & Williams, C.A., ‘Engage, Embed and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Movement’ 31 J. of Corporation L. 1-38 (2005);  J.Scott & D.Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law 
and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ 8 European Law Journal 1-18 (2002).
1.1 Defining the Wrongdoers: Who or What is Violating Human Rights?
This dissertation uses the terms ‘business actors,’ ‘business entities’ and business 
enterprises’ interchangeably.  Likewise, it refers to ‘commercial’ actors, entities and 
enterprises.  In the same way that there are disparate initiatives which attempt to hold 
business actors accountable and, in some cases, responsible for human rights violations, 
there are also confusingly numerous terms and phrases used by States, inter-governmental 
organisations and civil society to describe the private entities whose accountability and 
responsibility is sought.  The two most commonly used terms in recent times are 
Transnational Corporation (TNC) and Multinational Enterprise (MNE).  While the former 
has been used at the UN, most notably its Commission and Centre for Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC),4 the latter was adopted by the OECD in its Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises.5  Neither term is especially helpful and disorder prevails for two 
reasons.  Firstly, the language used self-evidently describes both the particular business 
model, i.e. ‘corporation’ or ‘enterprise,’ and also, secondly, the geographical nature of the 
business activities undertaken, i.e. ‘transnational’ or ‘multinational.’  Users of such 
terminologies either assume, incorrectly, that there is common agreement as to their 
meaning and use them carelessly or they tie themselves in knots trying to justify the use of 
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4 UN Group of Eminent Persons, ‘The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on 
International Relations’ UN Doc. E/5500/Add.1 (Part 1), 24 May 1974.  See also UNCTC Terms of 
Reference: ECOSOC Res. 1913 sets out the UNCTC’s Terms of Reference: E/Res/1913/LVII, 5 December 
1974, UNCTC, CTC Reporter 1, No.1 (December 1976) 3-4; see  UNCTC, Proposed Text of the Draft Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 31 May 1990, UN Doc. E/1990/94 of 12 June 1990  For an 
overview of the work of the UNCTC see e.g. T.Sagafi-nejad & J.H.Dunning, The UN and Transnational 
Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2008) 
(hereinafter Sagafi-nejad & Dunning) 89-123; P.T.Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd 
ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2007) (hereinafter ‘Muchlinski (2007)’) 119-120 and 660-662.
5 OECD, OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, of 21 June 1976, C
(76)99(Final) (OECD, Paris, 1976) as amended in 2000: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL, 31st October 2001; 
as amended in 2011: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Recommendations for Responsible 
Business Conduct in a Global Context, 25 May 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf 
[last accessed 20.8.11] (hereinafter ‘OECD Guidelines 2011’). See also infra Chapter 5.  For a general 
overview and history of the  Guidelines see e.g. OECD Observer, Policy Brief: The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, (OECD, 2001);  J.Karl, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ in 
M.K.Addo, (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, (Kluwer: 
London, 1999) (edited collection hereinafter ‘Addo’) 89-106; C.Hägg, ‘The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: A Critical Analysis’ 3 Journal of Business Ethics 71-76 (1984); D.J.Plaine, ‘The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ 11 Int'l L. 339 (1977).
one terminology over another.6  This dissertation posits the view that both approaches are 
wrong and that debating the finer meanings of language is both unhelpful and, more 
importantly, unnecessary.  A broader approach is to be preferred, as encompassed by the 
treaty proposal of the UN Sub-Commission on the Protection of Human Rights in the form 
of the draft ‘Norms on Transnational Business Corporations and other business 
enterprises’7 and more recently by the mandate and work of UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie8 both of which 
specifically include TNCs as well as other business entities.
Historically, consistent language has never been used in this field.  In the first edition of his 
classic work, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, Peter Muchlinski identified an 
assortment of different terminologies utilised when referring to commercial actors 
conducting business across national borders.  He questioned whether there was an ‘agreed 
definition that is sufficiently sophisticated to encompass the various business forms that 
such firms might take.’9   Eight years later,  in the second edition, Muchlinski is still 
describing ‘terminological confusion.’   He outlines the reasons for the development of 
different terminologies, identifying three key terms: Multinational Corporation, 
Multinational Enterprise and Transnational Corporation.  
Firstly, in defining ‘Multinational Corporation’ he asserts that:
The first use of the term ‘multinational’ in relation to a corporation has been attributed 
to David E. Lilienthal, who, in April 1960 gave a paper to the Carnegie Institute of 
Technology on ‘Management and corporations 1985,’ which was later published 
under the title ‘The Multinational Corporation’ (MNC).  Lilienthal defined MNCs as 
‘corporations…which have their home in one country but which operate and live 
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6 See e.g. J.H.Dunning, Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley: Wokingham, 
1993) (hereinafter ‘Dunning) at 3; J.I.Charney, ‘Transnational Corporations and Developing Public 
International Law’ Duke L.J. 748-788 (1983) (hereinafter ‘Charney’) at 748 Note 1; F.Rigaux,‘Transnational 
Corporations’ in M.Bedjaoui, International Law: Achievements and Prospects (UNESCO/Kluwer: Paris and 
Dordrecht, 1991) (hereinafter ‘Rigaux’) 121-132 at 121.
7 UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities with Regards 
to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 of 26th August 2003.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the Norms see infra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.2.
8 Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Human Rights Council 
Resolution 2005/69, 20th April 2005.  See also the Guiding Principles note 2.
9 P.T.Muchlinksi, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell: Oxford, 1999) at 12.
under the laws and customs of other countries as well.’  This definition sees the MNC 
as a uninational enterprise with foreign operations.10
He concludes that the use of ‘Multinational Corporation’ is rooted in the experiences of US 
business and therefore does not consider business enterprises of ‘multiple national 
origin.’11  Nevertheless it is a term in regular use by academics in the spheres of 
economics, politics, management and business.12
The second term, ‘Multinational Enterprise,’ emerges from economic literature and is 
adopted by economists such as John Dunning who defines it as ‘an enterprise that engages 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or controls value-adding activities in more 
than one country.’13   Muchlinksi describes it more bluntly:
…the MNE is a firm that engages in direct investment outside its own country.14
He believes that MNEs are a ‘distinct type of business enterprise’ which ought to be 
regulated in a manner specific to them.15 
Multinational in this context still seems to exclude businesses of multiple national origin.  
This definition also clearly distinguishes between direct and indirect investment:
Economists have favoured a simple all-embracing formula, defining as a 
‘multinational enterprise’ any corporation which ‘owns (in whole or in part), controls 
and manages income generating assets in more than one country.16   
For Muchlinski, the use of the term ‘enterprise’ is unproblematic and secondary to the lack 
of uniformity caused by the inconsistent employment of the terms ‘multinational’ and 
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10 Muchlinksi (2007) note 4 at 5.
11 Muchlinski, ibid.  While the term ‘multinational corporation’ received most use in the 1970s, it is still in 
use today in a variety of disciplines although it appears to be gradually falling out of favour.  
12 See e.g. C.Dörrenbächer & M.Geppert, (eds), Politics and Power in the Multinational Corporation: The 
Role of Institutions, Interests and Identities (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011).
13 Dunning note 6 at 3.
14 Muchlinksi (2007) note 4 at 5.  Muchlinski’s emphasis.
15 Muchlinski (2007) note 4 at 8.
16 Muchlinksi (2007) note 4 at 5.  
‘transnational.’17  He views the definitions as ‘no more than conceptual guidelines’18 and 
explains his position in simple legal terms:
The term ‘enterprise’ is favoured over ‘corporation’ as it avoids restricting the object 
of study to incorporated business entities and to corporate groups based on parent-
subsidiary relations alone. International production can take numerous legal forms.  
From an economic perspective the legal form is not crucial to the classification of an 
enterprise as ‘multinational.’19
Such an analysis is correct.  Furthermore, it is contended that the legal model employed to 
describe the entity is irrelevant when assessing accountability or responsibility for 
violations of international human rights law.  So the corporate entity itself, and possibly its 
officers, is liable or in non-corporate situations, the individuals engaging in the commercial 
activities are liable.  The issue therefore becomes one of geography. 
Finally, there is the Transnational Corporation.20  Jonathan Charney, writing in 1984, 
embraces the term ‘Transnational Corporations’ and attempts to differentiate them from 
Multinational Enterprises.  This is despite his assertion that ‘[t]he literature on 
multinational enterprises employs the terms Transnational Corporations (TNC) and 
Multinational Entities (MNE) interchangeably.’21  His definition of TNCs, however, is 
convoluted and complex and illustrates the difficulties of attempting to characterise such 
businesses:
The term TNC is used here because it conveys more clearly this article’s focus on 
business enterprises.  There are numerous definitions of TNCs… For the purposes of 
this article the following definition will be used: [A] number of affiliated business 
establishments which function simultaneously in different countries, are joined 
together by ties of common ownership or control, and are responsible to a common 
management strategy.  From the headquarters company (and country) flow direction 
and control, and from the affiliates (branches subsidiaries and joint enterprises) 
products, revenues, and information.  Management may be organized in either 
monocentric or polycentric fashion. In the former case, top management is centred in 
one headquarters company; in the latter case, management has been divided into 
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geographic zones and a separate headquarters company has been established for each 
zone.22
François Rigaux shares the view that the term Transnational Corporation is to be 
preferred.23  He contends this on the basis that the commercial entities involved are almost 
always companies but weakens his argument for terminology based on corporate status by 
acknowledging that other private actors may be involved in transnational business.24  He 
also claims, erroneously, that there is general agreement as to the language to be employed:
There now seems to be an accepted terminology in this field.  We no longer speak of 
multinational corporations (or enterprises), as the use of this adjective gives the 
mistaken impression that the company or enterprise has national status in different 
countries.  The term transnational more correctly refers to a form of autonomy which 
corporations with establishments scattered over the territories of several States have 
been able to acquire in their relations with each one of them.25 [emphasis in original]
As has been demonstrated, there is no such ‘accepted terminology.’   Further evidence of 
this can be seen in two additional examples, one academic and one institutional.  
Firstly, Michael Addo in the introduction to his 1999 edited collection Human Rights 
Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations acknowledges the 
uncertainty of the situation, noting that only ‘some of the essays in this book’ employ TNC 
terminology:
It is a form of reference used in this book not unaware of the other terms such as 
multinational corporation, international company, multinational enterprises, often 
used to represent large corporations which have a policy headquarters in one country 
(the home country) and operating in foreign jurisdictions (the host country) through 
wholly or partly owned subsidiaries, agencies and other forms of business 
representatives.26
Interestingly, none of the works in the collection attempts to address ‘the doctrinal 
differences relating to the effect of one or the other title.’  This dissertation takes the view 
that such distinctions are therefore irrelevant for legal purposes.  Rather they exercise 
Chapter 1  Defining the Business and Human Rights Problem: Actors, History, Context! ! 22
22 Ibid.
23 Rigaux note 6 at 121.
24 Rigaux note 6 at 122.
25 Rigaux note 6 at 121.  Rigaux’s emphasis.
26 M.K.Addo, ‘Introduction’ in Addo note 5 at 3.
economists.  Witness John Dunning drawing on a variety of sources in an attempt to help 
classify a particular entity as ‘multinational’ or ‘transnational.’  He identifies:
…several criteria for assessing the degree of an enterprise’s multi- or transnationality.  
These include:
(1)The number and size of foreign subsidiaries or associate companies it owns 
or controls,
(2)The number of countries in which it engages in value-adding activities such 
as mines, plantations, factories, selling outlets, banks, offices and hotels,
(3)The proportion of its global assets, revenue, income or employment 
accounted for by its foreign affiliates,
(4)The degree to which its management or stock ownership is 
internationalized,
(5)The extent to which its higher value activities, for example, research and 
development, are internationalized; this measure is intended to capture the 
quality or depth of foreign production,
(6)The extent and pattern of the systemic advantages arising from its 
governance of, and influence over, a network of economic activities located in 
different countries.27
He does, however, acknowledge that such a classification is inevitably ‘arbitrary’ and that 
‘the multi- or transnationality of an enterprise is best considered as a multi-dimensional, 
rather than a unidimensional concept.’28  Muchlinksi also believes that ‘[i]nevitably, a 
certain degree of arbitrariness is involved’ and cites the UN institutional experience as 
evidence, which leads to the second example.29  
The UN has muddied the waters with an inconsistent and shifting approach to terminology.  
In the early 1970s the UN employed the term ‘Multinational Corporation’30 but by the 
middle of the decade, as a result of UNCTC debates, it had switched to ‘Transnational 
Corporation.’31  This shift came at the behest of several States who took the view that the 
term ‘transnational’ ‘better expressed the essential feature of operation across national 
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borders than did the term multinational.’32  There was also intense disagreement between 
the developed and developing nations about whether or not to include State corporations 
within the scope of the proposed UNCTC Code of Conduct.33  Conversely the more recent 
UN projects such as the Global Compact, the draft Norms and the work of SGSR Ruggie 
adopt a broader approach, referring not only to TNCs but also to ‘business entities and 
other business organisations’ thus avoiding the debate about nomenclature to a certain 
extent.
The emergence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an enduring term of art34 in 
the 1990s merely led to further uncertainty (although the term is believed to have been in 
use since the 1960s35).  This lack of consistency in terminology impacts on the regulatory 
scope of the different business and human rights initiatives.  A broad definition is self-
evidently far-reaching and inclusive of all business entities.  A narrower definition 
obviously limits and restricts regulatory reach.  So, for example, after much debate, the 
Draft Code of Conduct of the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations was intended to 
apply only to transnational corporations:36
The term ‘transnational corporation’ as used in this Code means an enterprise, 
whether of public, private or mixed ownership, comprising entities in two or more 
countries, regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which 
operates under a system of decision-making, permitting coherent policies and a 
common strategy through one or more decision-making centres, in which the entities 
are so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them [may be able to] 
exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share 
knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others.37
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This was a response to Latin American objections, specifically Andean Pact nations which 
used the term ‘multinational’ to ‘refer to corporations jointly set up under Andean Group 
rule.’38  The agreement to use the term did not stop ongoing disagreements as to the 
definition of TNC, so for example, many States expressed ongoing dissatisfaction at the 
proposed inclusion of State-owned enterprises within the scope of the draft Code.39   At 
around the same time the OECD began drafting its Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 
and chose to adopt an alternative vocabulary. The OECD Guidelines are addressed to 
multinational enterprises, thus applying, not only to corporate actors, but to a much wider 
group of business actors.  Guideline I(4) states that:
A precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of the 
Guidelines. These enterprises operate in all sectors of the economy. They usually 
comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so 
linked that they may co- ordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more 
of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of 
others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one 
multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, State or mixed. The 
Guidelines are addressed to all the entities within the multinational enterprise (parent 
companies and/or local entities). According to the actual distribution of 
responsibilities among them, the different entities are expected to co-operate and to 
assist one another to facilitate observance of the Guidelines.40
As stated in the introduction to the chapter, the draft Norms produced by the UN’s Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to encompass all 
businesses within a proposed convention by adopting the term ‘Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises.’41  This broader approach has also been embraced by 
SGSR Ruggie.  In his 2007 Report he refers to the ‘challenges posed’ by ‘transnational and 
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private enterprises’42 and the Guiding Principles published in 2011 use ‘business’ and 
‘business enterprise.’43  David Weissbrodt, Chair of the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which oversaw the creation of the draft 
Norms, has concluded that the use of the term TNC became entrenched historically due to 
intense ‘media attention on the activities and misdeeds of major corporations.’44  He 
further cites the ‘mobility and power’ of TNCs as reasons for the regulatory focus, pointing 
out that they can ‘evade national laws and enforcement because they can relocate’  and can 
‘use their political and economic clout to pressure governments to ignore corporate 
abuses.’45   In his words, the draft Norms sought to ‘level the playing field’ by applying 
‘not only to TNCs but also to national companies and local businesses’ so that each would 
‘be responsible according to their respective spheres of activity and influence’46  In doing 
so, the Norms endeavoured to avoid the risk of ‘sophisticated corporate lawyers’ 
structuring commercial entities in such a way ‘as to avoid the application of international 
standards designed only for TNCs.’47
Attempting to categorise commercial entities as MNCs, MNEs or TNCs, or any variation 
thereof, is to miss the point.  Such definitions are a red herring.  Certainly, these 
commercial actors are doing business across national borders.  Yes, their behaviour may be 
constrained by national regulation.  As will be demonstrated, however, circumstances arise 
regularly whereby national regulation is impotent and business actors operate with 
impunity.  There are certain minimum international standards of behaviour, particularly in 
relation to human rights which ought to be observed because they transcend national 
jurisdiction.  Such standards operate irrespective of the multinationality or transnationality 
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of the actor.  All business actors, whether operating in their home State or abroad, ought to 
adhere to them.  Defining business actors by reference to business models and 
geographical configurations more often than not, as Weissbrodt concludes, enables rogue 
businesses to escape legal accountability and responsibility.48  Corporate nationality 
notwithstanding, they elude accountability and redress in host States for reasons which will 
be elaborated upon later in this chapter.  They also escape the territorial jurisdiction of their 
home State because domestic legal systems almost invariably regard them as foreign 
nationals and thus the responsibility of the State of incorporation.   This dissertation is 
founded upon the premise that such definitions are unnecessary.  An international 
regulatory architecture directed simply to every entity engaged in business activities and 
implemented at the national level is the key to achieving accountability, responsibility and 
individual redress for human rights violations. 
1.1.2 Literature Review
As will be demonstrated, the modern conceptions of business and human rights and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) did not emerge until the latter part of the twentieth 
century, nevertheless, early corporate governance scholars did address issues of corporate 
accountability and responsibility.  Most notably a debate between preeminent US corporate 
law scholars Professors Berle and Dodd took place in the Harvard Law Review in the early 
1930s and is generally recognised as being the starting point for stakeholder theory.49  The 
Berle-Dodd  debate arose out of contemporary concerns about the fast growth of large 
corporations where the ‘control had passed from owners to managers’ and which gave rise 
to questions about the nature of the corporation.50  In essence, this new stakeholder 
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approach represented a challenge to the accepted position as elaborated clearly in Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co.:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.51
Professor Dodd in particular challenged the traditional position that a company existed 
only for the benefit of the shareholders.  Berle and Dodd disagreed initially that a corporate 
entity existed not solely for the benefits of its shareholders but also for the benefit of the 
wider community including its employees and those living in the vicinity of a company’s 
activities.52  Nevertheless, two decades later, Berle acknowledged publicly that Dodd had 
been correct and that corporations ought to act for the public benefit.53     
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the debate continued with mainstream corporate law 
scholars such as Manning rejecting the notion of ‘corporate power’ as vague and 
unhelpful:54  
The conclusion seems to me inescapable that in our present posture of knowledge, 
analysis and disagreement, we are far from ready to deal with anything so abstract as 
the asserted Problem of Corporate Power and Individual Freedom. We have none of 
the necessary elements under intellectual control. We cannot categorize the actors-
cannot say what they do or do not do that is contrary to our desires-do not know who 
is affected--do not know in what respect they are affected-and have no common set 
of norms or criteria by which to judge whether we think particular results are good or 
bad-or how intensely we feel about it. Every link in this chain vies to be the weakest.  
When we do not know what the problems are, we are hardly in a position to 
Constitutionalize about it.55
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Likewise, Rostow criticised the proposals put forward by Berle and others to change the 
status quo as ‘bewildering balderdash’ and argued that the ‘quest for maximum revenue’ by 
companies resulted in competition in the market which in turn was ‘superior to any 
alternative, in its contribution to the economic welfare of the community as a whole.’56  
Harwell Wells, however, argues that the social responsibility of corporations was an 
accepted fact by the mid-1960s57 but it is difficult to agree with this assertion as having any  
meaningful effect.  As Blumberg noted in 1970: ‘responsibility to the community has not 
replaced responsibility to shareholders as the legal standard for determining the validity of 
corporate conduct.’58  Certainly there was no change to the existing normative framework 
governing corporations.  Even if CSR were recognised as a principle of business, the 
leading text of the time, Walton’s Corporate Social Responsibilities, defined it as a purely 
voluntary principle:59 
In short, the new concept of social responsibility recognizes the intimacy of the 
relationships between the corporation and society and realizes that such relationships 
must be kept in mind by top managers as the corporation and the related groups 
pursue their respective goals.60 [emphasis added]
Walton’s influential work no doubt helped to establish the voluntarism versus regulation 
narrative that came to dominate the CSR paradigm.61  Given the emphasis on the voluntary 
nature of CSR, it was not at all clear that corporate social responsibility had become a 
generally accepted principle of either business or law.  
Post-colonial issues subsequently affected much of the pro-regulation academic literature 
during the 1960s and 1970s arising in part from debates surrounding the UN Declaration 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Charter on the Economic Rights 
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and Duties of States.62  Particular concerns over the activities and power of what came to 
be known as transnational corporations were expressed by developing States.  So, for 
example, it became a key point for discussion at the UN Commission on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC), and thus shifted the spotlight, from what had been a 
predominantly domestic legal issue in the US, onto CSR at an international level.63   The 
activities of the United Fruit Company and International Telephone and Telegraph in Latin 
America stretching back to the 1950s64 and the controversial involvement of international 
business in apartheid South Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s65 clearly influenced 
States drafting the UNCTC Code of Conduct as they sought to limit what was perceived as 
the expanding power of TNCs.66 
Two important works published around this time, Stone’s Where the Law Ends: The Social 
Control of Corporate Behaviour67 and Nader, Green, and Seligman’s Taming the Giant 
Corporation68 addressed what was perceived to be the increasing abuse of corporate power 
and advocated legislative regulatory solutions.  In what seems to be a clear nod to the 
Berle-Dodd stakeholder theory, Nader, Green, and Seligman argued quite simply that 
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corporate actors ought to ‘avoid exploiting consumers or communities.‘69   A subsequent 
article by David Engel is intensely critical of both texts for their focus on regulation:70
the basic question of corporate social responsibility is not whether we wish to compel 
or forbid certain kinds of corporate conduct by legislative command, for example, 
but rather whether it is socially desirable for corporations organized for profit 
voluntarily to identify and pursue social ends where this pursuit conflicts with the 
presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit.71
Nevertheless, Engel also recognised that corporate social responsibility could not be 
considered in isolation and had to be ‘debated...against the background of a general 
political theory.’72
The pro-regulation movement was not unchallenged.  For example, Detlev Vagts asserted 
that TNCs wielded little real power.73  Most famously a vehemently neoliberal economic 
approach to corporate governance was expounded by Milton Friedman in an article in the 
New York Times Magazine in 1970 where he pronounced: ‘the key point is that, in his 
capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the 
corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to 
them.’74  This, of course, was a point that Friedman had elaborated upon some eight years 
previously in his monograph Capitalism and Freedom where he railed against any 
acceptance of corporate social responsibility writing that:
few trends would so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society 
as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make 
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as much for their shareholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive 
doctrine.75
Friedman’s neoliberal economic approach to corporate governance was resisted by many 
scholars at the time and the literature, at least in the US, focused on the role of the 
corporation in society.  So, for example, economist David Linowes was a vociferous 
supporter of socially responsible business arguing that 'the corporation cannot realistically 
or rationally divorce itself from society.'  He concluded that 'socially constructive corporate 
action will in the long run benefit all of society‘ while ‘[i]rresponsible action - or inaction - 
will boomerang to harm business as well as the non business sector.’76  
As the work of the UNCTC faltered77 it was clear that neo-liberalism had emerged as the 
predominant driving force of globalisation and academic focus turned to the effects of 
increasing transnational commercial activity within a globalised context.  Professor Steven 
Ratner’s substantial and impressively wide-ranging article in the Yale Law Journal in 2001 
is probably the first modern attempt to establish a theoretical framework for business and 
human rights within an international law paradigm.78  He argues that there has been an 
‘erosion’ of the domain reservé and that this presents a challenge to the traditional 
prerogative of States to regulate companies within their jurisdiction.79  Ratner claims that 
‘[t]he question is not whether nonstate actors have rights and duties but what those rights 
and duties are’80 although he recognises that States are ambivalent about ‘accepting 
corporate duties‘ especially in relation to human rights duties.81  He takes the view that 
such ‘duties of a company are a direct function of its capacity to harm human dignity.’82  
This position is reflected in the work of several other subsequent scholars.
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Much of the modern business and human rights literature therefore focuses on how to 
regulate business actors in relation to human rights and thus a key element of scholarly 
work became the discussion about instrumentality versus normative framework (or hard 
law versus soft law).83  Some scholars such as Glinksi, Williams and Blanpain focus on the 
positive regulatory value of voluntary corporate codes of conduct.84  More recently there 
has also been an increase in literature focusing on institutional analysis.85  Thus we see 
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Rev. 401-414 (2001); R.A.Anderson, ‘Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward Global Regulation of 
Transnational Corporations 88 Denver Univ.L.Rev. 183 (2010) (hereinafter ‘Anderson’); K.Basu, ‘Compacts, 
Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives for Higher International Labor Standards’ 34 Cornell Int’l L.J. 487 
(2001); G.C. Shaffer & M.A.Pollack, ‘Hard Law vs Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in 
International Governance,’ 94 Minn. L. Rev. 706 (2010); D.Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a 
Globalized World’ 25 Boston College Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 273-322 (2002) (hereinafter Shelton (2002)’).
84 See C.Glinski, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Legal Potential of Private Regulation,’ in O.Dilling, M.Herberg & 
G.Winter, (eds), Responsible Business: Self-governance and law in transnational economic transactions 
(Oxford: Hart, 2008) 41-66; C.Glinski, ‘Self-Regulation of Transnational Corporations: Neither Meaningless 
in Law Nor Voluntary’ in S.MacLeod, (ed.), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice: Volume 2 
Corporate Governance, (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 197-220.  See also e.g. S.D.Murphy, ‘Taking Multinational 
Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level,’ 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 388-433 (2005); 
C.Williams, ‘Text of Remarks on Panel: “Codes of Conduct and Transparency”’ 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 415-422 (2001); R.Blanpain, (ed.), Multinational Enterprises and the Social Challenges of the XXIst 
Century  (The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles at Work. Public and Private Corporate Codes of 
Conduct.) 37 Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 2000, (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
(hereinafter ‘Blanpain’); R.Shamir, ‘Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the 
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility’ 38 Law & Soc. Rev. 635-664 (2004) (hereinafter 
‘Shamir’).
85 See e.g.  Zerk note 83; S.Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations: Humanizing Business 
(Routledge, 2012) (hereinafter ‘Deva (2012)’); J.L.Černič, Human Rights Law and Business: Corporate 
Responsibility for Fundamental Human Rights (Europa Law Publishing, 2011) (hereinafter Černič (2011)’); 
Amao (2011) note 49.
Weissbrodt, Kinley, Deva and other scholars positively evaluating the approach of the UN 
Norms86 to business regulation, in contrast to Ruggie and Baxi. 87
Domestic approaches to the problem, particularly under the US Alien Tort Claims Act, 
have received scholarly attention but the absence of concrete outcomes in the US courts 
meant that there has been little jurisprudence to analyse.88  The problem of business actors 
and human rights has received little legislative attention elsewhere and so there is limited 
scope for scholarly literature to address national CSR approaches.  This is despite the fact 
that many claim that ‘national courts and national legal regimes are crucial.’89
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86 Weissbrodt, of course, was a member and then chair of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights which drafted the Norms.  See: D.Weissbrodt, ‘Business and 
Human Rights’ 74 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 55-73 (2005) (hereinafter ‘Weissbrodt (2005)’); D.Weissbrodt, 
‘International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses’ 26 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 
373-391 (2008) (hereinafter ‘Weissbrodt (2008)’); D.Weissbrodt & M.Kruger, ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights’ 97 AJIL 901 (2002) (hereinafter (Weissbrodt & Kruger’); S.Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in Right Direction?’ bepress 
Legal Series, Working Paper no.112 (2004) http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1270&context=expresso&sei-redir=1#search=%22norms%20business%20human%20rights%22 [last 
accessed 15.7.11] (hereinafter ‘Deva (2004)’); J.Campagna,’ United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights: The 
International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rule Makers’ 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1205 
(2003-204) (hereinafter ‘Campagna’). D.Kinley, J.Nolan & N.Zerial, ‘The Norms are dead! Long live the 
Norms! The politics behind the UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ in D.McBarnet, A.Voiculescu & 
T.Campbell, (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (2007) 
459-475 (hereinafter ‘McBarnet, Voiculescu & Campbell’ and ‘Kinley, Nolan & Zerial (2007a)’); D. Kinley, 
J. Nolan & N. Zerial, ‘The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations 
Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25 Companies and Securities Law Journal 30 (hereinafter 
‘Kinley, Nolan & Zerial (2007b)’).
87 J.Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ 3 Innovations: 
Technology Governance Globalization  189-212 (2008) at 198; U.Baxi, ‘Market Fundamentalisms: Business 
Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights’ 5 Human Rights Law Review 1-26  (2005) at 5.
88 Alien Tort Claims Act 28 USC 1350.  See discussion infra Section 1.6.1, Section 1.5.1 and Section 3.5.1. 
For literature see e.g. W.S.Dodge, ‘Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations?’ 24 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 351-380 (2001); M.D.Ramsey, ‘Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act: Some Structural Concerns’ 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 362-380 (2001) (hereinafter 
‘Ramsey’); Shamir note 84; S.MacLeod, ‘Maria Aguinda v. Texaco Inc.: Defining the Limits of Liability for 
Human Rights Violations Resulting from Environmental Degradation,’  4(2) Contemporary Issues in Law 
189–209 (1999) (hereinafter ‘MacLeod (1999)’); S.Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation (Oxford: Hart, 2004).
89 International Council on Human Rights Policy,‘Beyond Voluntarism: Human rights and the developing 
international legal obligations of companies’ February 2002, http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/
7/107_report_en.pdf [last accessed 28.8.12] at 160.
Numerous scholars, both eminent and emerging support the case for some form of binding 
international regulation, albeit to different degrees and in different ways.90  Ratner has 
concluded that the creation of binding rules for business actors is a logical development of 
international law:
Proposing international norms of corporate responsibility for violations of human 
dignity continues the trajectory that the law has taken, but it also represents new 
challenges for the enterprise.  It challenges the state's exclusive prerogative(what 
some might call sovereignty)to regulate business enterprises by making them a 
subject of international scrutiny; it makes them entities that have their own duties to 
respect human rights.91
The calls for binding international regulation have been vociferously and frequently 
opposed by Ruggie92 and scholars outside the discipline of law also tend to support a non-
binding approach to CSR93 although Philip Alston has queried the implications of imposing 
human rights obligations on business actors.94  Opposition to legally binding international 
regulation of business actors in the human rights sphere has come predominantly from 
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90 Ratner note 62 at 538-540.  See: Shelton (2002) note 83 at 322; O.De Schutter, ‘The Challenge of 
Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate Actors’ in O.De Schutter, (ed.), Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 1-40; H.H.Koh,‘Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate 
Responsibility Litigation’ 7 J. of Int’l Economic L. 263-274 (2004) (hereinafter ‘Koh (2004)’) who argues 
for a multilateral treaty; Zerk note 83 at 298; J.Wouters & L.Chanet, ‘Corporate Human Rights 
Responsibilities: A European Perspective,’ 6 Nw U.J. Int’l Hum. Rts 262 (2008) (hereinafter ‘Wouters & 
Chanet’) at para.20; Amao (2011) note 49 who advocates the creation of global company law; Weissbrodt 
(2005) note 86; Weissbrodt (2008) note 86; Weissbrodt & Kruger note 86; Deva (2004) note 86 at 40; 
Campagna note 86; Anderson note 83;  P.Simons, ‘International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of 
Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights’ 3 Journal of Human Rights and Environment 
(2012);  Černič (2011) note 85 at 253 who advocates an international normative framework in order to create 
a ‘harmonic society‘ although the myriad of options proposed renders the precise framework unclear.  See 
also: UK House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Any of our business?  
Human Rights and the UK private sector,’ First Report of Session 2009-10, Vol.1, HL Paper 5-I, HC 64-I, 
16th December 2009 at 96 para.17.
91 Ratner note 62 at 540.
92 See e.g.: Ethical Corp., By Invitation: John Ruggie: Business and Human Rights—Treaty Road not 
Travelled (6 May 2008), available athttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/news/ruggie/Pages%20from
%20ECM%20May_FINAL_JohnRuggie_may%2010.pdf [last accessed 25.8.12] (hereinafter ‘Ruggie 
(2008a)’); Professor John G Ruggie, ‘Presentation of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council’ (30 
May 2011) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/TransCorporations/HRC
%202011_Remarks_Final_JR.pdf [last accessed 25.8.12];  JG Ruggie, ‘Response by John Ruggie to 
Misereor/Global Policy Forum, “Problematic Pragmatism – The Ruggie Report 2008: Background, Analysis 
and Perspectives”’ (2008) http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-response-to-Misereor-GPF-2-Jun-2008.pdf [last 
accessed 25.8.12]; J.G. Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ 101 
Am.J.Int’l L. 819 (2007) (hereinafter ‘Ruggie (2007).
93 See e.g. J.J.A.Shaw, ‘The European Constitution and CSR; Consensus or Conflict,’  2 Social 
Responsibility Journal 186 - 193 (2006); A.G.Scherer & G.Palazzo, ‘The New Political Role of Business in a 
Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, Governance, 
and Democracy,’ 48:4 Journal of Management Studies  899-931 (2011). 
94 P.Alston, ‘The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?’ in P.Alston, (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, (Oxford:  OUP, 2005) 3 at 13-14.
business actors, trade organisations and States.95   Legal scholars as a general rule do not 
reject international regulation but many conclude that it is an ‘unlikely’ outcome.96
Another important theme which emerges in the literature and which underpins this 
dissertation is what Koh describes as a culture of ‘norm-internalization’97 through 
socialisation whereby one moves from ‘grudgingly accepting a rule one time only to 
habitually obeying it’ as ‘the rule transforms from being some kind of external sanction to 
becoming an internal imperative.’98  This analysis links with Slaughter’s ‘liberal theory’ of 
international law which advocates a ‘bottom up’ approach to creating international law 
norms and thus:
‘identifies multiple bodies of rules, norms and processes that contribute to 
international order, beginning with voluntary codes of conduct adopted by individual 
and corporate actors operating in transnational society and working up through 
transnational and transgovernmental law to traditional public international law.’99
Zerk supports Slaughter’s approach arguing that what she describes as the ‘socialisation’ of 
business and human rights norms at the domestic level is ‘well underway’.100  She 
concludes that despite the State-centric nature of international law, this in itself is not a 
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95 See discussions infra at Section 1.6.2 and Chapter 6.
96 Zerk note 83 at 297.
97 H.H.Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’ 74 Ind. L. J. 1397-1417 (1999) 
(hereinafter  ‘Koh 1999)’) at 1400; H.H.Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’ 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623-681 
(1998) (hereinafter ‘Koh (1998)’); H.H.Koh. ‘Internalization through Socialization’ 54 Duke L.J. 975-982 
(2005) (hereinafter ‘Koh (1995)’).  See also generally R.Goodman & D.Jinks, ‘Toward an Institutional 
Theory of Sovereignty’ 55 Stan.L.Rev. 1749 (2003) (hereinafter ‘Goodman & Jinks’). 
98 Koh (1999) ibid at 1400.  For a riposte to Koh’s theory of norm internalization see e.g. T.M.Franck, ‘Dr. 
Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh's Optimism: Commentary’ 35 Hous. L. 
Rev. 683 (1998-1999).
99 A. Slaughter, ‘A Liberal Theory of International Law’ (2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 240 at 242; 
A.Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ 6 EJIL 503 (1995).  See also International 
Council on Human Rights Policy,‘Beyond Voluntarism: Human rights and the developing international legal 
obligations of companies’ February 2002, http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107_report_en.pdf [last 
accessed 28.8.12].  See also: International Council on Human Rights Policy,‘Beyond Voluntarism: Human 
rights and the developing international legal obligations of companies’ February 2002, http://www.ichrp.org/
files/reports/7/107_report_en.pdf [last accessed 28.8.12] at 160.
100 Zerk note 83 at 309.  For more on Zerk’s theory of socialisation see Zerk at 94-95 (on the role of NGOs in 
the socialisation process), 98, 101 and 309.  See also T.Risse & K.Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of 
International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’ in T.Risse, S.Ropp & K.Sikkink 
(eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).
barrier to a positive role for international law in addressing human rights violations by 
business, rather it offers ‘regulatory opportunities’ which are under-utilised currently.101  
In terms of institutional analysis of CSR activities, the academic community has been slow 
to address the ways in which international and regional bodies were tackling the problem 
of  human rights abuses by business actors.   There are, however, recent institutional 
analyses which have been critiquing institutional frameworks.102  Thus we see scholarly 
examinations of the burgeoning CSR regulatory approaches at the UN (the UN Norms,103 
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101 Zerk note 83 at 310.
102 See e.g Zerk ibid; Černič (2011) note 85; Amao (2011) note 49.
103 Weissbrodt (2002) note 86; Weissbrodt (2005) note 86; Weissbrodt (2008) note 86; Weisbrodt & Kruger 
note 86;  S.MacLeod, ‘The United Nations, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: challenging the 
international legal order,’ in N.Boeger, C.Villiers & R.Murray, (eds), Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) at 64-84;  S.MacLeod, ‘Reconciling 
Regulatory Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility: The European Union, OECD and United Nations 
Compared’ 13 European Public Law 671-702 (2007) (hereinafter ‘MacLeod (2007)’); Černič (2011) note 85 
at 221-224; L.C.Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Law,’ 37 Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. (2006) 287; Deva (2004) note 86; D.Kinley, ‘The Politics of 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ 
25 Company & Sec. L.J. 30 (2007) (also published as Sydney Law School/ Kinley, Nolan & Zerial (2007b) 
note 86); D.Kinley. & R.Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law’ 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 447-497 (2006); C.F.Hillemanns, ‘UN Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights,’ 4 German Law Journal No.10 1065-0180 (2003) http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/
Vol04No10/PDF_Vol_04_No_10_1065-1080_European_Hillemanns.pdf [last accessed 13.7.11]
Global Compact104 and Guiding Principles105) and at the OECD106 and the European 
Union.107 
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(2011) note 85 at 228-229; D.Cetindamar, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Practices and Environmentally 
Responsible Behaviour: The Case of the United Nations Global Compact’ 76 J. of Business Ethics 163-176 
(2007); S.Deva, ‘Global Compact: A Critique of the UN’s “Public-Private” Partnership for Promoting 
Corporate Citizenship’ 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 107-151 (2006); King, B., ‘UN Global Compact: 
Responsibility for Human Rights, Labor Relations, and the Environment in Developing Nations’ 34 Cornell 
Int’l L.J. 481 (2001); W.Meyer & B.Stefanova, ‘Human Rights, the UN Global Compact and Global 
Governance’ 34 Cornell Int’l L.J. 501 (2001); J.Nolan, ‘The United Nation’s Compact with Business: 
Hindering or Helping the Protection of Human Rights?’ 24 U. of Queensland L.J. 445 (2005); A.Rasche, 
‘Toward a Model to Compare and Analyze Accountability Standards – The Case of the UN Global Compact’ 
16 Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 192–205 (2009); A.Rasche,’“A Necessary Supplement”: What the 
United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not,’ 48 Business & Society December 511-537 (2009); 
E.Oshionebo, ‘The UN Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myth 
from Realities’ 19 Fla. J. Int’l L. 1-38 (2007); J.G.Ruggie, ‘Global_governance.net: The Global Compact as 
Learning Network’ 7 Global Governance 371-378 (2001).
105 S.Deva, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implications for Companies’ 9(2) European 
Company Law 101-109 (2012); N.Jägers & W.van Genugten, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: Moving 
Beyond ‘Principled Pragmatism’ to ‘Ruggie-Plus’’ 1 March 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1844203 [last accessed 16.7.11]; S.Jerbi, ‘UN Adopts Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights - What Comes Next?’ Institute for Human  Rights and Business, 17 June 2011 
http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/un_adopts_guiding_principles_on_business_and_human_rights.html
[last accessed 8.7.11]; J.H.Knox, ‘The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for 
Corporations,’ 15 ASIL Insights 1 August 2011, http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf [last 
accessed 23.10.11].
106 Černič (2011) note 85 at 184-206; L. C.Backer, ‘Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) v. 
DAS Air and Global Witness v. Afrimex: Small Steps to an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the 
Regulation of Multinational Corporations,’ 10(1) Melb.J.Int’l Law 258 (2009); J.L.Černič, ‘Responsibility 
for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ 3 Hanse Law 
Review 71-101 (2008); C.Hägg, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: A Critical Analysis’ 3 
Journal of Business Ethics 71-76 (1984); D.J.Plaine, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ 
11 Int'l L. 339 (1977); S.Tully, ‘The 2000 Review of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,’ 50 
ICLQ 394-404 (2001); B.H. Melgar, K.Nowrot & W.Yuan, ‘The 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Balanced Outcome or an Opportunity Missed?’ Institute of Economic Law 
Transnational Economic Law Research Center (TELC), School of Law Martin Luther University Halle-
Wittenberg, June 2011, http://telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/BeitraegeTWR/Heft112_0.pdf [last 
accessed 4.11.11].
107 See e.g. MacLeod (2007) note 103; MacLeod (2005) note 104; O.C.De Schutter,‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility European Style,’ 14 European Law Journal, 203–236 (2008); G.Roth & H.Fitz, ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility: European Models,’ 30 Hastings Law Journal 1433 (1978–1979); J.Wouters & 
N.Hachez, European Parliament Study, ‘Business and Human Rights in EU External Relations: Making the 
EU a Leader at Home and InternationallyEXPO/B/DROI/2009/2 PE407.014, April 2009 http://
ghumweb2.ghum.kuleuven.ac.be/ggs/publications/study_ep.pdf [last accessed 23.8.10]; Wouters & Chanet 
note 90; Wouters, J. & Hachez, N., ‘The EU’s international corporate social responsibility strategy: a 
business-driven, voluntary and process-oriented policy, (JESP Symposium: The European Union's global 
social role)’ 19 Journal of European Social Policy 2009 110-113 at 110;  A.Voiculescu, ‘The Other European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility: From the ‘Green Paper to New Uses of Human Rights 
Instruments,’ in McBarnet, D. Voiculescu, A. & Campbell, T., (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 365-396.  On 
the more specific issue of EU external trade relations see O.Amao, ‘Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and 
Multinational Corporations: The EU-ACP Context’ 32 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 379 (2009); 
K.K.Hermann, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development: The European Union 
Initiative as a Case Study,’ 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 205 (2004) (Student author).
The literature is predominantly critical of the institutional frameworks and does not locate 
the debate within an explicitly new governance paradigm which recognises that effective 
regulation can encompass both hard and soft law.108  Although there are some scholars who 
advocate a joined-up approach to regulation.  So, for example, Černič advocates a 
‘harmonic society,’ Amao a ‘global company law’ and Deva ‘an integrated theory of 
regulation.’109
This dissertation primarily involves an institutional analysis of the responses of the UN, 
OECD and EU to the issue of human rights violations by business actors.  It does not claim 
to be an exhaustive analysis of all possible international mechanisms for dealing with the 
problem, rather it focuses on initiatives which have been specifically established at the 
international and regional level to prevent further human rights abuses by business actors 
and to provide a measure of accountability.  The dissertation recognises many positive 
elements of these institutional responses, along with the negative, in contrast to earlier 
approaches, and argues that a hybrid approach to CSR regulation which incorporates hard 
and soft elements is the solution.  Thus the dissertation is rooted in new governance 
approaches to regulation.  It does not advocate an ‘either/or’ approach which is reflected in 
much of the literature, neither advocating a purely hard law regulatory response nor 
voluntarism.  
As is shown throughout this dissertation, business actors violate many different types of 
human rights in a wide variety of contexts and geographical locations.  There is little 
disagreement that this is the case or indeed that business actors ought not to be socially 
responsible.  The disagreements arises in relation to the form of regulation that ought to be 
implemented.  In an ideal world, States would would have attempted to regulate this 
wrongful behaviour from the top-down through domestic regulation.  State regulators in 
general are not, however, regulating the business and human rights sphere in any 
meaningful or consistent fashion.  Grassroots, bottom-up attempts to encourage observance 
of human rights standards as part of a socialisation process are progressing positively but at 
a glacial pace.  Waiting for corporate social responsibility to become an ‘internal 
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108 See generally Trubek & Trubek note 3; Conley & Williams note 3; Scott & Trubek note 3.
109 Černič (2011) note 85; Amao (2011) note 49; Deva (2012) note 85.
imperative’ will be a slow process and in the meantime business actors continue to violate 
human rights.
This is why a hybrid approach to regulation is necessary.  It implies both softer, bottom-up 
attempts at regulation and harder command-based legislation.  The hybrid approach 
advocated in this dissertation recognises that norm-internalisation is a desirable goal and 
actively supports many of the softer CSR initiatives, but it also recognises that in order to 
deal with rogue business actors, law backed by strong enforcement mechanisms are also 
essential.  There are many positive elements to the institutional responses analysed in this 
dissertation but it is clear that a stronger, more enforceable regulatory response is required 
and thus the hybrid approach is appropriate.
1.2 Creating a Better World for Merrill Lynch: The Rise and Rise of 
 Transnational Business
Compliance with host country law has been enough - indeed, often more than enough - to 
ask of the foreign investor.  For the corporation, the relationship with the citizenry 
became a matter of getting the best terms out of the employment contract.  The 
citizenry’s human rights were the government’s responsibility, not theirs.  
In short, the race to the bottom was on.110
As stated in the previous section, corporate social responsibility discourse can be traced 
back to the early 1930s debate between Professors Berle111 and Dodd112 originating in the 
Harvard Law Review and which resulted ultimately in the concession that corporations 
were required to ‘serve not alone the owners or the control, but all society’113 and that they 
performed a ‘social service as well as a profit-making function.’114  The debate is widely 
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the Concept of the Corporation’  64 Columbia L. Rev. 1458 (1964); K.Wedderburn, ‘The Social 
Responsibility of Companies’  15 Melbourne University Law Review 4-30 (1985) at 6.  For an overview of 
the background to and history of the debate see generally Harwell Wells note 34.
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113 Berle & Means note 49 at 312.
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viewed as having given rise to stakeholder theory 115 with Berle expressing his rather 
idealistic position thus:
Most students of corporate finance dream of a time when corporate administration 
will be held to a high degree of required responsibility –  a responsibility conceived 
not only in terms of stockholders’ rights, but in terms of economic government 
satisfying the respective needs of investors, workers, customers, and the aggregated 
community.116  
Dodd goes further stating that ‘the law has already reached the point…where it compels 
business enterprises to recognize to some extent the interests of other persons besides their 
owners’ and he concluded that ‘a sense of social responsibility toward employees, 
consumers, and the general public may thus come to be regarded as the appropriate attitude 
to be adopted by those who are engaged in business.’117  Thus we see the emergence of a 
corporate social responsibility paradigm and the identification of issues, such as the 
credibility of self-regulation, which are still being debated today:
It may well be that any substantial assumption of social responsibility by incorporated 
business through voluntary action on the part of its managers can not reasonably be 
expected.  Experience may indicate that corporate managers are so closely identified 
with profit-seeking capital that we must look to other agencies to safeguard the other 
interests involved, or that the competition of the socially irresponsible makes it 
impracticable for the more public-spirited managers to act as they would like to do, or 
that to expect managers to conduct an institution for the combined benefit of classes 
whose interests are largely conflicting is to impose upon them an impossible task and 
to endow them with dangerous powers.118
Berle and Dodd could little have imagined that the CSR debate would remain largely static 
and unresolved for the best part of a century. 
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While not as prolonged as the more general, conceptual debates around CSR issues, the 
specific problematic relationship between business and human rights has been on the 
international radar for decades.  Steven Ratner writes that:
Claims that various kinds of corporate activity have a detrimental impact on human 
welfare are at least as old as Marxism, and have always been a mantra of the political 
left worldwide.119
Arguably it was the Nuremberg Military Tribunal cases against the directors and other 
officers of IG Farben,120 Krupp121 and Flick122 (and the prosecution of various Nazi 
industrialists for war crimes and crimes against peace in the Roechling Case123) which first 
brought the correlation between business actors and human rights violations to public 
attention, although ultimately, international law was enforced against numerous officers of 
the companies rather than the businesses.124   Individual members of the Vorstand or 
managing board ranging from Chief Executive Officers, to accountants, legal counsel and 
others were accused in the IG Farben, Krupp and Flick cases of ‘acting through the 
instrumentality’ of the companies in order to commit variously, crimes of aggression, 
crimes against peace, spoilation and using forced labour.125  In other words, these 
individuals directly assisted the Nazis in the war effort, through the auspices of the 
companies.126  While some of the defendants had been members of the SS or held military 
offices, the key factor was that ‘all of the defendants held high positions in the financial, 
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120 IG Farben Case ( USA v. Carl Krauch et al. 1947-48) NMT Vol.7; In re Krauch and Others 15 Ann. Dig. 
668 (Case No.218) (1948) (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg) (hereinafter ‘IG Farben Case’). 
Twenty-four individuals were prosecuted.  See J.Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in 
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said’ 109 Columbia L. Rev. 1094 (2009).
121 Krupp Case (USA v. Alfred Krupp et al. 1947-48) NMT Vol.10; In re Krupp 15 Ann. Dig. 620 (Case No.) 
(1948) (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg).Twelve individuals were prosecuted.
122 Flick Case (USA v. Friedrich Flick et al. 1947) NMT Vol.5; In re Flick 14 Ann. Dig. 266 (Case No. 122) 
(1947), (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg).
123 The Case Against Hermann Roechling and Others, General Military Tribunal of the Military Government 
of the French Zone of Occupation in Germany, June 30, 1948; In re Roechling 15 Ann. Dig. 398 (Case No.) 
(1948)  For a digest of the case see W.W.Bishop Jr, ‘The Case Against Hermann Roechling and Others ‘43 
AJIL 191-193 (1949).
124 For overviews of the cases see e.g. R.Sasuly, IG Farben, (Boni and Gaer: New York, 1947); J.Barkin, The 
Crime and Punishment of IG Farben (Deutch: London, 1979).
125 IG Farben Case note 120 at 14.
126 Koh (2004) note 90 at 266 and Note 14.
industrial and economic life of Germany.’127  In IG Farben, Krupp and Flick the charges of 
crimes of aggression and crimes against peace were unsuccessful and the defendants found 
not guilty, however, many of the charges of spoilation and forced labour resulted in 
convictions.  Roechling was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against peace both in 
his capacity as Generalbeuftrager (Plenipotentiary General) and as President of the 
Reichsvereinigung Eisen (Reich Iron Association) and because of his seizure and 
‘rigorous’ control of the French steel industry.128 
Taking the inevitable criticisms of the Nuremberg Tribunals as retroactive justice and 
victors’ justice into account,129 these Nuremberg judgments ought not to be ignored.  At the 
very least, they point to an alternative approach to the issue given the subsequent inability 
of the international community to reach a consistent and coherent regulatory approach to 
human rights violations by business actors.  Individual responsibility for human rights 
violations committed by business actors will be revisited in the final chapter of this 
dissertation as a possible solution to the ongoing problems of regulatory capture 
highlighted in Chapters 3 to 6.   
Post-Nuremberg, however, it was not until the final decade of the twentieth century that the 
international community started to take the problems of human rights violations by 
business actors seriously.  During the 1970s, in the wake of the scandal of International 
Telephone and Telegraph’s involvement in Pinochet’s coup in Chile, both the UNCTC and 
the ILO became engaged in creating human standards for business via the draft Code of 
Conduct on TNCs130 and the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
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Law?’ 1 Int’l L. Q. 153 (1947); H.Weschler, ‘The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial’ 62 Poli. Sci. Q. 11 (1943); 
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130  ECOSOC Res. 1913 sets out the UNCTC’s Terms of Reference: E/Res/1913/LVII, 5 December 1974, 
UNCTC, CTC Reporter 1,  No.1 (December 1976) 3-4;  UNCTC, Proposed Text of the Draft Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 31 May 1990, UN Doc. E/1990/94 of 12 June 1990; see Sagafi-
nejad & Dunning ibid note 4 at 92.
Enterprises and Social Policy, respectively.131   Likewise ‘economic development 
agreements’ clearly defined the rights and duties of transnational business enterprises.132  
Nevertheless, as globalisation escalated apace throughout the 1980s and 1990s, businesses 
headquartered in the industrialised nations looked ever more to new markets for sales and 
cheaper production costs (so-called ‘bottom feeding’) as well as new territory to explore 
and exploit for natural resources.133  Consequently fewer legal duties were imposed on 
them by States anxious to attract inward investment.     
Developing nations became ‘host’ States, required to accept foreign direct investment 
(FDI) under the banner of ostensibly neutral concepts such as ‘structural adjustment’ and 
‘conditionality’ which were imposed by international financial institutions, for instance the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in order to reassure and ‘serve the 
interests of TNCs, banks and investors.’134  This economic liberalisation programme was 
propounded by the so-called Washington Consensus, a set of policies developed by 
economist John Williamson135 and advocated by the US, the IMF and World Bank, which 
regarded free-market capitalism as the only globally workable economic model and sought 
subsequently to implement, or arguably, impose it on the debt-laden developing world 
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134 Chomsky (1994) ibid at 178.  See also e.g. S.Tugelbayev, ‘Come and Exploit Us’ Far E. Econ. Rev.  25 
(1998); J.Bendall, ‘Barricades and Boardrooms: A Contemporary History of the Corporate Accountability 
Movement’ UNRISD Technology, Business and Society Programme Paper Number 13, June 2004 
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(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 85-112 at 88.  See also ‘What is the IMF?’ 1 June 2011 http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm [last accessed 28.8.11].
135 J.Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform,’ in J.Williamson, (ed.), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Chapter 2 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1990), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486 [last accessed 
20.8.11].
purportedly to enable States to ease their debt burden.136  In so doing, the Washington 
Consensus handed great power directly to private business actors.   As Chomsky puts it, 
the Consensus represented ‘an array of market oriented principles designed by the 
government of the US and the international institutions that it largely dominates’ whose 
‘principal architects…are the masters of the private economy, mainly huge 
corporations,’137 which drove developing countries into embracing the traditional capitalist 
economic dogma of low inflation, privatisation and trade liberalisation.  The policies are 
often summed up in the maxim ‘stabilize, privatize and liberalize.’138    Commonly these 
were attained (or at least attempted) through the infamous structural adjustment 
programmes whereby, in exchange for loans serviced by the IMF and World Bank, 
developing countries were structurally adjusted in a manner compatible with ‘laissez-faire 
capitalism.’139  Consequently host States:
adjusted domestic laws to make them more attractive to corporations, handed over 
tracts of land to de facto control by corporations, or simply turned a blind eye to 
violations of domestic law.140
Furthermore the Washington Consensus:
… privileged market forces, and the [World] Bank followed by promoting 
privatization programs that took the state out of health, education, and housing.  
Reduced social spending transferred resources to the private sector and, in some 
cases, the military.141
 
As the rights of transnational corporations and other business enterprises expanded thanks 
to self-styled free trade agreements such as GATT and NAFTA so too did their power and 
their ability to influence policy but many scholars have argued that ‘no corresponding 
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(1999)’) 19-40; Sornarajah note 33 at 25-30 and at 52.
137 Chomsky (1999) ibid at 20.
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World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform’  Vol. XLIV Journal of 
Economic Literature 973-987 (2006) at 973.
139 J.Pilger, Hidden Agendas, (London: Vintage, 1998 ) at 63.
140 Ratner note 62 at 460.
141 Shelton (2002) note 83 at 290.
obligations’ were imposed upon them.142  This was despite a shift on the part of the World 
Bank (but not the IMF) towards ‘social safety nets, human rights and the notion of good 
governance.’143  As Richard Falk puts it:
Neoliberalism, without the challenge of socialism, dispensed with pretensions that 
economic policy should take explicit account of the needs of people to the extent 
politically possible, and world capitalism showed its cruel face.144
Indeed in a bizarre twist, some business entities have themselves been able to claim the 
protection of human rights instruments.145  Examples of rights granted to legal persons, 
specifically companies, can be found in relation to claims brought under the Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 ‘right to property’ provision of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms146 which specifically provides that ‘[e]very natural or legal person 
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.’  This has been interpreted as 
protecting both a company as a legal entity, as well as its shareholders,  thus:
today the European Convention on Human Rights is seen more as an instrument that 
provides rights for corporations rather than one that lays down obligations for them, 
unless they are vested with state powers and/or are controlled by the state.147  
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recently expressed concern 
about the ‘existing imbalance in the scope of human rights protection between individuals 
and businesses’ noting that: 
While a company may bring a case before the Court claiming a violation by a state 
authority of its rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights...an 
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145 See generally Addo note 26.
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individual alleging a violation of his or her rights by a private company cannot 
effectively raise his or her claims before this jurisdiction.148
While the Parliamentary Assembly is keen to rectify this situation by putting in place 
regulatory mechanisms,149 nevertheless, such a quirk has one important and positive 
aspect, as Harold Koh points out, ‘[i]f corporations have rights under international law, by 
parity of reasoning, they must have duties as well.’150  
Notwithstanding this peculiarity of human rights law, as SGSR John Ruggie explains, 
business rights expanded in other arenas:
 In recent decades, especially the 1990s, global markets expanded significantly as a 
result of trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and domestic liberalization 
and privatization.  The rights of transnational corporations became more securely 
anchored in national laws and increasingly defended through compulsory arbitration 
before international tribunals.  Globalization has contributed to impressive poverty 
reduction in major emerging market countries and overall welfare on the 
industrialized world.  But it also imposes costs on people and communities – 
including corporate-related human rights abuses…151  
In a 2008 report ‘On the Margins of Profit,’ the Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice (CHRGJ) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) also recognise the positive impact of 
what they describe as the ‘widespread growth of commerce and the reach of business.’152   
The report, however, laments the fact that ‘human rights protections have lagged behind’ to 
the extent that ‘[t]here are no clear, common rules to prevent business-related human rights 
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Risk in the Global Economy,’ Volume 20, No.3(G), February 2008 http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/
bhr.pdf [last accessed 21.8.11] (hereinafter ‘On the Margins of Profit’) at 50.
abuses and provide adequate remedies and reparation when they occur.’153  The burden of 
this dissertation lies in proving that there ought to be such ‘common rules’ in both hard, 
soft and hybrid forms.  At present, no hard law exists and the soft rules have a limited 
effect.   
The right of access to global markets alluded to by Ruggie, CHRGJ and HRW, 
corresponded with some astonishing developments.154  For example, the Institute of Policy 
Studies determined that by the beginning of the twenty-first century, fifty-one ‘of the 100 
largest economies in the world’ were corporations and ‘only’ forty-nine were countries155 
and the situation could be summarised thus:
General Motors is now bigger than Denmark; DaimlerChrysler is bigger than Poland; 
Royal Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is bigger than Singapore; and Sony 
is bigger than Pakistan.156  
In addition, the number of TNCs  increased exponentially.  Approximately 7,000 TNCs 
could be identified in 1970,157 rising to 35,000 by 1990158 and 60,000 by 1999.159  
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2009 identifies ‘82,000 TNCs worldwide, with 
810,000 foreign affiliates in the world.’160  The foreign affiliates employ approximately 77 
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million people, a ‘fourfold’ increase ‘since 1982.’161  There has been a growth in 
internationalisation by the Top 100 TNCs (although this has slowed in light of the global 
economic crisis beginning in 2007) and this is also evident among the non-listed TNCs, the 
non-financial TNCs from developing nations and also those that are State-owned and 
family-owned.162  Increasing numbers of TNCs are headquartered in developing States163 
and there has been a steady increase in the number of State-owned TNCs.164
Alongside economic expansion and escalating commercial internationalisation came the 
recognition that globalisation was challenging the traditional Westphalian conception of 
the world.  While States continued to be key actors in the new world order they were no 
longer the sole actors.  Richard Falk acknowledges the continuing primacy of States but 
observes that ‘a sustainable world order in the future depends on some major structural and 
ideational innovations to protect an otherwise severely endangered global public interest in 
the years ahead.’165  Henkin notes, while recognising that ‘as a matter of law and as a 
matter of politics, states continue to remain responsible’ for transnational business 
activities, nevertheless, because ‘globalization occurs within and across the state system’ 
businesses operating across international borders are subject to international law and 
specifically international human rights law. 166  What appears to be a self-evident 
statement, is, in reality, incredibly contentious and gives rise to complex arguments about 
the nature and application of human rights obligations.
Chapter 1  Defining the Business and Human Rights Problem: Actors, History, Context! ! 49
161 World Investment Report 2009 ibid at 17.
162 World Investment Report 2009 ibid at18-19.
163 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low Carbon Economy (UN: New York, 2010), 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf [last accessed 21.8.11] at 17.
164 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and 
Development (UN: New York, 2011] http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf [last 
accessed 21.8.11] at 28:  ‘In 2010 there were at least 650 State-owned TNCs, with more than 8,500 foreign 
affiliates, operating around the globe. While this makes them a minority in the universe of all TNCs...they 
nevertheless constituted a significant number (19 companies) of the world’s 100 largest TNCs of 2010 (also 
in 2009), and, more especially, of the top 100 TNCs from developing and transition economies of 2009 (28 
companies).’ 
165 Falk note 144 at 58.
166 Henkin note 1 at 22.
1.3 The Rise of the Corporate Social Responsibility Agenda
Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when
it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?167
An increasingly globalized civil society is likely to respond to economic globalization by 
opposing liberalized trade and investment regimes that are not accompanied by 
accountability, transparency, public participation and respect for fundamental rights.168
Mounting dissatisfaction rooted in a ‘strong public distrust of the economic and political 
power of corporations’169 and in the prevalence of an economic system which appeared to 
be making ‘the world a better place for Merrill Lynch’170 together with increasing 
awareness of actual and potential human rights violations via ‘transnational issue 
networks,’171 led directly in the late 1980s and early 1990s172 to allegations, complaints, 
claims and counterclaims against business enterprises operating across a variety of 
sectors.173  Textile and clothing manufacturers faced a barrage of accusations regarding the 
use of sweatshops and child labour, while indigenous populations sought to challenge the 
unbounded influence of natural resource companies and their exploration and
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exploitation activities as inimical to their traditional ways of life.174  Still others were 
accused of wreaking environmental havoc, killing, maiming and inducing life-threatening 
illness in urban and rural settings alike.175 From the Bhophal disaster to Shell’s fraught 
relationship with the Ogoni people of Nigeria, abuses and causes were highlighted and 
supported by non-governmental organisations and became increasingly fuelled by popular 
campaigns and boycotts.176  These early, high-profile and popular crusades targeted, in 
particular, the extractive, textile and sportswear industries and provided the initial impetus 
for change.177  As Sir Geoffrey Chandler, founder-chair of the Amnesty International UK 
Business Group and a former Director of Shell International describes it:
It was the damaging experience of Shell and BP in Nigeria and Colombia respectively 
which proved the catalyst for a change of attitudes and provided a lesson about 
corporate responsibility which was reinforced by the experience of Nike and other 
major international brands with reputations to protect.178
Whereas the focus and preoccupation of the international community had always been on 
the failure of States to adhere to their human rights obligations, accelerating globalisation 
brought business activities into sharp relief.  Companies which had been able to operate in 
a multitude of overseas territories subject to little scrutiny, free from much regulatory 
constraint and with impunity, found themselves and their activities to be the focus of 
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inspection and analysis at a global level almost overnight.179  Or to put it another way, they 
became vulnerable to ‘brand tarnishing, to investor resistance, to shareholder resistance.’180 
This was not as a result of ‘corporate initiative’ rather it was ‘the result of reputational 
disaster.’181   NGOs and other ‘norm entrepreneurs’182 disseminated evidence of their 
wrongdoings, galvanising public opinion and stimulating media interest:183
Each day, allegations of human rights abuses make their way to the public through 
various channels.  Increasingly, companies are the subjects of these allegations.  
Whether through official reports or more informal means, various parties - NGOs, 
trade unions, States, media outlets, communities, shareholders and individuals - 
express concern over corporate-related human rights abuses.184  
Nevertheless this process is what Harold Koh and others regard as an important aspect of 
human rights enforcement in general and the first step in ‘norm-internalization’ or 
‘socialization.’185  By publicly and vocally drawing attention to human rights violations by 
business actors, civil society began the push towards ‘socialization’ ensuring compliance 
with an embryonic normative framework rooted in social responsibility.186
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182 Koh (1999) note 97 at 1409; Koh (1998) note 97 at 646.  
183 See generally, for example, On the Margins of Profit note 152.  See also the work of e.g. No Sweat http://
www.nosweat.org.uk/ [last accessed 22.8.11]; OXFAM Australia Nikewatch http:// www.oxfam.org.au/
explore/workers-rights/nike [last accessed 22.8.11]; CorpWatch http://www.corpwatch.org/ [last accessed 
22.8.];  http://www.globalwitness.org/ [last accessed 22.8.11].
184 Report of the Special-Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Addendum 2, Corporations and human rights: a 
survey of the scope and patterns of alleged corporate-related human rights abuse, A/HRC/8/5/ADD.2, 23 
May 2008 http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-2-addendum-23-May-2008.pdf  [last accessed 20.8.11] (hereinafter 
‘Ruggie survey’) at 8.
185 Koh (1999) note 97 at 1400.  See discussion infra at Section 1.1.2. See also Goodman & Jinks note 97: 
Koh (2005) note 97.  See also Slaughter (2000) note 99 at 242; Zerk note 83 at 94.
186 Zerk note 83 at 94.
As will be demonstrated in the next section, despite some arguably notable exceptions such 
as Body Shop International187 which trades on its ethical reputation and the Cooperative 
Bank188 which has ‘made a conscious decision to project...an ‘ethical identity,’189 the 
business community has tended to react to these claims, rather than being proactive,190 
regardless of the fact that the accusations cut across every sector and region.  
1.3.1 Typologies of How Business Actors Violate Human Rights
In 2008 SGSR Ruggie published ‘A Survey of the scope and patterns of alleged corporate-
related human rights abuses’ focusing on allegations ‘reported in the public domain 
between February 2005 and December 2007.’191  The survey ‘reviews 320 cases of alleged 
corporate-related human rights abuse’192 without ‘drawing any conclusions about the 
merits of the allegations’193 and categorises the rights impacted by business actors as either 
‘labour rights’ or ‘non-labour rights.‘  Drawing only on the International Bill of Rights and 
the core ILO conventions194 the survey sets out a rather narrow and specific set of rights 
impacted:
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189 J.M.T.Balmer, K.Fukukawa & E.R.Gray, ‘The Nature and Management of Ethical Corporate Identity: A 
Commentary on Corporate Identity, Corporate Social Responsibility and Ethics’ 76 Journal of Business 
Ethics 7-15(2007) at 7.
190 Parkinson, note 179 at 50.
191 Ruggie survey note 184 at 8.
192 Ibid at p.7 para.2.
193 Ibid at p.8 para.4.
194 Ibid at p.10 para.11: Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UNGA res. 217A (III), UN Doc.A/811 10th 
December 1948; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976;  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
Table 1 - SGSR Ruggie Survey
Labour rights impacted Non-labour rights 
impacted
Non-labour rights 
impacted (cont.)
Freedom of association Right to life, liberty and 
security of the person
Right to self-determination
Right to equal pay for equal 
work
Right of peaceful assembly Right to political life
Right to organize and 
participate in collective 
bargaining
Right to an adequate 
standard of living 
(including food, clothing, 
and housing)
Right to social security
Right to equality at work Freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment
Freedom of movement
Right to non-discrimination Right to marry and form a 
family
Right to privacy
Right to just and favourable 
remuneration
Right to physical and 
mental health; access to 
medical services
Abolition of slavery and 
forced labour
Equal recognition and 
protection under the law
Right to a safe work 
environment
Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion
Abolition of child labour Right to education
Right to rest and leisure Right to a fair trial
Right to work Right to hold opinions, 
freedom of information and 
expression
Right to family life Right to participate in 
cultural life, the benefits of 
scientific progress, and 
protection of authorial 
interests
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Despite its restrictions, the survey does acknowledge that a great many overlaps of impacts 
occurred, so frequently an alleged abuse was ‘not discrete’ and ‘often generated impact on 
multiple human rights.’195  
The survey differentiated between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ abuses and concluded that 59% of 
allegations related to direct abuse,196 that is where ‘the company’s own actions or 
omissions were alleged to cause the abuse’ and ‘there was either no degree or a very 
minimal degree of separation between company actions and alleged abuses.‘197  Indirect 
abuse arose in situations where  ‘the company was perceived to contribute to or benefit 
from the violations of third parties, including suppliers, States or arms of a State, and other 
business.’  These findings are significant given the subsequent emphasis on managing the 
supply chain in the UN Guiding Principles.198
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196 Ibid at p.16 fig.6.
197 Ibid at p.11 para.13.
198 Note 2.  See discussion at section 1.6.2 and sections 3.3-3.7.
Also in 2008, Human Rights Watch published its assessment of the impacts of business 
actors on human rights taking a different approach with seven categories of rights impacted 
drawn from a significantly broader list of ‘core international human rights instruments.’199  
Table 2 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice/Human Rights Watch 
Rights impacted Examples of how human rights are
 impacted by business actors
Right to security of the 
person
Ill-treatment of prisoners by US private contractors in 
detention facilities in Iraq; sexual abuse of workers in 
Saudi Arabia; beating of child workers in Egypt (p.10)
Economic and social rights Dumping of toxic waste affecting environment, health and 
livelihood in Cambodia; child workers having limited 
access to education El Salvador, Ecuador, US (p.18)
Civil and political rights Confiscation of identity papers in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the US; 
destruction and theft of property in South Africa; use of 
intimidation and force against local residents in Namibia, 
South Africa, Guatemala, Nigeria; harassment on the 
basis of sexual orientation; mandatory medical 
examinations (including HIV tests) (pp22-23)
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Discrimination (ICERD), adopted December 21, 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force January 4, 1969; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into 
force January 3, 1976; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 
1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, entered into force March 23, 1976; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), adopted December 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force September 3, 1981;  Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 
39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 
1987; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted November 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 
44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force September 2, 1990; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (CMW), adopted December 18, 1990, G.A. Res 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 
262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force July 1, 2003; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CPD), adopted December 13, 2006, G.A. Res. 61/611, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (2006), entered into 
force 3 May 2008;  International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(CED), adopted December 20, 2006, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/61/488 (2006), entered into force 23 
Decemeber 2010.
Rights impacted Examples of how human rights are
 impacted by business actors
Non-discrimination Favouring of one ethnic groups by employers in DRC; 
mistreatment of migrant workers; gender discrimination; 
HIV-status discrimination; sexual orientation 
discrimination (p.28)
Labor rights Children used to carry out dangerous agricultural work in 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, and South Africa in 
violation of international standards; forced labour and 
debt bondage; human trafficking; wage exploitation 
(p.34)
Rights of communities or 
groups, including 
indigenous peoples 
Profiting from relocation of indigenous groups in 
Indonesia and Tibet; forcible evictions (pp39-40)
Right to an effective 
remedy and accountability
Bribery in Cambodia; failure to prosecute sex-traffickers 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in Guatemala, regulations 
governing the actions of private security forces have not 
been enforced, allowing abuses to be carried out with 
impunity (pp46-47)
The authors make clear that the list was not intended to create a hierarchy or ‘rigid 
division‘ between the rights nor does it preclude overlap, rather ‘the clustering of rights 
under these categories is intended to facilitate an overview of the broad range of rights that 
are impacted by business activity.’200  Interestingly, the right to an effective remedy and 
accountability is omitted from SGSR Ruggie’s survey which is curious given his Protect, 
Respect, Remedy agenda.  Moreover, in general, these two surveys illustrate that there is a 
clear difference in typology which has obvious repercussions for establishing a regulatory 
framework.201
In terms of sector, the SGSR Ruggie survey concluded that while most allegations of 
human rights abuse were made against businesses operating in the extractive and retail 
industries, 28% and 21% respectively, there were also a significant number of complaints 
against businesses in other sectors e.g. pharmaceutical and chemical (12%), infrastructure 
Chapter 1  Defining the Business and Human Rights Problem: Actors, History, Context! ! 57
200 On the Margins of Profit note 152 at 7.
201 See e.g. the difference in approach between the UN Norms, note 7 and the UN Guiding Principles, note 2 
discussed infra at 1.6.2.
and utilities (9%), financial services (8%).202  While the survey also identified that the 
complaints emanated predominantly from the developing world, specifically Asia and the 
Pacific (28%), Africa (22%) and Latin America (18%), 3% of allegations related to Europe 
and 7% to North America.203 Furthermore, some 15% of allegations related to ‘global’ 
activities, that is ‘where is it was alleged that a company action impacted rights in two or 
more regions simultaneously.’204  This last statistic in particular, lends support to the 
assertion by Human Rights Watch that it is misleading to assume that human rights abuses 
are ‘highly segmented and limited to a few sectors’ and therefore incapable of happening 
on a global level.205  Quite clearly they do occur on a global level.
1.4 The Business Response to the New CSR Paradigm
...the great industrial managers, their bankers and still more the men 
composing their silent ‘control,’ function today more as princes and ministers
 than as promoters or merchants.206
Of course, despite Berle and Dodd’s early twentieth century conclusions about the social 
obligations of corporations, in reality, and as famously pronounced by Milton Friedman, 
making a profit for shareholders had become the sole purpose of companies by the end of 
the millennium.207  Any shift towards a CSR paradigm which challenged this status quo 
was not welcomed by the business community on the whole.  The  proponents of the 
liberal economic theory driving globalisation were particularly opposed to any 
refashioning of corporate duties.208  Change would inevitably lessen market control and 
increase the likelihood of regulatory capture, according to Hayek:
So long as the management has the one overriding duty of administering the resources 
under its control as trustees of the shareholders and for their benefit, its hands are 
largely tied; and it will have no arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular 
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interest.   But once the management of a big enterprise is regarded as not only entitled 
but even obliged to consider in its decisions whatever is regarded as the public or 
social interest, or to support good causes and generally to act for the public benefit, it 
gains indeed an uncontrollable power – a power which would inevitably be made the 
subject of increasing public control.209   
What Hayek fails to acknowledge is that the ‘uncontrollable power’ of TNCs was already 
being exercised without concomitant ‘public control.’  Unsurprisingly, the business 
community and its representatives resisted calls for any form of regulation arguing that 
social responsibility was outside the remit of business and amounted to unwarranted 
interference in the private sector.  In particular, they argued that human rights obligations 
and their development did not pertain to private business actors, rather they were the sole 
preserve of the State.  It was not for business ‘to act as moral arbiters.’210  This view is 
reflected widely in responses to a variety of CSR initiatives.  For example the International 
Organisation of Employers in its submission to the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR) regarding the UN Norms project stated that ‘developing and applying 
international human rights is an issue for states alone.’211  In a similar vein, the US 
submission to the UNHCHR asserted that the attempt to impose human rights obligations 
on business was ‘dangerous shifting’ responsibility from States to private actors.212
Nevertheless, as claims of human rights abuses occurred with increasing frequency, 
different conceptions of the corporation,  as well as business obligations, came to the fore.  
John Parkinson describes an alternative business model:
…the organisational view regards companies as social institutions with characteristics 
determined by public policy enshrined in law and whose legitimacy depends on their 
contribution to the public good. The state has a corresponding right to redefine 
relationships within companies and with outsiders to ensure that an appropriate 
conception of the public interest is served.213       
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It is this understanding of the role of business actors that underpins the calls for binding 
CSR rules, but it is one that is only partially fulfilled.  As will be demonstrated, the notion 
of social responsibility has gained grudging acceptance within the business community but 
the imposition of  State regulation is opposed vociferously.
In the earliest days of CSR, the meagre reaction of the business community to these new 
challenges to its commercial operations only served to infuriate and frustrate civil society.  
Traditional corporate philanthropic gestures and out of court settlements merely added to 
the belief that business operated outside of regulatory frameworks.  For example, in June 
2009 when Shell made a ‘humanitarian gesture’ by setting up a trust fund to benefit the 
Ogoni people of Nigeria its action was met with a mixed response because it was part of an 
out of court settlement to the Ogoni claimants and potentially damaging legal proceedings 
in the US courts were dropped as a result.214  Shell did not accept any responsibility for the 
human rights violations that had taken place.  Chevron Texaco received even greater 
criticism for its remediation programme in the Ecuadorean Oriente region.  Over several 
decades, the Ecuadorean government chose to take no action when confronted with human 
rights abuses perpetrated by Texaco against the indigenous peoples of the  
environmentally-sensitive Oriente.215 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
reported on the situation and concluded that the Republic of Ecuador itself had violated 
human rights standards by failing to adequately control the activities of oil companies 
within its territory.  It considered that:
…the absence of regulation, inappropriate regulation or a lack of supervision in the 
application of extant norms may create serious problems with respect to the 
environment which translate into violations of human rights protected by the 
American Convention.216
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It was also extremely critical of the oil firms themselves and their use of sub-standard 
technology which led to the discharge of oil onto the land and into the waterways of the 
Oriente as well as the release of harmful toxic waste via waste pits and flaring.217  
Eventually, after several unsuccessful class actions brought, over several years, in New 
York State under the Alien Tort Claims Act.218 Texaco undertook to remediate the affected 
land to the value of US $40 million but this has been deemed inadequate by the indigenous 
population and NGOs and there is an ongoing campaign to try to force the company to 
increase the payout anywhere up to US $27 billion.219
Humanitarian undertakings, such as contributing to or even building infrastructure such as 
roads, schools and medical facilities, came to be viewed suspiciously in a post-Enron 
world.220  Energy trader Enron had engaged in generous external corporate philanthropy 
throughout its existence but failed to take care of the interests of its employees and pension 
holders, large numbers of whom suffered severe financial loss when the company failed 
due to large scale fraud.  More than that, post-Enron, business philanthropy was deemed 
insufficient, despite its long history.221  The advent of CSR meant that ‘doing good’ was no 
longer adequate, the new paradigm demanded that a business ‘do no harm‘ to the people it 
employed and to the communities it encountered in its commercial operations.  
Nonetheless, the international legal system continued to offer no redress or remedy and in 
the absence of domestic regulatory frameworks, home States, almost invariably, were not 
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in a position to address claims arising from the extraterritorial activities of business 
enterprises domiciled in their territory.  By rolling back State power and demanding the 
furtherance of private interests, globalisation rendered many States simply unable, or 
indeed unwilling, to implement or enforce human rights standards.  Such failings on the 
part of a host State are not an unusual occurrence and highlight the complexities of a 
problem where a State and a commercial actor are in the wrong.222  As highlighted  
previously, the drive to create ‘a hospitable investment environment’223 left many 
developing nations at the mercy of the IMF and World Bank and their demands to stabilize, 
privatize and liberalize their economies.  
In the face of bad publicity, reputational damage and most importantly the fear of loss of 
profits as a result of boycotts,224 business had to be seen to be doing something and so the 
commercial response was to default to self-regulation.  Myriads of voluntary codes of 
conduct were devised which set out the human rights standards and principles by which 
each business enterprise agreed to abide.225  They appeared on corporate websites and in 
corporate literature, disparate in style and in content from one business to the next, and 
referring inter alia to human rights standards, humanitarian law, labour standards and 
environmental principles in a disordered fashion.226  Industry groupings sought to bring a 
measure of coherence to code of conduct mania by attempting to coalesce particular 
industries and sectors under one set of principles with success limited to a few sectors.227  
Notwithstanding the ad hoc approach, some of the initiatives are well regarded and 
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reasonably successful.  For example, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control.228 Likewise, the Kimberley Process (KP)229 which emanated from UN General 
Assembly Resolution 55/56230 has been deemed largely a success in a few short years since 
its inception231 although regrettably that perception is changing.
Beginning in 2000, the KP has sought, through the use of a Certification Scheme, to 
eliminate the exploitation of so-called ‘blood’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds mined in conflict 
zones.  Trading in conflict diamonds perpetuated wars, stifled development and contributed 
to extensive human rights violations in countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  The UN Security Council responded with numerous 
resolutions attempting to stem the trade in conflict diamonds. 232  Today it is calculated that 
less than 1% of diamonds traded on the international market are conflict diamonds, 
‘compared to estimates of up to 15% in the 1990s’ and the KP has ‘helped stabilise fragile 
countries and supported their development.’  Even so, some commentators take the view 
that the KP lacks ‘proper enforcement’ which limits its effectiveness because of the 
reliance on individual States to monitor compliance with the Certification Scheme.233  
Nonetheless, the KP has strived to address these weaknesses and it is evident that it has 
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achieved much during its brief existence.234  Unfortunately the successes are now being 
offset by the ongoing failure to address various problems of non-compliance, in particular 
in relation to Zimbabwe.  This has caused great dissatisfaction among NGOs, leading to 
disengagement with the KP on the grounds that ‘there is a significant, and widening, gap 
between how the Kimberley Process presents itself, and what it is actually achieving.’235 
Overall, however, such voluntary strategies were perceived by many as mere sticking 
plasters and did little to stem the tide of corporate misbehaviour because they did not act as 
a deterrent, nor did they offer redress or remedies for human rights violations.  Indeed they 
served only to encourage further accusations of ‘whitewashing’ and ‘greenwashing’ 
blending into a veritable finger pointing rainbow of ‘bluewashing’ and ‘redwashing’ and 
ultimately the less colourful ‘CSR-washing.’  Put simply, the terms refer to business actors 
which implement codes of conduct or participate in voluntary CSR schemes for public 
relations and marketing purposes as opposed to more altruistic reasons.  ‘Greenwashing’ is 
defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the creation or propagation of an unfounded 
or misleading environmentalist image’ while ‘bluewashing‘ refers to businesses which seek 
to become involved with UN bodies and CSR projects such as the UN Global Compact in 
order to project a positive CSR image and possibly to exercise influence within the UN.236  
As the not-for-profit CorpWatch explains in blunt terms:
When the Secretary-General of the United Nations joins the heads of such 
corporations on the podium, or when a UN agency joins such companies in a joint 
venture, a disturbing message is sent to the public.  As the UNDP guidelines put it, 
when a UN agency ‘is engaged in a public relations activity within the  framework of 
a corporate relationship, a mutual image transfer inevitable takes place.  This is 
especially true in the era of corporate branding. With the image transfer, the UN's 
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positive image is vulnerable to being sullied by corporate criminals, while companies 
get a chance to ‘bluewash’ their image by wrapping themselves in the flag of the 
United Nations.237
Finally, ‘redwashing’ is an emerging and less common term used to describe situations of 
philanthropy where the businesses donating to charitable causes take ‘too much credit for 
their social contributions’ and get ‘more bang out of their social marketing buck than the 
charities.’238  Conley and Williams in their helpful empirical study of the CSR movement 
describe the problem thus:
An initial observation is that the very existence of a coherent CSR movement may 
invite insincerity.  A company could learn the culturally appropriate behaviors and 
participate in the CSR discourse without significantly changing their real world 
behavior.  In this view, CSR participation is little more than a show of voluntary 
reform intended to head off government mandates, preempt NGO attacks, and succor 
favor with the minority of CSR-conscious consumers.239   
They conclude that ‘at least some skepticism is warranted‘ when it comes to examining the 
motives of business’ involvement with CSR models240 and there is no evidence to suggest 
that anything has changed in the intervening years since their 2005 study.
As public awareness of commercial exploitation increased, the demands for truly 
responsible business models soared and so the CSR movement was born.  Far from being 
an easy birth, the CSR movement has had to wrestle with numerous problems, not least 
conflicting definitions of key concepts.  Fundamental disagreements arose between 
stakeholders i.e. States, business actors, international organisations, NGOs, trade unions 
and other members of civil society in relation to the nature, form and scope of any 
obligations as well as enforcement, redress and remedies..  The next section addresses the 
key problems and disagreements and explains why a binding global framework must 
operate in tandem with local and regional soft law initiatives to provide a solution.
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1.5 Is An International Legal Response Necessary?
1.5.1 The issue of extraterritoriality
Even if it is agreed that commercial actors do have social responsibilities, specifically 
human rights obligations, extraterritoriality presents a major stumbling block to  
accountability.   As highlighted, accelerating globalisation by its very nature led to a huge 
expansion in transnational or crossborder business activities.241  Developing countries were 
encouraged or required to become investor-friendly environments, creating regulatory and 
tax frameworks advantageous to business, in line with the prevailing liberal economic 
theory.242   In the dash to be the most business-friendly host nation, human rights (and 
environmental) obligations were frequently ignored.243  Businesses, invariably from the 
industrialised north, engaged in a ‘race to the bottom‘ or ‘bottom-feeding‘ in order to profit 
from the inevitably cheaper labour and operating conditions, as well as lax regulatory 
frameworks.244  Modern day forum shopping, in other words.  This convergence created 
conditions whereby human rights abuses could occur with impunity.
Typically, the business would be headquartered in a northern, industrialised home State and 
operate a locally-incorporated subsidiary in a host developing State.  Frequently, the legal 
requirement of local incorporation was the mechanism utilised by developing countries to 
maintain a measure of control over natural resources, for example, or perhaps to impose a 
modicum of corporation tax.245  Alternatively, the home State business entity would use 
locally-based suppliers in the host State.  Thus two separate but interrelated issues arise.  
The transnational nature of the commercial activity seems to raise questions of legal 
jurisdiction but conversely, local incorporation of a legal person, i.e. a corporation, means 
that national jurisdiction has precedence.246       
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Corporations have the nationality of the place of incorporation.
Quite clearly, corporate entities incorporated in a host State are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the local courts and legal system, as are any other business entities domiciled there.  In 
such circumstances, local law applies but all too often the courts are unable or unwilling to 
uphold human rights standards.247  Denied a remedy in such situations, some victims have 
sought redress in the courts of the home State where a parent company or contractor is 
based.248  Often the courts of home States will not, or are at least reluctant to, interfere with 
another State’s internal sovereignty by declaring jurisdiction over a claim and decline 
jurisdiction on the grounds of forum non conveniens and comity.249  
Added to this, an absence of any international legal means of holding the commercial 
perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable or responsible, means that the victims are 
left without redress or remedy.  It is this injustice that drove the CSR movement, most of 
all the demands for legally binding international regulation.  Despite various international 
initiatives, it is generally acknowledged that a global instrument remains improbable.  
Nevertheless, in a recent report, the tone of the UK’s Joint Committee on Human Rights 
was bleak but not without hope:
An international agreement on business and human rights is unlikely in the near 
future.  However, the impact of business on rights is a global issue that ultimately 
requires a global solution.  We are concerned that reluctance by states to take 
unilateral action coupled with failure to commit to an international solution will mean 
that little progress is made.  We believe that an international solution should be the 
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ultimate aspiration of any debate on business and human rights. There is considerable 
scope for joint working on a regional and globally to agree a consistent approach to 
business and human rights.  We recommend that the Government develops such joint-
working programmes.250
This dissertation will justify the need for a coherent global solution, together with local 
action, by explaining how the existing international and regional business and human 
rights initiatives are inadequate as well as explaining why the traditional vertical 
conception of human rights, i.e. enforceable only against States, is no longer applicable.  
1.5.2 The issue of voluntarism or the ‘business case.’
As the examples of human rights violations by business actors proliferated, the regulatory 
debate raged with stakeholders falling into two distinct, and now familiar, irreconcilable 
factions.251  On the one hand, the ‘business case’ sought to minimise regulatory attempts 
and advocated pure self-regulation via voluntary codes of conduct and industry-based 
schemes.252  Voluntarism is predicated on the idea of the business case for CSR253 and in 
the words of Olivier De Schutter it is ‘at first impression highly convincing’ as an 
argument.254  The business case proceeds from the assumption that adherence to CSR 
standards makes good business sense.  Put simply, the argument is that CSR is 
economically advantageous for business, and in particular that consumers will favour 
companies which act in an ethically responsible manner. Firms that act consistently with 
CSR standards will not lose competitiveness. Rather they may actually enhance their 
competitive position through improvements to their image and thus their marketing 
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prospects.  De Schutter writes that there is an inherent danger in linking good corporate 
behaviour to ‘economic returns.’255  He concludes that such an approach fails to 
acknowledge that CSR may not be profitable and that by encouraging firms to comply with 
CSR standards because it is commercially advantageous may in fact implicitly permit non-
compliance or implementation when it becomes apparent that CSR actually increases 
costs.256  He further argues that the business case for voluntarism is ‘fragile’ because it 
depends on a  competing number of factors such as the initiatives adopted by a business, 
the costs of implementation, impact and context.257  Finally he warns that adherence to the 
business case:
serves to create the impression that the development of CSR will make natural 
progress, in a sort of evolutionary growth driven by market mechanisms, without such 
progress having to be encouraged or artificially produced by an intervention of public 
authorities. There is a very thin line between the idea that ‘CSR is profitable for 
business’ and the idea that ‘CSR may take care of itself’. This consequence should be 
avoided at all costs.258
Those who argue for a voluntarism-based approach to CSR therefore need to respond to 
the following question: if CSR does in fact enhance competitiveness, then why does 
business choose voluntary measures only? What does business have to fear from non-
voluntary measures? There are a variety of potential commercial reasons for a business 
case response.
Aside from what appears to be a generalized distaste for regulation,259 it seems that there is 
also a perception that imposed CSR will be more expensive in terms of production costs 
such as wages and employee benefits, and administration. The argument is that this extra 
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expense will affect the competitiveness of corporations in the global marketplace. Such 
perceptions are linked to a neo-liberal, laissez faire attitude to commercial activities, that 
is, the view that the market is the most efficient mechanism to dictate how business 
operates. Only minimal regulation, as necessary to correct the standard ‘market failures’, is 
therefore necessary or appropriate.  Wouters and Chanet explain the decision thus:
Proponents of the ‘business case’ explain that corporations are financially rewarded 
for behaving responsibly in various ways.  They argue that not only consumers, but 
also investors and even workers attach importance to corporations’ human rights 
records and have a clear preference for responsible businesses.  Thus, the market itself 
acts as an important and sufficient incentive for corporations to take human rights into 
account, since responsible behavior leads to higher profits.  This assumption leads 
them to conclude that a voluntary approach to corporate responsibility is sufficient.260
This is a position espoused historically by the majority of States 261 although the empirical 
evidence supporting it is weak.262   As David Vogel points out, ‘companies will engage in 
CSR only to the extent that it makes business sense for them to do so’ but it only makes 
good business sense ‘if the  costs of the more virtuous behaviour remain modest.’263  He 
concludes that ‘the market for virtue is not sufficiently important to make it in the interest 
of all firms to behave more responsibly.’264  In other words, there will always be some 
business actors which choose to ignore societal pressures to behave in a socially 
responsible manner.265  Nevertheless, there will also be what John Parkinson calls 
‘enlightened’ business actors which see the wider and inherent benefits of ethical 
behaviour irrespective of the economic impact:
Enlightened companies will recognise that responsible behaviour is often a 
prerequisite for long-term profitability, but ethically and socially desirable conduct 
Chapter 1  Defining the Business and Human Rights Problem: Actors, History, Context! ! 70
260 Wouters & Chanet note 90 at 266-267 para 12.
261 See the State responses to the Norms cited at note 259.  Although many States objected to the perceived 
ultra vires activities of the Sub-Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, most were 
concerned about the idea that business  enterprises would become objects of international law. 
262 See e.g. D.McBarnet,‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law: The New 
Corporate Accountability’ (hereinafter ‘McBarnet’), in D.McBarnet, A.Voiculescu & T.Campbell, (eds), The 
New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 9- 56.  Also available as an Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3/2008.
263 Vogel note 65 at 4.
264 Vogel ibid at 16.
265 See for example Afrimex (UK) Limited discussed in detail in Chapter 5 at Section 5.6.;  Final Statement 
by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) 
Ltd, 28 August 2008, URN 08/1209 (Afrimex Final Statement) http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-
sectors/low-carbon-business-opportunities/sustainable-development/corporate-responsibility/uk-ncp-oecd-
guidelines/cases/final-statements [last accessed 22.8.11].
should not be seen merely as a means of promoting competitive success.  Rather 
managers should regard ethical and social values as possessing independent weight, 
and should accept that respect for them will sometimes require companies to make 
less than the maximum possible profits.266
These ‘enlightened’ companies fall within Thomas McInerney’s Group A or Group B 
categories of business actors.267  He writes:
Many regulatory scholars recognize that there are four types of companies with which 
regulators have to deal.  These four types include: those who know the law and are 
willing to follow it (Group A); those who do not know the law but would like to be 
law abiding (Group B); those who know the law and do not want to follow it (Group 
C); and those who do not know the law and do not wish to be law abiding (Group D).  
Most CSR literature does not even reflect these basics.  As this analysis suggests, 
Group A firms are willing to comply on intrinsic grounds.268
The logical conclusion, therefore is that a voluntary CSR framework is effective only in 
relation to the already enlightened, for as McInerney surmises ‘it seems that it is precisely 
Group A that represents its greatest source of support.‘269  He continues plaintively, 
‘[s]urely CSR must be more ambitious than seeking to ensure that the good continue to be 
good?’270
This is the crux of the matter.  The businesses which operate with the most flagrant 
disregard for human rights standards will never adhere to a voluntary framework and this 
is the key reason for opposing the business case for self-regulation.  Rogue business 
elements operating across the globe serve to underline the pressing need for a binding 
international legal architecture.  Voluntary CSR and ‘market forces’ will never be ‘strong 
enough’ to secure responsible behaviour by such actors ‘over and above their obligation to 
comply with their legal obligations.’271
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Furthermore, while a large majority of consumers claim that they would choose ethical 
products despite the extra expense or boycott businesses which violate human rights, the 
reality is very different.272  Wouters and Chanet argue rightly:
The idea that good responsible behaviour leads to increased profits may be a good 
incentive for  corporations to act responsibly, but it should never be seen as the 
ultimate reason for responsible behaviour.  Corporations have to behave responsibly 
because it is their duty to do so, not because it helps them to make more profits.273
They agree with the principal thrust of this dissertation, declaring that the ‘business case 
does not suffice’ and that ‘an appropriate regulatory framework is needed.’274    
Such a view was adopted by a group composed largely of NGOs, trade unions and other 
members of civil society which oppose the purely voluntary, market-driven business case 
for CSR.  Rather, they demand hard regulation and nothing less than a full blown 
international covenant will suffice.275  As the UN Development Programme (UNDP) put it 
in 1999:
...multinational corporations are too important and too dominant a part of the global 
economy for voluntary codes to be enough.  Globally agreed principles and policies 
are needed...276
This binary division muddied the waters for many years as supporters of each approach 
extolled the virtues of their favoured methodology: this ultimately resulted in stalemate.277   
The tension played out subsequently in every international organisation in which there has 
been a debate about CSR, with the so-called ‘business case’ for voluntarism prevailing.  
Thus, the UN Global Compact (a forum for business leaders), the OECD and the European 
Union analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively continue to emphasize the voluntary 
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nature of CSR.  As a result no enforceable regulatory or dispute settlement mechanism has 
developed.  
These definitional problems continue to this day as there is no one favoured definition of 
CSR, with stakeholders adopting positions which in some cases remain poles apart.278  At a 
basic level CSR has become a term of art which symbolises that all businesses have 
obligations beyond the financial and commercial and which includes social obligations, 
particularly in the spheres of human rights and the environment but there is no consensus 
as to how these obligations are to be imposed, whether they ought to act as a deterrent or 
indeed whether they ought to provide redress for those on the receiving end of business 
misconduct.  States for the most part have consistently resisted a hard regulatory CSR 
framework and thus with clear institutional support, the term CSR has come to represent 
voluntarism.  As this dissertation will demonstrate, such an approach is inconsistent with 
effective CSR largely because it enables too many businesses to escape regulatory capture.  
1.6 State and Institutional Responses to Business and Human Rights
1.6.1 State responses
While civil society demands for enforceable CSR standards gathered pace and support, 
some politicians and even States looked to national measures to regulate the extraterritorial 
behaviour of corporate nationals.  Some states responded by implementing mandatory 
social reporting for companies.279  Others found existing domestic legal provisions being 
used in new and creative ways which resulted in some odd bedfellows and a ‘battle’ for 
Harold Koh’s previously mentioned concept of ‘internalization’ of international human 
rights.280  For example, no one could have imagined that the anonymous and arguably 
derelict eighteenth century US Alien Tort Statute (ATS) would have been at the forefront of 
federal court challenges to US business misbehaviour overseas, albeit that these were 
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largely unsuccessful challenges due to the propensity of forum non conveniens 
dismissals.281  US courts have required that there be a sufficient ‘link to state action to 
justify considering it [the business] to be acting for or with the state’282 thus the ATS 
appears to apply only in situations of business complicity in human rights abuses.283  A 
recent Appeals Court decision in 2010, however, took a stricter view and in a surprising 
judgment in Kiobel et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company et al, the court concluded 
that:
corporate liability is not a norm that we can recognize and apply in actions under the 
ATS because the customary international law of human rights does not impose any 
form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).284  
This is a regressive decision and according to Judge Leval ‘[t]he majority’s rule conflicts 
with two centuries of federal precedent on the ATS, and deals a blow to the efforts of 
international law to protect human rights.’285  In October 2011, however, the US Supreme 
Court agreed to hear an appeal against the decision of the Second Circuit and the outcome 
is eagerly awaited.286  It seems clear that if the Supreme Court upholds the decision then 
the potential role of the ATS as a means of redress will end.
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In England, the law of torts was applied effectively to the activities of companies operating 
in southern Africa.287  Such national endeavours are limited in range, lack a critical mass of 
substantive success288 and in any event are outside the scope of this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, these particular limited precedents and their limited ability to act as a 
deterrent or provide redress merely serves to underscore the need for a normative 
international approach to CSR.       
1.6.2 Institutional responses: the UN
International and other supranational organisations responded slowly to the calls from civil 
society for the implementation of global CSR standards and their numerous and diverse 
attempts to render corporate actors liable for human rights violations have ended either in 
ignominy and failure or in widely accepted resignation as to their limitations to act as 
deterrents or to offer redress for human rights violations.  From early attempts by the 
UNCTC which operated in the environment of the New International Economic Order289 to 
more recent endeavours in the shape of the UN Global Compact and the UN Norms,290 it 
has been obvious that the international community is unable to agree upon a coherent CSR 
methodology. 
This chaotic and disparate state of affairs was deemed unsatisfactory by UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan and in 2005 he appointed Professor John Ruggie of Harvard 
University as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights with a mandate to identify the issues and to come up with some solutions.291  
Ruggie was granted an initial two year mandate292 by the Commission on Human Rights 
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292 Ibid.
which was extended by one year293 in order to enable him to complete the final report 
under that mandate and he was granted a further three year mandate in 2008.294  In 2008 in 
Ruggie’s final report under his 2005 mandate, he describes the problem thus:
The business and human rights debate currently lacks an authoritative focal point. 
Claims and counter-claims proliferate, initiatives abound, and yet no effort reaches 
significant scale. Amid this confusing mix, laggards - States as well as companies - 
continue to fly below the radar.295
The report also unveiled the benchmark standard of ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ which 
pinpointed the three principles that ought to apply in regulating corporate behaviour.  This 
encompassed several important ideas.  Significantly the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
agenda recognised that the primary duty to protect human rights rests with States but that 
business does have a ‘baseline’296 responsibility to respect human rights and, perhaps most 
crucially, that there is a requirement to establish an adequate and appropriate remedy for 
any human rights abuses which fulfill the dual functions of punishment and redress.297  
According to Ruggie these three principles together ‘form a complementary whole in that 
each supports the others in achieving sustainable progress.’298  
  
Aiming to provide a CSR focal point and implement the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
agenda, the 2008 Special-Representative mandate conferred by the Human Rights Council 
specifically authorised Ruggie ‘to identify, exchange and promote best practices and 
lessons learned’ in the field of CSR and to consult with ‘international and regional 
organizations,’ among others, on CSR issues.299  The SGSR was mandated to:  
(a)To provide views and concrete and practical recommendations on ways to 
strengthen the fulfilment of the duty of the State to protect all human rights from 
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abuses by or involving transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
including through international cooperation; 
(b) To elaborate further on the scope and content of the corporate responsibility to 
respect all human rights and to provide concrete guidance to business and other 
stakeholders; 
(c) To explore options and make recommendations, at the national, regional and 
international level, for enhancing access to effective remedies available to those 
whose human rights are impacted by corporate activities; 
(d)To integrate a gender perspective throughout his work and to give special 
attention to persons belonging to vulnerable groups, in particular children;
(e) Identify, exchange and promote best practices and lessons learned on the issue 
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, in coordination with 
the efforts of the human rights working group of the Global Compact; 
(f)To work in close coordination with United Nations and other relevant 
international bodies, offices, departments and specialized agencies, and in 
particular with other special procedures of the Council; 
(g) To promote the framework and to continue to consult on the issues covered by 
the mandate on an ongoing basis with all stakeholders, including States, national 
human rights institutions, international and regional organizations, transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, and civil society, including academics, 
employers’ organizations, workers’ organizations, indigenous and other affected 
communities and non-governmental organizations, including through joint 
meetings; 
(h) To report annually to the Council and the General Assembly.
Obviously these duties were to be carried out while taking account of the underlying 
principles of ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy,’ namely that the primary duty of the State is to 
protect citizens from human rights abuses, that the responsibility incumbent upon business 
is to respect human rights (essentially to ‘do no harm’)300 and that the necessity of ensuring 
access to adequate remedies for those who have suffered human rights violations at the 
hands of business is paramount.  Businesses must exercise ‘due diligence’ when carrying 
out commercial activities to ensure that human rights requirements are met, furthermore, 
this due diligence requirement extends to the supply chain.301  Ruggie defines due 
diligence as:
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...a process whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws but 
also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it. The scope of 
human rights-related due diligence is determined by the context in which a company 
is operating, its activities, and the relationships associated with those activities.302
So there were two clear strands to Ruggie’s proposals, firstly preventing human rights 
abuses  by business actors and secondly, ensuring that the victims of such abuses have 
effective access to redress.  Undoubtedly the provision of effective remedies for human 
rights violations by business is the area most in need of serious attention and in the opinion 
of Ruggie is seriously ‘underdeveloped’ ‘patchwork’ and ‘flawed’ and can only be 
satisfactorily addressed by combining the three principles.303  In order to address this 
inchoate state of affairs Ruggie has outlined the minimum elements required for an 
effective remedy, clearly drawing on established human rights discourse.304  An effective 
remedy should be ‘legitimate,’ ‘accessible,’ ‘predictable,’ ‘equitable,’ ‘rights-compatible’ 
and ‘transparent’ which in essence means that it ought to be independent, non-
discriminatory, fair and with clearly defined procedures.305  Ruggie’s project, rightly or 
wrongly, is the key global CSR project of the moment especially as his Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights based on the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework 
were approved by the Human Rights Council in June 2011,306 and so it seems logical to 
view the examples identified throughout this dissertation through a ‘Ruggie lens.’  As will 
be demonstrated, some, but not all, of the Ruggie criteria are met by existing international 
CSR initiatives. 
In order to move towards implementation of the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework, 
Ruggie’s Preliminary Work Plan outlined the so-called ‘operational phase’ of the Mandate 
and represented a response to those critics who were unhappy with what they perceived to 
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be a merely principled approach to the problem, lacking in concrete action.307  It was 
evident that a multi-stakeholder approach was crucial to this phase and he was very keen to 
see ‘what works, what doesn’t, and where the gaps are’ by drawing upon the experiences of 
all international institutions involved with business and human rights.308  This high-profile 
experiential methodology is to be welcomed as in recent years there has been reluctance in 
some quarters, most notably on the part of the European Union, to learn from the CSR 
practice of others.309  Ruggie sought to amass this shared information to create what is 
described as ‘a backdrop to the mandate’s own processes of developing guiding 
principles.’310 It is Ruggie’s belief that in doing so it will ‘strengthen the overall 
international architecture in the business and human rights domain.’311  The question is 
whether existing initiatives have anything positive to contribute to this architecture.  In 
submitting his final report under the original mandate Ruggie recognised throughout that 
the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ mantra was simply a framework for action and 
acknowledges that it was a merely a baseline, or starting point, and clearly indicated the 
aspiration for practical tactics for moving the process forward.  Unanimous approval of the 
Guiding Principles by the Human Rights Council is certainly a step forward.   Further 
progress is heavily dependent upon States, however, and while it is clear that some, like 
Norway for example, are supportive of Ruggie’s goals, the fact remains that the majority of 
States remain resolutely opposed to the imposition of mandatory human rights standards 
upon business.312  
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Moreover, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3 the Guiding Principles depart from the 
2008 formulation of the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework in several respects and 
are attracting much criticism from civil society and scholars.313  The failure to impose 
binding human rights duties on business actors combined with a lack of enforceable 
remedy and redress means that the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework may not 
significantly ‘strengthen the overall international architecture in the business and human 
rights domain’ as hoped by Ruggie.  This dissertation will demonstrate that concrete action 
in the form of mandatory duties and enforceable remedies are necessary to hold business 
actors to account for their human rights violations.
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Chapter 2
Business Actors as Subjects of International Law: Redressing the 
‘ideological poverty of the Vattelian worldview.’1 
The eventually dominant Vattel tradition is not merely a tradition of international 
law. It implies a pure theory of the whole nature of international society and hence of 
the whole nature of the human social condition; and it generates practical theories 
which rule the lives of all societies, of the whole human race. it is nothing but mere 
words, mere ideas, mere theory, mere values – and yet war and peace, human 
happiness and human misery, human wealth and human want, human lives and 
human life have depended on them for two centuries and more. 2
2.0 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, transnational business activities raise complex issues of 
accountability  and responsibility because the increasing power and influence of 
transnational business actors challenge traditional conceptions of State-centric 
international law.  Respect for State sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction inhibit 
accountability and responsibility measures and failure by the international community to 
ensure that responsibility results in impunity.  Furthermore, States do not yet recognise in 
general that commercial enterprises may have mandatory duties under international law 
and this is reflected in the soft law approaches to CSR analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
which do not impose any binding obligation on businesses to adhere to human rights 
standards.  Businesses are not being held to account for human rights violations via 
consistent or formal external regulation, although there are numerous self-regulation 
initiatives.3  What this means is that the victims of human rights abuses are left without 
redress against business actors which perpetrate, or are linked to, abuses.  Nevertheless, the 
transnational element of the problem need not hinder accountability, rather it offers 
opportunities for solutions to the problem.  Some of these possible solutions are discussed 
in subsequent Chapters. 
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The prevailing Vattelian paradigm within which international law operates adheres to a 
subject-object dichotomy in relation to international legal personality.  Accordingly, this 
means that only States can be subjects of international law because only they, on this 
analysis, exercise sovereign power and business actors (and others such as natural persons 
and NGOs) are merely objects.  This dissertation operates on the premise that non-State 
business actors may properly be regarded as current subjects of international law and, as 
such, are bound by international human rights law.  Failing that, business actors ought to 
be regarded as either subjects or participants in international law and thus bound by its 
rules.  This chapter sets out the theoretical basis for these hypotheses. 
Firstly, it examines the nature of international legal personality as it stands currently. 
Secondly, it rejects the traditional Vattelian analysis that only States and a very narrow 
category of other entities such as international organisations may be properly regarded as 
subjects of international law and establishes that business enterprises, and corporations in 
particular, have historically been treated as subjects of international law with concomitant 
elements of international legal personality.  Often, this personality is derivative but there 
are examples of corporate entities acting with, what could be described as, a measure of 
objective legal personality.   An examination of the legal status of the Dutch and British 
East India Companies, the Hanseatic League of northern Europe and the United Fruit 
Company demonstrates that there have always been entities acting on the international 
plane which do not fit into the State template, yet which possessed international rights and 
duties and acted like States.  At the very least business actors participate in international 
legal processes and in applying a participatory analysis as advocated by Higgins,4 they 
therefore ought to be bound by international law.
Thirdly, and in the alternative, if such historical examples do not serve to support the 
assertion that business actors can already be categorised as subjects of international law, it 
is argued that, in any event, there is no reason in international law for any business actor to 
avoid responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.  It is clear that in a globalised world, 
States have long acknowledged the international legal personality and status of private 
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enterprises.  Since the latter half of the twentieth century, States have engaged increasingly 
with business actors as subjects of international law and this can be demonstrated by 
examining the decisions of international tribunals relating to business actors which are 
based upon both general principles of law and treaty obligations.  This includes decisions 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), among others.  
Finally, it is evident from the substantive provisions of numerous international covenants 
that States do regard private business entities as subjects of international law, or 
participants at the very least.  Consequently, there is no reason in international law for 
business actors to escape responsibility for breaches of international law, specifically, 
human rights violations.  The steady resistance to mandatory provisions in this regard must 
therefore be attributed to a lack of political will and a desire to maintain the international 
status quo.
2.1 International Legal Personality
2.1.1 The Traditional Doctrine of International Legal Personality: The 
 Subject-Object Dichotomy
We have erected an intellectual prison of our own choosing and 
then declared it to be an unalterable constraint.5 
States and business actors cite the lack of international legal personality as one of the key 
reasons for denying that private business actors have binding obligations, and thus 
responsibility, under international law.6  Specifically, and similarly to individuals, business 
actors have not been regarded traditionally as subjects of international law, rather they are 
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categorised as objects7 and as such are denied international legal personality.  Such an 
interpretation of international law bars the application of human rights obligations to 
private business actors.  Pellet criticises this refusal to recognise ‘the international legal 
personality of private persons‘ because it is based on ‘clearly ‘ideological’ reasons’8 which 
operate to ‘avoid facing the consequences of questioning the monopoly of States over 
international law.’9  This dissertation does not assert that international legal personality is a 
requirement for imposing legally binding obligations on business actors, but given that the 
absence of international legal personality is often put forward as a justification for the 
refusal of States to create binding legal obligations, it is important to examine the doctrine.  
Even though the‘subject-object dichotomy’10 continues to prevail, nevertheless it can be 
shown that business actors can in fact meet the criteria for subject status and thus legal 
personality.  
Charlesworth and Chinkin note that the status of ‘subject’ of international law is 
entrenched in the Montevideo Convention criteria for Statehood, the most important of 
which is the exercise of sovereign power,11 and which ‘establishes a model for full 
international personality that other claimants for international status cannot replicate.’12 It 
is, however, argued that business actors can and do exercise some elements of sovereign 
power on occasion and thus arguably meet the key element of international personality. 
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ILC Special Rapporteur Gaja outlined the conventional definition of international legal 
personality in his first ILC report on the responsibility of international organizations:
...one has to start from the premise that responsibility under international law may 
arise only for a subject of international law. Norms of international law cannot 
impose on an entity ‘primary’ obligations or ‘secondary’ obligations in case of a 
breach of one of the ‘primary’ obligations unless that entity has legal personality 
under international law.13 
Thus international legal personality and the subject-object dichotomy are apparently 
irrevocably entwined.  According to this particularly conservative view of international 
law, international organisations now excepted,14 States adhere largely to the traditional 
position that legal personality attaches only to subjects of international law.15  In so doing 
they render the majority of non-State actors, and therefore private businesses entities in 
particular, devoid of any responsibility for violations of international law.16  Yet it is the 
concept of international legal personality that is apparently a necessary condition of action 
under international law.  As Jan Klabbers points out, however, ‘one does not need legal 
personality to conclude treaties, to perform acts of recognition, to impose conditions on 
others, or indeed, to violate international law.’17  He then questions the entire utility of the 
theory:
What then does legal personality signify, if it does not constitute a threshold 
condition for performing legal acts?  What is the point of legal personality if it 
seemingly has no discernible practical ramifications, and if one can perform various 
legal acts without it?18
Chapter 2 Business Actors as Subjects of International Law! ! 85
13 Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, ‘First report on responsibility of international organizations,’ 
International Law Commission, Fifty-fifth session, 26 March 2003, A/CN.4/532 (Hereinafter ‘Gaja, First 
report’) http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_532.pdf [last accessed 7.9.11] at para.15.
14 See discussion of international organisations infra at Sections 2.2.1.1. and 2.2.1.2. 
15 See E.Lauterpacht, (ed.), International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, (Volume I: 
The General Works), (Cambridge: CUP, 1970) at 136 for a discussion of the traditional position.
16 For the traditional position see: Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ. (ser. B) 
No. 15 (Mar. 3)http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_B/
B_15/01_Competence_des_tribunaux_de_Danzig_Avis_consultatif.pdf  [last accessed 9.9.11] at 17.
17 J.Klabbers, ‘The Concept of Legal Personality’ 11 Ius Gentium 35-66 (2005) (hereinafter ‘Klabbers’) at 
38.  See also discussion infra at Section 2.2.4 on the performance of international legal acts by business 
actors.
18 Klabbers ibid.
He asserts that international legal personality is an ambivalent concept and that it ‘has 
more to do with political recognition of relations between actors and those relations’ 
relevancies, than with anything else.’19  So where does this leave international law?
The most significant problem with the subject-object perspective or the ‘object theory of 
the individual’20 is that it is inherently State-centric.  There is no space for other actors, let 
alone the individual.   Certainly, as indicated above, this has been the ‘classic view.’21  
Indeed some international lawyers, such as François Rigaux, still hold this view22 but most 
significantly it remains in favour with many States23 and thus can be used to justify 
opposition to binding rules.  This largely positivist conviction24 admits that only ‘objects 
and subjects exist in the international legal system.’25  There have always been scholars, 
however, who disagree fundamentally with this ‘bizarre Vattelian legal world-view’26 
where States are preeminent at the expense of individuals.  Thus there are those who think 
that the individual is, or ought to be, at the centre of international law and not merely 
categorised as objects, as well as those who consider the subject-object doctrine ought to 
be dispensed with altogether.  Each of these positions will be examined in turn.  
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2.1.1.1 The Individual as a Subject of International Law
Does it suffice to admit that the individual’s good is the ultimate end of the law but 
refuse the individual any capacity in the realisation of the good?27 
Hersch Lauterpacht famously regarded the individual as the ‘ultimate subject’ of 
international law by virtue of the creation of human rights28 thus rejecting ‘the view that 
States alone are subjects of international law.’29  He reminds us that ‘states are composed 
of individual human beings’ and that:
behind the mystical, impersonal and therefore necessarily irresponsible personality of 
the metaphysical state there are the actual subjects of rights and duties, namely, 
individual human beings.30
As Elihu Lauterpacht explains:
...the position of the individual in international law was long a matter of major 
concern to Hersch...In due course, his thinking developed into a direct and deep 
involvement in what became the most important facet of the decline of absolute State 
sovereignty, namely, the international protection of the rights of man.31
Similarly, Kelsen considered ‘erroneous’ the ‘traditional opinion’ that only States could be 
subjects of international law.32  He rejected the notion that international law ‘by its very 
nature’ was ‘incapable of obligating and authorizing individuals.’33  Given the ‘formal 
adherence‘ of positivists to ‘object theory‘34 this might seem to be a somewhat surprising 
conclusion.  Kelsen’s theory is of course based on the notion that ‘all law is regulation of 
human behavior’  and that the ‘only social reality to which legal norms can refer are the 
relations between human beings.’35  He argues, therefore, that ‘a legal obligation as well as 
a legal right cannot have for its contents anything but the behavior of human individuals.’  
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Concluding that States are simply ‘juristic’ persons he thus asserts that without human 
beings, international law would be devoid of content and ‘would not obligate or authorize 
anybody to do anything.’36  A similar argument can also be seen throughout the later work 
of Allott.37
By placing the individual at the heart of international law and acknowledging the primacy 
of human rights, this approach would therefore naturally impose duties on all other 
international actors, including business actors, to respect those rights.  In any event, it is 
clear that there has always been some debate as to whether individuals, both natural and 
legal, and business actors in particular, could be classified as subjects of international 
law.38  It appears, however, that there has been a paradigm shift among even positivist legal 
scholars, away from the strict binary of the subject-object classification towards what can 
be termed a more elastic conception of international law.  So, for example, Jennings and 
Watts in the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, while not placing the 
individual at the centre of international law like Lauterpacht, Kelsen and Allott, 
nevertheless write that while ‘States are primarily’ the subjects of international law, they 
are ‘not exclusively’ the subjects of international law.39  They contend that subject status is 
contextual and case-specific:  
To the extent that bodies other than states directly possess some rights, powers and 
duties in international law they can be regarded as subjects of international law, 
possessing international personality.  It is a matter of inquiry in each case whether - 
and if so, what - rights, powers and duties in international law are conferred upon 
any particular body.40
For Jennings and Watts the modern position has clearly and unquestionably moved on from 
the traditional conception as they elaborate in a footnote:
In the first three editions of this work [Oppenheim’s International Law] the view was 
expressed that states only and exclusively are the subjects of international law.  It is 
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now generally accepted that there are subjects other than states, and practice amply 
proves this.41
Examples of ‘atypical’ subjects of international law include the Holy See, the Sovereign 
Order of Malta, Free Cities, member states of federations, and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross i.e. entities which are not States but which exercise elements of sovereign 
power and have international rights and obligations.42 
Furthermore, the International Law Commission has recently revisited the question of 
international legal personality in the context of international organisations43 and thus:
the intergovernmental organization is established as a subject of international law, 
with separate will and personality, and with rights and duties on the international 
stage.  With this status achieved, the responsibility of organizations for breaches of 
international law is undeniable, at least in theory. Full recognition though has been a 
slow process.44
Of course, this dissertation argues, in the following section, that business actors can also be 
considered to be subjects of international law.  So it is clear that States are no longer the 
exclusive subjects of international law, if indeed they ever were, and it is therefore difficult  
not to conclude that the subject-object doctrine is a fiction designed to maintain the 
primacy of States.
While many scholars adhere to this modified version of the subject-object doctrine, others 
advocate its abandonment altogether, on the basis that a system which privileges States 
ignores the reality of the ‘fabric of international law.’45  As O’Connell writes
The individual as the end of community is a member of the community, and a 
member has status: he is not an object. It is not a sufficient answer to assert that the 
state is the medium between international law and its own nationals, for the law has 
often fractured this link when it failed in its purpose.46  
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Likewise Higgins is firm in her rejection of Vattelian dogma and in her assessment, we 
should speak simply of ‘participants’47 in international law, writing that:
We have all been held captive by a doctrine that stipulates that all international law is 
to be divided into ‘subjects’ - that is those elements bearing, without the need for 
municipal intervention, rights and responsibilities; and ‘objects‘ - that is the rest.48
Thus the doctrine demands that if an entity is not a subject it must by definition be an 
object and consequently States have ‘been able to block the access of individuals to certain 
arenas.’49  The only conclusion, says Higgins, is that all objects of international law must 
therefore be ‘like ‘boundaries‘ or ‘rivers‘ or ‘territory‘ or any of the other chapter headings 
found in traditional textbooks.’50  Higgins refuses to subscribe to this narrow, fixed and 
rule-based perception of international law stating that she believes ‘every step of this 
argument to be wrong.’51  She cites historical examples of non-State actors being 
recognised as more than mere objects of international law:
Plutrach and later Francisco de Vittoria in 1532 both wrote in terms that effectively 
acknowledge that non-State entities had internationally recognized legal rights.  De 
Vittoria, of course, was speaking of the Indian Kingdoms of America.  A century 
later Grotius, in his De jure belli ac pacis of 1625 was refining the idea.52  
Higgins thus offers an alternative model, arguing that while certain topics such as the law 
of the sea or issues around territorial boundaries are of great legal interest to States, 
nevertheless, the interests of individuals: 
lie in other directions: in protection from the physical excesses of others, in their 
personal treatment abroad, in the protection abroad of their property interests, in 
fairness and predictability in their international business transactions and in securing 
some external support for the establishment of a tolerable balance between their 
rights and duties within their national State.53  
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She concludes that ‘the topics of minimum standard of treatment of aliens, requirements as 
to the conduct of hostilities and human rights’  are not ‘simply exceptions conceded by 
historical chance within a system of rules that operates as between States.’54  More 
precisely they should be considered:  
part and parcel of the fabric of international law, representing the claims that are 
naturally made by individual participants in contradistinction to State participants.55 
Higgins therefore rejects the positivist view that international law consists of a system of 
unchanging rules which then requires ‘some specific rule‘ that permits ‘the individual to be 
a subject of international law.’56  The participant model recognises the role played in 
international processes by a variety of non-State actors, including business actors and civil 
society, as well as individual human beings.  It is a model which makes sense if we 
consider that under it all participants would have both rights and duties under international 
law.  The effect is thus twofold.  Firstly, the rights of individuals are enhanced because a 
participant model places the individual in a more advantageous legal position than the 
positivist’s individual-as-object, who operates only as a passive recipient of international 
law.  So for example, claims may be pursued by individuals in additional fora.57  Secondly, 
a participant model brings business actors within the scope of international legal 
provisions, especially in relation to human rights by recognising that they are not only the 
recipients of rights but also dutyholders under international law. 
Thus is is possible to conclude that the category of ‘subject’ is not closed but even if it 
were, a participatory model of international law would include business actors.  As it 
stands, the Vattelian model which venerates the State remains largely intact, even if there 
are increasing challenges to that supremacy.  In any event, even if the subject-object 
dichotomy prevails, it can be shown firstly, that business actors may exercise sovereign 
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power and therefore fall within the category of subjects of international law. Secondly, it 
can also be shown that business actors are already participants in international law. 
2.1.2.2 Business Actors as Subjects of International Law
Trying to shoehorn business actors into the prevailing subject-object paradigm seems to 
miss the fundamental point.  It becomes an exercise in what is and what is not a State or at 
least what resembles a State and is ‘unhelpful.’58  The State should not be at the heart of 
international law, rather the individual should take centre stage, nevertheless, the current 
position in international law ought to be examined because business actors can be 
categorised as subjects of international law even under traditional criteria.  Section 2.1.2.3 
identifies numerous examples of situations where business actors have been treated as 
subject of international law by States.
Writing in 1994, Rigaux stated emphatically ‘that transnational corporations are neither 
subjects nor quasi-subjects of international law’ and are ‘affected by the rules of 
international law only when these are mediated by a state legal order.’59  According to this 
view, therefore, it would appear that the traditional tenets of international law logically 
require that ‘the creation or adaption of international regulatory regimes that impose 
human rights responsibilities upon corporations’ demands ‘a radical departure from the 
structure of international orthodoxy.’60  Such a reductive view of international law is, 
however, not helpful and in the words of Louis Henkin, assuredly ‘misleading if not 
mistaken.’61  Brownlie, while acknowledging the controversial nature of business actors’ 
putative ‘candidature’ as subjects’ is open to the possibility nevertheless. 62  Likewise the 
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Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law concedes that their status is mutable 
stating that they have ‘not yet achieved independent status in international law.’63 
Brownlie is cautious in his analysis and although he is willing to accept that there are 
certain situations where business entities do participate on the international plane, he does 
not consider that they possess international legal personality as a consequence.  
Furthermore he warns ominously ‘against facile generalizations on the subject of legal 
personality.’64  He outlines his position thus:
...corporations of municipal law, whether private or public corporations, engage in 
economic activity in one or more states other than the state under the law of which 
they were ‘incorporated’ or in which they have their economic seat.  The resources 
available to the individual corporation may be greater  than those of  the smaller 
states, and they can, and do, make agreements, including concession agreements, 
with foreign governments, and in this connection in particular, jurists have argued 
that the relations of states and foreign corporations as such should be treated on the 
international plane and not as an aspect of the normal rules of governing the position 
of aliens and their assets on the territory of  state.  In principle, corporations in 
municipal law do not have international legal personality.65
Brownlie concludes that candidature for the status of subject is dependent on both context 
and ‘the relation of the particular entity to the various aspects of the substantive law.’  This 
is a sort of ‘pick and mix’ approach which does nothing to ensure the consistency of 
international law.  In refusing to recognise business actors as having international legal 
obligations, international law is not morally neutral, rather, the human rights of individuals 
are undefended in order to protect State sovereignty and so enables abuses to go 
unpunished.  This is ethically unforgivable, as Allott writes:
how can any morally sensitive person, knowing what happened in the twentieth 
century and seeing the prospects of the twenty-first century, fail to recognise a heavy 
burden of moral responsibility to do whatever can be done to improve human 
reality?66
Grant, similarly to Brownlie, is unwilling to categorise business actors as subjects proper 
and instead identifies what he calls, an ‘intermediate’ category of non-State actors between 
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States and natural persons, that has ‘proliferated and assumed a role in international 
society.’67  He is nonetheless willing to go beyond Brownlie’s analysis by saying that this 
intermediate category necessitates a re-evaluation of what constitutes ‘a person under 
international law.’ 68  This group encompasses ‘corporations, political or religious parties 
or movements, organized interest groups, transnational ethnic communities, and other non-
governmental organizations’ as well as numerous inter-governmental organisations.69  
Grant doubts whether ‘in truth writers ever really excluded non-states actors from 
international law’ he also asserts that, at minimum, ‘modern developments have increased 
the relative legal status of such actors.’ 70
On this analysis it would appear obvious that private business actors will never  satisfy the 
political criteria for classification as subjects of international law with attendant 
obligations.  Such an approach, while acknowledging that non-State actors have long been 
present on the international stage in a variety of guises, relegates them to the level of 
‘participants’ denied the rank of ‘subject.’71 Business actors, on this analysis, continue to 
lack the requisite level of autonomy to be subjects of international law and thus responsible 
for internationally wrongful acts, such as human rights violations.  This is in direct contrast 
to international organisations which, ‘have reached the stage of objective legal personality, 
making them responsible in their own right for breaches of international law.’ 72  The 
recent work of the International Law Commission (ILC) reflects this position.73
Unlike international organisations, which are accepted on the international plane by virtue 
of associated international objective legal personality, corporations remain excluded.74  
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There is, however, no reason to suppose that international legal personality for business 
actors is a chimera.  As the present author, together with Nigel White has noted, 
international recognition of intergovernmental organisations has been a sluggish and 
painful process.75  
Starting with the Reparations Case in 1949 and culminating in the recent work of the 
International Law Commission, the international community has moved towards a position 
where international organisations are recognised as subjects of international law with 
associated rights and duties.76  The Reparations Case confirmed the separate legal 
personality of the UN, however, it was another three decades before the ICJ expressly 
noted that international organisations were:
subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent 
upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under 
international agreements to which they are a party.77
The generally prevailing view, however, was, and is, that neither individuals nor 
corporations are subjects of international law and derive any meagre international legal 
personality from the will of the states creating them reflecting the traditional Austinian or 
‘flat earth’78 position enunciated by the PCIJ in the Lotus decision: 
International law governs relations between independent states… [which] emanate 
from their own free will…79
An Austinian analysis will elicit an enquiry as to where the power lies and will conclude 
that it rests solely with the state or law-maker.  Within such a voluntarist analysis, 
international law depends upon the engagement of states.   Any imposition of international 
obligations is thus dependent upon state consensus.  On this analysis,  therefore, 
individuals possess a modicum of legal personality.  So, for example, individuals are 
recognised as ‘subjects’ of international law under the Statute of the International Criminal 
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Court and as such bear responsibility for commission of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.80  Brownlie, however, takes issue with the use of such terminology to 
describe the status of natural legal persons:
There is no general rule that the individual cannot be a ‘subject of international law,’ 
and in particular contexts he appears as a legal person on the international plane.  At 
the same time to classify the individual as a ‘subject’ of the law is unhelpful, since 
this may seem to imply the existence of capacities which do not exist and does not 
avoid the task of distinguishing between the individual and other types of subject.81 
Special Rapporteur Gaja, however, in his First ILC Report cites the LaGrand82 case as an 
example of the ICJ’s changing attitude toward the question of individuals as subjects of 
international law:
The Courts’s assertion of the legal personality of international organizations needs to 
be viewed in the context of its more recent approach to the question of of legal 
personality in international law.  The Court stated in the LaGrand case that 
individuals are also subjects of international law.83
In LaGrand the ICJ concluded that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations created 
individual rights, specifically that an individual is entitled to have the relevant consular 
post informed of his or her detention by the receiving State.84  Gaja continues, 
contemplating that the ICJ will inevitably have to acknowledge the international legal 
personality of actors other than IGOs, specifically non-governmental organisations:
This approach may lead the Court to assert the legal personality even of non-
governmental organizations. It would be difficult to understand why individuals may 
acquire rights and obligations under international law while the same could not occur 
with any international organization, provided that it is an entity which is distinct 
from its members.85
If the law is shifting towards recognition of NGOs then the same argument applies to 
business actors.  While individuals have acquired both responsibilities and rights, as 
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demonstrated, commercial enterprises, have not been generally regarded as possessing any 
international legal personality and as such do not bear responsibilities under international 
law, in particular responsibility for human rights violations and/or violations of 
international humanitarian law.  This is despite the fact that business actors have also 
acquired rights and obligations under international law:
The overall effect of the decolonization period with respect to corporate-host state 
relations was thus to emphasize the rights of states and the duties of TNEs. 
Developing states asserted a right to expropriate with little or no compensation and 
to gain favourable economic development agreements that they could renegotiate on 
better terms.  They also proposed duties on investors to comply with host country 
law and policies.86 [emphasis added]  
It is clear, therefore, that business actors have long been regarded as suitable recipients of 
international legal duties.  In contrast to the situation of individuals, however, the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ does little to illuminate the issue.  While regarding corporations as 
legal entities which are separate from their shareholders, the ICJ has only been able to 
consider and rule on the on the rights of corporations rather than their responsibilities, 
notably the right to diplomatic protection.87  Nevertheless, the judgment in the infamous 
Barcelona Traction seems to reinforce the domestic law status of corporations with the 
Court stating that ‘[m]unicipal law determines the legal situation not only of such limited 
liability companies but also of those persons who hold shares in them.’ 88
Diplomatic protection is not an automatic right, rather it is a discretionary power to be 
exercised by the state of nationality.89  This position has been reaffirmed recently by the 
court in the Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo but the fact that corporations have a 
right to claim diplomatic protection actually serves to support the assertion that they are 
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recognised as subjects of international law.90  As Pellet argues, the notion that a State 
exercises diplomatic protection in defence of its own rights,91 son droit propre, is a legal 
fiction.  Rather, the State ‘represents the rights and interests of the protected person’ in this 
case, a corporation.92  The fiction is maintained for doctrinal coherence and for the purpose 
of maintaining State sovereignty:
It is the powerful voice of legal positivism and the sovereignty of the State which is 
at the heart of the legal construction obviously destined to bar individuals from 
international legal personality.93
These combine to create a ‘complete lack of symmetry’ where a State may protect its 
injured national ‘against the State which caused the harm’ but: 
the State which suffers harm as a result of the act of an individual cannot complain to 
the State of which that person is a national.
So if a business actor abuses human rights in a host State, that State cannot protect the 
rights of its nationals against the private actor via international courts.  If, however, the 
assets of that same business actor were to be appropriated by the host State without 
compensation, the company’s home State would be able to exercise diplomatic protection 
in order to protect its national.  There is something clearly wrong with this picture and 
Pellet concludes that the ‘one-way street’ is determined not by any sense of justice but by 
the power of politics and economics.94  
It is also arguable that the mere fact that business actors may claim rights under 
international law necessarily implies that they may also bear obligations.95  Klabbers 
Chapter 2 Business Actors as Subjects of International Law! ! 98
90 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo ICJ Reports (2007) (Preliminary Objections) http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/103/13856.pdf [last accessed 22.10.11] at para.61.
91 Mavrommatis note 9 at 12.  In exercising diplomatic protection a State is ‘asserting its own rights - its right 
to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’  See also Nottebohm Case 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) ICJ Judgment of April 6th 1955 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf 
[last accessed 22.10.11] at 24: ‘Diplomatic protection and protection by means of international judicial 
proceedings constitute measures for the defence of the rights of the State.’
92 Pellet note 8 at 38 para.8.  See also Dugard Report note 39 at paras 12-13.
93 Pellet ibid at 40 para.11.
94 Pellet ibid at 39 para.9.  Although diplomatic protection vis-à-vis human rights violations by State actors is 
the best way to protect human rights, Dugard Report note 39 at paras 21 and 29; Vermeer-Künzli note at 41 
and 57.
95 H.Koh, ‘Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility’ Litigation 7 J. of Int’l Economic 
L. 263-274 (2004) (hereinafter ‘Koh (2004)’) at 265.  See infra at 1.2 for more on this point in relation to 
human rights, specifically the ECHR.
argues that ‘performing legal acts’ is ‘evidence of personality as well as a simultaneous 
constitutive of personality.’96  If this is the case then why should it not also be the case that 
performing illegal acts, such as human rights violations, also evidences personality?
Notwithstanding such flawed logic, the traditional Vattelian, post-Westphalian narrative of 
States as the sole subjects of international law with attendant rights, obligations and duties 
holds fast and a conservative view of international law prevails.  This is despite the slowly 
increasing categories of exceptions, rendering corporations ostensibly devoid of 
international legal constraint.  In this light it is difficult not to view the present 
international legal system as a deeply unjust ‘unsociety’ where ‘states dominate’ and which 
is ‘markedly less representative of humanity’97 than one that prioritisies the individual.
2.1.2.3 Early Historical Examples of Business Actors as Subjects of 
  International Law 
Several historical anomalies in the Westphalian approach can be identified, however, upon 
an examination of how corporations operating internationally have been treated by States 
historically and in more recent times.  It can be demonstrated that States have clearly 
considered corporations to be subjects of international law or at least capable of engaging 
international responsibility in a derivative manner and consequently ‘are another candidate 
for functionally limited international legal personality’98 at a minimum.  There are several 
historical examples which support such an analysis although some commentators such as 
Sornarajah might oppose this assertion on the grounds that ‘there is little in common 
between these old corporations and the multinational corporation of times.’99  While there 
may be structural differences, such differences do not undermine the contention that there 
is documented evidence going back centuries that commercial entities have been treated as 
subjects of international law.
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Firstly, on the basis of Royal Charters established as far back as the 17th century, the Dutch 
and British East India Companies exercised key elements of what would today be 
recognised as sovereign power.100  So for example, these ‘little republics’101 exercised 
various sovereign powers including, in the case of the British East India Company, ‘the 
right to have its contracts treated as international treaties and the right to make war’102 as 
well as issuing currency, governing territories and maintaining ‘standing armies’ which 
‘engaged in military action.’103  Max Huber in the Islands of Palmas arbitration concluded 
that:
The acts of the Dutch East India Company (Generale Geoctroyeerde Nederlandsch 
Oost-Indische Compagnie) in view of occupying or colonizing the regions at issue in 
the present affair must, in international law be entirely assimilated to acts of the 
Netherlands State itself.104   
Further, he found that under the Treaties of Münster and Utrecht the Dutch East and West 
India Companies ‘were entitled to create situations recognized by international law’ even 
to the extent of concluding conventions of a political nature,105 thus exercising important 
elements of sovereign power. 
So the powers of the East and West India Companies were derived from and usually 
exercised on behalf of the sovereign state in question and therefore to a certain extent they 
are based upon the traditional perception of international law as reflecting the will of 
states.  Steven Ratner concludes that they ‘were effectively controlled by the 
government,’106 however, he also acknowledges that they had, along with their home States 
‘substantial rights vis-à-vis host states and (to the extent that anyone in the North noticed) 
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their populace.’107  Thus the powers exercised demonstrate an historical acceptance of 
corporations as actors and participants on the international plane, if not outright subjects.
 
There is even an argument that the 12th century Hanseatic League pre-dated the East India 
Companies by constituting ‘an early version of an internationalized corporate body’ or a 
communis mercator108 which exercised elements of sovereign functions.109  The Hansa (or 
Hanse) was a mercantile network of towns established in northern Germany which created 
‘protective and social alliances’ throughout Europe.110  It emanated from the desire to trade 
and to coordinate military expeditions targeting piracy and, in the view of some, the Hansa 
towns ‘almost assumed the proportions of small democracies.’111  Indeed the thirteenth 
century endeavours of the Hansa towns to tackle piracy are regarded as ‘[p]erhaps the 
earliest multilateral efforts against piracy’ and ‘united German cities because defense at sea 
was necessary against the swarms of pirates in the Baltic, North Sea, and elsewhere.’112
Despite the lack of what could be described as legal sovereign status and territorial 
aspirations,113 the Hanseatic League unquestionably demonstrated certain sovereign 
qualities.  So for example, internally it founded a democratic legislative body known as the 
Hansetag, which was the focus for coordinated improvements to infrastructure (especially 
canal networks) and exercised ‘autonomy in all inner affairs.’114  The members of the 
League had: ‘…free choice of civic rulers from the fittest elements, a right to govern 
themselves, and if need be to form alliances, and the right to tax themselves’115 although it 
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is also true that the League did not maintain a permanent military force, ‘common seal or 
officials or institutions of its own.’116
Externally, its sovereign characteristics were clear:
…the Hansa from is earliest origin, though organized for the ends of peace, was from 
its commencement and throughout its existence a militant body, ever watchful to 
punish infringement of its rights, ever ready to extend its authority, ever prompt to 
draw the sword or send forth its ships against offenders.117
To that end the League declared war on Denmark after the Hanseatic port of Visby was 
seized by the King of Denmark and victory resulted in the granting of significant 
‘indemnities, strategic territories and other concessions.’118  Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that:
The Hansa remained an anomalous institution which puzzled contemporary jurists.  
It was not a sovereign power, for it remained within the framework of the [Holy 
Roman] Empire and its members continued to owe some measure of allegiance to 
many different overlords ecclesiastical or lay.119
Notwithstanding this limitation, the Hanseatic League is an interesting example of an early 
entity which does not fit into the mold of sovereign State.  Neither can it be properly 
described by reference to modern transnational enterprises, however, it is illustrative of a 
commercial entity recognised on the international stage.  Epstein even goes so far as to 
suggest that a form of self-regulating CSR underpinned the League:
At its inception, the Hanseatic League and its members ‘were well appreciated as 
honorable merchants who ensured quality and fought against unscrupulous 
practices’ through vigorous affinity regulation by the membership.120
 
While the existence of CSR in the Middle Ages is questionable, these examples do serve to 
demonstrate that States have long considered business actors to be subjects of international 
law.  
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More recently, during the early to mid part of the twentieth century, companies were again 
permitted to wield enormous power within their spheres of influence, to the extent that, for 
example, the United Fruit Company expanded until it owned all of Guatemala’s ‘railways, 
ports and key shipping lines’121 although its dominance could be seen throughout Latin 
America.
These historical examples all point to States considering business actors to be subjects of 
international law or at least able to exercise elements of sovereign power which is a crucial 
element for establishing international legal personality under traditional conceptions of 
international law.
2.2 Business Actors as Subjects of Modern International Law
The early attempts described in the previous section demonstrate that the topic of business 
actors as subjects of international law has never been black and white.  Questions of status 
are, however, a late twentieth century development inextricably linked to globalisation and 
the rise of commercial power:
…the need to qualify the international legal position of transnational corporations is 
mainly a development of the period after 1945.122
Even within a Westphalian paradigm, it was inevitable that as the economic and political 
power of transnational business actors increased, their participation in international law 
would also increase.  Post-1945, States have certainly been ever more willing to recognise 
corporations as participants, if not subjects outright, in international law that have rights,  
obligations and responsibilities, specifically on the basis of international covenants.  
Wolfgang Friedmann, writing in 1964, concluded unequivocally that ‘private corporations 
are participants in the evolution of modern international law’.123 This is especially true 
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within the context of international investment.  Steven Ratner talks of  ‘host states and 
TNEs’ adjusting their ‘economic and legal relationship through economic development 
agreements’ which ‘clearly defined a set of rights and duties between the TNE and the host 
state.’124  An examination of decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as international conventions 
reveals the truth of his assertion.
In terms of rights under international law, there are various examples. Thus, as highlighted 
earlier in this chapter,125 corporate actors are entitled to claim the nationality of the State in 
which they are incorporated and consequently may claim the right of diplomatic 
protection.  This is founded upon the well established twin, substantive and procedural, 
principles of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad and State responsibility for injuries to 
aliens.126  Described by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions Case127 as an ‘elementary principle of international law’ it was also 
firmly upheld in relation to corporations by the International Court of Justice in Barcelona 
Traction.128  As Richard Lillich comments:
Even as bitter a critic of diplomatic protection as Judge Padilla Nervo admitted in the 
Barcelona Traction Case that ‘[f]or the time being, the principle which recognizes the 
capacity of a State to intervene, by way of diplomatic protection of a company of its 
own nationality, has proved to be a fair and well-balanced safeguard or insurance, 
both for the investor and for the State, where foreign companies operate.129
As highlighted in Section 2.1.2.2., however, there is an asymmetry to this principle which 
leads to the conclusion that corporations receive all of the benefits of international law 
without the same emphasis on corresponding responsibilities.  The world that Lillich 
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describes is one where the rights of business actors are safeguarded but the rights of human 
beings violated by those same business actors are not.130 
Numerous corporate actors have sought the diplomatic protection of their State of 
incorporation in a wide variety of circumstances.131  The position was recently reaffirmed 
in the Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo.132
Another category of right arises in relation to the taking of property.  A company is 
permitted to bring a claim against a State which has expropriated its property 
unlawfully.133  In so doing, the international community is again recognising private 
business actors as subjects or of international law because jurisdiction is dependent upon 
the consent of the parties to the dispute.  Such claims may be made in a variety of fora.  
For example the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes was  established to 
deal specifically with disputes between States and the nationals of other Contracting States 
and is very widely ratified.134  Article 25 of the ICSID Convention135 outlines the extent of 
the Centre’s jurisdiction:
Article 25
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or 
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.
While Article 25(2)(b) extends the right to corporate actors:
(2) ‘National of another Contracting State’ means:
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(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other 
than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented 
to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person 
which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that 
date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be 
treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this 
Convention.
Furthermore there is parity between State and corporate parties to the ICSID dispute 
settlement mechanism.  For example, both parties must consent to the jurisdiction of 
ICSID,136 either party may request conciliation proceedings137 and costs are split between 
the parties (unless the tribunal or the parties decide otherwise).138
As of January 2010, ICSID had concluded one hundred and eighty-one cases since its 
inception and is therefore an important example of State practice in relation to business 
actors.  It demonstrates that corporations may be parties to international agreements and 
treated as the equals of States in many important aspects.
Another example of State practice are the rules of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.  
Corporations which are nationals of either party to the constituent agreement may be a 
‘claimant.’139  Furthermore, an examination of other treaties where obligations are imposed 
upon corporations, offers additional support for the claim that private business enterprises 
are already regarded as subjects of international law.  For example, under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 the restrictions relating to appropriation of the 
seabed apply to natural and juridical persons as well as states.140  Likewise the Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 provides that the owner of a ship (natural 
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or legal person) will be held liable for pollution caused by that ship.141  Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty governs the activities of ‘non-governmental entities’ in relation to outer 
space, in particular, the moon and other celestial bodies.142  More recently, Article 10 of the 
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime makes reference to the liability of 
legal persons above and beyond the criminal liability of the natural persons involved.143
So it is clear that the international community recognises that private actors may incur 
international responsibility in some contexts but why not human rights responsibilities?  
Andrew Clapham, in the context of the International Criminal Court, has argued that:
As long as we admit that individuals have rights and duties under customary 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, we have to admit 
that legal persons also have the necessary international legal personality to enjoy 
some of these rights and conversely be prosecuted or held accountable for violations 
of their international duties.144
The only possible conclusion is that there is no desire on the part of the international 
community to do so.
There is, however, little or no agreement at international law as to whether human rights 
obligations ought to apply business enterprises at all, let alone the nature and degree of any 
applicable obligations.   Chapter 3 considers each of these issues in turn.  What is clear is 
that there is no reason to suggest that business actors cannot be subjects of international 
law.  Whether that is a desirable goal is another matter, as Pellet notes, ‘the advent of 
multinational corporations becoming the major actors in international relations’ may be 
something that ‘we want to deplore or something we want to applaud.’145  There is no 
doubt that they exercise great power and and are the recipients of many benefits under 
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international law but there is a need to impose obligations on them, in particular human 
rights obligations.  Of course, one way to avoid the subject-object debate  altogether would 
be to consider the participation model as a more suitable option.
2.3 The Impact of the New Governance Paradigm on Business Actors as 
 Subjects of and Participants in International Law
As the bipolar state system of the Cold War disappeared and non-state, 
substate, and supranational actors rode the tide of globalization, pundits and 
many scholars began heralding the era of complex, multi-level, 
global governance, tied together by networks.146
In the aftermath of the Cold War a new way of thinking about international law emerged.  
It builds upon and echoes Higgins’ participatory theory of international law in many ways 
and sees non-State actors moving towards a more formalised role in international legal 
processes.  As a consequence, and in response to ‘public doubts and suspicions about the 
activities of at least certain international organizations’ and the ‘perception of elite 
transgovernmental interactions taking place within them,’ various participatory and so-
called stakeholder initiatives emerged.147  It is at this point that we see the links between a 
participatory approach to international law and a new governance paradigm being 
established.  Slaughter describes the emerging participatory and stakeholder initiatives as a 
‘pluralist mix of global governance mechanisms’ which could be ‘folded into larger ‘mixed 
networks’ of governmental and private actors.’148  This new global governance theory 
portrays an international legal system where:
the democratic state is in the midst of a shift to a ‘post-regulatory’ model 
characterized by a weakening of top-down governmental regulation in favour of a 
diffusion of rights and responsibilities among governments, private companies, 
NGOs and other interested parties.  Power in other words, is to be spread and 
shared.149 
Chapter 2 Business Actors as Subjects of International Law! ! 108
146 A.Slaughter, ‘Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated 
Democracy’ 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1041 (2003) (hereinafter ‘Slaughter’) at 1045.
147 Slaughter ibid at 1054-1055.
148 Slaughter ibid at 1057.
149 J.M.Conley & C.A.Williams, ‘Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Movement’ 31 J. Corp. L. 1 (2005) (hereinafter ‘Conley & Williams’) at 6; see also e.g.  
D.M.Trubek & L.G.Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and 
Transformation’ 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 539 (2006-2007).
This new governance paradigm is characterised by a ‘diffusion of regulatory power among 
networks of state and non-state actors that transcend national boundaries’150 and, in 
particular, the ‘loosening of the sharp distinction between states and markets and between 
the public and the private.’151
Business actors, NGOs and others became involved in this ‘decentring’152 in numerous 
different fora153 and thus the new governance regime represents contemporary 
acknowledgement of the plurality of international legal processes.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, it is simply the latest example of business actors participating in 
international legal processes.
Participatory and stakeholder approaches have been particularly prevalent in relation to the 
CSR efforts of international organisations as will be seen throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation.  They have ‘instituted a raft of ‘outreach efforts’ to global civil society, 
enhancing transparency, hosting NGO meetings, and acknowledging and promoting 
‘global policy networks.’’154  For example, and as discussed in Chapter 5, while the OECD 
has historically given formalised roles to both business actors and trade unions in the 
context of the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, more recently the participation of 
NGOs has been sanctioned.155  Furthermore, the process which resulted in the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights is a clear illustration of these outreach efforts.156  
Likewise, the multistakeholder UN Global Compact is a good example of a global policy 
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network and indeed was established with that aim.157  Surya Deva also cites the  UNGC as 
a possible example of the change in categorisation of business actors as subjects.
At a wider level, the ‘public-private’ partnership represented a deviation in the 
generally state-centric nature of international law: it not only reflected the growing 
influence of non-states actors such as multinational corporations...in international 
law making, but might also be interpreted as an incremental step towards their 
recognition as subjects of international law. 158
It can of course be argued that these networks and mechanisms wield little or no real power 
and constitute mere talking shops,159 and Slaughter has certainly described them as 
‘haphazard’ and ‘chaotic.’160  Nevertheless they demonstrate that the international 
community has moved well beyond thinking of international law only in terms of the 
subject-object dichotomy.  The bigger problem of course, is that while business actors have 
been invited to the regulatory ‘table,’ States and the international organisations they 
dominate have chosen not to impose obligations on them.
2.4 Conclusion
Mendelson has written that:
‘[I]nternational law remains, as it has always been, essentially a law between States, 
and it is on States that its obligations fall.  This is empirically true as a matter of both 
historical and contemporary fact.’161
This chapter argues that such an analysis is wrong.  While it may have been true a century 
ago that ‘international lawyers could content themselves with the proposition that ‘States 
are the only subjects of international law’162 it is certainly no longer the case.  Rather 
international law has always recognised that certain non-State actors may be bound by 
international legal obligations.163  The law is not static and it is clear that, in any event, 
adherence to a State-only system of international obligations is undesirable and morally 
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repugnant in a progressively globalised world.  An international legal order which 
privileges ‘the interests of States or ruling elites over those of humanity as a whole’164 
simply ‘cannot be the way the world was meant to be.’165 
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Another World: ‘This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be’ An event to mark the retirement of 
Professor Philip Allott, Professor of International Public Law,’ University of Cambridge, 28–29 May 2004, 
16 EJIL 255 (2005) at 260. 
Chapter 3
Business and Human Rights: The Case for a New Horizontality
Globalization…has created powerful non-State actors that may violate human rights in 
ways that were not contemplated during the development of the modern human rights 
movement.  This development poses challenges to international human rights law, because, 
for the most part, that law has been designed to restrain abuses by powerful states and 
state agents, not to regulate the conduct of non-state actors….1
3.0 Introduction
Given their importance in the world, it is really remarkable that corporations 
have not received more attention in the evolution of international law, 
particularly international human rights law.2
Since their creation, human rights have protected the individual from the excesses of the 
State as mediated through governments.  Thus, human rights apply vertically between 
individuals and the States rather than horizontally between individuals and private actors.  
This has been the position since the establishment of a human rights paradigm after the 
Second World War and continues to the present day.3  Thus under international law 
currently it is States alone that bear mandatory duties and obligations to protect the 
individual from human rights violations.  In a globalised world, however, and as argued in 
Chapter 1, it is clear that private actors, specifically business actors pose a direct threat to 
individuals by abusing human rights, even if it is not always intended.4  As Geoffrey 
Chandler, a former director of Shell Petroleum, as well as the founder of Amnesty 
International’s Business Group and CSR pioneer, put it:
The corporate world touches the lives of people more closely than any other 
constituency, giving it immense potential for good or harm. To...the wealthy 
beneficiaries in a wealthy country, its benefits are obvious.  It also brings significant 
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273-322 (2002) (hereinafter ‘Shelton (2002)’) at 279.
2 D.Weissbrodt, ‘Business and Human Rights’ 74 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 55-73 (2005) (hereinafter 
‘Weissbrodt (2005)’) at 59.
3 For a history of the development of international human rights law see e.g. H.Steiner, P.Alston & 
R.Goodman, International Human Rights Law in Context: Law Politics Morals (3rd ed.) (OUP: Oxford, 
2007) (hereinafter ‘Steiner, Alston & Goodman’) at 58-133.  See also M.Ishay, The History of Human Rights: 
From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkley: University of California Press, 2008).
4 Infra Sections 1.2 and 1.3.  See also Note, ‘Organizational Irrationality and Corporate Human Rights 
Violations’ 122 Harvard Law Review, 1931-1952 (2009) for an interesting explanation of why some business 
actors violate human rights often without intending to do so.  
benefits to the developing world through investment, employment, technology, skills 
and access to markets.  But together with these benefits has come collateral damage 
– to individuals, to the environment, to communities. Whether directly or indirectly, 
companies encounter problems which we would now classify under the generic 
heading of human rights.  In their supply chains they can meet exploitative child 
labour, discrimination, risks to health and life, forced labour. The extractive 
industries can be involved in the spoliation of the environment and the destruction of 
communities. In contexts of conflict and human rights violations they confront a 
need for security which is too often provided by ill-disciplined state security forces.5
Many commentators ascribe intention to commercial actions which violate human rights, 
citing the profit motive as key.  Stephens argues that there ‘is tremendous profit to be made 
from abusive behavior’ because ‘in the absence of effective regulation, corporations often 
seek to maximize profit at the expense of basic rights.’6  Irrespective of the intent behind 
human rights violations, this chapter seeks to explain why mandatory rules are necessary.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation highlighted numerous specific examples of such abuses, 
which can be classified in different groups.7  Steven Ratner categorises three different 
ways in which businesses can be involved in human rights violations.  Firstly, situations 
where ‘governments have neither the interest nor the resources to monitor corporate 
behaviour.’8  He cites Freeport-McMoRan in Irian Jaya and Texaco in Colombia as 
‘extreme cases’ where ‘those entities exercise significant power in certain regions, often 
with little interference by the government.’9  Secondly, he uses the example of South 
Africa during apartheid to illustrate a situation where the State ‘uses various corporate 
resources in its own abuses of human rights.’10  Thirdly, he argues that the increased 
internationalisation of business activities and business actors has encouraged ‘bottom-
feeding’ whereby the pursuit of ‘fewer regulatory burdens, including human rights 
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6 B.Stephens, ‘Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation’ 24 Hastings Int'l 
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7 Infra at Section 1.3.1 in particular Table 1 and Table 2.
8 S.Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ 111 Yale. L. J. 443-545 
(2001) (hereinafter ‘Ratner’) at 462.
9 Ratner ibid.
10 Ratner ibid at 462-463.
regulations’ has become an important goal for many transnational businesses.11  This 
dissertation focuses on the first and third categories.  
Given the wealth of information in the public domain disseminated by NGOs and the 
media, the proliferation of court cases in various jurisdictions, as well as the emergence of 
numerous international initiatives addressing the problem (examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
of this dissertation), it is now impossible to deny that horizontal violations of human rights 
by business actors occur on a regular basis or to contest that they involve serious and often 
life-threatening abuses.  As Steiner, Alston and Goodman point out, this raises important 
questions about accountability:
For human rights proponents the growth of corporate power raises the question of 
how to ensure that the activities of transnational corporations in particular are 
consistent with human rights standards and of how to promote accountability when 
violations of those standards occur.12
Clearly in such circumstances the international community ought not to be able to indulge 
in its historical ‘tendency to look the other way’13 and this dissertation argues that it should 
look to establishing mandatory duties for business actors in relation to human rights, given 
the limited achievements of voluntary initiatives over the past couple of decades discussed 
in this and subsequent chapters.
   
The problem is simply that the international community still remains unwilling to extend 
the reach of human rights to private actors by responding to the actual horizontality 
through legal horizontality, hence the continued reliance on self-regulation via codes of 
conduct and voluntary projects.  
 
Regulatory capture of such behaviour does not require great legal contortions, however, 
nor does it threaten the fabric of the international legal order, indeed, Chapter 2 illustrated 
clearly that international law already applies to business actors in a variety of 
circumstances.  Muchlinksi, while believing that the bad behaviour by business actors is 
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overstated,  nevertheless seems to agree that there is a need to put in place binding 
regulatory measures pointing out that: 
It is not difficult to create technical legal solutions to the question of corporate 
responsibility for human rights violations.  The real issue is whether the political will 
exists to put them in place.14 
It is this latter point which is, as is so often the case, a stumbling block but one which 
needs addressing urgently.15  For as Steiner, Alston and Goodman also state, ‘a human 
rights regime which addresses itself effectively only to states will become increasingly 
marginalized in the years ahead.’16  Various commentators believe that horizontality is both 
achievable and desirable, although they do not necessarily describe the proposition in 
terms of vertical and horizontal duties.17 
For example, Ratner argues that horizontality is easily attainable and sums it up neatly, 
stating that non-State actors such as business enterprises ‘may pose a threat to human 
dignity - either acting with the state or alone - so that any contemporary notion of human 
rights must contemplate duties on those entities as well.’  Ratner was writing a decade ago 
and as will be demonstrated, contemplation of businesses as dutyholders has been 
superficial in the extreme in the years since.  Furthermore, Ratner contends that 
recognition of such duties can be achieved by simple extension of the scope of existing 
human rights standards, writing that  ‘[t]his step does not entail the recognition or 
development of new human rights’ rather ‘it requires the identification of new 
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the UNCTC Draft Code on Transnational Corporations and the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights.  
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17 See for example the work of David Weissbrodt.  Weissbrodt (2005) note 2; D.Weissbrodt, ‘International 
Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses’ 26 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 373-391 (2008) 
(hereinafter ‘Weissbrodt (2008)’); D.Weissbrodt & M.Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ 97 AJIL 901 
(2002) (hereinafter (Weissbrodt & Kruger’).  See also H.Koh, ‘Separating Myth from Reality About 
Corporate Responsibility’ Litigation 7 J. of Int’l Economic L. 263-274 (2004) here Koh argues for an 
international treaty; S.Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in Right Direction?’ bepress Legal Series, Working Paper no.112 (2004) 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1270&context=expresso&sei-redir=1#search=%22norms
%20business%20human%20rights%22 [last accessed 15.7.11] (hereinafter ‘Deva’); J.Campagna,’ United 
Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rule Makers’ 37 
J. Marshall L. Rev. 1205 (2003-204) (hereinafter ‘Campagna’). 
dutyholders.18  Thus creating new subjects of international law as envisioned in Chapter 2 
of this dissertation but also imposing something beyond a simple ‘cut and paste’ of human 
rights obligations.  He elaborates:
the notion of corporate duties represents a departure from the emphasis on the state 
as dutyholder and seeks to justify that new direction.  That position starts from a 
jurisprudential premise - that the rights of individuals give rise to not only a variety 
of duties but also a variety of dutyholders.19
His argument is rooted firmly in the work of Joseph Raz who has concluded that:
there is no closed list of duties which correspond to to the right...A change of 
circumstances may lead to the creation of new duties based on the old right.20
Thus it  is possible for existing human rights norms to apply  to the ‘new’ dutyholders. 
Furthermore, Raz argues that:
...one may know of the existence of a right...without knowing who is bound by duties 
based on it or what precisely are these duties.21
On  this analysis, States cannot argue that human rights obligations apply only to a closed 
category of dutyholders and business actors cannot feign ignorance of a duty in order to 
escape responsibility for human right violations.  Raz seems to be saying that the existence 
of the right is key rather than any specific awareness of duties imposed by it, therefore, the 
traditional verticality of human rights norms becomes irrelevant.  
3.1 The Lack of Political Will to Create a Legal Horizontality
But what of Muchlinski’s concern about the lack of international political will to enshrine a 
new human rights horizontality within a binding legal framework?  Lack of resolve on the 
part of governments,22 supported at every turn by the international business community, 
rather than legal impediment prevents the implementation of formal accountability 
Chapter 3 Business and Human Rights: The Case for a New Horizontality! ! 116
18 Ratner note 8 at 469.
19 Ratner ibid at 468.
20 J.Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 171.
21 Raz ibid at 184.
22  Muchlinski (2001) note 14 at 47.
mechanisms at the international level exemplified by the failure of the UNCTC Draft Code 
of Conduct and the UN Norms project analysed later in this chapter.23 
Of course such reticence to regulate and enforce human rights is not limited to the sphere 
of business actors.  Lack of enforcement of human rights norms against States is a 
perennial and overwhelming problem for the international community and there is a 
genuine fear that by focusing on human rights violations by business actors, it will detract 
from egregious behaviour by many States.24  It is therefore extremely important that 
regulation of business actors does not take place at the expense of enforcement of human 
rights standards against States.  This is something that has been reiterated frequently by 
SGSR Ruggie on numerous occasions, by States and by commentators.25  It is axiomatic 
that the vast majority of human rights abuses are perpetrated by States or those seeking to 
represent the State, one need only look at the contemporary situations in, for example, 
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24 See e.g. State responses referred to and attached to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
on Human Rights on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with 
regard to human rights,  E/CN.4/2005/91, 15 February 2005, http://www.business-humanrights.org/
Categories/UNintlorgs/UNintergovernmentalorgs/UN/SubmissionstoUN-2004consultation-
businesshumanrights?sort_on=sortable_title&batch_size=10&batch_start=11 [last accessed 26.10.11] 
(hereinafter ‘Report of the UNHCHR’).    Members of civil society, including NGOs, trade unions and 
academics, as well as individual business actors and business organisations also made submissions to the 
UNHCHR.
25 See e.g. ibid; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights,’ Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie A/HRC/8/5 7 April 2008 http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-7-
Apr-2008.pdf [last accessed 31.8.11] (hereinafter ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy (2008)’) at paras 9 and 18.
Burma (Myanmar),26 Sudan,27 Iran,28 Russia29 or North Korea30 to witness States engaging 
in extra-judicial killings, torture, forced labour, erosion of basic freedoms including 
curtailing political participation and detention without trial.  Industrialised nations fare no 
better. The USA is subject to ongoing accusations of major human rights abuses in relation 
to, for example, ‘extreme criminal punishments’ and counterterrorism.31  Likewise, the UK 
has been held liable for human rights violations arising from its counterterrorism activities 
in relation to indefinite detention of terrorist suspects and allegations of torture.32  
Notwithstanding the appalling behaviour of some States, the international community 
would be remiss if it were to simply ignore the actions of business actors.  If human rights 
are universal, then it does not matter who violates them and regulation of business actors 
ought to run parallel to States’ international human rights obligations, not as a replacement. 
It sends out a very negative message when States, including permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, do nothing to reign in the worst human rights excesses of their corporate 
nationals.  There needs to be a move away from the traditional vertical application of 
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27 US Department of State, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Sudan,’ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, April 8, 2011 http://www.state.gov/documents/
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28 Human Rights Council Sixteenth session, Interim report of the Secretary-General on the situation of 
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accessed 7.7.11].
29 Amnesty International, ‘World Report 2011: The State of the World’s Human Rights - Russian Federation,’ 
http://files.amnesty.org/air11/air_2011_full_en.pdf [last accessed 7.7.11] 270-273 at 270.
30 Human Rights Council Resolution, Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, 8 April 2011, A/HRC/RES/16/8 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/125/27/PDF/
G1112527.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 7.7.11].
31 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2011: United States of America,’ http://www.hrw.org/en/world-
report-2011 [last accessed 7.7.11] 609-624 at 609.
32 See for example A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-1.htm [last accessed 23.8.11].  See 
also the decisions of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Jedda v. United 
Kingdom (application no. 27021/08) ECtHR 7 July 2011 and Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom 
(application no. 55721/07) ECtHR 7 July 2011.  In R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin) (21 August 2008) the English 
High Court concluded in response to allegations of UK involvement with torture that, ‘by seeking to 
interview BM in the circumstances described and supplying information and questions for his interviews, the 
relationship of the United Kingdom Government to the United States authorities in connection with BM was 
far beyond that of a bystander or witness to the alleged wrongdoing, paras 87-88.
human rights towards a horizontal and more people-centred approach, as opposed to one 
where remedies are available only if the victim is ‘lucky’ enough to have experienced 
vertical abuse. 
To that end, Chapter 3 argues for direct and binding application of substantive international 
human rights obligations to commercial entities i.e. horizontality.  This is not a plea for 
business to ‘solve all of the world’s problems’ single-handed.33  It is acknowledged that the 
primary legal obligation to protect human rights rests with States and this is of course 
recognised in key international instruments including the UN Charter34 and the ICCPR35 as 
well as in other UN business and human rights initiatives such as the UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard 
to Human Rights36 and the UN Guiding Principles (GPs) approved by the UN Human 
Rights Council in June 2011.37  (Situations where the State is complicit in the human rights 
violations is outside the scope of this dissertation and while it will be referred to on 
occasion in general terms, it will not be addressed in detail.  The focus is on the stand 
alone, most severe violation of human rights by business actors because this is the area 
where there is least regulation.38)  The Guiding Principles do not go far enough, however, 
because they do not oblige businesses to respect human rights, rather they encourage 
business actors to respect human rights standards.  This is in direct contrast to earlier 
attempts to regulate the behaviour of transnational business actors, most notably the 
UNCTC Draft Code and the Norms, both of which intended to create mandatory rules on 
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38 For a discussion of complicity see e.g. A.Clapham, ‘On Complicity’ in M.Henzelin & R.Roth, (eds), Le 
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Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 339-350 (2001); M.Mafessanti, ‘Corporate Misbehaviour and International Law: Are 
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some level.  Chapter 3 therefore examines these early UN attempts at regulation as well as 
expanding on  the work of the UN Special Representative on business 
and human rights, John Ruggie and his Guiding Principles referred to in Chapter 1.  
Furthermore it argues against the public/private divide in the human rights sphere in 
relation to business actors, suggesting instead that international human rights law already 
applies to business actors and if it does not, then human rights duties ought to be imposed 
on them.  Finally, this chapter considers briefly which human rights ought to give rise to 
duties for business actors and concludes that it is not necessary to elaborate every 
individual applicable human right.
3.2 Early UN Attempts at Regulating Business in Relation to Human Rights
3.2.1 The International Labour Organisation’s Tripartite Declaration, the UN 
 Commission  on Transnational Corporations Draft Code and the Norms 
 on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
 Entities with Regards to Human Rights
For nearly forty years, the UN has attempted to address the problems posed by errant 
transnational business enterprises and to that end numerous diverse projects were 
undertaken with varying degrees of success.  This section, focuses on the historical role of 
the Draft Code of the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC)39 and the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights’ Norms.40  In 
addition to the Draft Code and the Norms there were also early attempts by the 
international community to regulate business behaviour through the efforts of the UN’s 
specialized agency, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) beginning in the 
mid-1970s and which operated in parallel with the UNCTC.41  
While this section does not examine the ILO in detail, it is, however, noteworthy for its 
tripartite structure, which involves States, employers and labour, thereby deviating from 
the state-centric norm of international law and which importantly is reflected in later 
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initiatives in the business and human rights sphere.42  Albeit non-binding, the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
‘invites governments of State Members of the ILO, the employers’ and workers’ 
organizations concerned and the multinational enterprises themselves’ to ‘observe’ the 
principles enshrined within it.43  Shelton comments that ‘regulation is made easier by the 
participation of labor and business in the law-making and supervisory procedures of the 
ILO’44 i.e. a multistakeholder approach.  As a clear example of a multistakeholder 
initiative involving all relevant actors, arguably the Declaration provided a template of best 
practice for other projects such as the Global Compact, addressed in Chapter 4.  While the 
Declaration is limited to workers’ rights, and does not extend to other human rights, it is 
nevertheless significant because it recognises that business entities have the power to 
violate international standards and thus seeks to regulate that power, albeit voluntarily, as 
well as accepting the appropriateness of asking them to adhere to those international 
standards.  This dissertation is focused on more general regulatory attempts in relation to 
human rights.
Starting with the UNCTC’s endeavours during the 1970s and continuing into the twenty-
first century with the Norms project of the Sub-Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, these UN attempts at regulatory capture sought the creation 
of a treaty-based apparatus for the enforcement of human rights obligations against 
business enterprises but both resulted in a failure to agree on a unified approach to CSR 
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44 Shelton (2002) note 1 at 281.
standards and ultimately the projects collapsed, albeit for different reasons.45  Initially at 
least it seems that the UN (or more accurately its constituent members) was unable or 
unwilling to put in place a credible device for the application of human rights obligations 
to business enterprises.
3.2.1.1 UNCTC: A Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations
Looking back at the story of the UNCTC, it is clear that all of what would be considered 
modern and familiar CSR issues were deliberated during the drafting of its putative Code 
of Conduct for TNCs i.e. voluntarism versus legally binding measures; addressees (should 
the Code apply to States alone, to TNCs alone or to both?); monitoring and sanctions.  
Ultimately it was decided that in the absence of any kind of agreement, the Draft Code 
should be ‘an instrument of moral persuasion’ rather than a binding document and a treaty-
based option was abandoned early on in the process.46  Notwithstanding this, 
commentators such as Rubin took the view that even a non-binding Code could be 
effective and observed by business actors to the same extent as mandatory norms.47
State involvement with the UNCTC was highly politicised, with regional and economic 
groupings disagreeing fundamentally.48 Developing nations in particular objected to TNCs 
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United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25 Companies and Securities Law Journal 30 
(hereinafter ‘Kinley, Nolan & Zerial (2007b)’).
46 ECOSOC, Report of the Group of Eminent Persons on the Impact of MNC on the Development Process 
and International Relations (New York, UN, 1974) at 55.
47 Rubin (1995) note 45 at 1276.  See also UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, ‘Certain 
Modalities for Implementation of a Code of Conduct in Relation to its Possible Legal Nature,’ U.N. Doc. 
EIC.10/AC.2/1978/9 (1978).
48 Rubin (1995) ibid at 1285-1286. 
in principle, seeking to protect their fledgling sovereignty via regulation, while the 
developed, industrialised nations perceived the Draft Code as a constraint on business 
activities and therefore resisted its implementation.  Writing at the time, Hellman noted 
that ‘the developing countries are not willing at this point to renounce part of their newly 
gained sovereignty to promote control over multinational corporations.’49  Steven Ratner 
explains further:
...host states sought to reign in the power of TNEs by drafting a multinational code of 
conduct for transnational corporations.  This goal had for a long time been a part of 
the agenda of socialist political leaders in both the North and South.  It received its 
primary impetus from the revelations about United Fruit Company’s and 
International Telephone and Telegraph’s roles in destabilizing, respectively, the 
governments of Guatemala in the 1950s and Chile in the early 1970s.50      
Thus it is significant that the UNCTC acknowledges the power and influence of TNCs in 
its founding documents.  One of its key objectives was:
To secure effective international arrangements for the operation of transnational 
corporations designed to promote their contribution to national development goals 
and world economic growth while controlling and eliminating their negative 
effects.51
To that end the UNCTC undertook the creation of a Draft Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations as a ‘priority’52 at its first session in 1975.53  Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s attempts were made to complete the Code54 with the most recent version 
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49 R.Hellman, Transnational Control of Multinational Corporations (New York, Praeger, 1977).
50 Ratner note 8 at 457.
51 Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the Second Session, 1-12 March 1976 (E/5782; E/
C.10/16 Economic and Social Council Official Records, 61st Session Supplement No.5) at 2, para.6(b).
52 Muchlinski (2007) note 43 at 660; Rubin (1995) note 45 at 1282.
53 Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the First Session 17-28 March 1975 (E/5655; E/C. 
10/6 Economic and Social Council Official Records 59th Session Supplement No.12) at 2 para. 9.
54  See S.Joseph, ‘An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises,’ in 
M.Kamminga & S.Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, (The Hague/
London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000) (hereinafter ‘Joseph’ and ‘Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi’) 75-93 
at 84; P.Muchlinski, ‘Attempts to Extend the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of 
UNCTAD,’ in Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi 97-117 (hereinafter ‘Muchlinski (2000)’) at 101 (see footnote 12 at 
101 for details of the intervening meetings). A putative first draft of the Code was presented at the eighth 
session of UNCTC in 1982 but it has been criticised by P.T.Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Law (Blackwell: Oxford,1999) (hereinafter ‘Muchlinksi (1999)’) as being an ‘incomplete document’ at 593.  
Commenting that ‘no drafting had been done on the ‘preamble and objectives’’ and that there was 
considerable disagreement about the substantive content of the Code.
appearing in 1990.55  From the outset there was no objection in principle to imposing 
obligations on TNCs on the basis that they could not be subject to international legal duties 
and the Draft Code included numerous obligations, including a human rights obligation.  
As Muchlinski notes, the Draft Code had its roots in the movement towards the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) promulgated by the G77 nations and it became 
apparent that the political problems which plagued the progress of the NIEO spilled over 
into the UNCTC and led to its ultimate demise.56  In particular there was considerable 
disagreement:
over whether the Code should be addressed only to TNCs, as desired by the Group of 
77, or whether it should also extend to the treatment of TNCs by host governments, 
as desired by the major capital exporting countries.  Ultimately the capital-exporting 
countries succeeded...Thereafter the Draft Code would consist of two main parts: the 
first on the activities of TNCs, the second on the treatment of TNCs.57      
Rubin describes the initial meetings in rather colourful terms writing that ‘the 
first...sessions of the UNCTC turned consideration of a sensible and moderate Group of 
Eminent Persons report [on TNCs] into a forum for a shouting match.’58
Throughout the subsequent process, the G77 group expressed considerable disquiet about 
TNC activity including inter alia preferential treatment demanded by TNCs, political 
interference, arms trafficking, obstruction of access to technology and a ‘lack of respect of 
the socio-cultural identity of host countries.’59  There was also substantial disagreement 
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55 Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 31 May 1990, UN Doc. E/
1990/94 of 12 June 1990.
56  Muchlinksi (1999) note 54 at 593. See also Joseph note 54 at 84.
57 Muchlinski (2000) note 54 at 100.
58 Rubin (1995) note 45 at 1276.  Rubin is referring to is the ECOSOC, Report of the Group of Eminent 
Persons on the Impact of MNC on the Development Process and International Relations (New York, UN, 
1974).
59 Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the Second Session, 1-12 March 1976 (E/5782; E/
C.10/16 Economic and Social Council Official Records, 61st Session Supplement No.5) 21, Annex 1 ‘List of 
Areas of Concern Regarding the Operations and Activities of Transnational Corporations, Note Submitted by 
the Group of 77.’  Unsurprisingly this attitude was supported by the Soviet Bloc countries, at 26, Annex III, 
‘Issues Requiring the Attention of the Commission and the Information and Research Centre on 
Transnational Corporations.’  Note submitted by the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic 
Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
surrounding the ever contentious issue of compensation for expropriation.60  It is clear then 
that this grouping saw the proposed Code ‘as a means of subjecting the activities of TNCs 
to greater regulation’ which supports the assertion that there was no general objection to 
TNCs being subjects of international law, supporting the argument made previously in 
Chapter 2.  In contrast, the industrialised, capital-exporting nations sought to ‘use the Code 
primarily as a means of protecting TNCs against discriminatory treatment contrary to the 
international minimum standards accepted by these states.’61  The industrialised states were 
keen to confer rights on TNCs and again, the mere fact that states were attempting to 
ensure the imposition of international standards, no matter their content, indicates that 
there was no apparent opposition to TNCs being treated as subjects of international law, 
again reinforcing the conclusions reached in Chapter 2.  Thus the Draft Code included 
specific obligations for TNCs to respect human rights. 
In terms of substantive content, however, the 1990, and final, version of the Draft Code’s 
human rights provision was meagre and generalised:
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
14. Transnational corporations shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the countries in which they operate.  In their social and industrial relations, 
transnational corporations shall not discriminate on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
religion, language, social, national and ethnic origin or political or other opinion.  
Transnational corporations shall conform to government policies designed to extend 
equality of opportunity and treatment.’62
This obligation was not elaborated upon save for subsequent specific provisions relating to 
the prohibition of activities which supported apartheid and incorporation of the ILO’s 
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the ‘appropriate’ standard preferred by developing states.  UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) 1962 on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and UNGA Resolution 3281 (XXIX) 1974 the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States both refer to the ‘appropriate’ standard although there was 
disagreement as to whether it should be a binding obligation. The tension between the different viewpoints is 
evident in e.g. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libyan Arab Republic 53 ILR 389 (1977).
61 Muchlinski (1999) note 54 at 593.  See also in relation to the Draft Code, Report of the Second Session 
1976, note 59 at 23 Annex II, ‘Areas of Concern Which Relate to Relations Between Transnational 
Corporations and Governments.‘  Note submitted by the delegations from France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. 
62 Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 31 May 1990, UN Doc. E/
1990/94 of 12 June 1990 para. 14.
Tripartite Declaration into the Code.63  Nevertheless, a clear duty was set out for TNCs to 
respect human rights, nothwithstanding the eventual decision that that Draft Code would 
be non-binding nature if it ever came to fruition.
Even if the Draft Code had been implemented, binding or not, its enforcement provisions 
were relatively weak, and redundant ultimately in the absence of state adoption.  In 
essence, disputes were required to be settled at the domestic level and this included 
governments acting on behalf of corporate nationals.  Nonetheless, a periodic assessment 
reporting mechanism  was also proposed,  a classic device used in relation to States under 
international human rights instruments, and which again suggests no principled objection 
to TNC’s being treated in a similar way to states in international law.64
By 1992, however, efforts had reached a stalemate and Joseph concludes that ‘the code 
concept was abandoned due to its apparent ambitiousness and irreconcilable North / South 
differences.’65  Hillemanns agrees, writing that the ‘project proved too ambitious in trying 
to set up an overarching regulation of the activities of transnational corporations and their 
relationships with host governments.’66  Peter Muchlinski points to the political difficulties 
that stymied the Draft Code asserting that ‘[i]n the international arena, the fears generated 
by calls for a New International Economic Order on the part of LDCs led to a reaction by 
developed nations.’67
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64 Paragraphs 57, 58 and 69 respectively.  Under the Code, the UN Commission on TNCs was to assume an 
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65 Joseph note 54 at 84.  See also J.A.Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility Limitations 
and Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 246.
66 C.F.Hillemanns, ‘UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ 4 German L.J. 1065-1080 http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/
Vol04No10/PDF_Vol_04_No_10_1065-1080_European_Hillemanns.pdf [last accessed 13.7.11] at 1066.
67 Muchlinski (2007) note 43 at 10-11.  See also Hillemanns ibid at 1066.
This reaction manifested itself in a shift in focus by the UNCTC which reflected the neo-
liberal economic concerns of the capital-exporting nations and the interests of business.68  
There was still a state-centric focus, although it was more about protection of the principle 
of state sovereignty than the issue of TNCs as subjects of international law.  By 1994, the 
UNCTC was absorbed into UNCTAD and this effectively ended any possibility of using 
the Code as a mechanism to control human rights abuses by business actors as priorities 
changed and the focus shifted towards the arguably ‘positive impacts of FDI and TNCs on 
development’ and away from ‘controlling the political and economic activities of TNCs.’69 
The reasons for the demise of the UNCTC and its perceived failings, differ little from those 
of the Norms just a few years later and appear to be as follows.70  Attitudes emerging from 
the New International Economic Order, the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of 
States and the concept of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources led to developing 
states querying the wisdom of allowing transnationals access to their territory and their 
natural resources in particular.  The Soviet bloc countries were in favour of regulation for 
obvious ideological reasons.  What is important here, however, is that it appears from the 
documentation that at no time did any state, developed or developing, object to the idea 
that transnational corporations could be bound by international law.  Of course the non-
binding nature of the Code influenced this but as Rubin has pointed out that a ‘generally 
accepted set of standards may eventually’ have had ‘as significant effect as a more formal 
commitment.’71  The UNCTC failed due to a lack of political agreement on how to regulate 
TNCs on the ground, rather than the idea that they could not be brought within the 
regulatory structure of international law and specifically international human rights law.  
The principle that TNCs could be subject to international law, including international 
human rights law, was not contested.
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creating a globally accepted Code.  UNCTC, ‘The New Code Environment,’ UNCTC Current Studies, Series 
A, No.16, ST/CTC/SER.A/16.
69 UNCTAD, ‘UNCTC Evolution,’ http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCEvolution.aspx [last accessed 
18.7.11].
70 See infra at Section 3.2.1.2 and Chapter 4 respectively.
71 Rubin (1995) note 45 at 1286.
The overarching general preoccupation with defending State sovereignty meant that there 
was little objection to the notion of a legally effective, if not outright legally binding, 
international instrument which would apply directly to corporations and bring them to 
account for their actions.  In particular there was no objection to human rights obligations 
being imposed upon TNCs but in any event the proposed enforcement and reporting 
mechanisms were weak.72  Despite the ultimate failure of the UNCTC to implement the 
Draft Code, its general efforts live on in the ongoing work of UNCTAD where 
consideration of TNCs issues is an important aspect of its work.73
3.2.1.2 The UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
  Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
...a train wreck... 74 
After the demise of the UNCTC and its Draft Code, the business and human rights 
movement entered its extended self-regulation phase with the emphasis on individual 
corporate codes of conduct and voluntary collective industry initiatives.  It became 
increasingly clear, however, that enlightened self-regulation alone was insufficient to 
tackle the problem of human rights abuses committed by business.  As outlined in Chapter 
1, numerous allegations of corporate misbehaviour arose throughout the 1990s and 
involved accusations of complicity in torture and slavery as well as allegations of direct 
violation of other human rights standards.  In particular, much publicity was given to so-
called sweat-shops and the use of child labour.75   By the end of the 1990s, the UN began 
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1990/94 of 12 June 1990. 
73 Eg the World Investment Reports.  See e.g. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009: Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, (UN: New York, 2009) http://www.unctad.org/en/
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Transnational Corporations.  See UNCTAD, ‘UNCTC Evolution,’ http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/
UNCTCEvolution.aspx [last accessed 18.7.11].
74 Remarks by John G Ruggie, UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Delivered at a 
Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility Co-Sponsored by the Fair Labor Association and the German 
Network of Business Ethics Bamberg, Germany, 14 June, 2006, http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-remarks-to-
Fair-Labor-Association-and-German-Network-of-Business-Ethics-14-June-2006.pdf at 2 [last accessed 
24.8.11].  The remarks regarding the Norms were subsequently repeated in 2007.
75 See for example: Nike: NikeWatch http://www.oxfam.org.au/explore/workers-rights/nike and generally 
http://www.oxfam.org.au/explore/workers-rights [last accessed 24.8.11]; Donna Karan: Lawsuit Accuses New 
York's Donna Karan of Running Sweatshops, New York Times 8th June 2000; See generally: http://
www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Sectors/Appareltextile; http://www.nosweat.org.uk/  and http://
www.cleanclothes.org [last accessed 24.8.11].
to demonstrate a renewed interest in bringing business actors within its domain, with a 
specific interest in deterring them from committing breaches of human rights.  Two 
completely contrasting responses emerged from the UN.  Firstly, Kofi Annan launched the 
Global Compact and secondly, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights produced the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises.76  As the Global Compact is an extant project it will be 
examined separately in more detail in Chapter 4.
3.2.1.2.1 The Emergence of the Norms
A subsidiary body of the then UN Commission on Human Rights,77 the Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,78 operating under Resolution 1998/8 
decided to establish a working group to examine the working methods and activities of 
transnational corporations.79  This resulted in the publication in 2003 of the controversial 
Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, with a view to their adoption by member states.80  What is important to note is 
that unlike any other post-UNCTC project the Norms sought to impose international 
legally binding obligations upon business actors.  
The Working Group endeavoured to draft a convention template which would impose 
human rights obligations upon business and which included a proposal for the monitoring 
and enforcement of those obligations.  This agenda was driven by particular members of 
the Sub-Commission and there was intense internal debate especially in relation to the 
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77 Replaced by the Human Rights Council, UNGA Res. A/RES/60/251 Human Rights Council, 3 April 2006, 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/502/66/PDF/N0550266.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed 14.7.11].
78 Replaced by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee which was established by Human Rights 
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2007, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/advisorycommittee.htm [last accessed 14.7.11].
79 Resolution 1998/8 of 20 August 1998.  Based on E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/11, the report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/12 
and Corr.1) submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with its resolution 1995/31 of 24 August 1995 
and the background document (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/6) prepared in accordance with its resolution 1997/11 
concerning transnational corporations.
80 Norms note 36.
inclusion of state-owned corporations.81   Many States viewed the imposition of rights and 
duties upon business enterprises as a direct challenge to the international legal status quo 
and as such opposed them vociferously.  Accordingly the Norms were met with powerful 
opposition from many quarters with States such as the USA criticising the imposition of 
human rights obligations on companies as being contrary to international law.82  Others 
such as Norway praised the Sub-Commission for its endeavours and in particular 
commended the attempt to put in place any type of dispute settlement mechanism.83  
The Norms were welcomed and rejected in equal measure. Despite the non-binding 
character of the Norms, NGOs largely supported the initiative in principle and welcomed 
this attempt to ensure that business entities respect human rights standards and the move 
away from exclusively soft law standards via the proposed convention.84  On the other 
hand, many member states, corporations and business organisations rejected the Norms as 
inappropriate, unworkable and erroneous and contended that they would operate contrary 
to the state-centric model of international law.85  Professor David Weissbrodt, the driving 
force behind the Norms has noted that the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and 
the International Organization of Employers (IOE) were ‘most forceful in trying to stop the 
Norms’ and ‘lobbied hard to kill the Norms.’86
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second session, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/12, of 28 August 2000, http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
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83 Norway’s submission ibid.
84 Report of the UNHCHR note 24, Submission by Amnesty International under Decision 2004/116 on the 
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to the UNHCHR, 29th September 2004. AI Ref. UN 411/2004; See also the Submission by Christian Aid, 
Submission by Human Rights Watch and Submission by Oxfam to the UNHCHR ibid.
85 Responses to the Note Verbale from the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Decision 2004/116 of 20 
April 2004 ‘Responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to 
human rights.’ For example, see the submissions of the USA and BP.  See also E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 
29 July 2003 ‘Joint Written Statement by the International Chamber of Commerce and the International 
Organization of Employers.’ 
86 Weissbrodt (2005) note 2 at 70.
Given these circumstances, it is therefore not surprising that the Norms foundered and 
were subsequently rejected by member states at the Commission on Human Rights for 
procedural reasons on the basis that the Norms had ‘not been requested by the Commission 
and as a draft proposal, has no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not 
perform any monitoring function in this regard.’87
Notwithstanding this rejection, the Commission on Human Rights at its 60th session, at the 
behest of the UK and other states, requested that the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (HCHR):
compile a report setting out the scope and legal status of existing initiatives and 
standards relating to the responsibility of transnational corporations and related 
business enterprises with regard to human rights, inter alia the draft norms contained 
in document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 and identifying outstanding issues.88
Further the High Commissioner was asked to identify ‘options for strengthening standards 
on the responsibilities of transnational corporations…with regard to human rights’ after 
consideration of existing standards (including the Norms) and extensive stakeholder 
consultation.89  The High Commissioner was also asked: 
to consult with all relevant stakeholders in compiling the report, including States, 
transnational corporations, employers’ and employees’ associations, relevant 
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and treaty 
bodies.90 
Before considering the submissions made to the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) in response to the requests, it is instructive to examine the 
content of the Norms.  It should be noted at this point that the Norms must be read in 
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regard to human rights’ at (c) (E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 22 April 2004 Report to the Economic and Social 
Council on the Sixtieth Session of the Commission, Agenda item 21(b)).
88 Ibid at (b).
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
conjunction with the accompanying Commentary which clarifies and elaborates on many 
of the issues raised.91
3.2.1.2.2 Content of the Norms
Weissbrodt has described the Norms as the ‘first non-voluntary initiative’ in corporate 
social responsibility.92  They are predicated on some basic human rights instruments, 
namely the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) which 
are referred to in the Preamble.93  It is through these instruments that the Sub-Commission 
proposed to impose the obligation to respect and protect human rights upon corporate 
entities and other business enterprises.  Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56 of the UN Charter rooted 
the Norms in the fundamental requirement to respect and observe human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  The UDHR makes reference in its preamble to its principles being 
applicable to ‘every organ of society’ and individuals as well as member states and 
governments and all should strive to promote respect for human rights, to ensure their 
universal recognition and to observe them.  Weissbrodt places particular importance on this 
reference94 but there was criticism of ‘the imprecision surrounding the source of [the 
Norms’] authority.’95
The Norms Working Group concluded that dozens of international and regional human 
rights instruments can potentially engage the responsibility of business actors and the 
Norms reflected this.  Varied in scope and nature, they included inter alia the Genocide 
Convention, the Convention Against Torture, the Slavery Convention, the Conventions on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and Discrimination Against Women, 
the ICCPR and ICESCR, the Geneva Conventions, the Convention on Biological 
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enterprises with regard to human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, 26 August 2003 (hereinafter ‘Norms 
Commentary’) http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.38.Rev.2.En?
Opendocument [last accessed 24.8.11].
92 Weissbrodt & Kruger note 17 at 903.
93 USTS 993 (1945) http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf [last accessed 23.10.11]  and 
UNGA res. 217A (III), UN Doc.A/811 10th December 1948 respectively. 
94 Weissbrodt (2005) note 2 at 61.
95 F.Calder & M.Culverwell, ‘Following Up the World Summit on Sustainable, Development Commitments 
on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Final Report, February 2005) at 
19.  See also e.g. Kinley, Nolan & Zerial (2007a) note 45 at 465-466 for comments about the process of 
creating the Norms. 
Diversity, the OECD Bribery Convention, the African Charter on Human Rights, the 
American Charter on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.96  
Reference was also made to the ILO Tripartite Declaration, the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises and the UN’s own Global Compact.  So there was a great breadth 
of human rights coverage but consequently this meant that the obligation incumbent on 
business actors was formulated in general, vague and non-specific terms.97  Unfortunately 
this led to confusion and a ‘lack of clarity as to exactly what was being prescribed and 
proscribed’98 (a criticism also levelled at other initiatives such as the Global Compact and 
the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises99).  Ruggie has criticised the Norms 
consistently and vociferously and he too has argued that the Norms’ approach was too hazy 
to be workable:
the norms would have extended to companies essentially the entire range of duties 
that States have, separated only by the undefined concepts of ‘primary’ versus 
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‘secondary’ obligations and ‘corporate sphere of influence,’ This formula emphasizes 
precisely the wrong side of the equation: defining a limited list of rights linked to 
imprecise and expansive responsibilities, rather than defining the specific 
responsibilities of companies with regard to all rights.100
Upendra Baxi also cautions against what he describes as the Norms’ ‘dense intertextuality’ 
because of their heavy reliance on a variety of external self-referential hard and, in 
particular, soft norms: 
The ever-proliferating forms, and formats, of ‘soft law’ production entail immense 
orders of self-referentiality. Each ‘soft law’ declaration thrives on multiple, even 
protean, references to the litany, even the litter, of prior textual enunciations. This 
process may be named as self-generating normative cannibalism, or self-devouring 
conspicuous consumption. Either way, this complicates practices of reading 
enunciatory texts.101
   He concludes that:
[t]his peculiar form of intertextuality remains worrisome for the future of human 
rights if only because it tends to produce continuing forms of human rights illiteracy 
for the human rights cognoscenti as well the laity.102
[This author can only agree with such a cogent analysis as she frequently feels illiterate.]
This criticism is particularly important because this intertextual approach has been adopted 
by other business and human rights projects at the international level and despite John 
Ruggie’s attempts it seems to have been repeated in the Guiding Principles discussed in 
Section 3.3.
Notwithstanding the effort to compel business actors to yield to general international 
human rights standards, it is important to note that Norm 1 emphasised that the primary 
responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights rests with member states at  
the international and national level and this encompasses ensuring that business actors 
observe them.  Over and above this reiteration of the general principle there was, however, 
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a specific attempt to impose an obligation upon business entities themselves.103  TNCs and 
others were to be obliged to exercise ‘due diligence in ensuring that their activities do not 
contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses:’104
Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment 
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognised in international as 
well as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and 
other vulnerable people.105 
This has been criticised as being a major departure from traditional international law and 
was the most controversial aspect of the Norms.106 However, this is an overstatement 
because, the Norms quite clearly stated that States have the primary obligation to protect 
human rights and as has already been shown, in any event TNCs are already the subjects of 
international law in a variety of areas.  The key objection was to the obligation to ‘ensure 
respect of and protect human rights’ because it was felt that this infringed upon duties 
reserved for States.  Nevertheless, a modified and non-binding corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights, as well as a due diligence requirement, have subsequently been 
included in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles discussed later in the chapter.107
The subsequent norms dealt with particular rights, so Norm 2 imposed the obligation to 
provide equality of opportunity and to refrain from acting in a discriminatory manner.  
Norm 3 referred to security of the person and prohibited business actors from either 
engaging in, or benefiting from, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and torture 
i.e. breaches of international humanitarian law.  Part D addressed the rights of workers and 
laid down a prohibition on forced labour as well as the economic exploitation of 
children.108  It also included obligations to provide a ‘safe and healthy working 
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environment’ and adequate remuneration and required business enterprises to ensure 
freedom of association and collective bargaining.109 
It is interesting to note that Part E was entitled ‘Respect for national sovereignty and 
human rights’ because here again was an emphasis on the national implementation of 
human rights standards and indeed a more traditional approach to international law. Under 
Norm 10, businesses were to be  required to observe ‘applicable norms of international 
law, national law and regulations’ in all states in which they operate. They were also 
specifically prohibited from engaging in bribery.110  Norm 12 stated that:
‘Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect economic, 
social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and contribute to their 
realization…’111 
It went on to identify particular rights in this context such as, inter alia, the right to 
development, adequate food and drinking water, privacy, education, housing, and freedom 
of religion.
Part F, Norm 13 related to consumer protection and good business practices. Part G, Norm 
14 imposed minimum standards of environmental protection.  Importantly, Part H 
introduced an implementation and monitoring system and required businesses to do the 
following:
1. Adopt internal codes of conduct implementing the Norms112
2. Submit to ‘periodic monitoring and verification by the United Nations’113
3. Provide ‘prompt, effective and adequate reparation’ to anyone adversely affected 
by a failure to comply with the Norms. 
It is crucial to note that the Norms attempted to implement a binding, independent 
monitoring, compliance and redress system, which is absent in any voluntary or self-
regulation model of corporate social responsibility.  This section was essential to the 
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consideration of the human rights responsibilities of business actors as it imposed specific 
legal obligations upon them.  As has been demonstrated such an attempt is entirely 
consistent with other areas of international law. 
In parallel with Norm 1, Norm 19 stressed yet again that states retained the primary 
obligation to observe and enforce human rights standards:
‘Nothing in these Norms shall be construed as diminishing, restricting, or adversely 
affecting the human rights obligations of States under national and international law,
….’114   
 
But Norm 19 also pointed out that business actors have obligations in international law in 
fields other than human rights:
… nor shall they be construed as diminishing, restricting, or adversely affecting other 
obligations or responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises in fields other than human rights115
Nobody was suggesting that the responsibilities of member states and governments to 
promote and protect human rights should be diminished.  But the question of whether a 
complementary regime should be imposed on business divided those who responded to the 
UNHCHR’s Note Verbale,116 as reflected in the Report on the Norms, presented to the 61st 
session of the Commission of Human Rights in March 2005. 117
3.2.1.2.3 Objections to the Norms
Who objected to the Norms and on what basis?  John Ruggie is scathing in his summary 
and  criticisms of the Norms writing that:
the Norms exercise became engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses. Even leaving 
aside the highly contentious though largely symbolic proposal to monitor firms and 
provide for reparation payments to victims, its exaggerated legal claims and 
conceptual ambiguities created confusion and doubt even among many mainstream 
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international lawyers and other impartial observers. Two aspects are particularly 
problematic in the context of this mandate. One concerns the legal authority 
advanced for the Norms, and the other the principle by which they propose to 
allocate human rights responsibilities between states and firms.118
Here Ruggie is referring to the efforts by the drafters of the Norms to draw their legal 
authority from the international Bill of Rights and the attempt impose direct human rights 
obligations on business actors.  
It is perhaps unsurprising that there was the usual divide between those supporting the 
‘business case’ and those supporting the ‘case for obligations.’  So, on the one hand, 
businesses and trade organisations and many member states objected to the introduction of 
the Norms and on the other, Non-Governmental Organisations and Trade Union 
Organisations supported their introduction.  This is a fairly crude division.  There were of 
course some member states that supported the initiative.  In fact, Norway actually 
expressed concern about the lack of an effective monitoring system.119  There were even a 
few business supporters, in particular members of the Business Leaders Initiative on 
Human Rights (BLIHR).120
A good example of an NGO response supporting the Norms was that of Amnesty 
International.  Amnesty had long espoused the Norms initiative121 and in its submission to 
the OHCHR, Amnesty praised the comprehensive nature of the norms, in contrast to the 
narrower approach of, for example, the Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines.  
Amnesty concluded that the Norms struck an appropriate balance between the obligations 
of member states and those of business.  Amnesty’s position seems to have been that both 
states and business have obligations to protect human rights, stating that:
Chapter 3 Business and Human Rights: The Case for a New Horizontality! ! 138
118 Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006) http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/110/27/PDF/G0611027.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 
24.10.11] (hereinafter ‘Interim Report (2006)’) at para.59.
119 Submission of Norway to the UNHCHR note 79.
120 See Kinley, Nolan & Zerial (2007a) note 45 at 464.  See generally http://www.blihr.org/ [last accessed 
24.8.11].
121 Submission by Amnesty International under Decision 2004/116 on the ‘Responsibilities of Transnational 
corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights’ to the UNHCHR, 29th September 
2004. AI Ref. UN 411/2004 http://www.humanrights.ch/home/upload/pdf/050729_submissionAIUN-
norms_2004.pdf [last accessed 21.7.11]
For human rights standards to contribute to the protection and promotion of human 
rights by companies, there must be transparent mechanisms and procedures by which 
to assess compliance with the standards. Companies must be accountable for their 
success or failure in meeting their human rights responsibilities.122
Amnesty also viewed the Norms as acting as a ‘catalyst for national legal reform’ and a 
‘benchmark to judge the adequacy of national laws and regulations.’ 123  There was also the 
clear plea for the imposition of ‘transparent mechanisms and procedures’ to assess 
compliance.124  In other words, the Norms should have been binding.  This line was 
adopted by other major NGO players, for example, Christian Aid, Human Rights Watch 
and Oxfam.125  
Opposing the Norms for a variety of reasons were among others, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the Caux Round Table and the International Organisation of 
Employers which stated that ‘developing and applying international human rights is an 
issue for states alone.’126  Much of the concern related to so-called ‘overlapping 
responsibilities.’  The submissions by the business and trade organisations were vociferous 
in stressing that the primary, and indeed sole, obligation to promote and protect human 
rights rests with member states and governments.  They supported increased ratification of 
human rights instruments by states. 
The most scathing rejection of the Norms was to be found in the submission of the United 
States of America.127  The US submission described the Norms as dangerous and 
conceptually flawed. The submission contends firstly that the Norms had no status, legal or 
otherwise, because they exceeded the mandate of the Sub-Commission and did not take the 
views of member states into account; secondly that the proposed monitoring regime also 
exceeded the mandate of the Sub-Commission; and finally that the Sub-Commission could 
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not create its own powers and functions.  These are all procedural points concerning the 
powers of the Sub-Commission.  They do not amount to a rejection of the principle that 
business actors could be subjected to human rights obligations in international law.
But the US submission did articulate this view. The US argued that where widespread 
human rights abuses occur they are a result of state action or inaction, ‘not generally’ as a 
result of acts of ‘private enterprises.’  It is worth pointing out that the US submission 
undermines itself in the recognition that human rights abuses are ‘not generally’ the 
responsibility of business actors.  This wording implies that, in some cases, business 
enterprises are responsible for human rights abuses. The US submission reiterated that any 
failure to enforce human rights standards rests with governments at the national level. The 
submission contended that the Norms were ‘dangerously shifting’ responsibility away from 
states to private actors.128 However, as has been shown, there is no need for the question of 
whether business actors can be held responsible in international law for human rights 
abuses to be seen as an alternative to the responsibilities of states in this respect.  The duty 
of business actors to positively respect human rights in international law can be 
constructed as complementary or supplementary to states’ obligations, and indeed the 
Norms reflect this position.129 
The US submission also posited that the Norms were themselves contrary to international 
law, contending that they were an ‘attempt to impose international obligations on entities 
that have neither accepted them nor played a part in their creation.’130  It considered that 
the focus of the international community should be on the Global Compact and concluded 
somewhat dramatically that the Norms ‘have no basis in fact, no basis in law’ and were 
‘doomed from the outset.’131  This position was supported in a submission by Maurice 
Mendelson, quoted in Chapter 2, that international legal obligations rest solely on States.132
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In essence, Mendelson’s analysis, and that of the United States, represents a conservative 
view of international law.  (In fact Mendelson’s analysis is incorrect as it fails to recognise 
entirely the existence of international criminal law as it applies to individuals.)  The main 
problem is that the US submission itself was based neither in fact nor law.  It failed utterly 
to acknowledge the abundant evidence that TNCs have been responsible in their own right, 
as well as in complicity with states, for violations of human rights.133  Key to its assertions 
are descriptions of political endeavours which seek to address corporate misbehaviour.  It 
categorically failed to demonstrate that there is any reason in international law why 
business actors should not be the subject of international legal standards protecting human 
rights.  The factual situation referred to by the USA and Mendelson simply no longer 
obtains.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there are numerous examples of international treaties 
which impose legal responsibilities upon business entities.  No good reason in 
international law to treat international human rights obligations differently has yet been 
articulated.
As highlighted in Chapter 1, Section 1.6.2, the Norms debacle led directly to the 
appointment of SGSR Ruggie in 2005 and the emergence of the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy framework which is implemented in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 2011.
 3.3 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
‘...the end of the beginning...’134
Chapter 1 of this dissertation set out the history of the mandate and the work of  SGSR 
Ruggie, as well as the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ background to the Guiding Principles.135  
They are the most important business and human rights initiative of recent years and thus 
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deserve close attention, not least because of their unanimous adoption by the UN Human 
Rights Council in June 2011. This section critiques the substantive approach and content of 
the Guiding Principles.
The product of eight years of extensive research and constructive multistakeholder 
consultation, the Guiding Principles represent a critical point in the business and human 
rights narrative and there can be no denying the empirical value of Ruggie’s 
contribution.136  Given their substantive approach and content, the GPs have elicited a 
variety of responses, from the very positive to the extremely negative.137  What remains to 
be seen is how the international community moves forward in the wake of their adoption 
by the Human Rights Council.  It would be easy for the issue to drop off the radar, 
notwithstanding the appointment of a new Human Rights Council Working Group as 
recommended by the GPs, or reference to them within, for example, the 2011 update to the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.138  This section of the chapter considers 
whether the GPs offer a viable solution to human rights violations by business actors.  It 
concludes that while they may offer a useful template for upstanding business actors to 
apply to their activities, ultimately they are a weak and disappointing culmination to SGSR 
Ruggie’s tenure because they do not impose binding obligations on business actors as 
dutyholders to respect human rights nor does it seem likely that they will ensure access to 
effective remedies for the victims of human rights abuses within the context of the Protect, 
Respect, Remedy framework.139  This means that it is probable that those determinedly less 
virtuous business actors will continue to evade responsibility.  Ruggie describes himself as 
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a principled pragmatist but it is difficult to see how the GPs, even accepting that they are a 
helpful starting point, will help the international community prevent, remedy or punish the 
most egregious human rights violations by those business actors who are intent on ignoring 
international human rights standards.140
3.3.1 Content of the Guiding Principles
3.3.1.1. Introduction and General Principles
The Introduction to the Guiding Principles summarises the history of and background to 
the work of SGSR Ruggie.  It outlines the three phases of his mandates: Firstly, 
identification and clarification of existing international standards and practices;141 
secondly, the recommendation phase and the publishing of the Protect Respect and 
Remedy framework (PRR);142 and finally the operationalising phase.143  Paragraphs 6, 7 
and 8 elaborate on the PRR explaining that the framework rests on the three pillars,144 that 
it has been endorsed by governments, business and civil society145 and that its 
multistakeholder approach ‘contributed to its widespread positive reception.’146
Clear about some of the GPs apparent limitations, however, the Introduction states that:
[Human Rights] Council endorsement of the Guiding Principles, by itself, will not 
bring business and human rights challenges to an end. But it will mark the end of the 
beginning: by establishing a common global platform for action, on which 
cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing any other 
promising longer-term developments.147
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Nevertheless, the GPs are venturing to become a ‘single, logically coherent and 
comprehensive template’148 for States and business actors although they are ‘not a tool kit’ 
to resolve the problem of  human rights violations by business because ‘one size does not 
fit all.’149 What they do strive to achieve is to identify ‘where the current regime falls short 
and how it should be improved’150 and to provide clarification of the obligations and 
applicable standards via the accompanying commentary.    
Ruggie’s report in 2010 set out ‘five priority areas’ which he identified as necessary for 
ensuring ‘greater policy coherence and effectiveness’ in the State duty to protect and which 
are elaborated upon to some extent by the GPs:
(a) safeguarding their own ability to meet their human rights obligations; (b) 
considering human rights when they do business with business; (c) fostering 
corporate cultures respectful of rights at home and abroad; (d) devising innovative 
policies to guide companies operating in conflict-affected areas; and (e) examining 
the cross-cutting issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction.151 
Furthermore, the stated aim of the GPs is to ‘not only to provide guidance that is practical, 
but also guidance informed by actual practice’152 therefore several of the GPs‘ key 
elements were ‘road-tested’ prior to their publication:
For example, those elaborating effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms involving business enterprises and communities in which they operate 
were piloted in five different sectors, each in a different country. The workability of 
the Guiding Principles’ human rights due diligence provisions was tested internally 
by 10 companies, and was the subject of detailed discussions with corporate law 
professionals from more than 20 countries with expertise in over 40 jurisdictions. 153
In addition, ‘off-the-record, scenario-based workshops’  were held with ‘officials from a 
cross-section of States’ who had ‘practical experience’ in dealing with the human rights 
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challenges arising in conflict zones.154  Such an approach is based clearly on Ruggie’s long-
stated desire to establish ‘principled pragmatism’155 in an area which he felt had long 
lacked an ‘authoritative focal point.’156  
Intensely critical of the Norms project and its attempt to create a binding set of rules 
governing business and human rights, Ruggie has stated that he views it as ‘inconceivable 
that any meaningful instrument encompassing all these features could be negotiated and 
adopted in the foreseeable future’ 157 which appears to contradict his earlier position where 
he refused to exclude international legislation as a possible future outcome.158  Indeed, he 
concluded in his 2006 Report that ‘normative undertakings and advocacy are essential 
ingredients for the continued development of the human rights regime in relation to 
business.’159  Nevertheless, he describes his current ‘principled pragmatism’ in these terms:
The first and most critical step in any  such endeavour is to set a clear strategic 
objective. I set mine as achieving the maximum reduction in corporate-related human 
rights harm in the shortest possible period of time.160
As stated, this is to be achieved ‘by establishing a common platform for action’ which 
ostensibly does not not preclude normative developments but given the opposition to an 
international treaty, it seems an unlikely prospect.161  Ruggie’s ‘common platform’ is of 
course founded upon the Protect, Respect and Remedy principles and envisions a clearly 
defined world where States have the obligation to protect human rights, business actors are 
encouraged to respect human rights and any human rights violations by business actors 
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ought to be remedied.  While there is no doubt that the GPs are founded upon the Protect, 
Respect, Remedy framework, as will be seen, there is some debate about the extent to 
which they reflect the original doctrine.  What is also evident is that Ruggie has actively 
stepped away from endorsing a binding international regulatory mechanism.162
Following the Introduction, several ‘General Principles’ are laid out.  The scope of the GPs 
is set out with a statement to the effect that they are applicable to all States and business 
actors, broadly defined i.e. ‘all business enterprises both transnational and others, 
regardless of their size, location, ownership and structure.’163  This broad and inclusive 
definition (reiterated in GP14) is to be welcomed as it eliminates the need for complex 
explanations which attempt to differentiate between organisational structures as 
highlighted in Chapter 1164 and encompasses Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
which are just as capable of violating human rights as larger entities.165  Required 
responses, however, may be dependent upon the capacity of an enterprise in certain 
contexts,166 more of which later. 
Most significant, and the target for most criticism, is the fact that the GPs are explicitly 
non-binding in their application:
Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law 
obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have 
undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights.167
Notwithstanding this limitation, the GPs are seeking to enhance ‘standards and practices 
with regard to business and human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected 
individuals and communities, and thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable 
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globalization.’168  Of course, it remains to be seen whether this is achievable and will 
necessitate further research.
3.3.2 Substantive Guiding Principles
There are thirty-one GPs in total, divided into three sections which correspond to the PRR 
framework i.e. the State duty to protect human rights; the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights; and access to remedy.  Each will be considered in turn.
3.3.2.1 The State duty to protect human rights
Principle 1 sets out that as a matter of international law, all States have a duty to protect 
against human rights violations ‘within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, 
including business enterprises.’  The obligation requires States to take ‘appropriate steps’ to 
‘prevent, investigate, punish and redress’ any such abuses by means of ‘effective policies, 
legislation, regulations and adjudication.’169  According to the Commentary, the ‘State duty 
to protect is a standard of conduct’ and ‘[t]herefore, States are not per se responsible for 
human rights abuse by private actors.’170  It does make clear, however, that the actions of 
business actors may be attributable to a State and that a State’s obligations may be 
breached if it fails to take the appropriate necessary steps.171 
Principles 2 and 3 elaborate on a State’s duty to protect.  States have a duty to make clear 
that there is a general expectation that business actors ‘domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction’  will ‘respect human rights.’172  Thus ‘laws,’ and  ‘policies’ should be put in 
place together with ‘effective guidance’ for business actors173 and a ‘smart mix of 
measures’ should be employed by States which according to Principle 8 is to be achieved 
by ‘policy coherence’ across different government department and State institutions.   So 
for example, Principle 9 urges States to ensure that human rights protection is maintained 
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when negotiating investment treaties.  Principle 10 encourages ‘capacity building’ and 
‘awareness raising’ as a means for ensuring policy coherence.  Furthermore, States should 
‘encourage and where appropriate, require’ business actors to communicate about how they 
are dealing with human rights ‘impacts.’174  The Commentary to GP2 concludes that ‘ [a]t 
present States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate 
the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction.’  
This arguably incorrect statement has caused much discontent among NGOs as will be 
seen later.
State-owned enterprises are covered by the GPs in Principle 4 and ‘adequate oversight’ is 
required in relation to State contractors and service providers.  Privatisation of State 
functions does not mean that human rights obligations can be relinquished175 and States 
have a duty to ‘promote’ human rights among contractors and service-providers.176  
Furthermore there is a specific provision relating to conflict zones and their associated 
‘heightened risks’ of human rights abuses.177  States should engage with178 and assist179 
business enterprises operating in conflict zones to ensure that human rights are not being 
abused and to help them assess the risks.  In particular States should deny ‘access to public 
support and services for a business enterprise that is involved with gross human rights 
abuses and refuses to cooperate in addressing the situation.’180  Businesses should also 
respect international humanitarian law.181
3.3.2.2 The corporate responsibility to respect human rights
Principle 11 contains the key provision that business actors ‘should avoid infringing on the 
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
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are involved.’[emphasis added]  It is a non-mandatory requirement and is merely a ‘global 
standard of expected conduct’ which encompasses the ‘taking of adequate measures’ to 
prevent, mitigate and ‘where appropriate’ remediate ‘adverse human rights impacts.’182  
This includes situations where  there is no direct contribution by a business actor but 
involves its commercial partners, other enterprises in the ‘value chain’ and other entities 
with links to the business.183  The human rights ‘benchmarks’ for business actors are to be 
found in the International Bill of Rights and in the ‘eight ILO core conventions as set out 
in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.’184  The GPs 
acknowledge in the Commentary that ‘some human rights may be at greater risk than 
others in particular industries or contexts’ therefore requiring particular attention e.g. the 
right to life in a conflict zone.185  In addition, they stipulate that care should be taken to 
protect the rights of specific groups such as women, children, minorities.186  Violations are 
to be judged on their severity on a case by case basis according to their ‘scale, scope and 
irremediable character.’187
Business actors are expected to implement human rights policies stating a baseline 
commitment to human rights as well as putting due diligence and remediation processes 
into practice.188  This shifts the GPs into operational matters.  GP16 expects businesses to 
produce a human rights policy statement at the most senior level of the business.  GPs 
17-21 then elaborate on the practical steps that businesses ought to undertake in order to 
respect human rights.  The important due diligence principle is set out in broad terms in 
GP17 whereby businesses should ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their adverse human rights impacts.  GPs 18-21 elaborate on the ‘essential 
components’ of due diligence.  It requires businesses to harness ‘internal and/or 
independent external human rights expertise’189 and to engage in ‘meaningful consultation 
Chapter 3 Business and Human Rights: The Case for a New Horizontality! ! 149
182 Ibid, GP11 Commentary at 13.
183 Ibid, GP13.
184 Ibid, GP12 i.e. UDHR note 93, ICCPR note 35 and ICESCR note 96.
185 Guiding Principles note 134, GP12 Commentary at 13.
186 Ibid, GP12 Commentary at 14.
187 Ibid, GP 14 Commentary at 14.
188 Ibid, GP15.
189 Ibid, GP18(a).
with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders’190 as appropriate in order 
to ascertain ‘actual or potential adverse human rights risks.191  Furthermore, businesses are 
expected to effectively integrate the findings of the due diligence process into their 
operations,192 to track the effectiveness of the response to adverse due diligence findings193 
and to communicate externally their response to such findings.194  Where there is a finding 
of adverse impact, businesses should  either create or cooperate with ‘legitimate’ 
remediation processes, 195 the first response, however, should be to mitigate the adverse 
impacts.196
3.3.2.3 Access to remedy
Principle 25 requires States to ensure access to ‘effective remedies’ otherwise the State’s 
obligation to protect is rendered ‘weak or meaningless.’197  An effective remedy may be 
achieved via judicial or non-judicial, administrative or legislative means.198  States should 
take steps to remove barriers to access to judicial mechanisms for addressing human rights 
violations by business as well as ensuring their effectiveness.199  
In the case of non-judicial remedies, which ‘industry, multi-stakeholder and other 
collaborative initiatives’ are encouraged to support,200 a variety of mechanisms may be 
suitable including ‘mediation’ and ‘adjudication’ as well as other ‘culturally appropriate’ 
options.201  Principle 28 encourages States to facilitate the use of and access to non-State-
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based grievance mechanisms which may be created by a business actor itself, ‘industry 
associations’ or a ‘multistakeholder’ group.  Regional and international human rights 
bodies also fall within this category.  Furthermore, businesses themselves are encouraged 
to implement operational mechanisms for dealing with adverse impacts.202  Finally, all 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms should be ‘legitimate,’ ‘accessible,’ ‘predictable,’ 
‘equitable,’ ‘transparent,’ ‘rights-compatible’ and ‘a source of continuous learning: drawing 
on relevant measures to identify lessons for improving the mechanism and preventing 
future grievances and harms.’203  Mechanisms implemented at the operational level should 
be ‘[b]ased on engagement and dialogue: consulting the stakeholder groups for whose use 
they are intended on their design and performance, and focusing on dialogue as the means 
to address and resolve grievances.’204
The following sections will address negative and positive aspects of the Guiding 
Principles.
3.3.3 Critiquing the Guiding Principles
The major criticisms of the GPs have come from the NGO sector as well as a few 
academics205 but given their recent publication and adoption by the Human Rights Council 
there is limited in-depth analysis of the GPs at present.  Unsurprisingly States and business 
actors themselves have welcomed them.206  There appear to be three general flaws in the 
GPs and each will be addressed in turn, as well as arguments supportive of the GPs.  The 
key problems with the GPs are that, firstly, their language results in what has been 
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perceived as a weakening of States’ human rights responsibilities, secondly, no binding 
duties are imposed on business actors and thirdly, there is a failure to require that 
enforceable remedies are provided and accessible for those impacted by human rights 
violations by business actors.
3.3.3.1 Weakening of States’ Human Rights Responsibilities
One of the most serious criticisms of the GPs relates to what is perceived as their flawed 
statement of current international human rights law.  NGOs have condemned them for 
elaborating:
...a more regressive approach towards the human rights obligations of States and the 
responsibilities of non-state actors than authoritative interpretations of international 
human rights law and current practices.207
A joint statement on the Draft Guiding Principles by leading NGOs during an open 
consultation period attacks them as ‘weak,’ for not being ‘a statement of the law’208 and 
that ‘the State duty to protect’ lacks ‘specificity,’ moreover, they ‘at times depart from 
existing interpretations of international law provided by UN human rights treaty bodies.’209  
NGOs are not the only critics of this aspect of the Guiding Principles.  Robert 
McCorquodale commenting on the draft GPs states that:
the international obligations of state responsibility  makes clear that states are legally 
responsible for all actions of all state agents and entities, and for all actions within 
the state by non-state actors...and human rights treaty bodies have affirmed this.210 
Jägers & van Genugten argue in a brief comment that the GP formulation ‘contradicts and 
weakens clearly established obligations for States.’211  
In particular there is concern that the State duty to protect has been watered down with 
Principle 2 stating that States ought to ‘encourage’ business enterprises to respect human 
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rights.  It is certainly a departure from Ruggie’s own report in 2008 which seemed to 
advocate ‘regulatory action’ on the part of States.212  Given other international 
developments, it is surprising that Ruggie has opted to conclude that ‘at present, States are 
not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial 
activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction’213  Jägers & van 
Genugten argue that this is factually incorrect if one has regard to, for example, the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.214  
3.3.3.2 Failure to Define Business Actors as Dutyholders
The failure of the GPs to impose a duty on business actors to respect human rights and to 
more carefully clarify the extent of their responsibility has been the source of much 
criticism by civil society, unsurprisingly.215  Human Rights Watch has described the GPs as 
‘minimalist’ and accuses the Human Rights Council of having ‘squandered an opportunity 
to take meaningful action to curtail business-related human rights abuses.’216  NGOs have 
concluded that the GPs ‘therefore risk undermining efforts to strengthen corporate 
responsibility and accountability for human rights.’217   Jägers and van Genugten contend 
that GPs are not worded strongly enough and that by not requiring business actors to 
respect human rights, the GPs fail to acknowledge business actors as dutyholders.218  
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Guiding Principle 11 does not impose any duties or obligations upon business actors 
stating only that:
Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights 
impacts with which they are involved.219 [emphasis added]
In the commentary the non-mandatory aspect of this foundational principle is further 
clarified being described as ‘a global standard of expected conduct.’  In Ruggie’s 2009 
Report it was noted that there was ‘near-universal recognition by all stakeholders’ of the 
corporate social duty to respect human rights.220  If this is the case, why then do the GPs 
not acknowledge this by framing the obligation in mandatory terms?  Ruggie’s consistent 
rejection of and justification for the non-mandatory approach, as already highlighted, is on 
the basis that he believes that any international legislative approach would be unsuccessful. 
It seems, however, that the GPs have missed a prime opportunity to, at the very least, 
enshrine and formalise an already generally accepted principle. 
Ruggie himself has objected to what he describes as a ‘bizarre’ critical response by NGOs 
to the proposals.  In a robust letter to the Financial Times in January 2011 he admonished 
them for attacking the GPs and asked: ‘[h]ow much longer will they [the NGOs] ask 
victims to wait in the name of some abstract and elusive global regulatory regime when 
practical results are achievable now?’221  In an equally vigorous response Amnesty 
International replied: 
We do not believe the draft guiding principles effectively protect victims' rights or 
ensure their access to reparations...Let's be frank - the real opposition to effective 
guiding principles does not come from Amnesty International but from business 
interests. The draft guiding principles enjoy broad support from business, precisely 
because they require little meaningful action by business.222
Chapter 3 Business and Human Rights: The Case for a New Horizontality! ! 154
219 Note 134.
220 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, ‘Business and human rights: Towards 
operationalizing the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework,’ A/HRC/11/13 22 April 2009 http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf [last accessed 25.8.11] at para.
46.  See also para. 47.
221 Ruggie, Letter to Financial Times, note 215.
222 Brown, Letter to Financial Times, note 215.
The reality is that despite twenty years of voluntary CSR, many business actors continue to 
violate human rights.  As Penelope Simons points out: 
it is difficult to see how, without the complement of international legal obligations, 
this privatized voluntary process will be significantly more effective than other 
voluntary self-regulation regimes in regulating and enforcing the compliance of 
corporations with human rights norms.223   
While it is true that there may be some positives achieved by employing a hybrid or smart 
mix of regulatory approaches, nevertheless, human rights abuses will continue unabated 
absent binding rules and strong enforcement mechanisms which punish wrongdoers and 
offer redress for victims.
3.3.3.3 Lack of Access to and Enforcement of Effective Remedies
In the following three chapters it will be demonstrated that the lack of access to and 
enforcement of remedies or ‘remedies deficit’224 is a fundamental problem in this field.  In 
particular, where some form of remedial mechanism is available, such as the OECD 
Specific Instance Procedures, major problems arise in relation to enforcement in the 
absence of mandatory regulatory provisions.225  This is especially problematic with rogue 
business actors who have no inclination to adhere to human rights standards and do not 
respond to a ‘carrot’ approach.   Imposing an obligation on States to ensure access to 
effective remedies does not necessarily enhance the impact of the GPs.  
There is a real danger that implementing the GPs could become a paper exercise with 
business actors producing meaningless policies and statements and States creating more 
ineffectual non-binding mechanisms.  There is also a lack of institutional involvement in 
the process and McCorquodale advocates the creation of ‘institutional mechanism/s’ for 
the purposes of ‘periodic monitoring and reporting, critical thinking and best practices, 
advice and support, and standard-setting for human rights impact assessments.’226  In some 
ways it may be difficult to distinguish the proposed processes from the discredited 
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Communications on Progress required as a prerequisite of membership of the Global 
Compact and discussed in Chapter 4.  It will be interesting to see what the practical and 
concrete outcomes of the GPs will be other than to keep corporate lawyers busy for a 
while, as evidenced by the following section.
These flaws will be addressed throughout the rest of this dissertation generally.  This is 
because it is the lack of a mandatory regulatory regime coupled with the likely lack of an 
effective remedy for those impacted by business actors’ human rights violations that 
exposes John Ruggie’s conclusions in the form of the GPs to ongoing criticism.227  
Ruggie’s own Protect, Respect and Remedy framework recognises the limitations of 
judicial mechanisms in many states and also concludes that non-judicial mechanisms must 
be ‘credible and effective’228 i.e. legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, rights 
compatible and transparent.  It is difficult to see how a non-binding remedy which 
otherwise meets the criteria of the PRR framework and the Guiding Principles qualifies as 
credible and effective. The examples discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate that 
while there is a place for various types of remedy, ultimately mandatory international rules 
are required to operate in parallel with voluntary options to act as a deterrent, to punish the 
wrongdoers and to provide enforceable redress for victims.  Sir Geoffrey Chandler 
expressed it in the clearest terms in his comments on the draft GPs:
Neither voluntarism nor legislation on their own can meet the need. History 
demonstrates that voluntarism does not work; and the international legislation 
required lies years, if not decades, ahead and cannot embrace the whole of the 
diversity and protean nature of corporate activity. We need a wider vision from both 
companies and NGOs and the support of governments before it will be possible to 
place the last block on the foundations that the SRSG has established.229
Simons also agrees with these conclusions, stating that ‘softer norms and forms of 
regulation‘ can offer a ‘flexibility‘ which is absent in binding regulatory approaches.230  It 
is unlikely, however, that the new UN Working Group is going to move things forward to 
the satisfaction of many observers, in particular consideration of international legislation, 
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while in the meantime human rights violations continue with little or no negative 
consequences for the business actors involved.
3.3.4 Positive Aspects to the Guiding Principles
Notwithstanding the limitations of the GPs there are some positives to be gleaned from 
their emergence.  As Ruggie hoped, there are already some tangible outcomes:
Numerous individual companies are already aligning their policies and practices with 
the UN Guiding Principles. And consulting firms and corporate law firms are 
sending out client memos offering their services to make companies ‘Ruggie proof’-- 
honestly, I didn't invent the term; they did.231
Ruggie is himself taking up a corporate consulting role now that his mandate as SGSR has 
ended,232 although it is difficult not to conclude that Ruggie-proofing commercial policies 
may simply involve implementation of the most basic human rights norms, or lowest 
common denominator, as opposed to demonstrable best practice.
The broad and inclusive reach of the GPs is also a positive step, covering all business 
enterprises and their supply chains.  Furthermore, the emphasis on a variety of regulatory 
mechanisms is to be welcomed.  It will be seen that in the context of the Global Compact, 
for example, that a new governance approach to regulation can reap some concrete results, 
albeit limited ones.233
In terms of the process of producing the GPs, the multistakeholder and inclusive approach 
means that there is a certain sense of ownership of the process which is to be applauded, 
despite many NGO’s distancing themselves subsequently from the final product.  In 
addition, Scott Jerbi points out that: 
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this appears to have been the first time in the sixty plus year history of the UN 
human rights system that member states have unanimously endorsed a set of 
principles they themselves had not negotiated.234
It is quite clear that the GPs have been well received by States235 as well as being ‘strongly 
welcomed’ by the European Commission236 but this is almost certainly because they do not 
attempt to put in place a binding regulatory framework.  Similarly, the GPs have been 
welcomed positively by many business actors such as Total, Coca-Cola and ING, as well 
as business groups like the International Chamber of Commerce.237  A cynic might argue 
that self-interest and the profit motive demand such approval.  Nevertheless, Jerbi 
describes the GPs as a ‘game changer’ because within Paragraph 4 of Resolution 17/4 there 
is an ‘acknowledgement of a deliberate strategy of incremental progress based on evidence 
and the potential for future legal standards in the years ahead.’  He cites the creation of the 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights with its three year mandate as evidence of 
this strategy.  
Of course it remains to be seen whether the GPs are in fact a ‘game changer’ or a 
‘squandered opportunity’ but what is clear is that they are indeed flawed, especially with 
the omission of binding rules or any form of effective remedy, things which were 
highlighted by Ecuador at the Human Rights Council in June 2011238 and which continue 
to be highlighted by civil society.   The following section explains why the failure to 
implement a binding duty for business actors weakens international human rights generally  
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and how extending human rights dutyholder status to business actors is entirely consistent 
with human rights principles. 
3.4  The Failure to Recognise Business Actors as Dutyholders in Relation to 
 Human Rights is Problematic
This chapter, of course, acknowledges that there are inevitably situations where States are 
unable or unwilling to meet their human rights obligations.  It is not proposing that 
businesses step in to fill the gap left by bad or weak States.  Rather, it argues that as 
members of the international community and by virtue of general legal principles, 
expressed in international human rights instruments, businesses are required to adhere to 
human rights standards, contrary to the GPs just discussed.  Thus they ought to be held 
either directly responsible for human rights violations or responsible by association.  Such 
mandatory rules ought to apply in addition to the separate human rights obligations of 
States.  As such the subsequent section of this chapter satisfies Muchlinski’s criteria for 
directly enforceable human rights obligations:
If MNEs are to be subject to direct and legally enforceable obligations to observe 
fundamental human rights, the grounds for doing so must be strong and completely 
unassailable.239
Furthermore, these human rights obligations apply to business activities in all States and at 
all times.  In particular, business actors should not be permitted to take advantage of failing 
States, difficult economic circumstances or conflict situations.  Many host States will be 
simply ‘unable to fulfil their ‘duty to protect’’240 under the GPs, for the reasons elaborated 
in Chapter 1.  The remainder of this chapter therefore addresses the issue of the public/
private divide in human rights as well as the issue of which human rights standards apply 
or ought to apply directly to business actors.  International human rights law sets out a 
multitude of human rights norms and clearly business enterprises are capable of violating a 
great many different human rights.  Nevertheless, some human rights norms are more 
pertinent than others and it is helpful to try to identify which apply.  This is of particular 
importance for analysing the effectiveness of the different international initiatives at 
holding businesses to account for human rights violations in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
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It is uncontroversial and clear that the primary responsibility for protecting human rights 
rests with States.  As SRSG Ruggie has put it, ‘[a]ll sides agree that the state is the primary  
duty bearer in relation to human rights.’241  In addition to the UN Guiding Principles it has 
been highlighted and adhered to in the work of the Global Compact and in the ill-fated 
Norms project where Norm 19 stated:
Nothing in these Norms shall be construed as diminishing, restricting, or adversely 
affecting the human rights obligations of States under national and international 
law…242
One might question, therefore, why international law is relevant at all in relation to 
business actors conducting commercial activities in States other than their own?  The 
answer is simple.  If, as argued in the previous chapter, business actors are subjects of 
international law, then international human rights standards apply either directly to a 
business or by association i.e. responsibility is engaged via the supply chain.  Furthermore, 
to deny that business actors have or ought to have human rights obligations is to reject the 
founding precepts of international human rights law.  
3.5  Recognising Business Actors as Dutyholders Would Place the Individual 
 at the Heart of the Human Rights Paradigm
It is true that human rights principles were established originally as a response to excessive 
State power and its abuse, nevertheless they express agreed minimum standards of 
behaviour which operate to uphold the collective good and ought not to be limited to 
States.  Rights ‘skeptics’ criticise the ‘self-imposed limitations’ which result from the 
acceptance of ‘the public/private distinction’ and which construe human rights in a narrow 
vertical sense:
Rights thinking has predominantly concerned the relationship between the individual 
and the state.  As traditionally understood, the human rights project is to erect 
barriers between the individual and the state, so as to protect human autonomy and 
self-determination from being violated or crushed by governmental power. 243
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This traditional approach ignores the truth of a globalised world.  It may be true that no 
one envisaged that the power and influence of business actors would increase so radically 
and in such a short space of time, or that their activities would be capable of threatening 
the ‘collective good’ in the guise of individual rights and freedoms.  Certainly forty years 
ago Detlev Vagts in his classic article The Multinational Enterprise: A new Challenge for 
Transnational Law questioned whether transnational business actors wielded significant 
power at all and disputed the views of those who argued otherwise, dismissing them as 
‘Nationalists, Muscovites and New Leftists:’
Others draw a far more malign picture of the autonomous MNE. Essentially free of 
moral or legal constraints, their MNE grinds remorselessly toward its financial and 
technological objectives, ‘el pulpo’ (the octopus) spreading its tentacles over the 
world and holding other countries, in particular the less developed, to ransom. With 
its enormous profits, it surpasses its ancestors, the investment bankers, who bore the 
burden of the imperialism described by Lenin and Hobson. In this picture the MNE 
is no longer the arm of the state; rather, the marines are the loyal servitors of 
capitalist enterprise.244
He concludes:
After protracted contemplation of the MNE, I cannot find in it the malevolent 
influence, discernible by some observers, which leads us into interventions all over 
the world and drags down less developed countries into economic vassalage while 
sustaining the economic stability of Nigeria and South Africa. Its political power 
does not seem particularly formidable, and there is a good case for the proposition 
that it pays its way in host countries- to the point where one might argue that, 
particularly in its tendency to diffuse technology with great speed, it relatively 
disadvantages the home country. If the MNE in fact poses a threat to human freedom 
it is because of its peculiar effectiveness. Its capacity to pursue a centralized and 
coordinated strategy removes decision-making power far from the reach of people 
intimately affected by it.245
Events throughout the latter part of the twentieth century have proved him wrong, in 
relation to his analysis of political power at least, and the international community ought to 
have reacted to curb this power.  As Karl Klare puts it:
Chapter 3 Business and Human Rights: The Case for a New Horizontality! ! 161
244 D.Vagts, ‘The Multinational Enterprise: A new Challenge for Transnational Law’ 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
739-792 (1970) at 745.
245 Ibid at 791.
Unquestionably, a just society requires…protections [against States], but human 
freedom can also be invaded or denied by nongovernmental forms of power, by 
domination in the so-called ‘private sphere.’246
Andrew Clapham describes several trends which are forcing us ‘to redefine the parameters 
of the public and private spheres’ and the international community ought to acknowledge, 
therefore, that non-State private actors bear human rights obligations.247  Only two of those 
trends are relevant to this dissertation and Clapham’s arguments are rooted in an analysis 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, nevertheless, they can be applied to human 
rights generally.  Firstly, he categorises business actors (among others) as one of the 
emerging ‘new fragmented centres of power’ and  concludes that their rise means that:
...the individual now perceives authority, repression, and alienation in a variety of 
new bodies, whereas once it was only the State which was perceived ...to exhibit 
these characteristics.248
It is certainly possible to take issue with Clapham’s view of history in relation to business 
actors being ‘emerging...centres of power’ as one need only look at the extensive record of 
abuse of power by, for example, United Fruit Company and International Telephone and 
Telegraph in Latin America throughout the twentieth century.249  Nevertheless the salient 
point is that today there is definitely a broader global awareness, assisted by vastly 
increased access to information and technology,250 that business actors exert great 
authority, engage in repression and alienate communities than perhaps was apparent just a 
few decades ago.  In such circumstances it makes sense to protect the individual from the 
abuse of power no matter the source of the abuse.
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The second relevant trend, is that narrow, traditional conceptions of the ‘private sphere’ 
have become outdated and must be ‘re-evaluated.’251  So the ‘classical distinction...which 
identifies the public with the nation-State and the private with the free market’ must be re-
examined because ‘[t]he public/private distinction can quickly become a weapon utilized 
in order to deny or claim jurisdiction.’252
As outlined in Chapter 1 Section 1.5, this is precisely what happened with regard to the 
question of whether private business actors can violate human rights.  Accountability and 
responsibility were bypassed by resorting to strict and outmoded conceptions of the private 
sphere.  Clapham argues that:
The mistake is to jump from a concern to protect [human rights] to the belief that 
society can be divided into two realms: one which is inherently under the jurisdiction 
of the apparatus of the nation-State, and one where the State is forbidden to enter.253
It was the slavish adherence to the latter belief, motivated by profit-driven self-interest, 
that led to the business community, and many States, opposing the imposition of any 
human rights obligations upon commercial entities and the situation remains largely 
unchanged today.  As will be demonstrated, however, the State is advancing slowly into the 
‘forbidden’ private zone, albeit at the behest of NGOs and civil society.  
Despite his focus on the ECHR Clapham concludes more generally, that ‘international 
human rights law is moving towards the recognition and prohibition of private action 
which violates human rights.’  Halting this advance would be an entirely objectionable 
course of action.  Unfortunately while there has been some recognition of private actions 
which violate human rights at the UN, the OECD, the EU and elsewhere, States remain 
reluctant to impose a mandatory prohibition on business actors and persist with a non-
mandatory approach to the problem.  This was recently and resoundingly demonstrated by 
the unanimous approval of the non-mandatory Guiding Principles at the UN Human Rights 
Council.254  Clapham argues that as a matter of policy:
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...the consequences of failing to protect against private violations are undesirable; not  
only does such a failure leave vulnerable groups and individuals unprotected, but it 
also creates a false public/private dichotomy capable of functioning as a tool 
arbitrarily to weed out applicants and potential and deny them access to justice.255
Such a conclusion holds whether in the context of the ECHR or otherwise.  Adherence to a 
rigid division between the public and private spheres flies in the face of the principles that 
underpin human rights, specifically, that the individual is, or ought to be, at its centre and 
that the individual requires protection from abuse of power.  It is thus irrelevant who or 
what is exercising that power. In a human rights paradigm individuals are placed at the 
heart of the international legal system and in theory, the concerns of States and others 
ought to be subordinate.  As Hersch Lauterpacht wrote:  
The recognition of inalienable human rights and the recognition of the individual as a 
subject of international law are synonymous.  To that vital extent they both signify 
the recognition of a higher, fundamental law not only on the part of States but also, 
through international law, on the part of the organized community itself.  That 
fundamental law, as expressed in the acknowledgement of the ultimate reality and the 
independent status of the individual, constitutes both the moral limit and the 
justification of the international legal order.256    
In other words, as Lauterpacht put it, individuals ‘by dint of the acknowledgement of…
fundamental rights and freedoms’ became the ‘ultimate subject of international law.’257  As 
such, they ought to be protected no matter the source of the threat.  The duty attaches when 
there is the power and ability to violate human rights.  Such a theory admits that a 
functional approach rather than one based upon the idea of the State is more appropriate.  It  
does not deny that human rights principles emerged as a response to the past behaviour of 
States but it acknowledges that for human rights to continue to be protected, their 
conception must move with the times.  That is not to say that the rights themselves change, 
as will be seen later in this chapter, simply that they must operate in a changing 
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international environment.258  In this case, the notion of the State being the sole dutyholder 
in relation to human rights must be altered and a new paradigm developed whereby new 
dutyholders are acknowledged.
Social context is paramount when examining the responsibility of business actors for 
human rights violations.  Since the 1990s, as Chapter 1 indicated, there has been a 
tremendous paradigm shift on the international plane and States are sharing the stage with 
a variety of non-State actors including business actors.  States can no longer lay sole claim 
to the international arena.  If business actors have become so big and so powerful that 
many of them dwarf State economies, then it is self-evident that their power should also be 
contained, in particular as regards the individual and in relation to human rights abuses.  
An insistence that human rights can only be violated by States or their  agents is to ignore 
the purpose of international human rights law, that is, the protection of the individual.  
Kamenka notes that ‘behind human rights lies a proper concern for human autonomy and 
development’259 and this is what ought to be protected from the abusive activities of 
business actors.  The ‘ultimate reality,’ as Lauterpacht would have it, is that business actors 
violate the fundamental law of human rights but in order to protect the individuals affected 
this of course means that such non-State business actors must be acknowledged as subjects 
of international law and human rights dutyholders.  Andrew Clapham expresses it thus:
By jettisoning the State-nexus test as a jurisprudential trigger, the application of 
human rights in the private sphere demands a concentration on victims rather than on 
State actors.260
Currently, ‘rights charters almost invariably concern restrictions on state power and 
therefore leave intact many forms of ‘private’ domination…’261  As will be demonstrated in 
subsequent chapters, however, this paradigm is slowly shifting with human rights doctrine 
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spreading into the so-called private sphere, nevertheless it is argued that the lack of binding 
rules means that ‘private domination’ remains intact.
Even, if international law does not apply directly, in any event, as stated at numerous 
points the primary responsibility for protecting human rights rests with States themselves 
and it would seem obvious that businesses operating transnationally would be subject to 
the laws and jurisdiction of a host State.  Indeed, this principle is enunciated in 
international human rights instruments ranging from Article 56 of the UN Charter and the 
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to paragraph I (5) of the Vienna 
Declaration which reiterates that ‘it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’262  Of course, this is to be achieved through national measures:
The human rights obligations assumed by each government require it to use all 
appropriate means to ensure that actors operating within its territory or otherwise 
subject to its jurisdiction comply with national legislation designed to give effect to 
human rights.263
Furthermore it is a principle which has been elaborated in the UN Guiding Principles via 
the ‘Protect’ requirement, albeit in a way which appears to weaken the obligation.264  So it 
follows that where business enterprises violate the right to life, or utilise forced labour or 
child labour, the host State has the obligation to stop the abuses and to provide redress 
mechanisms for those harmed.  This assumption, however, ignores the reality of the 
situation.  All too often States themselves are unwilling or unable to uphold human rights 
standards for multifarious reasons.  This does not mean that business enterprises ought to 
be allowed to violate human rights with impunity. Nor does it mean that business actors 
should do the job of the State.  There are several separate but interrelated issues to 
consider: (1) the responsibility of the host State; (2) the responsibility of the home State; 
and (3) the responsibility of the business enterprise.  This dissertation is concerned 
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primarily with the third category, however, the first and second categories are addressed 
briefly in the next sections.
3.5.1 Responsibility of Host States and Home States for Human Rights 
 Violations by Business Actors
There are various reasons why a host State is unwilling and/or unable to protect human 
rights. The host State itself may be complicit in the human rights violations, for example in 
Burma/Myanmar where the government was instrumental in the provision of forced labour 
for the construction of infrastructure for a gas pipeline.265  Or in Ecuador where oil 
concessions were granted to US oil companies such as Texaco which then ravaged the 
environment using sub-standard technology and caused untold damage to the indigenous 
population.266  In that case, the State-owned oil company took over the tainted operations 
and continued to exploit the natural resources, perpetuating the human rights abuses.267  
Other States simply do not wish to implement their human rights obligations because of a 
general antipathy towards, what are perceived as, ‘Western’ human rights.  Still others cite 
economic pressures as justification for failure to enforce human rights standards.    It is this 
final reason which is perhaps the key to understanding State and business actors’ resistance 
to mandatory regulation.  The drive for foreign direct investment and the profit margin 
steer them away from an expansion of the category of human rights dutyholders.  It seems 
that current practice is not so very far removed from Friedman’s profit-making Elysium.  
Steiner, Alston and Goodman focus on these economic factors when offering possible 
reasons for the failure of States to implement human rights standards:
(1) governments are often loathe to take the measures necessary to ensure 
compliance by TNCs, especially, but not only, in relation to labour matters; (2) such 
measures are costly and perceived to be beyond the resource capabilities of 
governments in developing countries; (3) in the context of increasing global mobility 
of capital, competition among potential host countries discourages initiatives that 
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may push up labour costs and make one country less attractive than others with lower 
regulatory standards (the so-called ‘race to the bottom’); (4) the transnational 
complexity of manufacturing and related arrangements in an era of globalization 
makes it increasingly difficult to identify who is responsible for what activities and 
where; and (5) especially in the labour area, difficult issues arise about the different 
levels of minimum acceptable standards from one country to another.268
This list is not exhaustive and arguably focuses too much on labour issues, when it is clear 
from the examples cited throughout this dissertation that a whole spectrum of human rights 
violations may occur as a consequence of business misbehaviour.
3.5.2 Conflict Zones
 
There are, of course, other reasons for States not adhering to their human rights 
obligations.  For example, the issue of businesses operating in conflict zones is particularly 
fraught.  So-called ‘failing’ States are inevitably embroiled in armed conflicts.  Invariably 
this means that they are simply unable to perform the key functions of a State, let alone 
protect the population from human rights abuses perpetrated or aggravated by private 
business enterprises.  Governments, government factions, rebels, terrorists or essentially 
anyone in de jure or de facto control of territory are often also complicit in the abuses.  
Particularly prized is the power to grant natural resource concessions either legally or on 
the ground.  The enormous riches generated perpetuate the conflicts, whether they be the 
result of oil and gas exploitation in Angola,269 illegal logging in Liberia,270 or the 
exploitation of coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC).271
The DRC is a particularly pertinent and current example.  NGOs such as Global Witness 
have long complained that the commercial activities of many business actors are 
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supporting and financing the continuation of the conflict in the DRC and consequently 
fuelling human rights abuses.  The natural resource sector, in particular, has been the 
source of countless human rights violations, specifically the use of child labour and forced 
labour.  As far back as April 2001 the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo was describing certain mining companies and their suppliers operating 
in the DRC as the ‘engines’ of conflict.272  In its first report the Panel identified general 
‘lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority’ as central to the problem.273  
Businesses have subsequently exploited these weaknesses as the Panel points out:
The role of the private sector in the exploitation of natural resources and the 
continuation of the war has been vital. A number of companies have been involved 
and have fuelled the war directly…274
In their ‘rush to profit’ it was evident that ‘some foreign companies…were ready to do 
business regardless of elements of unlawfulness and irregularities.’275  The Panel expressed 
concern about numerous foreign companies implicated in the conflict via the supply chain.  
It cited companies incorporated in Belgium, Germany, Rwanda, Malaysia, Canada, 
Tanzania, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, Kenya, India, Pakistan and the Russian 
Federation.276   
The Panel’s Final Report in 2002 concluded that companies continued to contribute to 
human rights abuses.277  It also identified eighty-five foreign companies which it 
considered to be in breach of the OECD’s Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.  The 
list included, Afrimex Limited, a UK registered company which is discussed further in 
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Chapter 6 in the context of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises and the 
UK’s response to its activities.
  
According to NGO reports, child labour and forced labour is probably still being used in 
the mining process by companies which are incorporated outside of the DRC or through 
the supply chain.  So-called ‘taxes’ paid to rebel forces participating in the fighting inflame 
the conflict further by fuelling the trade in natural resources for arms, for example, and 
thus perpetuating the abuses.278  Very few of the companies named by the Panel have been 
held to account for their behaviour.  Afrimex is one exception as it has been the subject of a 
complaint to the UK’s National Contact Point under the Specific Instance Procedure 
established under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  
Such experiences show that in many conflict zone situations, national law is rendered 
largely irrelevant when seeking remedies for human rights abuses.  At first glance it would 
appear that the modern cross-border activities of business actors are intrinsically 
international and therefore engage international legal rules.  Difficulties arise, however, 
because of the nature of foreign direct investment coupled with the peculiarities of 
corporate law, as highlighted in Chapter 1.279  Many developing countries, in response to 
the New International Economic Order and the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, started requiring corporate investors to incorporate locally.  This was 
done as a means of protecting natural resources as well as ensuring a measure of control 
over corporation tax.  Thus it is frequently the host State subsidiaries of companies 
registered in the home State which are legally responsible for the human rights violations.  
It means, therefore, that they are nationals of the host State and consequently it is the host 
State that has the legal obligation to uphold human rights standards.  Thus, on the face of 
it, international law lacks jurisdiction over the abuses and invariably the host State lacks 
the will or capability to comply with international human rights obligations.
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3.6 If Human Rights Obligations Apply to Business Actors, What is Their 
 Form and Content? 
Even if it is accepted that business actors are required to comply with international human 
rights standards there are certainly different views as regards the nature and extent of the 
obligation, ranging from a de minimis approach apparent in voluntary codes of conduct and 
arguably many of the international initiatives, to an all-encompassing ‘kitchen sink’ 
methodology espoused by the UN Norms.  
3.6.1 Regulatory Form and Content
One of the key debates surrounding CSR has been the issue of applicable human rights 
obligations.  If business actors are subjects of international law with attendant rights and 
duties, does this mean that all human rights provisions apply?  If so, how should this 
obligation be articulated?  Civil and political?  Economic, social and cultural?  Labour 
rights?  Individual or collective rights?  The right to a clean environment?  Section 1.1.2 
set out two different typologies of human rights impacted by business actors and proposed 
adherence to the second and broader approach advocated by Human Rights Watch.
As demonstrated by the initiatives analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, there is now general 
agreement that business entities ought to adhere to human rights standards or at the very 
least respect them.  Where existing initiatives diverge is as to the regulatory form of the 
obligation and as to their content.  That is firstly, whether human rights standards ought to 
be voluntary or binding, and secondly, the substance of the rights applicable to business 
activities.
3.6.1.1 Regulatory Form
To the extent that this dissertation posits the view that human rights are either directly 
applicable or applicable by association to business actors, an examination of the traditional 
debate surrounding the voluntary or binding nature of such obligations is redundant at this 
point.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, at Section 1.5.2, the case for voluntarism versus the 
case for binding regulation has been at the heart of the business and human rights debate 
since the concept of CSR emerged in the 1990s.
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3.6.1.2 Content: Determining Applicable Human Rights
It is not actually difficult to determine which human rights standards ought to apply to 
business entities, as will be demonstrated.  Yet the various international bodies seeking to 
implement human rights standards for business actors, lack consistency in approach and 
adopt one of two approaches.  They either formulate a vague and generalised reference to 
human rights e.g. the Global Compact or they tie themselves in knots attempting to 
categorise and log every possible human right that may be violated by business e.g. the 
Norms project.  Further clouding of the waters is caused by NGO or industry-led and 
industry-specific codes being produced. There is no coherent approach to the problem.  
Human Rights Watch in its 2008 report, ‘On the Margins of Profit,’ argues that the 
difficulty stems from the fact that essentially there has been ‘no shared assessment of the 
extent of the impact business practices have on human rights.’280  HRW cites the extractive 
industries as one example:
…the frequent observation that certain industries, such as the extractive industries, 
have faced repeated human rights controversies, when presented without reference to 
examples from a range of other industries, can form an impression that human rights 
problems are highly segmented and limited to a few sectors.  By the same token, the 
special attention given to particular problems that can arise in certain business 
contexts, such as areas of violent conflict or so-called weak governance zones, when 
considered in isolation can suggest that business-related abuses do not occur on a 
global scale.  Likewise, the connection between business activity and certain sets of 
rights, especially labor rights, can lead to assumptions that other rights are 
intrinsically less affected by business.281
This lack of a clear understanding underpins the proliferation of industry-specific 
voluntary codes of conduct.  For diamonds, look to the Kimberley Process; for the textile 
industry, be NICE; for private military and security contractors turn to the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.282  As HRW states, these 
initiatives ‘typically have limited reach and apply only to individual companies or 
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industries or particular country contexts.’283  This dissertation does not distinguish between 
categories of business actors as it is clear from the typologies set out in Section 1.1.2 that 
all business actors are capable of violating the most basic human rights.   
While there is general agreement as to the pertinent standards, opinions vary and 
disagreements abound as to the form the obligations ought to take.  Consequently, they 
range from the general and all-encompassing to the very specific.  Historical and existing 
initiatives, which are examined in detail in later chapters, arguably offer limited assistance 
because they are couched in vague terms and are lacking in detail as a general rule.  On the 
one hand, this could be viewed as a bland and ineffectual concession to human rights 
principles which are incapable of being enforced due their nebulous form.  On the other 
hand, such an approach could be perceived as granting great flexibility in terms of 
potential interpretation and application of human rights standards.  Irrespective of the 
analysis, however, these approaches tend to suggest that all relevant human rights are 
potentially applicable to business actors.  While this may be true, a ‘cut and paste’ 
approach ought to be approached with caution with some authors such as Jägers & van 
Genugten arguing that they cannot be blindly applied to the ‘corporate context.’284
The generalised human rights provision in the UNCTC Draft Code of Conduct has already 
been highlighted in this chapter285 and likewise, more recent regulatory initiatives have 
adopted a broad brushstroke definition of human rights.  The Global Compact (GC) in its 
Ten Principles initially make the following request of business actors:
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights; and
 
Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
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The Principles also make reference to labour and environmental rights as well as anti-
corruption practices.286  The GC explains that these standards are based upon international 
norms:  
The UN Global Compact's ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the 
environment and anti-corruption enjoy universal consensus and are derived from:
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
• The International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work 
• The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
• The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their 
sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour 
standards, the environment, and anti-corruption…287
Over time, however, the GC has elaborated upon the content of these principles and now 
sets out why business actors ought to adhere to human rights standards and even more 
importantly how they can go about implementing those standards.  This includes 
encouraging businesses to look beyond the workplace and to interact with local 
communities288 and describing how a business may incorporate human rights standards 
into its culture and operations. 289  The Global Compact is examined in more detail in the 
following chapter.
Much like the Global Compact, and despite their 2011 update, the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises require businesses based in adherent States to observe human 
rights standards in a very general sense.  They must respect human rights, avoid infringing 
human rights, address adverse impacts, operate a human rights policy and exercise due 
diligence 290  So again there is a broad brush approach and it is an improvement on earlier 
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versions of the Guidelines.291  Arguably this ensures that business actors cannot maintain 
that certain rights are inapplicable, rather it makes certain that obligations are imposed 
according to their ability to violate human rights.  This is not to say that identifying 
particular rights assists in their protection to any great degree.
In contrast to the GC and the OECD, the Norms project of the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights outlined general and specific human rights 
obligations incumbent upon business enterprises including reference to civil and political 
rights, economic, social and cultural rights as well as labour rights, environmental rights 
and international humanitarian law obligations.292  It also set out precisely which 
international instruments would apply to business enterprises, listing several dozen in total 
and ranging from general regional instruments to specific international ones.  By including 
rights which appeared not to apply to business, the Norms especially, were attacked by 
critics as ‘overly inclusive’ and in any event lacked a ‘principled basis’ for determining 
how, or even if, a right was applicable to business.293  
As discussed in Chapter 1, recent research has concluded that a great variety of human 
rights can be impacted by business behaviour.294  SRSG Ruggie in his 2008 Survey 
identified numerous rights impacted by business in a study period lasting just under two 
years.295  The survey categorises the rights as ‘Labour Rights Impacted’ and ‘Non-Labour 
Rights Impacted’ although allegations were raised at least as frequently in both categories 
and it is not clear why this classification was adopted.  There was, however, a suggestion 
that ‘labour-related abuses might be underrepresented in the sample’ because labour issues 
‘may be more likely to have been taken to a formal mechanism for resolution.’296  
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Presumably due to the relatively high level of State and business compliance with the ILO 
Conventions.297  
The labour rights identified in the Ruggie survey were based on the standards set out in the 
ILO’s key Conventions and certain of the abuses were ‘alleged at almost double the rate of 
others.’298   These included the right to work (34%), the right to just and favourable 
remuneration (30%), the right to a safe work environment (31%) and the right to rest and 
leisure (25%).299  It was also evident that many of the violations of labour rights ‘were 
often not discrete.’300  In other words, one labour-related abuse allegation could spawn 
other allegations, encompassing both labour and non-labour rights.  The survey gives the 
example of a situation where there might be a specific allegation relating to the use of child 
labour but ‘the circumstances of the case might also give rise to alleged impacts on the 
right to education, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right 
to health, and even the right to life.’301
As regards Non-Labour Rights Impacts, eighteen different civil, political, economic, social 
or cultural rights were found to have formed the basis for allegations.302  They ranged from 
the most serious and life-threatening abuses such as torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and violations of the right to life  and the right to self-determination.  
Furthermore, numerous other classic civil and political rights were found to have been 
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impacted by the activities of business actors303 and economic social and cultural rights 
were also identified as having been violated.304
It seems clear, therefore, that attempting to delineate too narrowly  all of the applicable 
human rights norms would be a self-defeating task, resulting in Baxi’s ‘dense 
intertextuality’305 and potentially permitting business actors to escape liability.  A broad but 
inclusive approach is to be preferred.  In this regard, the approach of the Guiding 
Principles which rest ‘at minimum’ upon the International Bill of Rights and the ILO core 
conventions as well as context-specific ‘additional standards’ seems to be sensible as a 
starting point.306   Given that business actors are capable of very broad human rights 
impacts,307  however, it is suggested that in order to ensure proper accountability in the 
longer term, the international community must be prepared to embrace a more penetrating 
typology  of human rights impacts such as that  proposed by the Center for Human Rights 
and Global Justice/Human Rights Watch.308        
3.7 Conclusion
Louis Henkin writing on the 50th of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was clear, 
that at the very least, the UDHR applied to business actors ‘even though the companies 
never heard of the Universal Declaration at the time it was drafted.’309  He was also 
adamant that it was addressed to society as a whole:
 The Universal Declaration is not addressed only to governments.  It is a ‘common 
standard for all peoples and all nations.’  It means that ‘every individual and every 
organ of society shall strive – by progressive measures…to secure their universal and 
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effective recognition and observance among the people of member states.’  Every 
individual includes juridical persons.  Every individual and every organ of society 
excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace.  The Universal Declaration 
applies to them all.310 
This chapter supports such a view and has argued for recognition of a new human rights 
horizontality which goes beyond the concept of ‘respect’ for human rights or due diligence 
and acknowledges that business actors have direct and binding human rights obligations.  
The failure to sanction business actors as human rights dutyholders is due to lack of 
political will and powerful economic forces rather than legal impediment inhibiting the 
application of binding rules.  Furthermore, the private/public distinction in human rights is 
unhelpful and is, in fact, contrary to the founding precepts of international human rights 
law which places individuals at the heart of the international legal system.  
It is time for the international community to impose mandatory rules because businesses 
are violating a wide variety of human rights in a number of different contexts.  This is not a 
new phenomenon and the international community has had at least four decades to address 
the problem.  Such rules ought to operate in parallel to the existing voluntary initiatives 
such as the Global Compact, discussed in the following chapter, which has been having 
some success in terms of dissemination and grassroots activities.  This hybrid or smart mix 
approach to regulation will therefore not only capture business actors who are willing to 
adhere to human rights norms but also the rogues who will never adhere to voluntary 
standards of behaviour, motivated as they are solely by profit and self-interest.  One need 
only consider the activities of businesses in conflict and weak governance zones such as 
DRC, Angola and Liberia, for example. The profit-motive is too powerful a force to be 
combatted by voluntary CSR in such contexts.  What this means in practice is that business 
actors ought to be endorsed as human rights dutyholders, which is a more onerous 
obligation than the simple duty to respect human rights advocated by the UN’s General 
Principles.  Moreover, these duties ought to be enforced via a legally-binding global 
enforcement mechanism.  While Ruggie may be right in concluding that a ‘meaningful’ 
international instrument would be ‘inconceivable’ nevertheless it is contended that 
‘principled pragmatism’ dictates that the creation of a legally binding mechanism is of 
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paramount importance and ought to be attempted, difficulties notwithstanding.  As Allott 
says:
[w]e make the human world, including human institutions, through the power of the 
human mind.  What we have made by thinking we can make new by new thinking.311
It is time to move away from the old vertical human rights paradigm and to think about 
business actors as human rights dutyholders at minimum.
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Chapter 4
The UN Global Compact: A Global Network Approach to 
Business and Human Rights
‘...the soft power of moral suasion...’1
4.0 Introduction
While the UN Norms project discussed in Chapter 3 did not result in any tangible 
regulatory outcome, it did have the effect of stirring up an energetic debate within the UN 
about how to address the problem of business violations of human rights.  In 2000, the then 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, established a flagship project focusing on the social 
responsibility of business actors and which for a short time operated in parallel to the 
Norms venture.  John Ruggie was also instrumental to the undertaking as an advisor to 
Annan2 and it seems evident that his ‘principled pragmatism,’ discussed throughout this 
dissertation, has had a heavy influence on its development.  
Annan, in a speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999, had set out his 
response to globalisation and his vision to ‘give a human face to the global market’3 via a 
so-called Global Compact.   According to Ann-Marie Slaughter’s analysis, this is an 
example of Annan’s recognition of ‘an increasingly borderless Information Age’ where 
transgovernmental networks necessarily had to expand to include ‘a host of private 
actors.’4
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Thus Annan had begun ‘positioning the UN as the convener of ‘global policy networks’’ 
with the specific aim of bringing ‘together all public and private actors on issues critical to 
the global public interest.’5  Rasche agrees:  
The Global Compact reflects a Global Public Policy Network...bringing together UN 
agencies, corporations, NGOs, and labor representatives from all over the world. The 
set up of the initiative in 2000 reflects a fundamental shift in the attitude of the 
United Nations toward the private sector; a shift that emphasizes cooperation more 
than confrontation...6 
Thus it differs substantially from the UNCTC Draft Code and Norms addressed in the 
previous chapter.  As such, the UN Global Compact (UNGC) is an example of new or third 
way governance.  Certainly it is an example of an initiative which emanated from 
‘sustained demand for international actor accountability’ for ‘less formally institutionalised 
actors’ driven by certain governments, stakeholders and civil society.7  
Surprisingly there is scant engagement by legal scholars with the Global Compact and the 
majority of critical analysis is being undertaken by political scientists, and academics in 
the environmental management, business ethics and international relations fields among 
others.8  Often reference to the UNGC in legal articles or texts is reduced to a few 
paragraphs or pages9 and only a very few have been devoted entirely to it in
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recent years.10  Presumably this is due, at least in part, to the UNGC’s lack of a ‘hard’ 
normative framework which is unfortunate as there are many positive elements to the 
initiative, notwithstanding the lack of mandatory rules and enforcement mechanism.  In 
particular, it has much to commend it as a multistakeholder public policy and learning 
network.  So what specific events led to Annan establishing the UNGC?
Annan was responding to global unease at the pace and consequences of globalisation, an 
unease which resulted in a non-violent anti-capitalism demonstration in Seattle erupting 
into violent protest.  Such events were viewed by UN Secretary-General Annan as both 
‘warning’ and ‘opportunity.’11  A warning of increasing discontent with the process and 
outcomes of globalisation and an ‘opportunity...to aim for a general consensus on the 
fundamental conditions under which all forms of global commerce might be peacefully 
and productively conducted.’12  In Davos, he had referred in his speech to the ‘fragility’ of 
globalisation and concluded that the:
spread of markets outpaces the ability of societies and their political systems to 
adjust to them, let alone to guide the course they take. History teaches us that such an 
imbalance between the economic, social and political realms can never be sustained 
for very long.13
In the Secretary-General’s view, the global population did not have the ‘confidence’ that 
‘minimum standards will prevail’ in a globalised world in the same way that it does in 
relation to national markets, because ‘national markets are held together by shared values’ 
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even in times of ‘economic transition and insecurity.’14  He concluded that in the absence 
of such confidence:
the global economy will remain fragile and vulnerable -- vulnerable to backlash from 
all the ‘isms’ of our post-cold-war world: protectionism; populism; nationalism; 
ethnic chauvinism; fanaticism; and terrorism.  What all those ‘isms’ have in common 
is that they exploit the insecurity and misery of people who feel threatened or 
victimized by the global market. The more wretched and insecure people there are, 
the more those ‘isms’ will continue to gain ground. 15
His solution to the problem was the creation of ‘social safety nets’16 which would 
‘underpin the new global economy’17 and he called upon business actors: 
individually through your firms, and collectively through your business associations 
-- to embrace, support and enact a set of core values in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, and environmental practices.18
Increased cooperation between the UN and business actors was to be the focus of this new 
Global Compact, in order ‘to find a way of embedding the global market in a network of 
shared values’19 and which represented a significantly different approach to the previous 
traditional inter-State, top-down regulatory attempts undertaken at the UN.  Business 
actors were urged firstly, to ‘encourage States to give us, the multilateral institutions of 
which they are all members, the resources and the authority we need to do our job.’20  
Secondly, and significantly, Kofi Annan acknowledged that business actors are capable of 
violating human rights and as such have a responsibility to work to prevent such abuses 
because they represent internationally agreed ‘universal values’ as enunciated by the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
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Principles and Rights at Work.21  Annan asked the business community to take direct action 
in the pursuit of ‘responsible global capitalism:’22
Many of you are big investors, employers and producers in dozens of different 
countries across the world. That power brings with it great opportunities -- and great 
responsibilities. You can uphold human rights and decent labour and environmental 
standards directly, by your own conduct of your own business.23
Thus the UN Global Compact was born and in 2000 it joined the ‘constellation’ of actors 
within the ‘UN Galaxy’ of agencies with a direct interest in the activities of transnational 
business actors.24  It was established with a ‘small staff and modest budget, to provide 
general information, nurture new partnerships, develop studies, and arrange dialogues 
throughout the world.’25
This chapter analyses the Global Compact and its evolution and considers whether it is 
achieving its lofty objectives.  There are certainly some positives to be taken from the ‘new 
governance’ or ‘third way’26 approach of the UNGC project, which utilise non-binding 
norms or soft law to achieve outcomes.  The Global Compact exemplifies what Scott and 
Trubek describe as the six ‘characteristics’ of new governance, that is (a) participation and 
power-sharing; (b) multi-level integration; (c) diversity and decentralisation; (d) 
deliberation; (e) flexibility and revisabilty; and (f) experimentation and knowledge 
creation.27  Indeed, many of these new governance characteristics are also apparent in the 
UN Guiding Principles and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.  
Nevertheless, the inherent structural limitations of the UNGC as a vehicle for encouraging 
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21 Ibid at 2.  See also E.George, ‘See No Evil? Revisiting Early Visions of the Social Responsibility of 
Business: Adolf A. Berle’s Contribution to Contemporary Conversations,’ 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 965 (2010) 
(hereinafter ‘George’) at 992-993.
22 Sagafi-nejad & Dunning note 1 at 195.
23 Kofi Annan Speech (1999) note 3 at 2-3.
24 Sagafi-nejad & Dunning note 1 at 175.  They cite some thirty UN agencies which ‘touch on the activities 
of TNCs,’ with twelve having an ‘intense interest in TNC and FDI matters.’
25 Sagafi-nejad & Dunning ibid at 196.
26 On new governance generally see J.Scott & D.Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to 
Governance in the European Union’ 8 European Law Journal 1-18 (2002) and at 2.
27 Scott & Trubek ibid at 5-6.
and supporting ‘corporate citizenship’28 as opposed to responsibility, accountability, 
redress or punishment continue to highlight the need for a binding regulatory framework to 
protect against violations of human rights by business actors. In other words, a hybrid 
approach to regulation is required which harnesses the power of both binding and non-
binding norms.  As it stands, there is a very real danger that the UNGC operates as a 
vehicle for commercial rhetoric rather than concrete achievements. 
The following section 6.2 outlines briefly the objectives of the UNGC.  Section 6.3  
examines its structure and substantive content as well as considering the implications of 
the voluntary nature of the UNGC, in particular the issue of bluewashing (defined in 
Chapter 1 as the abuse of UN endorsement), and its participatory stakeholder approach.  
Section 6.4 then identifies and analyses the challenges facing the UNGC and the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.  Finally, the chapter ends with an analysis of the effectiveness of 
the UNGC and concludes that while some of its activities offer a practical and welcome 
response to the issue of business and human rights, it cannot of itself resolve the entire 
problem and needs to operate in tandem with a normative regulatory framework .
4.1 Global Compact Objectives
Andreas Rasche has argued that it is fundamentally important to understand not only what 
the Global Compact is but also, perhaps more crucially, what it is not, otherwise any 
criticism lacks context.29  The UNGC was launched as a business leaders’ initiative, with 
the primary purpose of creating policy dialogues on corporate social responsibility issues 
and describes itself as:
both a policy platform and a practical framework for companies that are committed 
to sustainability and responsible business practices. As a leadership initiative 
endorsed by chief executives, it seeks to align business operations and strategies 
everywhere with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, 
labour, environment and anti-corruption.30
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11.11.10].  For an early analysis of the Global Compact see Meyer & Stefanova note 10.
29 Rasche (2009b) note 8 at 512.
30 UN Global Compact, ‘Global Citizenship in the World Economy,’ (UN Global Compact: New York, 2008) 
at 2.  See also Rasche (2009a) note 4 at 200.
Thus the UNGC’s stated objective is to offer ‘a unique strategic platform for participants to 
advance their commitments to sustainability and corporate citizenship.’31
With such clear, non-normative, strategic objectives, it is not surprising that the Global 
Compact, unlike the UNCTC and the Norms addressed in  Chapter 3, has never tried to 
realise either a hard law approach or implement a binding enforcement mechanism and 
therefore sits clearly within a new governance or third way paradigm.  It demonstrates a 
more nuanced, alternative approach to business accountability than hard regulation or even 
voluntarism as had been understood previously.  As Rasche contends, ‘the discussion about 
the Global Compact needs to...show more sensitivity to the underlying core idea of the 
initiative, which is long-term learning experience and not regulation’ as well as an 
understanding of ‘the constraints of the institutional framework in which the initiative is 
embedded.’32  That is, that the UNGC was never intended to provide, for example, 
remedies or sanctions for business violations of human rights.  Rasche also acknowledges, 
however, that: 
This is not to imply that binding regulations are not needed but that regulations must 
be complemented by a dialogue-based approach that gives reference to the fact that 
most companies still have a lot to learn when it comes to managing social, 
environmental, and governance issues.33
This understanding has to be at the heart of any sensible debate about the UNGC, as many 
critics summarily dismiss the Global Compact when it does in fact offer some useful 
contributions to the business and human rights paradigm.34
From its inception, it was made clear that the UNGC was intended to be a voluntary35 
public-private partnership and ‘relies to a great extent on the corporate community’s 
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31 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html [last accessed 15.8.11].
32 Rasche (2009b) note 8 at 512 and 514.
33 Rasche (2009b) ibid at 514-515.
34 See e.g. Deva note 10 and Nolan note 10. 
35 See the Ten Principles at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html and 
About the Global Compact, 5 August 2010 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html [last 
accessed 10.11.10].  See also George note 21 at 996.
collective desire for cultivating a positive image’36 to achieve its objectives.  Georg Kell, 
Executive Director of the UNGC has stated that:
Public-private partnerships are necessary in today’s global world where business 
interests increasingly overlap with development objectives. We feel that undertaking 
partnerships is a practical manifestation of good corporate citizenship and 
underscores a company’s commitment to societal change.37
Some commentators see this move towards public-private partnerships as a sign that the 
UN is trying to modernise, ‘reinvent’38 itself and meet new challenges by widening its 
sphere of influence to include non-State actors, so for example Surya Deva concludes:
This UN partnership with private non-state actors also became imperative because 
the UN could neither fulfill its ambitious goals under the UN Charter nor could the 
objective of ensuring a sustainable and inclusive globalization be achieved solely 
with the support of states.39   
Others, as will be seen, are critical of what is perceived as harmful commercial intrusion 
into the heart of the UN40 as well as a legitimisation of rogue business actors ‘under a 
protective UN umbrella.’41 
4.2! UNGC Structure and Content: Voluntarism, Broad Brushstrokes and a 
 Multistakeholder Approach
...more like a guide dog than a watch dog.42
Business and civil society around the globe were encouraged to become participants in the 
UNGC but it was always made clear in UNGC literature that there would be no binding 
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37 Business, NGOs and the UN Convene Discuss Partnership Solutions for Today’s Global Challenges, 25 
September 2009, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/news_archives/2007_09_25.html [last 
accessed 10.11.10].
38 Nolan note 10 at 445.
39 Deva note 10 at 108-109.
40 For a description of increased business involvement at the UN see Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 58-60.
41 T.Deen, ‘Q&A: ‘Bluewashing Has Become a Very Risky Business,’ Inter Press Service, 3 June 2010,Thalif 
Deen interviews Georg Kell, Head of the UN Global Compact, (hereinafter ‘Interview with Georg Kell.’) 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/in_the_media/IPS_3.6.10.pdf [last accessed 31.7.11].  
See also Thérien & Pouliot ibid at 67.
42 UN Global Compact, Global Compact Network Management Toolkit (UN Global Compact: New York, 
2011) at 35 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/networks_around_world_doc/GCLN_ToolKit.pdf [last 
accessed 31.7.11].  See also Interview with Georg Kell ibid.
regulatory structure.  This was reinforced in late 2010 by the publication of a document 
entitled  ‘The Importance of Voluntarism’43 and confirms that the UNGC is:
predicated on the idea that voluntary initiatives are most effective when they play a 
complementary role in relation to regulation; such initiatives are, by definition, not 
legally binding.44
Which may be why the substantial membership of the UNGC reflects a truly participatory 
stakeholder approach although its voluntary nature is often also cited as one of the 
initiative’s greatest weakness.45  Nevertheless, the active involvement of civil society is a 
key element of a new governance paradigm.  
In 2011, of over 8,000 signatories to the Global Compact there are more than 6000 
corporate participants from 135 States46 of which half are small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  The significant remainder of ‘non-business stakeholders’ is composed 
of NGOs, UN agencies, business associations, labour organisations and academic 
members.47  Thus in: 
[f]ollowing the path carved out by the ILO for almost a century, the Global 
Compact’s multistakeholder approach bespeaks a wish to go beyond the classic 
model of intergovernmental multilateralism.48
Arguably this more inclusive approach to governance lends the UNGC and its processes 
greater legitimacy through the creation of a ‘democratic surplus,’49 although as will be 
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Importance of Voluntarism’) http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/
Voluntarism_Importance.pdf [last accessed 10.11.10].
44 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business_Participation/
the_importance_of_voluntarism.html [last accessed 26.8.11].
45 Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 67.
46 UN Global Compact, Annual Review 2010 (UN Global Compact: New York, 2011) http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/UN_Global_Compact_Annual_Review_2010.pdf [last 
accessed 9.8.11] at 6 (hereinafter ‘Annual Review 2010’).  See also Overview of UN Global Compact 
Participants and Stakeholders, 28 July 2011, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/
index.html [last accessed 9.8.11].
47 Annual Review 2010 ibid at 10.  See also Rasche (2009b) note 8 at 517.
48 Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 61.
49 Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 65 citing S.Tesner, The United Nations and Business: A Partnership Recovered 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000) at 111.
seen, in practice business actors tend to dominate, for example, in the structure of the 
Steering Committees of Local Networks.50 
Business participants voluntarily agree to abide by the UNGC’s Ten Principles (originally 
Nine Principles – an anti-corruption provision was added in 2004) on human rights, the 
environment and corruption and incorporate them into the fabric of the business, as well as 
adhering to the mandatory reporting requirements.51  They further agree both to support 
and respect human rights and also to ensure that they are not complicit in human rights 
abuses.  As well as the general human rights principles, participants also agree to adhere to 
minimum labour and environmental standards.  The UNGC makes clear that it is not a 
‘regulatory instrument’ nor does it ‘police, enforce or measure the behavior or actions of 
companies’52 hence the  ‘guide dog not watch dog’ tag.  Instead it focuses on:
public accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, 
labour and civil society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the 
principles upon which the Global Compact is based.53  
Stress is placed on partner dialogue and Kell, explains its role thus:
The Global Compact is neither a seal of approval, nor a certification. In fact, if things 
go wrong and a company stands accused of violating workers rights or damaging the 
environment, their participation in the Global Compact puts arguably even more 
pressure on them. Because joining the Global Compact requires a public 
commitment, we don't hide it. And it requires follow-up, transparency, and 
disclosure.54
It is this self-regulatory nature that has long been regarded as the Compact’s greatest 
failing because while there are many thousands of participant companies making the 
‘public commitment’ there is no enforcement mechanism and many observers have 
believed from the outset that the UNGC would be hijacked and utilised by transnational 
corporations as a mere marketing tool.  Indeed, it has been described in the strongest terms 
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51 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html and http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business_Participation/index.html [last accessed 10.11.10].
52 UN Global Compact, ‘The UN Global Compact Operational Guide for Medium-Scale Enterprises,’
July 2007 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/Operational_guide_ME.pdf [last accessed 
26.8.11] at 3.
53 Ibid.
54 Interview with Georg Kell note 41.
as an ‘exercise in futility’  which ‘provides a venue for opportunistic companies to make 
grandiose statements of corporate citizenship without worrying about being called to 
account for their actions.’55  Furthermore the UN is accused of being ‘careless’ in allowing 
business actors to ‘wrap themselves in the flag of the United Nations without committing 
to actually changing their behaviour.’56  There have been several examples of this so-called 
‘bluewashing’ including a notorious abuse of the logo by Daimler-Chrysler in the earliest 
days of the UNGC.57  As Thérien and Pouliot comment:
...bluewashing is considered dangerous because it allows private enterprise to 
dissimulate its motives but also because it tarnishes the UN’s image.58
From the very beginning, high-profile critics such as Ralph Nader were scathing in their 
attacks on the Global Compact arguing that:
...with the U.N. permitting itself to become perverted with corporate sponsorships, 
partnerships, and other entanglements, it risks veering down the road of 
commercialization and marginalization.59
Nader continued:
An effective United Nations must be free of corporate encumbrances. Its agencies 
should be the leading critics of the many ways that corporate globalization is 
functioning to undermine the U.N. missions to advance ecological sustainability, 
human rights, and global economic justice – not apologists and collaborators with the 
dominant corporate order.60 
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September 2003, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/global-compact-is-another-exercise-in-futility/
91447/0 [last accessed 15.8.2011].
56 K.Bruno & J.Karliner, earthsummit.biz: The Corporate Takeover of Sustainable Development, (Institute for 
Food Development and Policy/CorpWatch, 2002) at 53.  See also Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 68.
57 CorpWatch, ‘Greenwash + 10 The UN’s Global Compact, Corporate Accountability and the Johannesburg 
Earth Summit,’ January 2002 http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/gw10.pdf [last accessed 
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69.  For an alternative view see  D.M.Bigge, ‘Bring on the Bluewash: A social constructivist argument 
against using Nike v. Kasky to attack the UN global Compact’ 14 Int’l Legal Persp. 6 (2004) (hereinafter 
‘Bigge’).
58 Thérien & Pouliot ibid at 68.
59 R.Nader, ‘Corporations and The UN: Nike And Others ‘Bluewash’ Their Images,’ San Francisco Bay 
Guardian,  18 September, 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/091900-103.htm [last 
accessed 31.7.11] (hereinafter ‘Nader’).
60 Nader ibid.  See also Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 68.
While this is no doubt true, it does not mean that when addressing the issue of business and 
human rights that the UN should not work collaboratively with business and other 
stakeholders.61  What it does mean is that robust checks and balances ought to be put in 
place to ensure that abuse of the system does not happen.  
In response to the early allegations and discussed in the following paragraph, the UNGC 
enhanced its integrity measures and overall, it can be said that the UNGC’s wide 
stakeholder participation policy renders it a good example of a cooperative approach to 
regulation, on a surface level at least.62  Furthermore, as Rasche reiterates, ‘one cannot and 
should not criticize the Compact for something it has never pretended or intended to be: a 
compliance-based mechanism that verifies and measures corporate behavior.’63
Another aspect of the multistakeholder approach can be seen in the convening, in January 
2002, of a UNGC Advisory Council which comprised ‘senior business executives, 
international labour leaders, public policy experts and the heads of civil society 
organizations.’64  Notably, it was the ‘first UN advisory body composed of both private and 
public sector leaders.’65  While the UNGC is ‘neither an instrument for monitoring 
companies nor a regulatory regime’ the Advisory Council had a significant role to play.66  
It had four key priorities: (1) safeguarding the integrity of the UNGC; (2) serving as 
advocates of the UNGC; (3) providing expertise and (4) offering advice on policy and 
strategy.67  Again on a positive note, and related to the accusations of bluewashing, the 
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63 Rasche (2009b) note 8 at 524.
64 M.Robinson, ‘Beyond good intentions: corporate citizenship for a new century’ RSA World Leaders 
Lecture, RSA Journal 3/6 34-36 (2002) also available at http://unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/
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65 Secretary-General Convenes First Meeting of Global Compact Advisory Council, 1st August 2002, http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/newsandevents/news_archives/2002_01_08.html [last accessed 27.8.11].  See 
also G.Kell, ‘The Global Compact: Report on Progress and Activities,’ Global Compact Office, July 2002 
(hereinafter ‘Global Compact Report (2002)’) http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/
news_archives/2003_07_02.html [last accessed 26.8.11] at 15.  See Appendix D at 60 for a list of original 
members.
66 G.Kell & D.Levin, ‘The Evolution of the Global Compact Network: An Historic Experiment in Learning 
and Action,’ Paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Conference ‘Building Effective 
Networks’Denver, August 11-14, 2002 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.5/denver.pdf  
(hereinafter ‘Kell & Levin’) [last accessed 27.8.11] at 17.
67 Global Compact Report (2002) note 65 at 15.
Council issued guidelines ‘regarding the official use of the Global Compact logo’ after 
NGOs expressed concern about corporate abuse and exploitation.68  Notwithstanding these 
guidelines, in March 2005, the Global Compact Office (GCO) felt compelled to release a 
new, detailed policy on the use of the UNGC names and logos and it was updated again in 
2010.69   For example, the use of the UNGC name or logo is not permitted for promotional 
purposes, branding nor as a ‘permanent graphical element of stationery…’70 nor may there 
be any suggestion or implication that the GCO ‘has endorsed or approved’ any particular 
activity.71  Anyone wishing to use the name or logos must first seek authorisation from the 
GCO and if permission is granted authorised users must then submit ‘samples of all 
materials that bear the Global Compact name and logos’ to the GCO.72  The Advisory 
Council was replaced by the Global Compact Board in 2005, but it has largely the same 
objectives and responsibilities.73
Other developments, and key to meeting the Compact’s overarching learning objective, 
include the expansion of the UNGC Learning Forum to encompass a global academic 
network which engages in relevant research and analysis.74  There also seems to be a 
genuine desire to foster stakeholder participation in the process and recognition of the 
importance of high-level advocacy.75   Furthermore, SGSR Ruggie was obliged to engage 
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69 UN Global Compact, ‘Policy on the use of the Global Compact name and logos,’ 9 March 2005: http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/content/NewsDocs/gc_logo_pol.pdf [last accessed 22.3.07];  UN Global Compact 
‘Policy on the Use of the Global Compact Name and Logos,’ 15 Janury 2010: http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/logo_policy/Logo_Policy_EN.pdf [last accessed 26.8.11].
70 Policy on the Use of the Global Compact Name and logos (2010), ibid at 3.
71 Ibid at 3.
72 Ibid at 2 and 4 respectively.
73 The Global Compact’s Next Phase, 6 September 2005, paras 4.5-4.9, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
docs/about_the_gc/2.3/gc_gov_framew.pdf [last accessed 22.3.07].  Foe the work of the Global Compact 
Board see e.g. Annual Review 2010 note 44 at 43.
74 Global Compact Report 2002 note 65 at 35.  The UNGC is being taught increasingly on MBA and 
management courses.  See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/academic_network/
index.html [last accessed 26.8.11].
75 See e,g, Kell & Levin note 66 at 7.  See also e.g. the ‘Global Policy Dialogue on the Role of Business in 
Zones of Conflict 2001’ cited at 13.  See also http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/conflict_prevention/
index.html [last accessed 26.8.11].
with it under his 2008 Mandate, specifically through the UNGC’s Human Rights Working 
Group.76  
While the UNGC does not impose binding standards upon private business actors, it does 
recognise that the values it champions among participants have their roots in existing 
international legal principles:
The Global Compact is an ambitious and unprecedented experiment to fill a void 
between regulatory regimes, at one end of the spectrum, and voluntary codes of 
industry conduct, at the other.  It is a cooperative framework based on internationally 
established rights and principles.77  
This is not insignificant given that other international initiatives site themselves squarely in 
the voluntary camp and appear not to acknowledge other regulatory possibilities in any 
meaningful sense.  Zerk rather states the obvious by concluding that it is the ‘non-
prescriptive nature of the Global Compact standards’ which has resulted in its ‘appeal to 
companies and governments from developing as well as industrialised states.’78
In terms of content, the Ten Principles relating to human rights, labour standards, the 
environment and corruption were laid down by the UNGC and corporations are asked 
voluntarily to ‘embrace, support and enact’ internationally recognised standards in these 
four areas.79  These core values are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights80, the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work,81 the Rio Declaration on the Environment82 and the UN Convention 
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2008 http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf [last accessed 22.8.11] 4(e).  
See Chapter 1 infra note 214.
77 Global Compact Report (2002) note 65 at 4.
78 Zerk note 9 at 260.
79 United Nations Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles’ at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
TheTenPrinciples/index.html [last accessed 26.8.11].
80 UN Doc.A/811 10th December 1948.
81 37 ILM 1233 (1998); http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?
var_language=EN&var_pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT [last accessed 3.3.07].
82 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (1992).
against Corruption.83  A great deal of emphasis is placed upon the benefits of ‘socially 
responsible business’ such as the ‘advantages of a good social reputation,’ ‘reduction of 
damaging criticism’ as well as ‘being more in touch with markets, customers and 
consumers.’84  Companies committed to the UNGC further undertake to promote the 
Compact via corporate documentation, e.g. annual reports, mission statements, training 
programmes and press releases.  Importantly, the UNGC harnesses UN ‘inter-agency 
cooperation,’ bringing together the ILO, UNEP, UNHCR and UNDP.85  
By 2008, however, there had been a subtle but important change of emphasis, with the 
UNGC describing the initiative as ‘global and local; private and public; voluntary yet 
accountable’ [emphasis added].86  The ‘collaborative solutions’ to the ‘challenges facing 
business and society’ are to be achieved by harnessing the ‘moral authority and convening 
power’ of the UN and the diverse problem-solving expertise of the private sector and civil 
society.    In addition to signing the Compact, participants are invited to enrol in one of 
almost one hundred Local Networks established under the UNGC87 and which are 
‘established and sustained by local interest and enthusiasm.’88  This ‘bottom up’ grassroots 
approach of these Local Networks aims to ensure that ‘local priorities and needs’89 are 
addressed but it is impossible to measure the success or otherwise of the networks.  The 
UNGC itself States that the:
networks provide opportunities for participants to improve understanding and share 
experiences on the Ten Principles and partnerships, as well as how to report on 
progress in these areas.  Collective action campaigns and government policy 
dialogues are also increasingly organised through the Local Networks.90
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index.html [last accessed 27.8.11].
85 Global Compact Report (2002) note 65 at 41.
86 Overview of the UNGC at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/  [last accessed 26.8.11].
87 UN Global Compact, Global Compact Local Network Report 2011, May 2011 (UN Global Compact 
Office, New York) http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/networks_around_world_doc/
Annual_Report_2011/Annual_Local_Network_Report_2011.pdf [last accessed 9.8.11] at 6 (hereinafter 
‘Local Network Annual Report (2011)’).
88 Annual Review (2010) note 46 at 37.
89 Ibid.
90 UN Global Compact, ‘Annual Review 2008’ (UN Global Compact Office, New York, March 2009),http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2009_04_08/GC_2008AR_FINAL.pdf 
(hereinafter ‘Annual Review (2008)’) [last accessed at 19.8.11] at 18.
It also points to the fact that the current UN Secretary-General has had meetings with 
several of the Local Networks and concludes that this is indicative of their growing 
importance.91  Likewise numerous examples of meetings, workshops, roundtables and 
conferences are held up as examples of the success of the networks and it does seem that 
there is a significant amount of education, training and dissemination of information taking 
place all of which should contribute to preventing human rights abuses.92  Nonetheless, 
there is little evidence of how or even if these activities are succeeding.   
Overall 60% of active participating companies are part of a local network which is useful 
in terms of disseminating information to the ‘converted’ but it seems as if the networks 
could be doing more in terms of outreach in relation to non-participating companies.  
Certainly there is nothing to indicate that concrete developments have taken place such as 
involving new participants in the UNGC or indeed that corporate misbehaviour has been 
averted as a result of the efforts of the networks.  It would be useful to have this 
information. For example, only one instance of tangible action on the ground is cited in the 
2008 Annual Review, a Mexican initiative.  
The Mexican Local Network, along with Mexican businesses, a US NGO and sporting and 
entertainment celebrities was involved in the creation of an emergency hotline for the 
anonymous reporting of child sexual exploitation.93  An advertising campaign was also 
undertaken.  While this campaign is admirable, and necessary, particularly in the context of 
a burgeoning Mexican tourist industry, the businesses involved are adopting a more 
traditional philanthropic role, historically adopted by a variety of industries over the years.  
There are no illustrations of situations where a Local Network has addressed the specific 
issue of human rights violations by business itself.  The Annual Reviews are silent on this 
point and it appears that the preventative role of the UNGC is restricted to the 
promulgation of information.  
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Notwithstanding its voluntary nature and its current limited modes of activity, as an 
organisation the UNGC has introduced some novel approaches to preventing business 
violations of agreed standards in the areas of human rights as well as the environment and 
anti-corruption in addition to seeking a measure of accountability where breaches do occur. 
The fact that more businesses than ever are actively participating in the UNGC and are 
submitting mandatory Communications on Progress (COP), illustrating their compliance   
with the principles, is to be applauded and may very well be as a result of the activities of 
the Local Networks.  Without concrete details it is impossible to determine this, however.  
Furthermore the UNGC has adopted a truly effective stakeholder approach by involving 
NGOs, trade unions, academics and other elements of civil society in all aspects of its 
operations.  The Mexican child safety hotline demonstrates this well but it can also be seen 
in the reports and documents being produced which are clearly harnessing cross-sector 
expertise.94  Many of those documents also rely on the work of SGSR Ruggie95 and it is 
significant to note this move towards a more ‘joined up’ approach by international 
organisations to the problem of business and human rights, which can only increase now 
that the Human Rights Council has approved the Guiding Principles.  So, for example, 
within the context of the UNGC, the Global Compact Netherlands Network has produced 
guidance for business participants to help them be compliant with the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy framework.96  This multistakeholder involvement and structure is one of the great 
strengths of the UNGC: 
...the Global Compact follows a rather inclusive, as well as communicative, approach 
and also profits from the perceived high legitimacy of the conventions/declarations 
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96 Local Network Annual Report 2011 note 87 at 26 citing the Business & Human Rights Initiative, ‘How to 
Do Business with Respect for Human Rights: A Guidance Tool for Companies,’ (The Hague: Global 
Compact Network Netherlands, 2010) http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/
Resources/how_to_business_with_respect_for_human_rights_gcn_netherlands_june2010.pdf [last accessed 
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issued by the UN. Brinkmann-Braun and Pies...encapsulate this by arguing that 
among the key assets of the initiative are its credibility and perceived legitimacy.97
These are strong reasons for supposing that the dissemination programme will be 
successful in ensuring greater respect for human rights standards, at least where businesses 
want to be involved.  To that end it will be interesting to see if new developments such as 
the ‘Global Compact Network Management Toolkit’ published in 2011 will be successful 
in increasing the concrete usefulness of the networks.98
4.3 Regulatory Challenges for the UNGC
Despite the progress, the UNGC, now in its eleventh year of operation continues to face 
many of the regulatory and procedural challenges it encountered at its outset and 
throughout its existence.   In particular, it faces serious issues relating to non-compliance 
with its reporting elements.
Although the UNGC is a voluntary initiative, it differs from other business and human 
projects in several ways.  Business actors participating in the Compact are required, as a 
mandatory condition of their participation, to submit on an annual basis concrete examples 
of measures taken to comply with the Ten Principles.99  These are to be published in the 
annual company report to ensure that there is an element of transparency in the process.  
During the initial 2001 pilot phase, of the 30 corporate submissions none were deemed 
‘worthy of publication.’100  Several problems were identified ranging from ‘substantial 
degrees of organizational change’ to ‘difficulties assessing the priority of corporate 
citizenship relative to profit-generating business activities.’101  In an attempt to resolve 
some of these problems, companies are now required to formulate their public submissions 
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in accordance with a ‘concise template’ drafted by the UNGC in order to focus on the 
‘strictly factual elements of company experience.’102  
After these early teething problems, in 2007 the UNGC registered its most successful 
quarterly reporting period with 428 companies submitting a Communication on Progress 
(COPs), representing a 41% increase on 2005.103  This figure has increased consistently 
with 2,834 COPs submitted in 2010, representing a 13% increase on 2009.104  In total 69% 
of business enterprises participating in the UNGC for longer than one year are ‘active,’ that 
is they are ‘in compliance with the Global Compact COP policy.’105   Notwithstanding 
these ostensibly positive developments, the increasing number of non-compliant 
participant companies gives cause for concern, especially the disproportionately high 
number of SMEs.106  As of January 1st 2011 ‘over 2,000 companies had been expelled from 
the Global Compact for failure to adhere to the COP policy, representing one-quarter of 
Global Compact companies.’107  While the majority of expelled companies are smaller in 
size, nevertheless, seven companies employing over 50,000 people have also been expelled 
for non-compliance.108  To be expelled, a company must have failed to communicate for at 
least one year.  Nevertheless, as will be seen, the UNGC has responded positively to 
genuine stakeholder concerns, although, it is unclear whether or not it will have an 
effective impact on business behaviour.  There is a risk that it will merely encourage 
businesses to focus on the style, rather than the substance of their submissions.  
Furthermore, there is concern that the already ‘light touch’ reporting requirements ‘instead 
of being made stricter’ have ‘gradually been loosened.’109  Thérien and Pouliot explain that 
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[last accessed 26.8.11].
103Press Release, ‘Record Quarter for  Companies Communicating on Progress,’ 30th January 2007 http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/news_archives/2007_01_30.html [last accessed 19.8.11].
104 Annual Review (2010) note 46 at 18.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid at 19.
107 Annual Review (2010) ibid at 18.  The precise figure is 2,048 at 19.
108 Ibid at 19.
109 Thérien & Pouliot note 8 at 67.
initially companies were asked to publish online an example of their compliance with the 
UNGC on an annual basis but now:
The UN subsequently lowered its requirements and is now content to ask firms to 
explain in their annual reports how they have applied the Compact’s principles.110
Moreover, in its Annual Report for 2008 the recurring themes around corporate failure to 
meet the specific communication obligation under the Global Compact loomed large.111  
While in the decade since the UNGC’s creation there has been a significant increase in the 
number of participants submitting COPs, at the same time large numbers have been 
delisted for failing to submit a COP at all.  Excluding businesses which are insolvent and 
which no longer exist, it seems clear, therefore, that there are three different categories of 
business operating.  
Firstly, there are the businesses which are willing and able to adhere to the UNGC 
principles e.g. submitting a COP and belonging to a Local Network.  These tend to be the 
big high-profile, high-street names which respond to reputational carrots.112  Next, there 
are those businesses which are willing but unable to adhere to UNGC commitments such 
as submitting COPs.  The vast majority of delinquent participants fall within the SME 
sector and the ‘naming and shaming’ stick used hitherto to embarrass participants into 
meeting their obligations is less likely to have a positive effect than previously simply 
because they and their activities are often less visible to the public.113  74% of UNGC 
participating companies which responded to a survey reported that increasing consumer 
trust in their business was a key reason for involvement in the initiative.114  SMEs 
generally have a lower public profile and it must therefore be assumed that they are less 
susceptible to bad publicity and the consumer campaigns and boycotts which often plague 
the larger high-profile businesses and act as a lever for better behaviour.115  
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included.  Annual Review (2008) note 90 at 53.
114 Annual Review (2010) note 46 at 12.
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Finally, there are businesses which are simply unwilling to become involved with 
initiatives such as the UNGC at all.  It is this renegade group which presents the greatest 
challenge for voluntary schemes.  If one of the aims of the CSR project is to convince 
industry that CSR is good for business then ways of reaching those businesses which ‘fly 
under the radar’ need to be developed over and above those which reach businesses that are 
responsive to the threat of losing consumer confidence or their reputation. This is the crux 
of the matter as the businesses currently engaged in human rights violations will never be 
persuaded by the reputational carrot held out by voluntary initiatives.116  Companies out of 
the public eye are far less susceptible to the notion of the ‘price of getting it wrong’ and 
this is why it is necessary to establish a parallel ‘top-down’ international regulatory 
architecture which will apply to all business.117  As Rasche comments, this is why the 
UNGC’s ‘learning based approach’ can only be a ‘supplement to regulation’ rather than a 
replacement.118   
In light of these ongoing difficulties, the UNGC will have to work hard to address the 
problem of non-communicating participants and inactive/delisted companies.  This is being 
addressed partly through the implementation of a quality reporting programme which is 
designed to help businesses draft their COPs, encourage ‘greater transparency’ among 
existing participants and standardise the COPs.119  Such a scheme will be of 
unquestionable value for SMEs who struggle with the administrative burden of 
institutional paperwork and red tape at the best of times.  The introduction of a COP 
template in 2010 will go some way to achieve this although the ‘differentiation 
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programme’ launched in 2011 may be more controversial because while it aims to help 
SMEs it introduces variable standards of implementation:
It is a framework for companies to differentiate themselves based on the extent to 
which their COP describes implementation of the Ten Principles and related areas 
based on clear criteria. It also aims to facilitate a more thorough assessment of 
sustainability performance and disclosure by stakeholders, while recognizing each 
company’s unique operational context such as size, industry and geography.120
Furthermore, the UNGC will also have to demonstrate that it is more than a mere ‘talking 
shop’ or opportunity for charitable works and move towards helping to materially prevent 
human rights violations by business.  There is no question that the dissemination of 
information and education about human rights standards (and the rest) is valuable in terms 
of ensuring respect for principles but there are ongoing breaches which require urgent 
attention and the UNGC remains unable to tackle them.
There are also concerns about the multistakeholder nature of the UNGC.  For example, 
disquiet has been expressed by the UNGC itself regarding the predominance of business 
actors in the Local Networks because 70% of Steering Committees are driven by the 
business actors themselves.121  This figure rises to 80% in European Local Networks and 
raises questions as to whether other stakeholders in the process are effectively involved 
and included on the ground.122  Such statistics dispute the UNGC’s claims to legitimacy by 
challenging its democratic credentials.123  As Thérien and  Pouliot put it:
Although the Compact does give more voice to nonstate actors on the international 
stage, clearly the language of ‘partnership,’ ‘networking,’ and ‘policy dialogue’ 
cannot by itself erase the inequalities that cause some groups to be ‘in’ while others 
are left ‘out.’124
The UNGC will have to work hard to ensure two things.  Firstly, that a balance is struck 
between the competing interests of the stakeholders and that the more powerful business 
actors do not harness the Local Networks for their own agendas and interests.  Secondly, 
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that NGOs and others are given access to Local Network Steering Committees on an equal 
basis to business actors.
While the UNGC is an important tool in relation to encouraging adherence to some aspects 
of CSR, nevertheless, the current institutional arrangements are simply not capable of 
addressing ongoing violations of human rights (it was never an objective) and certainly do 
not fully meet Ruggie’s requirements for an ‘effective remedy.’125  The UNGC was never 
designed with any sort of enforcement mechanism or punishment in mind for active human 
rights breaches and while the ‘bottom up’ reporting approach and dissemination activities 
are commendable in terms of preventing business misbehaviour, huge cracks appear in the 
system when businesses simply refuse to meet their reporting obligations and the system 
itself cannot remedy ex post facto situations of human rights abuse.  
Special Representative Ruggie during his mandate wanted to identify examples of existing 
good practice in relation to business and human rights.  There is no doubt that the UNGC 
has much to offer in this regard via the COPs and Local Networks in particular.  The 
UNGC is doing good work in the promotion of human rights standards, and consequently 
protection, but it is simply not in a position to offer any kind of remedy or redress for 
human rights violations by business unless its terms of reference change.  
4.4 Conclusion
The general impact of the UNGC remains to be seen. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
however, what the UNGC experience demonstrates is that it is possible for private business 
actors to work with the UN on the international plane. Again, no objection in principle 
from international law has impeded the work of the UNGC. Moreover, some business 
actors at least seem willing to comply with human rights obligations emanating from 
international treaties.  This is especially true when the content of internal codes of conduct 
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is examined. These include many references to the key international human rights 
instruments referred to in the UNGC.126
The UNGC represents a different approach to the issue of business and human rights and 
as such it has some notable strengths.  Firstly, the Global Compact adopts a top-down – 
bottom-up approach, whereby it relies upon the top-down application of general 
international human rights standards as well as bottom-up implementation of those 
standards at the national level.   The Global Compact does this through its Local Networks 
which promote the UNGC as a policy initiative and disseminate information about human 
rights.  
The second strength of the UNGC is that it is multistakeholder in nature.  That is, it 
actively involves relevant actors in the CSR process, that is, States, business actors, NGOs, 
trade unions, industry bodies and other members of civil society such as academics.  It has 
become generally accepted that a multistakeholder mechanism which engages all relevant 
parties is to be preferred.127   Witness the substantial criticism that the European Union 
attracted when it abandoned its multistakeholder approach to CSR and chose to engage 
only with representatives of business discussed in Chapter 5.128
A fourth strength of the UNGC project is that business accountability is a key factor, in this 
case a self-imposed and public obligation to account.  Accountability mechanisms are a 
crucial element of any business and human rights initiative for holding business enterprises 
responsible for violations of human rights standards in order to hold them to their 
obligations.  So for example, the UNGC utilises ‘naming and shaming’ techniques to 
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highlight members who fail to report as required.129  Companies can be permanently 
expelled for failure to adhere to the UNGC principles and this information is published on 
the UNGC website.130  
Fifthly, the UNGC attempts to operate in a transparent manner. So for example, participant 
companies voluntarily include a statement in their annual reports indicating their 
compliance with the human rights, environmental and anti-corruption principles,131
The increasing use of domestic and regional mechanisms by business and human rights 
initiatives has enabled the enhanced promotion and dissemination of information regarding 
human rights standards and so yields a final strength.  A large part of the Global Compact’s 
work involves disseminating information to and educating businesses about human rights 
standards.  This is done by the UNGC itself and increasingly by the domestic and regional 
Local Networks.132  
Undoubtedly the use of alternative methods utilised by the UNGC and discussed in this 
chapter has made some business actors respect human rights and consider and uphold their 
social responsibilities.  Thus it is argued that the UNGC is contributing to CSR norm 
internalisation but, notwithstanding the positive elements, there are also major hurdles to 
be overcome. Significantly, the UNGC suffers from a serious image problem and recurring 
accusations of bluewashing threaten to overshadow the positive achievements of the 
UNGC and its networks.  
Moreover, the UNGC must do more to address the large number of business actors who 
fail to meet the mandatory requirement to communicate their progress.  Without a 
significant reduction in this figure, the UNGC remains vulnerable to extensive criticism 
from civil society.  It is clear that the threat of expelling or delisting is an inadequate 
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131 Policy on Communicating Progress note 99.
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response to business actors who fail to meet their participation commitments.  What is also 
clear is that Ruggie’s concept of ‘principled pragmatism’ which pervades the UNGC has 
limits.  The UNGC, like the other examples of the OECD and EU discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6, demonstrates that in the absence of a hard legal regulatory framework some 
businesses will continue to ignore evolving standards and will violate human rights.
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THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: 
A TOP-DOWN - BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO REGULATING BUSINESS BEHAVIOUR
“[T]he only comprehensive, multilaterally endorsed code of conduct for 
multinational enterprises.”1
5.0 Introduction
In some respects the OECD adopts a truly cooperative approach to business and human 
rights and one which operates at the international and national levels.  Through the 
implementation of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,2 (‘the Guidelines’), the 
OECD harnesses the consensual authority of an international multilateral instrument 
coupled with institutional clout and national mechanisms to bring a degree of 
accountability to the behaviour of business actors.  Hence the ‘top-down - bottom-up’ 
description of the chapter title.  In this sense, the OECD system represents, an example of 
new governance where there is a ‘diffusion of rights and responsibilities among 
governments, private companies, NGOs and other interested parties.’3  As will be seen, 
however, this diffusion has been limited in both scope and impact, notwithstanding a June 
2011 revision.
The Guidelines form part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises, and Adhering Governments agree to promote their observance 
among multinational enterprises.4   Importantly,  its Adherent Governments comprise the 
majority of industrialised nations as well some of the most rapidly industrialising, such as 
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Brazil and are therefore home and host to significant numbers of transnational business 
actors.5  Quite clearly the OECD and governments adhering to the Guidelines are 
conforming to SGSR Ruggie’s (and international law’s) position that States have the 
primary obligation to protect individuals from human rights abuses but also recognise that 
business has minimum obligations and that human rights can only be protected, respected 
and remedied by a combined arrangement.   In other words the OECD adopts a top-down – 
bottom-up approach, albeit a flawed one, whereby a cooperative agreement operates at the 
international level while also enabling and encouraging domestic solutions.  As such, the 
OECD Guidelines are substantially different in nature and effect from the UNGC which, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, functions as a business leaders’ policy dialogue, focuses 
on the voluntary participation of business actors and does not require State participation.  
The Guidelines also differ substantially from the failed UNCTC Code of Conduct and the 
UN Norms addressed in Chapter 3, both of which sought to impose direct, legally binding 
obligations on business actors via international multilateral treaties.  The Guidelines, 
conversely, are recommendatory in nature and Adherent Governments merely, ‘jointly 
recommend to multinational enterprises operating in or from their territories the 
observance of the Guidelines...’6 thus ‘observance...by enterprises is voluntary and not 
legally enforceable.’7  While the Guidelines are addressed to business actors,  it is the 
governments of OECD Adhering Governments which adhere to them.
Despite the fact that the Guidelines are not legally binding, emphasising instead self-
regulation, capacity building and management systems,8 they do specifically address the 
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issue of human rights,9 in particular labour issues,10 as well as environmental protection.11  
The lack of clarity and specificity of language, however, has been criticised by one 
commentator for failing to meet the overarching objectives of the Guidelines:
The Guidelines endeavour to achieve an atmosphere of confidence and predictability 
between business, labour, governments and society.  Such objectives are ill-satisfied 
by jargon such as ‘local capacity building,’ ‘individual human development’ and 
good corporate governance which are evidently directed at non-participating 
addressees.12  
Nils Rosemann has also criticised the human rights provisions within the 2000 version of 
the Guidelines for being ‘weakly phrased’ and making ‘no explicit reference to rights 
critical to the protection of life, liberty and security.’13  While the expanded 2011 human 
rights chapter of the Guidelines is an improvement, as will be seen in Section 5.3, the same 
criticisms remain.
 
Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from the OECD Guidelines’ experience overall, 
both positive and negative, and this is true particularly in relation to accountability 
attempts via the National Contact Point (NCPs).14  This makes the OECD’s practical 
experiences in attempting to regulate business behaviour different from anything 
undertaken at the UN and elsewhere and offers a new governance or third way approach 
which exhibits potential elements of SGSR Ruggie’s definition of ‘remedy‘ although it 
fails ultimately for failing to act as a strong deterrent or to offer redress.  Notwithstanding 
this limited positive aspect, the OECD system exhibits substantial structural difficulties 
which have hampered openness, transparency and the involvement of civil society as well 
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classic problems in relation to weak enforcement and lack of fully effective remedies.  It is 
unlikely that the revisions made in the 2011 Guidelines will solve these problems.
Given that the Guidelines ‘cover up to 85% of total foreign direct investment flows,’15 it is 
important that this Chapter examines the application of the current Guidelines and analyses 
their effectiveness at achieving the accountability of business actors in relation to human 
rights violations.   In particular, it critiques the National Contact Point system and the 
implementation of Specific Instance Procedures.  It concludes that while the OECD 
Guidelines offer a useful model for achieving business accountability, their non-binding 
nature, their lack of enforceability and absence of individual redress renders them 
deficient.  Finally, the chapter outlines changes to both the Guidelines and to the NCPs 
which will be necessary in order to strengthen them as an accountability mechanism.  In 
the words of OECD Watch, (an important ‘global network‘ consisting of more than eighty 
NGOs working in the business and human rights sphere16), ‘it is imperative that there 
should be genuine improvements to both substance and procedure so that the Guidelines 
become more than a set of voluntary recommendations.’17   It is unfortunate that in 
updating the Guidelines in 2011, the OECD missed a crucial opportunity to rectify their 
weaknesses  in order to ensure their efficacy in the future.  
5.1 Background and History
Much like the UN, the OECD has a reasonably lengthy history in relation to CSR.  Drafted 
in 1976,  the Guidelines represented the OECD Member Governments’ response to 
increasing globalisation and what they described as ‘strategic challenges for enterprises 
and their stakeholders.’18  Peter Muchlinksi asserts that the response was a reaction to the 
positions of two different State groups both of which wanted some form of binding 
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en/Publication_3550  [last accessed 27.7.10]  (hereinafter ‘OECD Watch (2010)’).
17 OECD Watch (2010) ibid at 8.
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regulatory control over transnational business actors and which were discussed in Chapter 
1 of this dissertation.19    
Firstly, developing States were asserting their newly established sovereignty and 
‘demanding a change in the balance of world economic power‘20  This was already 
manifesting itself in a CSR context at the UNCTC via the debates surrounding the Draft 
Code of Conduct,21 as well as on a practical level through numerous post-colonial 
nationalisations of foreign-owned assets in developing nations.22  As was seen in Chapter 
3, the efforts of the UNCTC to create a multilateral binding Code of Conduct collapsed 
ultimately, while within the OECD context the non-binding Guidelines were devised and 
adopted.  Muchlinski contends that a key aim of OECD Ministers in creating the 
Guidelines was to hinder the development of stronger regulation by the developing 
nations23 and in this regard the OECD Ministers were successful, given the subsequent 
failure of the UNCTC to deliver an universally agreed Draft Code of Conduct.
Secondly, some OECD Member Governments such as Canada, the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian nations, as well as the Trades Union movement, also sought greater 
regulation and control of transnational business activities in the form of a ‘legally binding 
code.’24   Their concerns emanated from unease about unregulated transnational business 
within a context of embryonic globalisation, as opposed to protection of sovereign 
interests.  
Muchlinksi describes how the demand for regulation from both of these groups was 
balanced by calls from business ‘for greater emphasis on the removal of obstacles to 
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20 Muchlinski (2007) ibid.
21 See discussion Chapter 3 at 3.2.1.1.
22 For examples of these nationalisations see e.g. Anglo-American Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), 
Judgment of 22 July 1952, ICJ (1952); Liamco v. Libya 20 ILM 1 (1981); BP v. Libya 53 ILR 297 (1974); 
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23 Muchlinski (2007) note 19 at 578.
24 Muchlinski (2007) ibid.
foreign direct investment’25 and dubs the Guidelines a ‘corporatist initiative’ 26 drawing on 
Robinson’s work on political control of transnational business.27  This corporatist strategy, 
which in recent years has buttressed the so-called business case for self-regulation, runs 
through the geopolitical approach of the industrialised nations during the 1970s, 
Muchlinksi writes:
To counter these developments the OECD ministers, urged on by the US 
government, decided to adopt their own policy on MNEs, which it was hoped would 
influence the UN’s attempts at ‘codification’ to move away from a highly regulatory 
position of ‘MNE control.’28
The corporatist approach can also be seen in the grudging acknowledgment by the OECD 
Guidelines that a globalised economic environment ‘may’ have been enabling ‘some’ 
business actors to ignore social and environmental standards: 
Today’s competitive forces are intense and multinational enterprises face a variety of 
legal, social and regulatory settings.  In this context, some enterprises may be 
tempted to neglect appropriate standards and principles in an attempt to gain undue 
competitive advantage.  Such practices by the few may call into question the 
reputation of the many and may give rise to public concerns.29 
Despite this apparent understatement of the problem of business misbehaviour, the 
Guidelines are deemed to represent Adherent Governments’ ‘firm expectations’ about the 
behaviour of multinational enterprises in the social and environmental spheres.30  Four key 
objectives are set out in the Guidelines: ‘to ensure that the operation of these enterprises 
are in harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence 
between enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help improve the foreign 
investment climate and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development.‘31  
Joachim Karl, formerly of the OECD, has written that the ‘basic approach‘ of the 
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28 Muchlinksi (2007) note 19 at 578 quoting Robinson ibid at 113-120.
29 OECD Guidelines 2011 note 2 Preface at12 para.6.
30 Working Party on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications and Clarifications, DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL, 31 
October 2001, Clarifications at 9 http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAFFE/
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31 OECD Guidelines 2011 note 2 Preface at 11 para.1.
Guidelines ‘is that internationally agreed guidelines can help to prevent misunderstandings 
and build an atmosphere of confidence and predictability between business, labour and 
governments.‘32  Their content is discussed below but as will be shown, such an approach 
is limited in scope and has tended to exclude other stakeholders.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, the label ‘multinational enterprise’ is not defined in the 
Guidelines but it is to be interpreted broadly and encompasses a wide range of actors 
because 
‘[m]ultinational enterprises...have evolved to encompass a broader range of business 
arrangements and organisational forms’33 than historically existed.  This includes ‘private, 
State’ or ‘mixed’ enterprises:34
established in more than one country and so linked that they may co- ordinate their operations in 
various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence 
over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely 
from one multinational enterprise to another.35
Thus a very broad range of business actors fall potentially within the scope of the 
Guidelines, but as will be demonstrated, this has not yet translated into accountability.
5.2 Content of the Guidelines
As indicated above, in terms of content, the Guidelines contain recommendations endorsed 
by Adhering Governments, which are directed towards multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
in order to ‘provide principles and standards of good practice consistent with applicable 
laws and internationally recognised standards.’36  Specifically, they purport to set out 
principles of globally acceptable behaviour for transnational business actors in the social 
and environmental sphere with a view to facilitating transnational business.  The 
Guidelines also address other issues such as bribery, taxation and competition but these fall 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  It is made clear, however, that the legal effect of the 
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33 OECD Guidelines 2011 note 2 Preface at 11 para.2.
34 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline I(4).
35 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline I(4).
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Guidelines in their entirety is limited in that that they are not intended to supplant domestic 
laws, but are regarded as an ‘add-on’ to national legal provisions:
...it is important to note that self-regulation and other initiatives in a similar vein, 
including the Guidelines, should not unlawfully restrict competition, nor should they 
be considered a substitute for effective law and regulation by governments. 37 
It is this ancillary, non-binding character which ensures that when NCPs make a finding of 
a breach of the Guidelines, via a Specific Instance Procedure, any recommendations made 
cannot be enforced.  The reality is that Adhering Governments simply have not 
implemented domestic legislative provisions which punish human rights violations by 
business actors which are in contravention of the Guidelines or provide any redress for 
those affected by the abuses.  It should be noted, however, that Norway published a White 
Paper in 2009 outlining the case for an international CSR framework over disparate 
national legislation,38 so change may come in the future.
Guideline II(1) sets out in general terms the behaviour expected of enterprises, 
encouraging them to ‘[c]ontribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a 
view to achieving sustainable development.’39  In particular, enterprises should ‘[r]espect 
the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their activities.’40  MNEs 
are encouraged to cooperate closely with local communities, uphold and apply ‘good 
corporate governance principles’ and ‘develop and apply effective self-regulatory 
practices.’41  Furthermore, there are relatively detailed provisions on disclosure matters 
which emphasise the need for full and accurate information to be made available on 
business structure, activities, financial situation, performance, accounting, audit, 
environmental and social reporting (where they exist), plus other basic information relating 
to matters such as ownership, objectives, affiliates, and voting rights.42 Employment and 
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39 OECD Guidelines 2011 note 2 Guideline II(A)(1).
40 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline II(A)(2).
41 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline II(3), (6) & (7).
42 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline III(1), (2), (3) & (4).
environmental matters are dealt with in separate provisions.43 In relation to labour issues, 
the Guidelines concentrate on trade union rights, child labour, forced labour, 
discrimination, collective bargaining and health and safety. The environmental provisions 
address environmental management systems, disclosure of information, health and safety, 
technology, and training. Finally the Guidelines deal with bribery, consumers, science and 
technology, competition and taxation.44  A Report on their operation is published annually.
The Guidelines were revised substantially in 2000, when National Contact Points were 
introduced.45  Some seventy-five NGOs46 described the outcome of the 2000 review and 
the creation of the NCPs as ‘the worst of both worlds’ that is, ‘a combination of voluntary 
low level standards with a weak implementation mechanism’47 and it was hoped that 
Adhering Governments would learn from this previous review and address the inherent 
weaknesses of the system in the 2011 Review, especially with regard to NCPs, but this is 
not the case.  Since 2000, there has been substantial systemic criticism of the NCPs and the 
Specific Instance Procedures, as will be seen below, but structural and institutional matters 
relating to the NCPs were not considered as part of the 2010/11 review.  At the time of 
submission of this dissertation, the 2010/11 review had just taken place, focusing on 
several key areas, namely, supply chains, human rights, environment and climate change 
and resulting in the 2011 Guidelines.  One key issue that was open for consideration in the 
review, was the formal incorporation of SGSR Ruggie’s due diligence principle and this 
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review.
46 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Statements made on the adoption of the Review 2000, 27 
June 2000, ‘Statement to Governments Adhering to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises from 
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47 Ibid at 22.
has taken place.48  Much of the impetus for the 2010/11 review came from SGSR Ruggie’s 
condemnation of the OECD system49 as well as that of NGOs.50  
Chapter 4 of the 2011 Guidelines expands on the previous meagre human rights provision 
and this is an important step.  Firstly, it implements the provisions of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights in relation to Protect, Respect and Remedy 
framework51 and secondly, it ‘clearly and unambiguously establishes that enterprises 
should respect human rights wherever they operate.’52  Thirdly, a clear due diligence 
provision requires that enterprises and their supply chain identify, prevent and mitigate 
human rights risks.53  Thus ‘States have the duty to protect human rights‘ and enterprises 
‘should respect human rights‘ within ‘the framework of internationally recognised human 
rights‘ and the domestic laws of host nations.54  The Commentary to Chapter 4 describes 
‘respect for human rights‘ as the ‘global standard of expected conduct for enterprises‘ 
while reinforcing states‘ human rights obligations.55  Furthermore, enterprises should 
‘avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts‘ either directly or 
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21 March 2011, Introduction to the Guiding Principles at 5 para.13, http://www.business-humanrights.org/
media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf [last accessed 16.7.11] (hereinafter 
‘Guiding Principles’).
52 Amnesty International, ‘The 2010-11 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises has 
come to an end: the OECD must now turn to effective implementation,’ Public Statement 23 May 2011, AI 
Index: IOR 30/001/2011 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR30/001/2011/en/601f0e2c-a8a3-4fbc-
b090-c0abb3c51ab2/ior300012011en.pdf [last accessed 30.8.11] (hereinafter ‘Amnesty International Public 
Statement’) at 1.
53 OECD Guidelines 2011 note 2 Guideline IV(5).
54 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline IV(1).
55 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline IV Commentary at 30.
indirectly through ‘business relationships’56 and via acts or omissions.57  Thus, even where 
an enterprise has not caused or contributed to an adverse impact, those of any other 
‘directly linked‘ business will nevertheless engage the Guidelines where there is a 
‘business relationship’58 i.e. partners, suppliers and ‘any other non-State or State entity.’59  
Any adverse human rights impacts should be remediated through ‘legitimate processes’60 
which means that that they ought to be accessible, predictable, equitable, compatible with 
the Guidelines, transparent and ‘based on dialogue and engagement with a view to seeking 
agreed solutions.’61  The International Bill of Rights is the applicable benchmark human 
rights standard although ‘additional standards’ may have to be considered in relation to 
‘specific groups or populations’ or particular contexts, such as situations involving armed 
conflict.62  Addressing adverse impacts involves identifying, preventing and mitigating 
them where possible as well as the previously mentioned ‘remediation’ and ‘accounting for 
how the adverse human rights impacts are addressed.’63
The 2010/11 review process has been described as a ‘make or break moment’  which 
provided:
a golden opportunity to ensure that the...Guidelines are given the necessary 
institutional authority to make them an effective corporate accountability tool.64 
Certainly it seems that the opportunity was not seized, largely because Adherent 
Governments are unwilling to address the fundamental flaws of the system which as will 
be demonstrated are becoming increasingly apparent.  In particular, the 2010/11 review did 
not consider the deficiencies of the NCPs in failing to prevent human rights abuses or to 
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60 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline IV(6).
61 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline IV(6) and Commentary at 32.
62 OECD Guidelines 2011 ibid Guideline IV(3) and Commentary at 31.
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properly hold business actors to account in any meaningful way.  Amnesty International is 
extremely critical of the review in this regard
Despite strong encouragement by NGOs, neither mandatory oversight nor peer 
review mechanisms are expressly required. There is no clarification about the role of 
NCPs in making recommendations on observance of the Guidelines or on monitoring 
and following up on agreements and recommendations.65 
Furthermore:
No consequences for companies who fail to comply with the Guidelines or refuse to 
engage in mediation are specified. The absence of minimum standards to ensure the 
effectiveness of the implementation procedures and their coherent application across 
adhering States, risk undermining the value and meaning of the substantive 
improvements made elsewhere in the Guidelines and with it, the effectiveness and 
credibility of the instrument as a whole.66
Lack of redress, deterrent effect and punishment are key failings of the OECD system.  The 
next few sections examine the strengths and weaknesses of the Guidelines in their current 
form, while the concluding section of this chapter considers the options for ensuring 
greater future effectiveness of the Guidelines.
5.3 A Multistakeholder Approach
From their earliest beginnings, the Guidelines adopted a relatively open, multistakeholder 
approach at the highest level of the OECD in relation to business and human rights, an 
approach which should be regarded as positive.   As the Guidelines fall within the remit of 
the Investment Committee (formerly the Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (CIME)), it is this committee which is required to coordinate 
‘exchanges of views’ with stakeholders on relevant matters.67  This process has caused 
some difficulties in the past, however, because of the apparent exclusion of NGOs, in 
particular from participation in National Contact Points.  As will be seen, such exclusion 
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leaves the system open to criticisms that there has been a shift away from stakeholder 
involvement and consequently a lack of transparency in the processes.
Under the OECD Council Decision of June 2000, stakeholders to be consulted include the 
Business Industry Advisory Council (BIAC), the Trades Union Advisory Council 
(TUAC),68 as well as ‘other non-governmental organisations.’69  BIAC consists of 
representatives from both industry and employers’ associations within OECD member 
governments while TUAC is composed of national trade union organisations from all 
OECD members.  Both TUAC and BIAC have secretariats based in Paris and engage in 
formal and informal contact with the OECD.  From the classification of stakeholders it is 
evident that a clear distinction was drawn, at least initially, between the various 
stakeholders as regards their involvement.  TUAC and BIAC are officially regarded as 
regarded as operating on an equal footing, with an emphasis being placed on ‘strict 
parallelism of treatment’70 although some question this equality.71
Conversely, although NGOs may be consulted by the Investment Committee as relevant 
stakeholders,72 in practice they have been formally excluded from the Guidelines’ 
international implementation process and this has caused great frustration within the NGO 
community historically.73  In the Annual Report 2001, NGOs voiced their discontent, 
stating that, ‘[t]he unconvincing explanation given is that the NGOs are not organised in a 
similar fashion as BIAC and TUAC.‘  Certainly NGO participation is not formalised to the 
same extent as the trade unions and business actors.  It is reasonable to infer that given the 
large numbers of interested NGOs the absence of a coordinated agenda might make 
engagement problematic for the OECD but that does not justify their exclusion.  
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More recently, however, NGOs have become actively involved in the ‘monitoring and 
reviewing’ efforts of the Investment Committee and although their participation has not 
become formalised it certainly demonstrates a desire on the part of the OECD to increase 
and augment the involvement of civil society within the overarching framework of the 
Guidelines.  As will be demonstrated, however, in the years since the 2000 Revision NGOs 
have been playing an increasingly important role in the operation of some of the NCPs and 
their Specific Instance Procedures.
The formal exclusion of NGOs conflicts with a wider participatory approach to regulation 
of business actors, however, an OECD Council Decision of June 2000 requires that NGOs 
be permitted to make their views known.  In this respect, civil society stakeholders are 
certainly a better position under the OECD mechanisms than, for example,within the EU 
CSR model addressed in the following chapter.74  Moreover, the OECD has publicly stated 
its support for a full participation model:
Each of the main actors involved in corporate responsibility programmes – business, 
trade unions, NGOs, governments and international organisations – offers a 
distinctive perspective and body of knowledge and expertise.  The challenge is to 
bring these distinctive competencies together and to incorporate them into a shared 
way of seeing things and a common blueprint for action. 75
The OECD thus promotes a theoretical model based on formal and informal stakeholder 
participation in terms of its general approach to the regulation of business and human 
rights, even if this does not always translate into reality within the NCPs.  At the national 
level, in the best NCP models, such as Finland, all relevant stakeholders are formally 
involved in implementation of the Guidelines via the NCP.  Notwithstanding this evidently 
inclusive, multistakeholder inclination, there is much support for the assertion that the 
Guidelines are not being applied universally or effectively76 and this is largely to do with 
the structure of the NCPs, including the exclusion of NGO stakeholders.  The next section 
will examine these structural and systemic failings.
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5.4 Compliance with the Guidelines  
Despite the 2011 Revision, there is no overarching institutional mechanism for ensuring 
compliance with the Guidelines.  Nor indeed is there any other form of compliance 
procedure in place, such as naming and shaming, self-reporting or identifying best practice, 
as seen in the Global Compact model.  This means that, while individual business actors 
are permitted to make representations to the Investment Committee about Guideline 
matters relating to their own interests, ‘the Committee shall not reach conclusions on the 
conduct of individual enterprises.’77  Moreover, similar to discussions within the EU, the 
formally recognised representatives of business and trade unions at the OECD remain 
locked in a voluntarism versus normative rules debate about CSR.78  Clearly and 
unsurprisingly BIAC vehemently supports the voluntary nature of the Guidelines and its 
stance on the Guidelines has remained unequivocal over the years, concluding in its 2001 
Report that:
The Guidelines must remain voluntary – not legally binding.  They are not designed 
to replace national or international legislation or individual company or sectoral 
codes of conduct.79
In 2009 in response to the consultation about a possible further update of the Guidelines, 
BIAC restated its position:
Presenting to the OECD Investment Committee during consultations in October and 
early-December, BIAC reiterated its support for the OECD Guidelines as voluntary 
recommendations on responsible business conduct.80  
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Indeed BIAC has even condemned a past Dutch government proposal to oblige MNEs to 
adhere to the Guidelines as a prerequisite for obtaining export credit coverage and 
government subsidies:81
The Guidelines and their related implementation procedures are unequivocal in 
underscoring their voluntary nature with regard to MNEs.  To render an essential 
element  of international financial competitiveness conditional upon ‘acceptance’ and 
to pursue such  acceptance with tools of ‘enforcement’ – or in other words, negative 
’sanctions’  - are abridgements of the terms and spirit of the Guidelines and of the 
premise upon which BIAC leadership submitted the Guidelines to members for their 
consideration.
BIAC continues, ‘such an action would set a very negative precedent that should be 
avoided and in no way should be followed by other countries.’82  The opposition of BIAC 
to formal regulation could not be made clearer.  Indeed, it seems that for BIAC, the 
Guidelines represent a corporate marketing opportunity rather than an authentic 
opportunity to moderate corporate misbehaviour: 
For companies, the wide coverage of the Guidelines represents a blueprint for 
management systems and practice in today’s world where companies are subject to 
wider scrutiny than ever before. Used positively, the Guidelines are a helpful tool for 
companies positioning themselves in the global economy.83
While there is a need to promote socially responsible business behaviour as being good for 
business and a marketable concept, there is a very real danger that the human rights 
objectives become lost in a blizzard of public relations rhetoric.  On a slightly more 
positive note, BIAC has also set out some persuasive reasons why observance of the 
Guidelines makes good business sense, over and above any ethical considerations.  
Companies are engaging in voluntary CR [Corporate Responsibility] initiatives for a 
variety of reasons. These may include the following: set a positive example; 
anticipate new regulatory developments: help improve reputation and customer 
satisfaction; attract new investors; increase staff integrity, motivation and 
productivity; induce better supply chain management; reduce risks and cost 
associated with doing business.84
While this approach may be anathema to NGOs, trade unions and some commentators, if it 
succeeds in convincing business actors to respect the Guidelines then it is to be 
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commended.  Of course, it requires the willing participation of business in the process, as 
well as effective monitoring, and as demonstrated in Section 5.5.2 there is both a low rate 
of business implementation of the Guidelines and little or no monitoring of their execution. 
The fact that BIAC makes reference only to ‘corporate responsibility‘ as opposed to 
‘corporate social responsibility‘ is an interesting and noteworthy omission which may 
reveal an attempt by BIAC to limit the scope of the Guidelines.   In any event, voluntary 
principles have little or no impact on the rogue businesses which have no interest in better 
management or reputational repercussions.
Predictably, BIAC focuses on and prioritises certain aspects of the Guidelines; that being 
the improvement of the climate for foreign direct investment85 and the business case for 
supporting voluntarism.  TUAC on the other hand has consistently focused on the need for 
enforceable rules that are binding upon business.86  This is mirrored in NGO dissatisfaction 
with the lack of a system for monitoring the ‘effectiveness of the … Guidelines in 
achieving corporate sustainable behaviour.’87   Over the years NGOs have been stressing 
the need for practical solutions to the lack of enforcement, stating that they had ‘no interest 
in an instrument that will not have an actual impact on the ground.’88  To all intents and 
purposes so long as the mechanism operates effectively in practice this is all that matters 
i.e. human rights violations are prevented or remedied.  Of course, because the Guidelines 
and the NCPs are not working effectively, as demonstrated in the following section, NGOs 
continue to lobby, if not for a binding regulatory framework, then at least a more potent 
NCP system which sets out clear consequences for breaches of the Guidelines.89  It was 
thus disappointing that the terms of reference for the 2011 Review were limited in scope 
and did not include consideration of normative options.90
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The OECD Annual Reports highlight the continuing gulf between the business sector, 
TUAC and NGOs.  The familiar hard regulation versus voluntarism standoff is merely 
reproduced without offering solutions and the 2011 Review has done little, if anything, to 
change this.  It would appear that so long as the BIAC viewpoint carries more weight (and 
is supported by States) than that of the NGOs and the TUAC within the context of the 
OECD, the Guidelines will remain voluntary and non-binding.  Given that the Guidelines 
have remained voluntary since their original conception in 1976 it seems clear that the 
business case prevails.  Nevertheless, some commentators have taken the view that the 
Guidelines have had a very real and favourable impact on business behaviour:
...the Guidelines have...raised corporate awareness about the need to establish 
voluntarily codes of conduct. Another effect observed in this respect was a new wave 
of company codes and other corporate social responsibility initiatives in the late 
1990s. The development of company codes and other corporate social responsibility 
initiatives in the late 1990s entailed a new surge of awareness about corporate 
power.91
Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of the non-binding character of the Guidelines, 
the question remains as to whether the NCPs are in fact effective at monitoring business 
compliance with the Guidelines and mediating and resolving complaints under the Specific 
Instance Procedure.  The next section of the chapter considers this and concludes that 
while there are some positive aspects to the NCPs, ultimately the system is failing.92  
5.5 National Contact Points: Monitoring and Resolution of Complaints  
SGSR Ruggie has commented that the the NCPs are ‘potentially an important vehicle for 
providing remedy‘ but they have ‘too often failed to meet this potential.’93  To say that the 
NCPs have failed to meet their potential, however, is to suggest that they could have 
achieved more but it is not clear how this would be possible given the current structural 
limitations imposed by the Adherent Governments themselves.  NCPs are only as effective 
as their structure allows and this is entirely the responsibility of Adherent Governments.  
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Fault lies with the Adherent Governments, not the NCPs themselves, both in relation to the 
scope of the role given to NCPs under the Guidelines and in relation to the physical 
organisation at the national level.  As already intimated, the Guidelines are non-binding in 
character and therefore the NCPs can have only a limited impact as an enforcement and 
redress mechanism.  So what mechanisms are in fact in place within the OECD system and 
how effective are they at holding businesses to account for human rights abuses?  
After the Revision of the Guidelines in 2000, each OECD Member State was required to 
create an NCP for the purpose of, inter alia, monitoring the implementation of the 
Guidelines, promoting the Guidelines among all MNEs operating in or from its territory 
and contributing to the resolution of complaints.  It is important to note, however, that an 
NCP cannot initiate an investigation, but may only mediate a resolution in response to a 
complaint, and may only make recommendations.    Where mediation fails, the NCP may 
investigate the facts presented and reach a conclusion or determination, again accompanied 
by recommendations as to how to resolve the problems.  Nevertheless, the emphasis is 
always on achieving a mediated solution between the complainant and and the business 
actor against whom the complaint is made.  OECD Watch notes that while mediated 
settlements are ‘rare’ there have been some ‘notable agreements’ 94 between complainant 
NGOs and business actors.  Mediated agreements involving a variety of business actors 
and sectors including Adidas, First Quantum Mining, BHP Billiton and Accor Services are 
cited as examples.95  The report asserts that a mediated agreement is the ‘ideal outcome’ 
even if it is the ‘exception rather than the rule.’96 
 
Notwithstanding the mediation ideal, OECD Watch recognises that mediated agreements 
have a very limited impact on human rights on the ground and few lead to ‘improved 
corporate behaviour.’97  While citing the response of companies such as Bayer, GSL and 
Accor Services as examples of businesses which have made improvements to their 
behaviour subsequent to a mediated agreement, OECD Watch also acknowledges that:
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The lack of systematic monitoring and follow-up by NCPs on their own statements 
and recommendations makes it difficult to ascertain exactly how many cases have 
led to actual improvements in corporate behaviour.98
This is something that must be addressed as a matter of urgency by Adhering 
Governments.  Not least because the same criticisms can be levelled against the the Final 
Statements issued by NCPs where a mediated settlement has not been possible.   
On a positive note, however, the Final Statements disseminated at the end of Specific 
Instance Procedures are becoming increasingly detailed and are generally always published 
even if there has been no mediated agreement.  The UK and Dutch NCP Final Statements 
are of particular significance.  As will be seen, these Final Statements play an important 
role in clarifying the scope of the Guidelines and helping business actors to understand the 
nature of their human rights obligations, especially in relation to their supply chain.
5.5.1 Structure of the National Contact Points
Under the Guidelines, individual States are given wide latitude in relation to NCP 
structural arrangements and so the NCPs take a variety of forms but, disappointingly, the 
vast majority do not formally include NGOs, trade unions or even business within their 
constitution which is a major weakness because it conflicts with  the evolving and arguably 
enlightened multistakeholder approach of the OECD itself where both trade unions and 
NGOs participate in the monitoring and reviewing of Adherent Governments’ 
obligations.99
Of the forty current NCPs, seventeen are composed of a single government department,100 
eleven involve multiple government departments101 and one is bipartite (government and 
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business)102, nine are tripartite (government, business and trade unions).103  Finland’s NCP 
is the sole example of a ‘quadripartite’ NCP, composed of business, trade unions, various 
ministries and, significantly, NGOs104 while the revamped Dutch NCP operates using a 
‘mixed structure of independent experts and government representatives.’105  Previously, 
the Dutch NCP had been criticised for being entirely governmental in nature, thus:
The change is intended to ensure the independence of the Dutch NCP and avoid 
conflicting requirements between the NCP functions and those of the responsible 
Minister as member of the Dutch cabinet.106
In the view of OECD Watch, these ‘arms length’107 changes will render the Dutch NCP a 
‘more independent body.’108 For a trial period of three years,109 the chair will be 
independent and the NCP will include ‘two or three members with voting powers and four 
non-voting advisory members representing the ministries of economic affairs, social 
affairs, development cooperation and environment’ preserving ‘the governmental link’ as  
‘NCP statements will be accompanied by a ministerial position.’110
It is, however, recognised that characterising the NCPs in this way ‘does not provide a full 
picture of the scope and breadth of consultation.’111  Social partners and NGOs participate 
in the process formally and informally, so for example, in the USA they are consulted ‘via 
the Advisory Council on International Economic Policy or individually on an ad hoc 
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basis.’112  The UK NCP held a stakeholder consultation regarding reform of the NCP and 
implementation of the Guidelines in response to parliamentary113 and civil society114 
criticism of its performance relating to allegations of human rights breaches by UK-based 
businesses in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  The 2006 NCP report, for example, also 
noted that many of the NCPs regularly involve and consult civil society on both a formal 
and informal basis using:
other means for enhancing the inclusiveness of their activities. A number of countries 
reported using advisory committees or permanent consultative bodies whose 
members include non-government partners. Others stated that they convene regular 
meetings with business, trade unions and civil society. Still others state that they 
consult with NGOs or other partners on an informal basis or in reference to specific 
issues about which partners contribute their expertise.115
Thus, encouragingly, eleven of the forty NCPs adopt a structure whereby the government 
department(s) work together with business and civil society mostly in the form of trade 
unions although the Finnish NCP also embraces NGOs.116  This is a noteworthy 
improvement on previous years mostly as ‘a result of choices made by new Adherents’ to 
the Guidelines.117  In the 2009 Annual NCP Report a further shift in emphasis is recorded:
Compared with 2000, when the NCP mechanism under the revised Guidelines was 
created, the inclusion of stakeholders into NCP structures has markedly expanded.  
The number of NCPs with tri- or quadri-partite organisations has increased, and 
advisory committees or permanent consultative bodies involving non-government 
partners have become widespread in countries with government-based NCP 
structures. Meetings with business, trade unions and civil society have also become 
more frequent.118
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It would seem that there has been a conscious effort on the part of some but not all States 
to do this and to restructure NCPs generally in order to step away from purely government-
based institutions and to make them more transparent by opening them up to non-
governmental entities.119  So, as mentioned above, the Netherlands NCP is now made up of 
independent experts appointed to work with selected government advisors as opposed to its 
previous inter-departmental incarnation.  At the G8 Heilegendamm Summit in 2007 States 
made clear that they are actively seeking ‘better governance’ via the NCPs hence this 
restructuring, however this was not a focus of the 2011 Review which prioritised the 
substantive content of the Guidelines as opposed to structural issues.120 
It is undeniable that there has been a disparate response to the ‘better governance’ agenda 
because NCP arrangements are left to the discretion of individual Adhering Governments.  
Furthermore it seems to be the case that this lack of a coherent approach stems from the 
belief of States that ‘there is no perfect structure’ for NCPs.121  As a consequence, many 
Adherent Governments cling to an ‘in-house’ scheme whereby the NCP is situated entirely 
in one or several government departments and which seems to fly in the face of the 
multipartite ethos which underpins the Guidelines.  The arguments in favour of such a 
policy are set out in a 2008 NCP Review.122  States point to the fact that it is governments 
that ‘are the primary guarantors of the Guidelines’ and which also have the requisite 
economic expertise to deal with the issues and thus it makes sense for the NCP to be based 
solely within government.123  Quite clearly this does not adequately justify the apparent 
formal exclusion of civil society from many NCP structures and represents a retreat from a 
participatory approach involving civil society, contrary to a new governance or third way 
of regulation.  
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Moreover, States point to the difficulties of reaching consensus on contentious issues when 
civil society is included in the process but the evidence demonstrates that such snags can 
be dealt with in a straightforward manner.124  So, for example, in Sweden the chair of the 
NCP retains a casting vote, thus avoiding intractable stalemates.  Proclamations by 
Adherent Governments highlighting the fact that civil society can be involved with the 
process irrespective of the structure of the NCP betray the inherent overarching 
multistakeholder architecture of the Guidelines.  It is also difficult to see how an entirely 
government-based NCP ensures proper accountability.  Certainly proponents of the 
multipartite approach argue that true ‘objectivity, transparency and accountability’ can only 
be realised within an inclusive, multistakeholder NCP structure which has a measure of 
independence from the State.125  A coherent and consistent configuration across Adherent 
Governments can only add to the esteem of the NCPs, ensuring the proper application and 
protection of human rights standards.  It was a mistake, therefore, to exclude consideration 
of NCP structure from the 2011 Review as the impact of any substantive changes to the 
Guidelines is restricted by the overarching systemic problems of the NCPs. 
5.5.2 Monitoring
NCPs have failed singularly to monitor effectively the implementation of the Guidelines by 
business actors.  Perhaps more accurately, however, Adhering Governments have failed to 
equip NCPs with the requisite tools and resources to carry out their monitoring functions.  
OECD Watch concludes that ‘the ‘voluntary’ nature of the OECD Guidelines has resulted 
in governments being reluctant to monitor company compliance’ which means that it is 
difficult to evaluate to what extent the Guidelines are being ‘fully integrated into business 
policies and practices’ in order ascertain whether there have been practical advances.126  As 
observance of the Guidelines is not membership-based and there is no reporting 
requirement,  measuring their actual impact is problematic although some commentators 
suggest that increasing requirements for ‘CSR and sustainability reporting’ in a general 
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sense are filling the ‘information gap.’127  Nevertheless, a recent survey of publicly listed 
European companies established that only 55% of respondent companies based their CSR 
approach on the Guidelines, whereas the Global Compact and ILO Tripartite Declaration 
formed the basis of CSR for 92% and 64% companies respectively.128  Similarly, the GC is 
referenced significantly more frequently than the Guidelines in annual corporate CSR 
reports, 87% as opposed to a mere 39%.129    
Such figures suggest that the NCPs are failing to adequately promote observance of the 
Guidelines among business actors although it has been suggested that this is a ‘respectable 
performance’ given that companies ‘are not requested to reference their use.’130  It seems 
that a flagship initiative such as the Guidelines ought to have a better uptake rate, 
otherwise it can only lead to the conclusion that the business case for maintaining 
voluntary principles is simply not working.  If socially responsible business is good for 
facilitating transnational business, then the OECD and business community ought to 
demonstrate their commitment to binding legal principles and an effective enforcement and 
redress mechanism.
5.5.3 The (Non-) Resolution of Complaints: Specific Instance Procedures (SIP)
[t]he Guidelines’ “specific instance” grievance mechanism is where their 
unique added value lies and a key determinant of the positive impact they can have.131
In addition to their monitoring function, the NCPs play a crucial role in contributing to the 
‘resolution of issues that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines in specific 
instances.’132    Since the implementation of the SIP in the 2000 Review, ‘the total number 
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of requests’ for consideration of complaints has ‘exceeded the 200 mark.’133  ‘Of these, 146 
have been accepted for consideration and 114 of those have been concluded or closed’134 
but according to OECD Watch, there has been a ‘dramatic decrease in cases‘ submitted 
post-2004, although it is not clear why this is the case.135  It may be simply that the large 
costs and exertion of submitting a complaint outweigh greatly the likelihood of success.  
NGOs can expect to expend upwards of €100,000 and two years working on an NCP 
complaint.136  Up until June 2010, NGOs had filed 96 complaints,137 while trade unions 
had submitted 117 complaints in total.138  OECD Watch cites a ‘lack of confidence’ in the 
SIP, in particular the lack of an enforcement mechanism, as the reason for the ‘relatively 
small number of cases’ overall.139
Nearly half of NGO complaints involve allegations of human rights violations by business 
actors or their suppliers, accounting for 49% of all cases submitted to NCPs, although 
OECD Watch also notes that ‘most cases comprise multiple breaches of the Guidelines’ 
provisions.’140  Seventeen NCPs have never received a complaint from an NGO, which is a 
noteworthy number, while the UK has received twenty-three NGO complaints, Germany 
fifteen NGO complaints, and the US and Belgium thirteen NGO complaints apiece.141  The 
disproportionate use of the UK SIP could be regarded as a measure of its effectiveness, at 
least in comparison to other Adhering Governments, or it could be simply that UK NGOs 
are better prepared for using the SIP.142  Significantly, 72% of NGO complaints relate to 
business activities in ‘(non-Adhering) developing’ countries143 which on the face of it 
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would suggest that the Guidelines are being utilised transnationally in the way they were 
intended.    
Complaints brought under the SIPs cut across all business sectors but a significant majority 
relate to the extractive industry:
41 of the 96 NGO complaints have dealt with issues in the mining, oil and gas 
industry  A further 10 cases have involved the finance sector, predominantly through 
their provision of loans and financial services to the extractive sector.144
The outcomes, however, are less encouraging as 31% of all NGO complaints have been 
rejected without consideration of the facts.  Rejections tend to occur for two reasons: either 
parallel legal proceedings are underway or because the NCP concludes that no investment 
nexus exists ‘between the company against which the complaint was filed and the 
company or entity that actually committed the alleged violation.’145
5.5.3.1 Parallel Legal Proceedings
Rejection or suspension of complaints on the grounds of parallel legal proceedings (PLP) 
has been the subject of much ‘heated debate’ over the years.146  Part of the problem is that 
there is no clear definition or guidance given to NCPs of what constitutes a parallel legal 
proceeding and ‘no common approach.’147  OECD Watch defines PLP as a situation:
when a complaint deals with business conduct that is also the subject of legal or 
administrative proceedings at the national or international level. There are different 
types of proceedings: 1) criminal, administrative or civil; 2) alternative dispute 
settlement proceedings (arbitration, conciliation, mediation); 3) public consultation; 
or 4) other enquiries such as by the UN.148
Given that PLP is the most cited justification for rejecting or suspending complaints, 
affecting more than 40% of NGO and 33% of trade union complaints,149 the lack of 
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consistency of approach by NCPs is extremely problematic.150  NCPs have answered 
critics by highlighting the need to act in conformity with domestic law and also alluding to 
a need to remain sensitive to the sovereign rights of non-Adhering Governments involved 
in complaints.  Nevertheless, OECD Watch concludes that there is no reason why SIP and 
PLP should not operate concurrently and certainly the arguments are logical. It contends 
that there are three key reasons why SIP and PLP should not be mutually excluding.  
Firstly, the SIP is non-adversarial and is therefore substantially different from court 
proceedings ‘in both nature and substance.’151  Secondly, SIPs frequently address different 
aspects of a situation from parallel legal proceedings:
A closer look at the cases reveals that whilst parallel legal proceedings might deal 
with the same facts, often different issues and entities are involved. For example, 
there may be legal proceedings against suppliers or subsidiaries in the host country, 
while the OECD complaint may be concerned about the broader responsibility of the 
buyer or parent company.152
Finally, OECD Watch highlights the very real difficulties encountered by NGOs when 
seeking to establish that the SIP is appropriate and ought not to be suspended on the basis 
that parallel legal proceedings have been set in motion.  There is no guarantee that the PLP 
will resolve the dispute and may in some cases become a stalling mechanism to avoid 
settlement: 
NGOs, in particular in developing countries, are faced with a lack of effective and 
available judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms to address their concerns 
regarding business conduct. All too often, serious questions can be raised regarding 
the fairness and timeliness of national judicial means. Court cases may linger for 
many years without progress and the judicial system may lack independence or be 
corrupt. As a result of a narrow approach to parallel legal proceedings, NGOs may 
find their access to the NCP process blocked, ruling out a possibly more efficient and 
non-adversarial resolution to a dispute.153
Even in developed countries legal proceedings can take years to be resolved, witness the 
ongoing Chevron-Texaco class-action litigation involving the indigenous population of the 
Ecuadorean Oriente referred to in Chapter 1.154  Furthermore, companies may still continue 
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to resist SIPs after parallel legal proceedings have ended, as Shell did in relation to a 
dispute regarding its Pandacan oil depot in the Philippines which was brought before the 
Dutch NCP.155  
It is crucial, therefore, that the OECD develop clear and consistent rules to determine the 
circumstances in which a complaint will be suspended or rejected in light of parallel legal 
proceedings.  The Commentary to the 2011 Review does little to clarify the position 
unfortunately providing only that:  
When assessing the significance for the specific instance procedure of other domestic 
or international proceedings addressing similar issues in parallel, NCPs should not 
decide that issues do not merit further consideration solely because parallel 
proceedings have been conducted, are under way or are available to the parties 
concerned.156  
A great deal of discretion therefore remains with individual NCPs and it seems unlikely to 
resolve the problem satisfactorily.  At present the lack of a universal approach by NCPs is 
resulting in major inconsistencies.  So for example, in the US and Japan the consequence 
of PLP is automatic rejection of the complaint, while in the UK and the Netherlands 
guidance is provided ‘so as not to prejudice parallel legal proceedings’ and suspension or 
rejection of a complaint is not automatic.157  Both TUAC and OECD Watch wanted the 
2011 Review to address these shortcomings in the NCP system and TUAC points to the 
guidance developed by the UK NCP as an example of best practice which ought to be 
adopted across the board.158
In September 2009, the UK NCP announced the criteria that it would use when deciding 
whether to suspend or reject a complaint brought under the SIP where PLP exist.159  
Essentially,  PLP ‘will not of itself cause a suspension’ of the NCP’s ‘investigation and/or 
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its determination of any dispute’160 and it seems that this basic approach has been adopted 
by the 2011 Guidelines.  Furthermore the UK NCP ‘will suspend a complaint only where it 
is satisfied that it is necessary in order to avoid serious prejudice to a party to parallel 
proceedings and appropriate in all the circumstances.’161  The NCP emphasises the non-
adversarial nature of the SIP and prior to implementing a suspension, it expects the parties 
to the complaint ‘to give serious consideration to the benefits of conciliation/mediation 
which can lead to a quicker and more cost effective solution to the issues raised.‘162  
Finally, and importantly, the UK NCP will ‘will progress any aspects of a complaint that it 
concludes are not necessary to suspend’163 which addresses the second concern of OECD 
Watch discussed above.  TUAC endorsed this approach and unsuccessfully urged Adhering 
Governments to adopt these criteria as part of the 2011 Review,164 although it arguably 
falls short of TUAC’s own proposals:
In the past TUAC proposed a four-step approach that the NCP should take. The 
approach includes: alerting relevant enforcement authorities in case there are 
indications that criminal activities are involved; evaluating where the Guidelines and 
parallel proceedings converge and differ; taking account of parallel proceedings 
insofar as it provides for relevant sources of facts and information in considering a 
specific case; and facilitating dialogue and dispute resolution between parties taking 
due account of parallel proceedings. Where there is reasonable indication that the 
parallel proceeding is exposed to extensive delays in procedures, it is especially 
important that an NCP engages the parties in dialogue.165
It seems inevitable that absent more rigorous PLP criteria, business actors may well 
continue to cite PLP as justification for avoiding a SIP and NCPs may continue to reject 
complaints on this basis.  
5.5.3.2 Lack of Investment Nexus
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The 2000 Revision of the Guidelines extended their scope to the supply chain, a significant 
result for NGOs, which had been lobbying for this extension.  Debate continued, however, 
around the definition of ‘supply chain‘ and eventually, the Investment Committee decided 
that there must be an ‘investment nexus’ in order for the Guidelines to apply.  This was 
decided on the basis that the Guidelines ‘were part of the Declaration on International 
Investment.’166  In limiting the scope of the Guidelines to ‘investments’ or ‘investment-like 
relationships’ this clarification, itself, became the subject of controversy:
In tune with the spirit of deregulation of the past decade, the investment nexus came 
to be used by many NCPs to beat an unprecedented retreat in relation to the business 
activities that the Guidelines apply to. Ultimately, the investment nexus was 
interpreted by some NCPs as an obligation to reject all complaints related to business 
transactions such as trade and finance: in short, everything but direct investment.167
OECD Watch contends that the deliberate narrowing of the scope of the Guidelines was 
due to ‘political expediency’ and that consequently some NCPs were using the investment 
nexus in order to avoid accepting complaints under SIPs168 and ‘to try to shield their 
companies from scrutiny and censure.169 Over one third of NGO complaints to NCPs 
involve supply chains but 64% of these complaints have been rejected for lack of 
investment nexus.170  Such an approach flies in the face of the spirit of the Guidelines and 
conflicts with SGSR Ruggies’s due diligence requirement171 and NGOs lobbied hard for 
the inclusion of the due diligence principle in the 2011 Review.  It seems likely that the 
introduction of the due diligence requirement under Guideline IV and the absence of a 
reference to the ‘investment nexus‘ in the 2011 Guidelines means that ‘NCPs are no longer 
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authorized to limit the applicability of the OECD Guidelines to situations characterized by 
the presence of an ‘investment nexus’ or an ‘investment like relationship’ respectively.’172 
The UK NCP has already gone some way to dismantling the ‘artificial barrier’173 of the 
OECD’s investment nexus in its decisions in relation to Afrimex (UK) Ltd174 and Das 
Air,175 where, after relying on Ruggie’s definition of due diligence, it decided that both 
companies were in breach of the Guidelines for failing to exercise due diligence over their 
supply chains in the Democratic Republic of Congo.176  It seems probable that this  
expansive approach will be incorporated across the NCP network as a result of the new due 
diligence requirement.  Not only would it represent a step towards a more coherent and 
joined-up international framework, it would also ensure that business actors cannot escape 
vertical accountability and would help to prevent further human rights violations.  Ruggie 
himself sees the decisions of the UK NCP as a ‘significant development:’
reaffirming the principle that companies must respect human rights, and that doing so 
requires them to have adequate due diligence processes not only to ensure 
compliance with the law but also to manage the risk of human rights abuse with a 
view to avoiding it.177
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While the introduction of the due diligence requirement is a ‘major achievement’178 its 
implementation will of course require close monitoring to ensure that NCPs apply the 
principle.
5.5.3.3 Conclusions About SIPs
“NCP handling of specific instances has been erratic, unpredictable 
and largely ineffectual.”179
As with the NCPs generally, SIPs take different forms in the various OECD Member 
Governments and this lack of consistency in implementation further weakens the system.  
For example, the UK and the Netherlands have adopted a policy of naming the parties to 
initial assessments under SIPs and some NCPs such as the UK, Brazil and Japan publicise 
the acceptance of a Specific Instance complaint on their website.180  Transparency is 
therefore achieved on at least one level.181  On the other hand, where a case is rejected, 
every NCP, with the exception of The Netherlands, keeps the parties anonymous.  
Given the significant likelihood of suspension, rejection and failure of a complaint, on the 
basis of e.g. PLP, the risk of initiating a SIP represents a heavy burden particularly for 
NGOs.  Furthermore, complaints take on average more than two years to reach the 
consideration/investigation stage and are estimated to cost NGOs approximately €100,000 
per standard case.182  Taken together, these facts may help to explain both the low numbers 
of complaints lodged overall and the decrease in complaints submitted to NCPs in recent 
years.  Such barriers to access further weaken NCPs as an effective mechanism for 
addressing human rights violations by business actors.  The 2011 update did little to 
address the structural limitations of the NCPs.  Nevertheless, some NCPs and SIPs operate 
more effectively than others and the following section examines the workings of the UK 
NCP which is regarded as having improved its performance significantly since its original 
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incarnation183 and is regularly identified as one of the leading NCPs in a variety of 
contexts.184
5.4 The UK NCP and SIP: A mixed bag of success and failure
5.4.1 Case Study: The UK National Contact Point
As highlighted in the preceding sections, the UK NCP is generally regarded as one of the 
more effective of all the NCPs with a functioning Specific Instance Procedure which 
enables complaints regarding breaches of the Guidelines by business actors to be lodged, 
investigated and concluded within a specified time limit of twelve months.185  When the 
NCP was first established, however, it suffered from a variety of systemic problems, 
ranging from chronic delays, lack of transparency and accountability, lack of 
independence, exclusion of supply chains, lack of due process, lack of fact-finding powers 
and accusations of general mismanagement.186  In response to the criticisms the UK 
government restructured its NCP and while it is currently located within the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), it is overseen by a multistakeholder Steering 
Group, involving some civil society representatives but comprising mostly civil servants 
from various government departments:
A Senior Civil Servant in the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
reform will chair the Steering Board. The Board will also include representatives 
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International 
Development, Department of Work and Pensions and Export Credit Guarantee 
Department each having an interest in the promotion and implementation of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Other departments may participate 
in Board meeting on an ad hoc basis when issues of interest arise.187
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While the restructuring was welcomed by some as having a had ‘a significant and positive 
effect on the operation of the UK NCP’188 numerous concerns remained with critics 
concluding that:
The NCP is a non-judicial mechanism that provides a degree of accountability for 
the environmental and human rights impacts of British companies operating 
abroad. It  does not have any powers of enforceability, cannot impose penalties on 
companies or award compensation to victims. It has some capacity to investigate 
complaints brought to it by NGOs or unions directly, by seeking information from 
parties to the dispute and plays a mediating role in trying to bring them together to 
facilitate dialogue and a resolution to the case. If there is no resolution, the NCP 
can review the evidence, consult experts, make a determination and issue a 
statement on the case.189
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights noted that witnesses had:
raised concerns about its operation, including a lack of independence from 
Government; a lack of guidance for companies on the standards to be met; and the 
absence of sanctions against companies and remedies for individual victims.  
Insufficient information in the Guidelines about human rights obligations has also 
been the subject of critical comment.190
In 2008, in response to these continuing criticisms191 it was agreed that the NCP would be 
reorganised further to reduce the number of civil servants sitting on the Steering Group as 
permanent members,192 with the government commenting that this ‘created a more 
proportionate balance of non-government related participants and civil servants at 
meetings.’193  Note the subtle constraints imposed, however:
The Steering Board will also include four external members with business, 
employee, NGO or other experience selected for the competences they will bring 
relevant to the function and operation of the Steering Board. External members may 
act as their constituency representative, but will endeavour to be collegiate in their 
approach to decision-making. [emphasis added]
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External members are still outnumbered by government representatives and are, it seems,  
encouraged to be as anodyne as possible, which appears to be an attempt to neutralise their 
impact and defeats the purposes of a transparent, multistakeholder approach.  It certainly 
raises questions about the independence of the NCP, which is a concern of both the UK 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights and numerous NGOs.194  Indeed the 
Joint Committee has explicitly recommended that ‘the Government consider options for 
increasing the independence of the UK NCP from Government.’195
Notwithstanding the latest restructuring of the NCP, criticisms continue to be expressed by 
stakeholders generally.  Irrespective of the recent changes, trade unions and NGOs are 
firmly of the view that the UK NCP procedure is no substitute for judicial proceedings, 
particularly in light of the lack of enforcement measures and penalties.196  Improvements to 
the NCP and SIP, while welcome, will never ensure the accountability of business actors 
for violations of the Guidelines, nor act as a deterrent.  Even more importantly they will 
never offer an effective remedy for those affected by human rights violations.
In a further UK government consultation which was undertaken at the end of 2009, as a 
precursor to the 2011 Revision of the Guidelines, many of the respondents proposed the 
inclusion of a follow-up procedure within the revised Guidelines to ensure that any 
recommendations made as a result of a SIP are implemented.197  This reflects the current 
practice of the UK NCP, 198 although, as will be seen with the Afrimex example, the 
follow-up procedure is very limited in its impact, particularly when the business actor in 
question is uncooperative.  Nevertheless, the UK government was supportive of ‘the 
inclusion of more detailed guidance on the follow up to final statements by NCPs’ in the 
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revised Guidelines.199  Yet, without ensuring ‘that there are clear consequences following a 
negative final statement and failure by the company concerned to implement the NCP’s 
recommendations,’200 such an approach is unlikely to make certain that business actors are 
accountable for their actions or to act as a deterrent.    In any event, the 2011 update 
remains ‘ambiguous’ with regard to the follow up role of NCPs.201  Among the 2009 
Consultation responses were suggestions for consequences which attach to a negative 
NCP outcome:
Some respondents suggested linking the complaint process with an enforcement 
mechanism (e.g. reviewing/withdrawing government financial or export credit 
support).202
In its response, the UK government was silent on the question of this type of linkage and it 
is therefore logical to conclude that it has no interest in fortifying the current SIP.  Without 
deterrent or punishment elements, SGSR Ruggie’s requirements for an effective remedy 
are not present.  As highlighted  in Chapter 1,  Ruggie asserts that an effective remedy 
ought to be “legitimate,” “accessible,” “predictable,” “equitable,” “rights-compatible” and 
“transparent”, as well as dispensing punishment to the wrongdoer and providing redress for 
the victim of the human rights violation.  While there have been some strides to improve 
accessibility to and transparency of the UK NCP, the SIP simply does not act as a deterrent 
to bad business behaviour, nor does it offer redress to those businesses which abuse human 
rights either directly or through the supply chain.  
It is bleak to note, therefore, that the UK NCP is still regarded as one of the more effective 
NCPs among Adhering Governments.  Given that the 2011 Revision focused on 
substantive changes to the content of the Guidelines, it seems unlikely that anything will be 
done to rectify these flaws in the NCP system in the near future and indeed OECD Watch 
has concluded that the OECD:
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missed a once-in-a-decade opportunity to provide for a system capable of ensuring 
observance through investigative powers and the ability to impose some kind of 
sanction when the Guidelines are breached.203  
The inadequacy of the UK SIP, as well as a few strengths, can be seen clearly when 
examining the outcome of the complaint against Afrimex (UK) Ltd.204   
5.5 Why Binding Regulatory Rules are Necessary: Afrimex (UK) Ltd
The determination by the UK NCP under its Specific Instance Procedure in relation to 
Afrimex (UK) Ltd is significant for several reasons.  Firstly, it is one of a very small 
number of complaints upheld against a business actor for violation of the Guidelines, 
specifically the human rights provisions.  Secondly, the breach of the Guidelines was due 
to the failure of Afrimex to keep adequate check on its supply chain.  Thirdly, as 
highlighted previously, SGSR Ruggie’s due diligence principle is applied by the UK NCP.  
Finally, it demonstrates clearly the limitations of a non-binding regulatory system. 
The issue of business actors operating in conflict zones is of particular and increasing 
concern to the various bodies seeking to regulate business behaviour.  This was seen, for 
example, in relation to the UN Guiding Principles 205 and the OECD itself has created a 
Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones, which 
defines Weak Governance Zones as:
investment environments in which governments cannot or will not assume their roles 
in protecting rights (including property rights), providing basic public services (e.g. 
social programmes, infrastructure development, law enforcement and prudential 
surveillance) and ensuring that public sector management is efficient and effective.1 
These “government failures” lead to broader failures in political, economic and civic 
institutions that are referred to as weak governance.206
Clearly, conflict and post-conflict situations fall within this definition and raise distinct 
questions about the role of business in such circumstances, because as OECD Watch states:
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Doing business in conflict and post-conflict zones significantly increases the 
likelihood of real or complicit violation of human rights.  This is further exacerbated 
by the presence of heavy-handed security personnel and militia.207
The mining-related activities of Afrimex (UK) Ltd and its suppliers in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) demonstrates this point well.
5.5.1 Background to the Complaint
In February 2007, the NGO Global Witness lodged a complaint against Afrimex (UK) Ltd 
with the UK NCP on the basis of its investigations into the British registered company’s 
activities in the  conflict-ridden DRC.208  Afrimex was already on a list of eighty-five 
transnational companies whose activities were giving cause for concern to the UN Security 
Council’s Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC 209 
and had also come to the attention of a UK All-Party Parliamentary Group which was 
scrutinising the alleged involvement of British companies in the DRC conflict.210  The 
company had been engaged in commercial undertakings around the mining of coltan and 
cassiterite in the Democratic Republic of Congo over a number of years and as such, its 
alleged activities and British nationality brought it squarely within the scope of the OECD 
Guidelines and the remit of the UK NCP.   
Specific allegations were made in the complaint regarding the use of child labour and 
forced labour in mines within a conflict zone which supplied minerals to companies linked 
to Afrimex.  Furthermore there were allegations that Afrimex itself had paid ‘taxes’ to rebel 
forces in Congo which contributed to the ongoing conflict.  An initial attempt at mediation 
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between the parties failed because Afrimex disputed the allegations on the basis that there 
was no link between it and the alleged human rights violations because it was removed 
from the mining process and it had never paid ‘taxes’ to rebel forces.211  The existence of a 
conflict was significant to the outcome of the procedure not least because the UN Security 
Council’s Panel of Experts had previously stated that companies such as Afrimex were the 
‘engines’ of conflict in the DRC.212  After the unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the NCP 
investigated the situation and made a final determination.  
5.6.2. The Afrimex Determination
Significantly the NCP’s determination is rooted in Ruggie’s notion of due diligence, that is, 
the practical implementation of the obligation to protect human rights: ‘the steps a 
company must take to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights 
impacts.’213  The NCP concluded that Afrimex had failed to exercise due diligence in 
relation to its supply chain and was in breach of a multitude of provisions of the 
Guidelines.214  In particular, the NCP stated that it was ‘unacceptable’ for Afrimex to fail to 
impose conditions on its suppliers ‘given the context of conflict and human rights abuses 
taking place.’215  
The NCP specifically upheld the complaints regarding the use of child labour and forced 
labour in mines within a conflict zone which supplied minerals to companies linked to 
Afrimex, rather than to Afrimex itself.  It concluded in a strongly worded Final Statement 
that Afrimex had failed to meet the requirements of a multitude of provisions of the OECD 
Guidelines 2000, in particular Guidelines II and IV:
...Afrimex applied insufficient due diligence on the supply chain and this remains the 
case.  The UK NCP expects UK business to respect human rights and to take steps to 
ensure it does not contribute to human rights abuses.   Afrimex did not take steps to 
influence the supply chain and to explore options with its suppliers exploring 
methods to ascertain how minerals could be sourced from mines that do not use child 
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or forced labour or with better health and safety.  The assurances that Afrimex gained 
from their suppliers were too weak to fulfil the requirements of the Guidelines.216
It went on to declare in no uncertain terms that the activities of Afrimex had funded a 
conflict which ‘prevented the economic, social and environmental progress key to 
achieving sustainable development and contributed to human rights abuses.’217  
The NCP made several recommendations, at the heart of which was the practical and 
effective integration of a CSR policy.  It proposed that the policy document should make 
explicit reference to international human rights instruments and sought assurances that the 
document would change corporate culture and not be a ‘worthless piece of paper.’218  In 
making its recommendations the NCP explicitly refers to the Ruggie UN framework by 
advising Afrimex to adopt the due diligence standard and to require that its suppliers ‘do 
no harm’ 219 and:
to take credible steps to ensure that military forces do not extract rents along the 
supply chain; to require a commitment that adequate steps are taken to ensure that 
minerals are not sourced from mines using forced and child labour, and are not from 
the most dangerous mines.220
It recommended that Afrimex monitor its suppliers to ensure compliance with the due 
diligence principles as well as referring the company to a number of tools to assist with the 
development and application of its policy.221  Despite the non-binding nature of the 
recommendations the NCP’s determination was initially welcomed.  Global Witness stated 
in a Press Release that it sent the ‘right message’ to business and that the ‘British 
government’s ruling provides positive guidance to help…change…practices.’222
  
Chapter 5 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 246
216 Afrimex Final Statement note 203 at para.62
217 Afrimex Final Statement ibid at para.51
218 Afrimex Final Statement ibid at para 66.
219 Afrimex Final Statement ibid at paras 64,65 and 66.
220 Afrimex Final Statement ibid at para.66.
221 E.g. the OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones; the 
Sanctions Unit at the  UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
222 Global Witness, ‘UK company Afrimex broke international guidelines, says British government,’ Press 
Release 28 August 2008, http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/661/en/
uk_company_afrimex [last accessed 17.8.10].
The message is unequivocal: ‘The UK government expects British companies to exercise 
the highest levels of due diligence in situations of widespread violence and systematic 
human rights abuses.’223  There is no doubt that the new enhanced SIP offers a measure of 
accountability and is helping to clarify the scope of the Guidelines, the question is whether 
it can also offer realistic protection against human rights abuses in the absence of a binding 
mechanism or an effective remedy.  The NGO and trades union community, as well as 
experience, say that it does not and a new body with the power of sanctions and remedies 
for individuals is recommended.224  SGSR Ruggie too, emphasises that an effective remedy 
is one which will ‘investigate, punish, and redress abuse’225 and it is clear that while the 
UK Specific Instance Procedure involves an investigation of business behaviour, and an 
outcome which may act as a deterrent, it neither punishes nor provides redress for human 
rights abuses.  Nevertheless, as a result of the SIP, Afrimex was now firmly on the human 
rights ‘radar’ and even absent any punishment or redress it was hoped that the inevitable 
monitoring of its future activities might be a sufficient deterrent to breaches of the 
Guidelines.  Unfortunately, subsequent events serves to highlight the ultimate inherent 
weakness in the NCP system, that is, lack of enforcement.  Indeed the Afrimex experience 
demonstrates in the clearest terms the need for binding regulation of business actors.
5.5.3 The Limitations of the UK NCP Afrimex Determination   
While Global Witness welcomed the publication of the strongly worded Final Statement,226 
the NGO has since expressed considerable concern about Afrimex and its ongoing 
activities in the DRC, requesting that Afrimex indicate how it has complied with the NCP’s 
recommendations.  In March 2009, the company intimated to the UK NCP that there was 
no need for it to implement the recommendations because it was no longer operating in the 
DRC stating that, ‘it had stopped trading in minerals and that its last shipment of minerals 
left the DRC in around the first week of September 2008.‘227  Global Witness subsequently 
asked the ‘UK government to carry out an independent verification of Afrimex’s claim that  
Chapter 5 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 247
223 Afrimex Final Statement note 203 at 16, para 75.
224 Fit for Purpose? A Review of the UK National Contact Point note 50 at iv. 
225 Protect, Respect and Remedy note 49 at para.82.
226 Global Witness Report 2009 note 207 at 69; see also Press Release 28 August 2008 note 221.
227 Global Witness Report 2009 ibid at 69
it has ceased trading in minerals’ on the basis that its investigations support the contention 
that Afrimex has not suspended its Guidelines-breaching   activities in DRC.228
Furthermore, the NGO has encouraged the government to utilise the provisions of UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1856229 and 1857230 and report Afrimex to the UN Sanctions 
Committee.     As this has not been forthcoming, in July 2010 the NGO reluctantly sought 
judicial review of the UK government’s failure to refer the case to the Sanctions 
Committee stating that the British government had left it ‘no choice.’231  In the meantime, 
Afrimex, and dozens of other companies, continue to act with impunity in the DRC while 
the international community is unable and seemingly unwilling to act to stop it.  As Global 
Witness concludes:
at the international level, bolder action is needed to translate the discourse of concern 
into reality. This will require a willingness on the part of governments to broach 
these issues explicitly with government and military authorities in the Great Lakes 
region, at the highest levels, and for home states to exercise their responsibility over 
companies which continue to ignore the human rights impact of their trade. If eastern 
DRC’s natural resources are to turn into a source of wealth and development for the 
population, governments will have to have the courage to confront those on all sides 
who have been plundering the country and hold them to account.232
In broader terms, if the so-called leading NCP cannot effectively implement the Guidelines 
so as to stop human rights abuses, hold businesses to account for their actions and deter 
offending business actors then clearly something is wrong.  Afrimex is not the only 
company to ignore the recommendations of the UK NCP which further suggests that the 
NCP system is inadequate.  For example, Vedanta Resources PLC has simply refused to  
engage with or accept the determination of the NCP233 that it breached the Guidelines by 
Chapter 5 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 248
228 Global Witness Report 2009 ibid at 69
229 UN Security Council Resolution 1856(2008) The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, S/RES/1856 (2008), 22 December 2008, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N08/666/94/PDF/N0866694.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 17.8.10]
230 UN Security Council Resolution 1857(2008) The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, S/RES/1857 (2008), 22 December 2008, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N08/666/43/PDF/N0866643.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 17.8.10]
231 Global Witness, ‘Global Witness takes UK government to court for failing to list UK companies trading 
Congo conflict minerals for UN sanctions’ Press Release, 26.07.2010 http://www.globalwitness.org/library/
global-witness-takes-uk-government-court-failing-list-uk-companies-trading-congo-conflict [last accessed 
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233 Joint Committee on Human Rights note 112 at para.80.
failing to consult with the Dongria Kondh indigenous population in the Niyamgiri Hills, 
Orissa, India about the impact of a bauxite mine on culturally sensitive land:234
The UK NCP reported that Vedanta did not participate in mediation, even after an 
offer of independent professional mediation, external to the NCP. Other than 
providing submissions that the NCP should not accept the case and a copy of its own 
sustainable development report, the company did not engage with the examination 
and did not submit any evidence in response to that provided by Survival 
International. The NCP had no powers to compel Vedanta to participate and 
expressed disappointment at the decision of Vedanta Plc not to ‘engage fully’ with 
their work. 235
Vedanta has stated that it ‘refutes the conclusions [of the report] and has complied in all 
respects with Indian regulations including consultations with the local community.’236  
Furthermore, the company has informed the NCP that its activities are in line with the 
recommendations despite NGO submissions to the contrary.237  Thus the UK follow-up 
procedure whereby both the complainant and the business actor are ‘asked to provide the 
NCP with an update on the company’s progress towards meeting’ the recommendations 
made in the final statement has been ineffective.238  While the situation may be 
“embarrassing and potentially costly”239 for Vedanta, in the absence of binding rules, the 
UK NCP is powerless to do anything further in relation to Vedanta’s activities in India. 
It would be easy to conclude that the NCP is failing but as stated earlier in this chapter, the 
fault lies with Adhering Governments which will not extend the reach of NCPs.  So an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs remains:
As a non-judicial mechanism for satisfying individuals who may have a complaint 
against a UK company, [the NCP] falls far short of the necessary criteria and powers 
needed by an effective remedial body, including the need for independence from 
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Government and the power to provide an effective remedy.  There is little incentive 
for individuals to use a complaints mechanism which offers no prospect of any 
sanction against a company, compensation or any guarantee that action will be taken 
to make the company change its behaviour.240
In these circumstances, it seems that the only possible solution is to create a mechanism 
whereby binding sanctions can be imposed on business actors in breach of the Guidelines 
and which offers redress to those affected.  Given the lack of procedural or systemic 
changes made by the 2011 update, such a development is unlikely.
5.6 Summary of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the OECD Approach to 
 Business and Human Rights 
5.6.1 Strengths
The OECD system adopt a top-down – bottom-up approach, whereby the initiative relies 
upon the top-down application of general international human rights standards as well as 
bottom-up implementation of those standards at the national level.  Adherent Governments 
are required to implement the Guidelines via National Contact Points using a Specific 
Instance Procedure. Under the OECD Guidelines any ‘interested party’241 may lodge a 
complaint, via the SIP, alleging extraterritorial wrongdoing by a business operating from 
an OECD Adherent State.  In the same way that ‘multinational enterprise‘ is not defined in 
the Guidelines, neither is ‘interested party‘ although it  seems to be interpreted widely and 
at minimum includes the business community, labour representatives and NGOs.  
Procedural guidance given to NCPs permits their ‘making an initial assessment of whether 
the issue raised merits further examination’ and allows them ‘to determine whether the 
issue is bona fide and relevant to the implementation of the Guidelines.‘242  Consequently, 
NCPs ‘will take into account...the identity of the party concerned and its interest in the 
matter.‘  
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The UK NCP administers one of the better examples of a SIP with several cases resulting 
in complaints against transnational business actors being upheld.  Importantly, several 
NGOs and trade unions have lodged successful complaints.243  
According to SGSR Ruggie, an effective business and human rights mechanism ‘must 
provide sufficient transparency of process and outcome to meet the public interest concerns 
at stake and should presume transparency wherever possible; non-State mechanisms in 
particular should be transparent about the receipt of complaints and the key elements of 
their outcomes.‘244  While not every NCP can meet the transparency requirement because 
the majority of them remain  entirely governmental in structure,245 the UK NCP, in 
particular, is an example of how a measure of transparency can be achieved.  It publishes 
its determinations and recommendations regarding business violations of human rights on 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) website, its terms of reference 
and procedures are available publicly and its new structure ensures a limited 
multistakeholder approach.
In terms of accountability, the OECD Guidelines entail a relatively formal accountability 
mechanism because they impose obligations upon Adherent Governments to establish an 
NCP to implement and promote the Guidelines and also to create a SIP.246  As indicated 
above, the SIP may investigate complaints against businesses incorporated in the Adhering 
State in relation to human rights violations and offers some accountability.  NGOs have 
highlighted that ‘the importance of an NCP publicly finding companies to have been in 
breach of the Guidelines should not be underestimated.’247  Public acknowledgment of a 
complaint is powerful in itself and if the complaint is upheld by the State-backed NCP, it 
may be vested with a great deal of authority as well as ensuring dissemination of the 
Guidelines, which is key to ensuring that the human rights are respected and protected in 
future.
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Furthermore, as mentioned above, the NCPs are required to promote the standards 
established in the Guidelines.248  Statements by NCPs serve to clarify the scope of the 
Guidelines as well as helping to establish expected standards of business behaviour in 
relation to human rights.  For example, in 2005 the Norwegian NCP issued clear guidance 
to a Norwegian-based company Aker Kværner regarding its wholly-owned US subsidiary 
KPSI. 249  It found that both parent and subsidiary had provided maintenance services at the 
prison at Guantanamo Bay and that these services ‘at least in part can be considered to 
have affected the inmates.’250  In its conclusion, the NCP:
…emphasized the importance of continuous assessments by Norwegian companies 
of their activities in relation to human rights in general, adding that the provision of 
goods or services in situations like Guantanamo Bay require “particular 
vigilance.”251
 
The NCP also criticised Aker Kværner for failing to undertake ‘a thorough and 
documented assessment of the ethical issues in connection with its tender for the renewal 
of the contract in 2005’ and recommended that the company establish and apply a clear 
CSR policy across its operations.  NCPs can therefore proffer strong and clear guidance 
about appropriate standards which business actors are expected to implement.
A final strength of the OECD system is that, although the existing international system of 
business and human rights initiatives is chaotic and disparate resulting from too many 
different isolated projects, in recent years there has been improved cooperation and cross-
fertilisation of ideas, principles and standards252 and this can clearly be seen in relation to 
the 2011 Review.   Attempts at integration have gathered momentum as a direct result of 
SGSR Ruggie’s involvement.  As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the Ruggie due 
diligence approach has been implemented by the UK NCP in relation to the supply chain in 
making its determination and recommendations in relation to Afrimex and Das Air in 2008, 
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which in turn has influenced the substantive content of the 2011 Guidelines.253  
Consequently, there is an increasingly coherent approach to bad business practices and this 
means that growing numbers of businesses are falling within the business and human rights 
framework as the regulatory net widens. 
Notwithstanding these strengths in the OECD system, there are also significant weaknesses 
which negate the positive elements.   
5.6.2 Weaknesses
Firstly, notwithstanding the 2011 revision, the Guidelines lack specificity in their 
references to human rights standards which has implications for any realistic attempt at 
enforcement.  Victims of human rights abuses perpetrated by business actors need an 
effective remedy and clearly enunciated rights upon which to base a claim.  SGSR Ruggie’s 
recommendation of a separate human rights chapter254 within the 2011 Guidelines was 
included but it does not adequately set out the specific behaviour expected of business 
actors. While the human rights chapter may be a positive step and assist those seeking to 
make a complaint as well as business actors, nevertheless, without a binding enforcement 
mechanism such changes will be pointless.
Secondly, in light of the lack of binding enforcement mechanisms there is no effective 
deterrent to business misbehaviour.  Reputational carrots and the elaboration of applicable 
rights will always help to ensure that high street names adhere to nominal CSR standards 
but the bigger problem lies with those numerous rogue businesses which are unwilling to 
behave and are immune to reputational stimuli.  Even where a complaint against a 
company has been upheld, as in the Afrimex and Vedanta cases, the lack of effective follow 
up and monitoring procedures limits severely the impact of a negative determination.255  
The Guidelines can do little to change human rights conditions on the ground.  
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It is this lack of enforcement mechanism and deterrent factor that renders the Guidelines 
weak and arguably ineffectual.  The Protect, Respect, Remedy framework requires 
punishment, deterrent and redress for those affected by human rights violations and NCPs 
do not provide this.  This is a fundamental flaw and must be rectified if they are to meet 
Ruggie’s criteria for an effective remedy.
Thirdly, the chronic lack of consistency of approach among NCPs weakens the entire 
system substantially, especially in relation to the rejection of complaints on the grounds of 
parallel legal proceedings and lack of investment nexus although it seems that the latter 
issue has been addressed by the adoption of the due diligence standard.  Irrespective of the 
type of enforcement mechanism adopted, it is crucial that the issue of consistency is 
addressed to ensure a coherent approach across all Adherent Governments. This can only 
enhance the Guidelines’s claim to multilateralism and open up their scope in accordance 
with their spirit and intent.  Adoption of the UK NCP’s approach to parallel legal 
proceedings may help in this regard.
Finally, while implementing the principle of due diligence formally within the Guidelines 
is a positive step, again, it will be limited by the lack of binding enforcement measures.  
Rogue businesses , in particular, do not and will not monitor their supply chains unless 
there is an effective carrot or stick to make them do it.  It is clear that such business actors 
are not adhering voluntarily to the Guidelines and the lack of a monitoring mechanism 
ensures that it is difficult to ascertain the precise uptake of the Guidelines because there is 
no requirement to report their use.  Figures discussed in this chapter, however,256 
demonstrate that uptake is low at best and certainly worse than the Global Compact or ILO 
Tripartite Agreement.  For a due diligence standard across the supply chain to operate 
successfully, some form of monitoring must be introduced.  Ruggie’s due diligence 
proposals seek to establish a shift from ‘naming and shaming’ to ‘knowing and showing:‘
naming and shaming is a response by external stakeholders to the failure of 
enterprises to respect human rights.  Knowing and showing is the internalization of 
that respect by enterprises themselves through human rights due diligence.257
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Without binding obligations, however, such ‘internalization’ is going to be slow and 
painful.  Norm-internalization is always to be welcomed but in Harold Koh’s analysis, 
discussed in Chapter 1, such development follows external sanctions, which do not exist 
here.  The current system is ineffective in the face of resistant and recalcitrant business 
actors and without the requisite stick it is difficult to imagine an Afrimex, Das Air or 
Vedanta voluntarily demonstrating their adherence to the due diligence standard or indeed 
any non-legally binding human rights standard. 
5.8 Conclusion
The 2011 Revision presented Adhering Governments with a significant opportunity to 
shape the Guidelines in a way that is both workable and effective.  Unfortunately, it seems 
that the opportunity has been wasted and while there has been some tinkering around the 
edges of the Guidelines there is no substantive move towards an effective and enforceable 
OECD regime.  On a positive note, however, the Guidelines have elaborated on the 
specific human rights obligations of business actors as well as incorporating a clear due 
diligence requirement in relation to the supply chain, which extends rather than limits the 
scope of the Guidelines.258  Furthermore, the problem of too many NCPs rejecting trade 
and  finance-related complaints on the grounds that they do not fall within a strict category 
of direct investment has potentially been addressed but it remains to be seen how far 
Adherent Governments will move towards effective implementation of the Guidelines.  
Adherent Governments should have used the 2011 Revision to put in place provision for an 
effective enforcement mechanism within NCPs which will act as a deterrent to bad 
business behaviour and provide a remedy for those impacted by human rights violations.  
Furthermore, the structural weaknesses of the NCPs ought to have been addressed.  In 
particular, the lack of consistency in relation to the narrow interpretation of ‘parallel legal 
proceedings’ which leads to the rejection of complaints, the lack of independence from 
Adhering Governments and the lack of transparency.  
Ultimately, the OECD experience represents perhaps the strongest evidence of the need for 
binding regulation because its experimental hybrid of a top-down - bottom-up approach 
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has had limited impact on the ground.  While business actors cling to the freedom to invest 
afforded by the OECD, human rights violations continue to occur and the Guidelines do 
not  prevent, punish or provide redress for them.  Nevertheless, when compared to the 
attempts of the European Union discussed in the next chapter, the OECD system does 
provide a measure of public accountability and the Specific Instance Procedure has a role 
to play in acting as a deterrent, for businesses which value their reputation at least.  Like 
the Global Compact, it demonstrates that a new governance or third way approach has 
something to offer in this field, albeit a nominal offering.  The EU on the other hand has 
refused steadfastly to establish any regulatory mechanism addressing the issue of what it 
continues to call Corporate Social Responsibility and chooses to respect only the business 
case for voluntarism.  SGSR Ruggie is right when he criticises the OECD system for 
failing to reach its potential but at least there is potential, unlike the EU setup which 
ostensibly appears to reject the new governance paradigm outright.
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Chapter 6
 Business, Human Rights and the European Union
(Or, a Manual on How to Champion the Business Case, 
Exclude Civil Society and Avoid Implementing Normative Rules)
‘while CSR [in the EU] may have been initially an idea about the scope of the 
responsibility of businesses towards its environment, it ended up becoming a process in 
which the representatives of the business community have come to occupy the central role, 
and from which politics essentially retreated.’1 
6.0 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2, the ‘business case’ has come to dominate in 
business and human rights theory and practice, and is promulgated vociferously by 
industry groups and representatives in a variety of fora.  To reiterate, the business case 
supports the proposition that ‘the market’ will regulate commercial behaviour and therefore 
there is no need for mandatory regulation.2  Furthermore, the ‘business case’ defines CSR3 
as a purely optional concept, whereby transnational enterprises undertake to adhere to 
certain standards of behaviour on a voluntary basis, driven by market forces and 
profitability:4
According to the ‘business case’ on CSR, responsible business behavior is also good 
economic behavior, since it leads to an increase in profitability.  Thus responsible 
corporate behavior within a voluntary framework is argued to be a win-win situation 
for business and society, while regulatory interference would put unnecessary burdens 
on business without providing any additional benefit.5 
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It is this approach which has been adopted by the EU and nowhere has the business case 
been embraced so wholeheartedly as at the European Commission.6  Obviously, this has 
had a major impact on the approach of the EU to the business and human rights issue:7
The main features of the EU’s CSR policy as they appeared over time are...its 
fundamentally business-driven, voluntary and process-oriented character.8   
This chapter will identify the weaknesses with, and problems of, adopting such a restrictive 
strategy.  The EU approach has two distinct aspects, firstly the policies aimed directly at 
business actors and secondly, policies applicable to States e.g. in relation to external 
relations.  While the EU has not been especially active in pursuing either policy, the former 
policy in relation to business actors has been criticised heavily, in particular by civil 
society, and is the main focus of this chapter.  
As a report by Jan Wouters and Nicholas Hachez for the European Parliament states, ‘[t]he 
EU strategy is not centred on imposing hard obligations on enterprises, but rather on 
building processes for exchanging best practices, for mutual learning and raising 
awareness.’9  This may involve a European firm creating a corporate code of conduct, or 
participating in initiatives such as the UN Global Compact or the European Union’s 
Multistakeholder Forum, both of which are positive responses of course.10  It contrasts 
most obviously with the hybrid top-down - bottom-up or ‘third way’ approach of the 
OECD which, as discussed in the previous chapter, requires Adherent States to ensure that 
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6.1.2.2 and 6.3. 
business actors comply with the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises by establishing 
National Contact Points for the purpose of monitoring performance and receiving 
complaints.  Arguably, it also contrasts with the UNGC approach which, as seen in Chapter 
4, invokes naming and shaming techniques and reporting mechanisms in a bid to ensure 
good business behaviour, albeit on a voluntary basis.  No such techniques or mechanisms 
are employed in the EU context and there is no oversight or monitoring of business actors 
by the EU.  Voluntarism and self-regulation have been adopted without exception and there 
are no consequences at the EU level for business actors which choose not to adhere to CSR 
standards.  While these issues were revisited by the EU Multistakeholder Forum in 
November 201011 and the European Commission publicly welcomed the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs),12 nevertheless, it is difficult to believe 
that EU policy will change substantially in the future notwithstanding the apparent desire 
for a ‘new modern EU CSR policy framework.’13
As has been shown throughout this dissertation, NGOs and labour organisations have 
consistently opposed undiluted voluntarism.  They seek the establishment of 
complementary enforceable regulatory regimes which will ensure accountability for human 
rights violations in addition to softer mechanisms.14  The prevailing view among most 
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business actors, however, as well as their representative organisations such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce, is that there is no need for any regulatory mechanism 
which goes beyond voluntarism.  It is this view which has been incorporated wholesale 
into the EU’s CSR policy and maintained, despite the European Parliament’s support for a 
‘mandatory regime.’15  While 2010 witnessed an apparent shift by the European 
Commission towards a regulatory ‘smart mix’16 it remains to be seen whether this will be 
implemented at the EU level.
There is comparatively little academic literature on the topic of CSR in the EU context,17 
which is surprising, given the significance of the EU as the largest economy
in the world18 and of its Member States as home to a majority of the largest transnational 
business actors:19
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EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European Code of 
Conduct, A4-0508/98, 15 January 1999, OJ C 104, at 180; European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 
2007 on Corporate Social Responsibility: A new partnership, Final edition, P6_TA(2007)0062 http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2007-0062&language=EN [last 
accessed 27.8.11] (hereinafter ‘European Parliament Resolution 2007’).
16 Guiding Principles note 12 at 8, Principle 3 commentary.
17 In addition to the works by the present author, cited by De Schutter note 1 and Wouters & Chanet note 5, 
there are very few publications focused solely on European CSR.  See  A.Voiculescu, ‘The Other European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility: From the ‘Green Paper to New Uses of Human Rights 
Instruments,’ in D.McBarnet, A.Voiculescu, & T.Campbell, (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (2007) 365-396; K.K. Hermann, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Sustainable Development: The European Union Initiative as a Case Study, ‘11 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 205 (2004) (Student author.); P.A.Davidsson, ‘Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Within the European Union’ 8 Colum. J. Eur. L. 529 (2002) (Student author. hereinafter 
‘Davidsson.’); L.F.H.Enneking, ‘Crossing the Atlantic: The Political and Legal Feasibility of European 
Foreign Direct Liability Cases’ 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l Law Rev. 903 (2009).  Even where the EU dimension is 
addressed in the literature the discussion is often reduced to a few paragraphs and descriptive in nature.  See 
e.g. I. Bantekas, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law’ 22 B.U. Int’l L.J. 309 (2004) at 6;  
I.D.Bunn, ‘Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic Perspectives from the NGO 
Community’ 19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1265 (2004); C.A.Williams & J.M.Conley, ‘An Emerging Third Way? 
The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct’ 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 493 (2005) 
(hereinafter ‘Williams & Conley.’); C.Marks & N.B.Rapoport, ‘The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a 
Contemporary Democracy’ 77 Fordham L.Rev. 1268 (2009); J.W.Pitts III, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Current Status and Future Evolution’ 6 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 334 (2009).
18 CIA World Factbook, EU Economy https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
ee.html [last accessed 27.8.11]https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/
2001rank.html?countryName=European%20Union&countryCode=ee&regionCode=eur&rank=1#ee [last 
accessed 27.8.11].
19 European Parliament, ‘Report on EU standards for European Enterprises operating in developing 
countries: towards a European Code of Conduct,’ Committee on Development and Cooperation, Rapporteur: 
Richard Howitt, 17 December 1998, A4-0508/98, PE 228.198/fin. at 14.
Due to its ambition to become a “pole of excellence” for CSR, to its human rights 
tradition and commitment, its economic and moral influence, and its large network of 
external relations, the EU is certainly one of the best positioned actors to make a true 
difference in the field of business and human rights.20
 
There is no question that the EU ought to be in a strong position to influence the business 
and human rights agenda but over the past decade it has used its clout to further the 
business case rather than the cause of human rights.  
This chapter analyses the key EU documents to determine the limitations of this pivotal 
economic actor’s policy for ensuring the accountability of business actors for human rights 
violations.  Secondly, it criticises the EU Commission’s lack of response to this important 
issue, in particular the fact that it has offered little resistance to the mainstreaming of the 
business case and has retreated from possible binding regulatory options.  Finally, it 
considers how the EU can lead the way in establishing enforceable business and human 
rights standards and become the global ‘pole of excellence’ in CSR that it aspires to be.  
This dissertation disagrees fundamentally with the proposition that ‘Europe has been one 
of the pioneer regions’ 21 in relation to CSR or that EU CSR initiatives are ‘highly 
positive,’22 rather the opposite is true.
6.1 Background to Business and Human Rights in the European Union 
6.1.1 Developments Throughout the 1990s
In comparison to the UN and OECD, the EU has been slow to embrace the concept of CSR 
in any meaningful manner, despite its public pronouncements about the long European 
tradition of ‘socially responsible initiatives by entrepreneurs’23 and its claim that it wants 
to be a ‘pole of excellence’24 in CSR, leading the global way.   Wouters and Chanet assert 
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21 R.Mullerat, ‘The Global Responsibility of Business,’ in Mullerat & Brennan note 15, 3-30 at 17.
22 Davidsson note 17 at 554.
23 Communication from the Commission Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business 
Contribution to Sustainable Development, at 5, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002): http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0347:FIN:EN:PDF [last accessed 29.10.11]
(hereinafter ‘Commission Communication 2002’).
24 Pole of Excellence Communication note 10.
that the EU has “an important role to play in ensuring that its corporations respect and 
protect human rights wherever they operate.”25  They argue that because human rights are 
“core principles” of the organisation, the EU has a “special responsibility” for ensuring 
their protection.26  Despite this, throughout the latter part of the 20th century, when 
business and human rights issues gained increasing attention, the EU lacked a coherent and 
effective CSR policy, a state of affairs which continues today.  This is due largely to the 
determination of the business community and the EU Commission, in particular, to restrict 
CSR to voluntary measures.
There were, however, several isolated sporadic EU initiatives over the years which 
attempted to regulate business actors in the social sphere, both within the EU and 
externally, but no overarching policy or regulatory mechanism was established comparable 
to the OECD Guidelines or the Global Compact.  It is only the recent work of SRSG 
Ruggie which has apparently reinvigorated EU Member States, and the question of the 
social responsibilities of business at the EU level is being revisited after a long hiatus.  Jan 
Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, in their recent report for the European Parliament, say that 
the EU ʻhas always been a strong proponent of the Special Representative’s [Ruggie’s] 
mandate’27 and it is noteworthy that during the handover of the EU Presidency from 
Sweden to Spain in 2010, the following Declaration was issued:
The European Union and its Member States should take a global lead and serve as a 
good example on CSR when building markets, combating corruption, safe- guarding 
the environment and ensuring human dignity and human rights in the workplace. The 
European Union is the largest economy in the world and the largest development 
cooperation partner. Europe hosts many of the multinational enterprises in the world. 
We welcome that European employers consider it an important task to promote and 
take a global lead on CSR.28
The EU has been stating its desire to be a world leader in this regard for the best part of a 
decade but with little to show for its grand pronouncements.  In relation to the ‘Protect, 
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28 Swedish Presidency of the European Union, ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy – Making the European Union take 
a lead in promoting Corporate Social Responsibility,‘ Declaration,  November 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/
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Respect and Remedy’ framework it continues to support the status quo and has 
demonstrated ‘no fundamental shift’29 from the existing conservative international law 
position discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 that the obligation to protect against human rights 
abuses rests solely with States and that business actors cannot be human rights 
dutyholders.  Moreover, there has been no coherent EU CSR policy or regulation. 
Early EU initiatives were meagre and piecemeal and there was no overarching CSR 
strategy at all.  So for example, the European Employment Strategy, EU-Ecolabels, and the 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) all attempted in different and isolated ways 
to promote socially responsible business within the EU.  
Briefly, the European Employment Strategy (EES) was established to set up a dialogue and 
exchange of best practice in the labour realm, such as diversity, equality and poverty.30  
The EU-Ecolabel is a voluntary initiative designed to encourage the production and 
consumption of more environmentally friendly goods and services across Europe.  It also 
strives to ensure transparency for consumers by virtue of the Ecolabel Flower logo.31  
EMAS ‘promotes continuous improvements in the environmental performance of 
industrial activities by committing firms to evaluate and improve their own 
performance.’32 All three of these examples encourage socially responsible business among 
European enterprises on a purely voluntary basis and only the EES addresses rights.
In the context of external affairs, fragmented developments also took place, although their 
value is doubtful as ‘corporate social responsibility is not always given a real role in the 
various EU external relations policies.’33  For example, in relation to the EU’s external 
relations policy, the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
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Union and the Social Dimension of Globalisation – How the EU Influences the World, (Routledge: London, 
2009) at 177-178.
nations constitutes a more concrete attempt to promote human rights norms.  The original 
Agreement ‘incorporated a clause defining human rights as a fundamental element of the 
agreement which serves as the basis for dialogue with a third country government on 
human rights.’34  Specifically:  
respect for a comprehensive list of human rights - bearing down on a comprehensive 
list of stakeholders, including business partners - became essential parts of any project 
of development cooperation and investment between the EU and the ACPs.35
Voiculescu explains the importance of the clause:
ACP countries that failed to fulfil their human rights obligations risked having their 
allocated grants withdrawn and and the direct investment projects supported by the 
European Union under the development cooperation umbrella stopped.36
Thus the clause arguably represents a move away from voluntarism, because it imposes 
human rights obligations, albeit upon states rather than on corporate entities themselves.  
CSR principles have since been incorporated within the Cotonou processes in a broad 
sense.37
Furthermore, as regards its CSR policy in relation to third party States, two important 
Communications were published and the EU’s ‘external relations framework is presented 
as an avenue for CSR, as it is supposed to foster and reward core labour standards-
compliant corporate behaviour.’38  Firstly, the ‘Communication on the EU role in 
promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries;’39 and secondly, the 
‘Communication on Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance 
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35 Voiculescu ibid at 387-388.
36 Ibid at 388.
37 Ibid at 388-389.   See Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement - Consolidated Agreed Texts, 11th 
March 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/
second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf [last accessed 28.8.11].
38 J.Wouters & N.Hachez, ‘The EU’s international corporate social responsibility strategy: a business-driven, 
voluntary and process-oriented policy,’ (JESP Symposium: The European Union's global social role) 19 
Journal of European Social Policy 2009 110-113 at 110. (hereinafter ‘Wouters & Hachez, (2009)’)
39 European Commission, ‘The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in 
Third Countries,’ COM (2001) 252 final (8.5.2001).
in the context of Globalisation.’40 The first Communication provides that  human rights 
principles should filter across all EU external policies41 but a 2009 European Parliament 
Study concludes that the ‘business and human rights issue does not seem to be a priority.’42  
On a practical level, the Communications provide incentives in the form of trade 
liberalization ‘under the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) where countries 
comply and apply minimum social and environmental standards.’43  The GSP ensures 
compliance by imposing sanctions, in the form of preference withdrawal, when countries 
‘commit serious and systematic violations’ of International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
core labour standards.44  The GSP applies to the Least Developed Countries and additional 
preferences are immediately granted to developing countries that have ratified and 
effectively implemented the sixteen core conventions on human and labour rights and 
seven (out of eleven) of the conventions related to good governance and the protection of 
the environment. At the same time beneficiary countries must commit themselves to 
ratifying and effectively implementing the international conventions which they have not 
yet ratified. 
The EU has thus sought to advance human rights by encouraging EU-based businesses 
operating in developing states to promote human rights values in relation to, inter alia, 
workers' rights and ethical standards, ‘particularly where their operations have an 
influential role in countries with a poor record in this area.’45  Of course, this may be 
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precisely why some corporations choose to locate in such countries: to engage in so-called 
bottom-feeding.  In any event, there is no evidence to suggest that the EU’s external 
relations policy has progressed human rights protection in relation to business actors46 
although the European Parliament Resolution of November 2010 offers some hope.47  The 
resolution called for CSR provisions to be included the GSP and in all EU trade 
agreements as well as the general promotion of CSR, among other provisions, but the 
Commission has been slow to act upon this.48
Notwithstanding these external initiatives, it was not until the turn of the millennium that 
the EU began to develop and clarify its specific views and policies on CSR, most 
significantly with the publication of the Commission Green Paper on Promoting a 
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility.49
6.1.2 Developments Post-2000: The Commission Green Paper
Publication of the ‘European Declaration of Enterprises against Social Exclusion,’ which 
resulted in the creation of the European Business Network in 1995, was the initial starting 
point for distinct EU development of the concept of CSR.50  The  Declaration advocated an 
open dialogue between the relevant stakeholders and the exchange of best practice on 
CSR.51  By 2000, the year of the Lisbon Summit of the European Council, CSR was 
ostensibly ‘put at the top of the political agenda’ within the framework and context of 
sustainable development albeit with a clear nod to voluntarism:
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The European Council makes a special appeal to companies' corporate sense of social 
responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong learning, work organisation, equal 
opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable development.52
The Göteburg Summit in June 2001 specifically considered the role of companies within 
society and within the context of a ‘sustainable development strategy’ for Europe.53  
Sustainable development represented a widening of  the existing targets  of ‘economic 
growth and social cohesion’ as ‘strategic goals to be pursued in the framework of what 
came to be called the Lisbon strategy’54 and thus a step towards a social role for business.
6.1.2.1 The Commission Green Paper
As a consequence of discussions at the Göteburg summit, the European Commission 
published its ‘Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility’55 followed up in 2002 by 
the ‘Communication from the Commission Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Business Contribution to Sustainable Development.’56  It is clear that the Commission’s 
position on CSR has not changed since the publication of these documents, 
notwithstanding recent developments in relation to the UN Guiding Principles discussed at 
6.4.57  
The stated (and arguably successful58) aim of the Green Paper was to stimulate debate 
about the social responsibility of business within the European context rather than ‘making 
concrete proposals for action.’59  In other words, the European Commission was not 
prepared to adopt even a soft law approach.   From the outset, the Green Paper constricted 
any debate by relying on a very limited, and business-oriented, definition of CSR, 
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53 European Multistakeholder Forum on CSR, Final Results & Recommendations, 29 June 2004 at 2 http://
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58 Wouters & Chanet ibid at para.29.
59 Green Paper note 3 at para.93 at 23 .
describing it as a ‘concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis.’60  The Commission has continued to maintain this approach,61 although Wouters 
and Chanet, as well as De Schutter, have questioned whether this in fact was the 
Commission’s original intention.62  Wouters & Chanet make reference to the Commission’s 
‘early ambitions to put a basic enabling regulatory framework in place’63 while De 
Schutter highlights the fact that the Green Paper does not view an EU policy in isolation64 
rather it makes clear that any policy should:
...not be seen as a substitute to regulation or legislation concerning social rights or 
environmental standards, including the development of new appropriate legislation. In 
countries where such regulations do not exist, efforts should focus on putting the 
proper regulatory or legislative framework in place in order to define a level playing 
field on the basis of which socially responsible practices can be developed.65
Such an approach mirrors that of the hybrid OECD Guidelines, and the current view of the 
European Parliament,66 by encouraging the creation of domestic regulation in tandem with 
overarching international rules.  De Schutter, therefore, takes the view that the 
Commission’s position of approving of the regulatory involvement of public authorities in 
a formal CSR policy is at odds with the business case for voluntarism:
By confirming its view that CSR tools would only function effectively if they are 
transparent and based on clear and verifiable criteria and benchmarks, implying that a 
public policy was required to lend credibility to such voluntary initiatives, the 
Commission was in fact stating its disagreement with the position of employers’ 
organisations...67
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Wouters and Chanet agree with this analysis, observing that the ‘Commission clearly 
envisages an active role for public authorities’68 but little has been done to ensure the 
effective involvement of public bodies.  Subsequent actions by the Commission tend to 
mitigate against such an interpretation, as they mainstreamed voluntarism and the business 
case.
The Commission acknowledges in its subsequent Communication in 2002, which brings 
together the responses to the Green Paper, that guiding principles are important and further 
noted the proliferation of international ‘benchmark standards in the form of ‘guidelines, 
principles and codes during the last decade.’69  It highlights the usefulness of CSR norms 
which can be measured and compared, stating that they can ‘provide transparency and 
facilitate an effective and credible benchmarking.’70 
Furthermore it recognises that the existing initiatives are disparate in nature, stating that 
‘[n]ot all of these tools are comparable in scope, intent, implementation or applicability to 
particular businesses, sectors or industries.’71  The Commission goes on to criticise existing 
initiatives, citing the need for ‘convergence’ of the various schemes because separately 
‘[t]hey do not answer the need for effective transparency about business social and 
environmental performance.’72  Nevertheless, it continues, essentially setting out the 
business case: 
As expectations for CSR become more defined, there is a need for a certain 
convergence of concepts, instruments, practices, which would increase transparency 
without stifling innovation, and would offer benefits to all parties.73 
The emphasis changes towards protecting investment opportunities and there is no 
reference to remedies or redress, rather the mention of ‘transparency’ suggests that the 
focus is solely on reporting standards.  Convergence in the Green Paper and 2002 
Communication context means linking the principles elaborated in the ILO Tripartite 
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Agreement and the OECD Guidelines as the Commission considers that ‘CSR benchmarks 
should build upon core values’ originating in ‘internationally agreed instruments.’74 
Moreover, the Commission also acknowledges in the Green Paper that the EU has a role to 
play in this convergence and development of CSR principles stating that it ‘has an 
obligation in the framework of its Co-operation policy to ensure the respect of labour 
standards, environmental protection and human rights.‘75  It continues, highlighting the 
‘challenge of ensuring a full coherence’ between different EU policies, notably 
development, trade policy and ‘its strategy for the development of the private sector in the 
developing countries notably through the promotion of European investments.’76
Given the subsequent hands-off approach by the Commission discussed below, however, it 
is difficult to agree with either the Commission’s apparently high-minded approach or 
indeed with Professor De Schutter’s analysis.  In the decade since the publication of the 
Green Paper, the Commission has done little, if anything, to support convergence.  Indeed, 
SRSG Ruggie’s work has been the catalyst for embryonic convergence, not any 
Commission initiative.77  The Commission essentially abdicated responsibility for 
appraising the value of ’codes of conduct; management standards; accounting, auditing and 
reporting; labels; and socially responsible investment’78 by delegating the function to the 
European Multistakeholder Forum (EMS) established under the 2002 Commission 
Communication.79  Even De Schutter acknowledges this:
while clearly stating its conviction that more convergence and transparency was 
required, the Commission shifted the burden of having to identify solutions on the 
EMS [European Multistakeholder] Forum on CSR.80
As will be seen, the EMS Forum foundered quickly, as did any hope of an EU-led 
convergence of CSR initiatives.
Chapter 6 Business, Human Rights and the European Union 270
74 Ibid.
75 Green Paper note 3 at para.52.
76 Green Paper ibid at para.52.
77 See generally e.g. Swedish Presidency CSR Declaration note 28.
78 Commission Communication 2002 note 23 at 17; De Schutter note 1 at 210.
79 Commission Communication 2002 note 23 at 17-18.
80 De Schutter note 1 at 210.
6.1.2.2 Green Paper Consultation and Response 
As its basis, the Green Paper drew on the hypothesis of the triple bottom line.  That is, the 
concept of triple bottom line accounting practice whereby the traditional company 
reporting framework takes account of environmental and social performance in addition to 
the more usual financial matters.81  As part of a public consultation process, the 
Commission, via the Green Paper, asked several key questions relating to the role of the 
EU in CSR development; the role of CSR for business; the role of civil society in CSR; 
which CSR mechanisms were most appropriate; and how CSR could be monitored and 
evaluated.  Member States, the business community and civil society were invited to 
respond.82 
In total there were 261 responses to the Green Paper with only nine of the then fifteen 
Member States responding83 and this rather muted State reaction may help to explain the 
subsequent lack of progress.  Of the forty-nine individual company responses, more than 
half were from UK-based corporations: twenty-seven individual UK corporations 
responded.  It may be that at the time of the consultation, business social responsibility had 
a high profile in the UK in the wake of the RTZ asbestos litigation84 and the BP Brent Spar 
fiasco.85  This could also explain the relatively large number of US firms responding, such 
as NIKE and Levi Strauss, because US sportswear and fashion manufacturers had been 
subjected to intense NGO scrutiny throughout the 1990s and were thus alive to the rapidly 
emerging CSR debate.86  Another thirty-two responses were received from networks 
representing the corporate sector, such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the 
Confederation of British Industry.  The trade union movement, including the Trades Union 
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Congress submitted sixteen responses, while international and domestic NGOs submitted 
thirty-five responses.87  Given the robust global debate which had been taking place around 
voluntarism, it is not surprising to discover that the Commission’s emphasis on the 
voluntary nature of CSR did not find favour with the NGOs or other civil society actors 
responding to the Green Paper.88 Likewise the responses ‘expressed from the business side 
were not particularly encouraging’ as regards the implementation of a regulatory 
framework.89  Wouters and Chanet accurately describe the two positions as ‘diametrically 
opposed:’90
Business and employers’ organizations agree with the Commission’s definition that 
CSR involves actions that go beyond regulatory compliance.  They clearly favour a 
voluntary approach to CSR, which they see as a more efficient way to promote good 
corporate practices than prescriptive government codes and regulations.91
Furthermore, the proposition that CSR should be integrated into business operations, as 
opposed to being the starting platform from which business is conducted, was received 
negatively by civil society.  At this stage, the trade unions and the NGOs advocated a 
‘regulatory framework’ that established ‘minimum standards’ and ensured ‘a level playing 
field.’92  So for example, Amnesty International argued that CSR should not be an ‘add-on 
to core business activities’ and stated that the assumption that CSR should be viewed as 
voluntary is ‘flawed in that it fails to take account of the reality that voluntary approaches 
are generally implemented in response to consumer and community pressures, industry 
peer pressure, competitive pressure or the threat of new regulations or taxes,’93 i.e. rarely 
voluntarily.
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Another criticism levelled against the Green Paper concerned the intense focus on the 
business case, with little consideration for the interests of the wider constituency of 
stakeholders.94  As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, this is a recurring criticism 
of the Commission’s attitude to the social responsibility of business, with frequent 
assertions that civil society has been marginalised at the expense of business.  Such 
condemnation occurs with very good reason, as will be demonstrated.  Olivier De Schutter 
asks: 
whether the so-called ‘business case’ for CSR is strong enough, so that we may hope 
that the forces of market will suffice to encourage the companies to behave 
responsibly, over and above their obligation to comply with their legal obligations.95
The answer is simple.  No, as a general rule, market forces do not encourage business 
actors to behave responsibly.  If it were sufficient, then human rights abuses perpetrated by 
business actors would no longer occur as the market would dictate that only ethically 
responsible businesses would prosper at the expense of irresponsible commercial entities, 
which would falter and fold.
    
Critics have also argued, correctly, that the Commission's definition of CSR is flawed 
notwithstanding its adherence to voluntarism.96  In particular, it is not clear what the 
Commission is seeking to protect through the adoption of CSR.  This approach was 
criticised by David Engel in 1975 when he warned of the 
consequences of jumping into proposals of means to engender corporate social 
responsibility before addressing the question of what type of responsibility is 
desirable.97
The reference in the Green Paper to a wide variety of international legal instruments, such 
as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, ILO Conventions, and the UN Convention 
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on the Rights of the Child, has caused much confusion.98  Consequently, such a vague and 
all encompassing approach is bewildering for any business seeking to understand its 
obligations under the EU’s business and human rights policy.  
In the responses to the Green Paper, there is a remarkable homogeneity between individual 
corporate responses and the responses of industry representatives. The business responses 
all emphasise self-regulation, while demonstrating strong opposition to enforcement 
mechanisms, including the temporisation of implementation requirements, but displaying 
marked enthusiasm for voluntary CSR, and the sharing of good practice. The responses 
also displayed a general abhorrence of a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to CSR.99 Even the 
very title of the subsequent Commission Communication in 2002 - the ‘Communication 
from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: a business contribution 
to Sustainable Development’ - clearly owes much to business case rhetoric.100 
6.1.2.3 Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate 
  Social Responsibility: a business contribution to Sustainable 
  Development 2002
The Communication refers to frameworks, promotion, assistance, awareness, support, and 
good practice, but there is no indication that formal regulation is a possibility,101 much less 
a rejection of the dichotomy between voluntarism and hard regulation.  
In addition, the Commission retained its flawed definition of CSR stating102that ‘[i]n 
principle, adopting Corporate Social Responsibility is clearly a matter for enterprises 
themselves. . .’103  The Commission continues, ‘[n]evertheless . . . there is a role for public 
authorities in promoting socially and environmentally responsible practices by 
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enterprises.’104  Despite the vociferous civil society opposition to the optional nature of the 
EU’s CSR policy in response to the Green Paper, the 2002 Commission Communication is 
nonetheless entirely couched in terms of voluntarism.  There is little sense of any 
recognition that the case for other regulatory measures exists, let alone any attempt to 
reconcile the two positions.  
There was firm support in the 2002 Commission Communication for the OECD Guidelines 
on Multinational Enterprises, which it was hoped may affect the operation of the National 
Contact Points (NCP) and result in deeper cooperation105 but there is no particular 
evidence of this happening although there are CSR links between the two organisations.106  
Utilising the OECD Guidelines, as well as the International Labour Organisation’s 
Conventions, would encourage convergence between codes of conduct emanating from 
different regulatory regimes, and provide ‘a common minimum standard of reference’107  
but as has been made clear throughout this dissertation, there has been little or no 
cooperation or convergence between the various regimes, hence the need for the 
appointment of SRSG Ruggie. The Commission Communication 2002 did, however, 
contain several practical proposals. 
Firstly, it proposed the creation of an EU Multi-Stakeholder forum on CSR (EMS Forum), 
which was formally established in October 2002, and reported its conclusions in June 
2004.108  Some of the practical suggestions put forward for consideration by the EMS 
Forum included, for example, the incorporation of a framework directive harmonising the 
fairness of commercial practices and the production of a handbook on ‘green’ public 
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procurement but these were never considered.  This has led to it being criticised for lack of 
ambition.109  
In general, the EMS Forum had ‘the aim of promoting transparency and convergence of 
CSR practices and instruments’ 110 and determining the nature and shape of possible 
European measures, as per the original aims of the Green Paper.111  To that end, the Forum 
was to be composed of representatives from states, non-governmental organisations, 
corporations, and wider civil society.112 In this respect, the EMS Forum represented some 
elements of a hybrid or third way approach to CSR, in that it recognised the interests of 
non-business actors and sought to promote their participation in formulation of (admittedly 
voluntary) CSR measures.  In practice, however, the voice of business prevailed.  
Academics have denounced business participation in the EMS Forum pointing out that 
‘business representatives dominated the debate’ effectively ‘downgrading its mandate’.113  
Furthermore, ‘the new mandate of the platform, while largely espousing the wording‘ of 
the Commission Communication 2002 it did ‘present one crucial difference.’114   Whereas 
the original mandate included ‘identifying and exploring areas where additional action is 
needed at European level’115 the new mandate ‘abandoned’ it.116  The amended mandate set 
the EMS Forum objectives as:
[I]mproving knowledge about the relationship between CSR and sustainable 
development (including its impact on competitiveness, social cohesion and 
environmental protection) by facilitating the exchange of experience and good 
practices and bringing together existing CSR instruments and initiatives, with a 
special emphasis on SME specific aspects.117
As well as:
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[E]xploring the appropriateness of establishing common guiding principles for CSR 
practices and instruments, taking into account existing EU initiatives and legislation 
and internationally agreed instruments such as OECD Guidelines for multinational 
enterprises, Council of Europe Social Charter, ILO core labour conventions and the 
International Bill of Human Rights.118
There is no reference to ‘action’ and this represented a clear step back from normative and 
positive regulatory endeavours.
Second, the Commission Communication proposed that the EMS Forum should consider 
the integration of CSR into all EU policies including employment and social affairs policy, 
enterprise policy, environmental policy, consumer policy, and public procurement policy.119 
It also specifically addressed external relations polices. It advocated the promotion of CSR 
in line with the ‘Communications on the EU role in promoting human rights standards and 
democratisation in third countries.’120  This promotion of CSR includes, as discussed above 
in relation to Cotonou Agreement, ‘the use of bilateral dialogue with Governments’ and 
‘trade incentives’ as well as ‘engaging directly with multinational enterprises.’ This 
approach appears to embrace at least some elements of a third way of regulation, in that it 
engages a wider range of stakeholders than simply business, in particular it engages the 
governments of third party countries.121  Very little has been done to further this agenda, 
however.
Likewise, at the EU internal level scant progress was being made.  One of the many 
criticisms levelled at the Commission's Communication by the European Parliament in its 
Report in April 2003 was that the Parliament was ‘frozen out of the process in a way that is 
unacceptable, not least that the Commission Communication was effectively written before 
the Parliament's response to the Green Paper had been absorbed’, thus yet again appearing 
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to reject a participatory model of CSR.122   Beyond this general criticism, there appeared to 
be some Parliamentary support for the Commission's strategy, at least in the conclusions 
reached by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs.123 
In the years since the 2002 Communication, there has been, however, clear support among 
the various reporting committees for at least some mandatory rules, although some 
conflicting opinions surfaced.  For example, the Committee on Industry, External Trade, 
Research, and Energy demanded a ‘Global Convention on Corporate Accountability’ on 
the basis that ‘world society has a right to accountability in terms of environmental, social 
and human rights from transnational corporations and . . . SMEs.’124 This framing of a 
‘right’ to ‘accountability’ again conceptualises CSR in terms of voluntarism versus hard 
regulation.  Confusingly, however, the committee in a later document urged the 
Commission to ‘not undertake initiatives to establish yet another redundant regulatory 
framework that brings rules that do not exist in the Member States into play.‘125   It further 
insisted that ‘the involvement of companies in CSR should always be voluntary and should 
take into account the current state of development of the market in all of the Member 
States, as well as their business culture, compliance with the social partnership principle 
and political aspects.’126  This is at odds with the earlier call for a global CSR convention.
The Committee on Development and Cooperation sought to establish the extraterritorial 
reach of CSR by calling upon the Commission to ‘create an agency which would be 
responsible for introducing a system for assessing and monitoring observance of 
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international and national standards on CSR and the environment by EU companies 
operating in developing countries.’127
Significantly, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health, and Consumer Policy 
went further, although its comments relate to environmental matters as opposed to human 
rights.  It emphasised that ‘companies should be required to contribute to a cleaner 
environment by law rather than solely on a voluntary basis’, but it also invited the 
Commission to ‘explore ways of establishing a system of corporate accountability to 
citizens.’128  This might be seen as a call for an exploration of alternative CSR 
mechanisms, and in this respect it is an unusual example in the EU context of interest in 
third way approaches to CSR. Nevertheless, despite the various committee reports, the 
Committee for Employment and Social Affairs still came to the conclusion that a 
voluntary, soft law system was the best model.129
Similarly, the outcome of the original European Multi-Stakeholder Forum resulted in 
mixed signals.  It presented its final report in June 2004,130 but despite twenty months of 
consultation and consideration, the business and civil society approaches to CSR were 
irreconcilable and the future of any EU legislation left unclear.131  Notably, the first 
paragraph of the Foreword stated that:
‘[t]here are some differences and debates that remain. Members of the Forum 
expressed their views about the merits and limitations of this Report in their speeches 
and statements made on the occasion of the plenary meeting of the Forum.’132  
The traditional battle lines were drawn, with business on one side and NGOs, trade unions, 
and other stakeholders on the other.  Ultimately, the Report made lengthy 
recommendations of a non-binding nature, expressed in terms of ‘cooperation,’ 
‘promotion,’ ‘explore,’ and other general statements.133  For example, there are 
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recommendations for ‘increasing awareness’ of CSR, encouragement of ‘cooperation with 
stakeholders,’ support for more empirical research on CSR and stress on the diffusion of 
information about CSR, and emphasis on cooperation with and between companies.  In 
other words, the business case prevailed and the EMS Forum’s final recommendations 
reflect voluntarism.134  
Furthermore, and disappointingly, the supposedly ‘active’ role of public authorities was 
‘understood most restrictively.’135  The report describes their function in general terms and 
recommends that:
...public authorities at different levels (EU, national, regional and local) recognise 
their contribution to driving CSR, alongside others, and in cooperation with 
stakeholders, assess and strengthen their role in raising awareness of, providing 
information on, promoting, and supporting the take-up, development and innovation 
of effective CSR, and the development of environmentally and socially responsible 
products and services136 
Although the European Parliament describes the seventh recommendation of the 2004 
report as promoting the creation of a legal framework for CSR, in the context of the rest of 
the report, however, this could only mean a soft legal framework.137  Wouters and Chanet 
describe the recommendations as ‘very weak‘ generally and the specific reference to a 
CSR framework as ringing ‘hollow.’ 138  
There is no doubt that the EMS Forum failed to move the EU away from the binary 
approach to CSR, the idea that voluntary and other regulatory approaches are opposed and 
cannot be reconciled.  De Schutter blames the process, arguing that where the 
stakeholders’ initial positions are so incompatible any attempt to reconcile them becomes 
virtually impossible and a stalemate inevitable:
What the experience of the Forum showed...are the limits of a method which consists 
in bringing together a range of stakeholders with so different views, in the hope that 
they will arrive at a consensus through discussions facilitated, but in no way pre-
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empted or directed, by the Commission.  This method, which in theory might be 
praised for its openness, leads in fact to a situation where any final agreement will be 
based, not on the outcome of a rational discussion based on the law of the best 
argument...but rather on the few items on which the participants can agree, without 
betraying the mandate of their respective constituencies. The final report of the CSR 
EMS Forum, in that sense, represented the lowest common denominator which could 
be achieved: its results were less than impressive.139
On this analysis it seems that any multistakeholder approach to CSR is condemned to fail, 
at least from the perspective of those seeking something other than a voluntary regulatory 
option.  From the business case perspective, however, such an outcome would be 
welcomed.  Indeed, it appears that a multistakeholder system, rather than being predicated 
on equality, favours the business community:
To some, it appeared as if the Commission had put all its eggs into the basket of the 
multi-stakeholders platform, and now found itself tied to the willingness of the 
employers to cooperate fairly in the process; as to the employers, who insisted 
throughout on the importance of participants retaining ‘ownership’ of the process, 
they seemed to believe that CSR was too serious an issue to be left in the hands of the 
public servants of the Commission.140
So while a multistakeholder strategy may operate effectively in a voluntary business and 
human rights context, as was seen within the UN Global Compact framework, for 
example, the possible introduction of binding regulatory options into the dialogue creates 
an impasse.  As will be seen, in its subsequent policy debates about CSR, the European 
Commission took a novel approach to the problem and chose to dispense with a 
multistakeholder approach entirely.
6.2 The Aftermath of the Green Paper 
While in the past, NGOs and trade unions wanted the EU to create a concrete legal CSR 
framework, with all that such a framework would entail, their current position has 
changed.  Now these stakeholders are seeking a new governance or third way approach to 
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CSR.141  From their standpoint, the key limitation of the EMS Forum 2004 report was the 
failure to recommend any form of monitoring or compliance procedure, which is linked to 
the changed mandate identified previously.  A letter from the NGOs to the Commission and 
Council set out the steps necessary, in their eyes, for future progress:
Taken together, the recommendations, if they are fully implemented by the relevant 
actors, will help to generate a significant advance. For that to happen, it will be 
necessary to develop them into a proper framework that complements the voluntary 
commitment of a steadily growing number of companies with proactive and consistent 
public policies to create the right enabling environment and ultimately to ensure 
accountability by all companies.142
Thus a move towards a hybrid of voluntarism and binding regulation becomes the goal.  To 
achieve the advance, the NGOs advocated that EU institutions move away from ‘merely 
moderating dialogue to developing policies, setting standards and where necessary 
enforcing them.’143  In a clear criticism of the EU’s role (or lack thereof) in the EMS 
Forum the NGOs continued:
There needs to be proactive and consistent public policies to create the right enabling 
environment and ultimately to ensure accountability by all companies. Concretely, 
this means that the Commission, Council and Parliament, which have been neutral or 
absent throughout the Forum, must now take the lead role in the development of an 
effective EU framework for CSR.’144
This middle way seemed an obvious solution to the tension between the proponents of 
regulation and those who opposed it and anticipated the ‘smart mix’ of regulation 
advocated by the UN Guiding Principles by seven years.145  The EMS Forum, however, did 
not adopt this position.
Finally, after numerous delays, the Commission published a second Communication in 
2006 entitled ‘Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole 
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of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (the Pole of Excellence 
Communication).146  NGOs were particularly concerned by the delay in publication as it 
was felt that CSR was being sidelined as opposed to mainstreamed, perhaps as a response 
to the EU’s increased emphasis on competitiveness in accordance with the Lisbon 
Strategy.147  
More significantly, NGOs were excluded from the consultation process.  The Commission 
chose to consult with business groups alone and did not include any representatives from 
civil society.148  This reflected the Commission’s position in the Pole of Excellence 
Communication where it explicitly moves away from the wider participatory model of 
CSR by saying that it will ‘work more closely with European business’ through a new 
European Alliance on CSR, membership of which was only open to business enterprises.149 
Other stakeholders were acknowledged, but they were given no formal role in the CSR 
process, with the Commission saying that it continued ‘to attach the utmost importance to 
dialogue between all stakeholders…’ but no more.  De Schutter describes this ‘political 
message as particularly damaging’150 and he cites it as an example of John Conley and 
Cynthia William’s CSR ‘rituals’151 whereby rather than enabling participation, a 
stakeholder model stifles dialogue and allows ‘companies to control the way in which the 
[stakeholder] voice is exercised.’152  De Schutter writes:
One striking feature of the constitution of this [CSR] movement is the blurring of the 
lines between the roles of the respective participants: consensus is the rule; the ‘no 
name, no shame’ rule predominates; voices critical of the possibility of
achieving agreement and overcoming differences are outcast.153
Chapter 6 Business, Human Rights and the European Union 283
146 COM(2006) 136 final 22.3.2006.
147 ECCJ Advocacy Briefing note 141 at 1.
148 Ibid at 3.
149 Ibid at 3-4.
150 De Schutter note 1 at 216.
151 J.M.Conley & C.A.Williams, ‘Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Movement’ 31 J. Corp. L. 1 (2005) at 8.
152 Conley & Williams ibid at 12.
153 De Schutter note 1 at 212 note 33.
Thus in the European context, civil society was cast out of the process.  NGOs, through the 
European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), expressed horror at this development,154 
especially in light of business sector attitudes which seemed to be that the impact of CSR 
ought to be minimised as much as possible.’155  In  a November 2006 report, the ECCJ 
concluded firstly, that ‘[a] multistakeholder approach … has been abandoned outright,’ 
secondly, that the European Alliance on CSR is ‘perfectly suited to become a major 
greenwash operation’ and finally, that the Commission’s exclusive approach ‘poses a great 
danger to serious CSR initiatives.’156  Such a conclusion is supported by Conley and 
Williams’ empirical study157
The Commission did reinstate the EMS Forum at a late stage, and only after intense civil 
society lobbying, via the Poles of Excellence Communication,158 stating in a backpedalling 
press release:
The European Commission believes that while enterprises are the primary actors in 
CSR, credible CSR practices need to be developed with other stakeholders, such as 
trade unions, non-governmental organisations, public authorities and academic 
institutions.159
EECJ, however, was skeptical about the reinstatement citing a letter written by the Union 
of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) as evidence that the EMS 
Forum was a charade.  It stated that the letter:
revealed the true face of the European business representatives drafting the Alliance 
with the Commission. It shows that their only political interest in CSR at EU level is 
to ensure that EU initiatives or policies have as little impact as possible. The UNICE 
letter calls the new approach by the Commission a true success for business. 
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Furthermore, the letter says that ‘a few passages must be interpreted as verbal 
concessions to other stakeholders, which will however have no real impact.’160
 
NGOs were invited to the subsequent EMS Forum Review in December 2006 but declined 
to attend,161 however, a meeting in 2009 saw their return and a significant number 
participated in the last EMS Forum plenary session convened in November 2010.162 So 
latterly it would appear the Commission has recognised the value of a participatory CSR 
process but the decision to reinstate the European Multistakeholder Forum came late in the 
day and only after vociferous complaints from civil society actors that they were being 
excluded from the Commission’s CSR agenda.  Nevertheless, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the Commission’s policy approach to CSR will change as a result of NGO 
participation and as will be seen NGOs remain unconvinced about the merits of the 
existing policy.  
In terms of the regulatory model adopted in the Poles of Excellence Communication, once 
again the Commission adheres to voluntarism, primarily in its definition of CSR as a 
‘concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary  basis.’163  Its 
rationale for focus on voluntarism is that ‘an approach involving additional obligations and 
administrative requirements for business risks [would be] counter-productive and would be 
contrary to the principles of better regulation.’164  NGOs have consistently and 
vociferously opposed this approach since the 2004 Report of the EMS Forum.165  Instead, 
NGOs are seeking a hybrid or third way in terms of regulation and explicitly call upon the 
Commission to ‘depolarise the debate on voluntary versus mandatory approaches to 
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CSR.’166  Rather than seeking only the imposition of strict legally binding instruments, 
NGOs are now calling for a new governance approach via a variety of different regulatory 
mechanisms.  Regulatory recommendations include mandatory social and environmental 
reporting, redress mechanisms, extra-territorial application of human rights and labour 
standards and a duty of care upon companies and their directors regarding social and 
environmental impacts.167  The rationale for this is that voluntary initiatives gain credibility  
when they are supported by ‘effective legal safeguards.’168  In addition, the NGOs have 
proposed some alternative regulatory CSR mechanisms such as independent monitoring 
and verification, multistakeholder initiatives, and mandatory social and environmental 
reporting as a means of achieving transparency.169
Furthermore, the European Parliament in 2007 adopted a Resolution on Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A New Partnership.170 The Resolution is based on the Special Rapporteur’s 
report to the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs.  In essence, the Resolution 
seems to chastise the Commission for its failure to engage all the relevant stakeholders in 
CSR regulation.  It welcomes the re-establishment of the EMS Forum,171 and restates the 
importance of including non-business stakeholders in the European Alliance for CSR.172  
Although the Resolution welcomes reporting by business on their CSR compliance, it 
notes that very few reports refer to human rights norms, or cover the entire supply chain.173  
Of course, the European Parliament has no formal role in EU CSR regulation, and the 
European Commission is not obliged to follow any of its recommendations.
Two criticisms have been levelled consistently against the EU’s CSR strategy.  Firstly, that 
there has been an undue and unwarranted emphasis on voluntarism and secondly, that the 
interests of stakeholders have been marginalised and in some cases ignored.  There are 
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instances of the EU paying lip-service to a third way in CSR. For instance, the website of 
the Directorate General for External Trade describes CSR as
not a substitute, but a complement to hard law. As such it must not be detrimental to 
public authorities' task to establish binding rules, at domestic and/or at international 
level, for the respect of certain minimum social and environmental standards. The 
focus of the debate in this respect has now moved on from a simple dichotomy 
between voluntary and binding instruments, towards the overarching challenge of 
devising reporting tools and verification mechanisms to ensure proper compliance 
with CSR commitments.174
The debate may have ‘moved on’ for the Commission and for the business community  but 
only because civil society was excluded and they have chosen to discount options other 
than voluntarism.  Overall, it seems that the EU, while demonstrating an initial interest in a 
compromise approach to CSR, in the form of the EMS Forum, now appears to have 
retreated to an almost exclusively voluntarist CSR model.  Indeed, in as recently March 
2010 the Commission reiterated its commitment to a non-regulatory policy ‘to renew the 
EU strategy to promote Corporate Social Responsibility as a key element in ensuring long 
term employee and consumer trust.’175
6.3 European Multistakeholder Forum 2010
‘Europe can be a leader in driving up standards and in applying them, 
or it can risk falling behind.’176
In 2010, as a response to the global economic crisis which left many European economies 
in a fragile state, the EU issued its Communication Europe 2020177 setting out a decade of 
growth strategy for the region.  It comprises target objectives in the areas of employment, 
research and innovation, climate change and energy, education and poverty.  Significantly, 
Europe 2020 envisages a role for CSR, with the Commission stating its aim of creating an 
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‘industrial policy for the globalisation era’178 which includes renewing ‘the EU strategy to 
promote Corporate Social Responsibility as a key element in ensuring long term employee 
and consumer trust.’179  To that end the Commission convened a plenary meeting of the 
EMS Forum in November 2010 with the declared purpose of exchanging ‘views about the 
scope and content of a new European policy initiative in the field of CSR.’180 The aim was 
to ‘as far as possible, generate a degree of consensus around the scope and content of that 
policy.’ 181  Such an approach seems to indicate two things; firstly, that the Commission 
acknowledges that the old CSR policy was inadequate and secondly, that stakeholders were 
in disagreement about that policy.
On several levels this ostensibly represents a shift in gear by the Commission and was a 
clear response to the work of John Ruggie at the UN.  The previous year the Swedish EU 
Presidency had concluded in a Declaration that:
The United Nations’ Protect, Respect and Remedy framework provides a key 
element for the global development of CSR practices. It constitutes a significant 
input to the CSR work of the European Union.182
In a clear statement of intent the Declaration continues: 
Now the time is ripe to take this important work further by developing common 
frameworks; raising awareness and improving dialogue between all stakeholders; 
and measuring and evaluating tangible results.183
Viewed through this lens, the EMS Forum 2010 can be regarded as a move towards those 
goals.  Importantly, the plenary meeting brought together ‘all major stakeholder groups, 
including business, trade unions, investors, non-governmental organisations, academics 
and national government’184 in a return to a truly participatory EMS Forum.  Its purpose 
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was to consider ‘the current context of CSR, both in Europe and globally’185 and to discuss 
the ‘different issues and initiatives that could form part of European policy on CSR’186 
with a view to establishing a ‘way forward.’187  Six themes formed the basis for the 
discussions: ‘responsible consumption; responsible investment; the links between CSR and 
competitiveness; transparency and disclosure of non-financial information; business and 
human rights; and the global dimension of CSR.’188
From the perspective of this dissertation, one very interesting development took place.  
Many participants concluded at the meeting that implementation of a regulatory ‘smart 
mix’ as per the UN Guiding principles renders the voluntarism versus regulation debate 
redundant,189 with the Swedish Government representative proclaiming that ‘the era of 
declaratory CSR is over.’190  Industry stakeholders such as BusinessEurope (formerly 
UNICE), take the opposite view, however, leading to the conclusion that a consensus on a 
new EU policy is far from achievable.  BusinessEurope does not advocate a smart mix of 
regulation at all, rather it continues to espouse pure voluntarism commenting that CSR 
must ‘be integrated in strategies, systems and processes.’191  While this is a laudable goal 
and entirely in keeping with an intelligent approach to regulation, nevertheless the 
organisation suggests that the Commission can ‘help to increase the uptake of CSR 
amongst companies, by concentrating on practical activities which promote the business 
case of CSR’ [emphasis in original].192  This includes providing CSR ‘incentives’ and 
‘helping companies’ to implement CSR, which again is in the spirit of hybrid regulation 
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and is to be encouraged.  BusinessEurope, however, favours this soft approach at the 
expense of ‘strict and detailed frameworks for business’ which it describes as 
‘counterproductive’ and its opinion clearly runs contrary to smart mix regulation.193  
Similarly, EuroCommerce, a group representing the retail and wholesale industry indicates 
a strong preference for voluntarism:
The European Commission should continue to encourage and support companies to 
take up voluntary CSR initiatives in close cooperation with their stakeholders and to 
make CSR an integrative part of their business strategy.  Any legal obligation or 
mandatory requirement related to CSR would be counterproductive and prevent 
companies from getting engaged.  Therefore, EuroCommerce would like to underline 
once more the necessity for CSR to remain a voluntary concept.194
Such a hardline approach does not bode well for future consensus among stakeholders.
   
Civil society, of course embraces a hybrid approach, as it has done in the EU context since 
2004.195   Amnesty International in its submission to the meeting recommends an EU 
policy which implements the UN Guiding Principles,196  including include ‘legal and 
policy measures’ requiring ʻcorporate actors to conduct human rights due diligence and 
mandatory reporting, and impose sanctions if corporate actors fail to carry out such 
requirements.’197  Furthermore it recommends mandatory reporting mechanisms and 
measures to address extraterritorial human rights violations.198  Access to judicial and non-
judicial remedies for the victims of corporate human rights abuses should also be 
ensured.199   Likewise, the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), which 
represents over two-hundred and fifty NGOs from across Europe remains adamant that a 
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smart regulatory mix is required, combining both legislative and voluntary measures, 
contending that it is ‘not an either/or question.’200
It is clear that the historically wide gulf between business and civil society on the strategy 
that ought to be adopted for a new EU CSR policy remains intact.  What is also clear is that 
in order to implement the UNGPs the EU ought in fact put in place a mix of regulatory 
options otherwise any policy simply looks like voluntarism by another name.  
Furthermore, a redress mechanism, either judicial or non-judicial, needs to be created in 
order for the policy to be Ruggie-compliant.  It remains to be seen how the Commission 
will respond but reports of the demise of the ‘era of declaratory CSR’ appear to be an 
exaggeration.  Nevertheless, the Commission announced in April 2011 that it ‘will put 
forward a new framework initiative later this year to tackle issues related to the societal 
challenges that enterprises are facing,’ and it will therefore be interesting to observe 
whether normative rules will form part of its configuration.201 
Thus, although it remains to be seen what will be the outcome of the resurrected EMS 
Forum, it may be said that currently the EU is failing almost entirely to reconcile the 
approaches of voluntarism and hard regulation. Indeed, the European Commission does not 
appear to have understood the possibility of a hybrid or third way, drawing criticism from 
civil society: ‘If the Commission really wants to make Europe a Pole of Excellence on 
CSR it should at least be on top of the debate.’202  In this respect, other regional and 
international regulatory regimes, such as those of the UN and the OECD, may be perceived 
more favourably when it comes to reconciling the different approaches.
6.4 Conclusions and the Future of Business and Human Rights in the EU
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This dissertation proceeds from the position that it is in fact possible to reconcile the 
apparently irreconcilable regulatory stances of voluntarism and hard regulation, into a 
compromise ‘third way’ of CSR regulation.  The apparently fixed position of the European 
Commission, and indeed business itself, suggests that voluntarism and hard regulation are 
mutually exclusive, and that voluntarism, founded on the business case for CSR, is the 
only appropriate basis for regulation of transnational business enterprises.
Nevertheless, as has been shown in previous chapters by the Global Compact and most 
notably by the OECD, so-called third way regulatory mechanisms are already in operation.  
In the Global Compact context, stakeholder participation and transparency are key to its 
operation, irrespective of its voluntary status.  Failure by corporate participants to adhere to 
the reporting mechanisms results in public ‘naming and shaming’ via the non-compliance 
register on the GC website.  Such measures fall directly within the ambit of the ‘third way’ 
mode of regulation.  While ostensibly adhering stoutly to voluntarism, the OECD also 
embraces a stakeholder participation model with roles for business, trade unions and 
NGOs, the latter albeit in an informal capacity.
Even the UN’s Sub-Commission on the Protection of Human Rights’ Norms on the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, while ostensibly advocating the creation of 
an international covenant, nevertheless included some elements of third way regulation.  
Wide stakeholder participation took place through the UN’s usual NGO channels, in 
addition to the specific consultation which took place as part of the UNHCHR Report into 
the Norms.  The UN therefore is encouraging stakeholder participation across a variety of 
initiatives. This is in direct contrast to the European Commission which in practice has 
seemed intent on stifling civil society involvement in the CSR regulatory debate.  The 
dismantling of the EMS Forum and the subsequent creation of the European Alliance on 
CSR which involved business alone has done immense harm to the Commission’s 
reputation with NGOs and its stated aim of being a global leader in CSR.203  The belated 
resurrection of the EMS Forum may be insufficient to bridge the gaps between the parties.  
The Commission has shown itself to be unwilling to reconcile voluntarism and hard 
regulation.  It clings to a polarised voluntarism model with little regard for any possible 
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alternative third way regulatory measures, a position described as ‘unwarranted.’204  Unlike 
the NGOs, which have moved from their initial adherence to hard regulation to a 
compromise third way position, the Commission has adopted an entrenched voluntarism 
position.  This also conflicts with the more enlightened positions adopted by the UN and 
the OECD.  If it truly seeks to be a ‘Pole of Excellence’ in CSR regulation, the 
Commission must acknowledge that there are regulatory options beyond the confines of 
voluntarism with which it must engage.  So far, the signs are not good.  In a speech to the 
resurrected EMS Forum in 2009, Günter Verheugen Vice-President of the European 
Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry, made clear the Commission’s 
position:
I believe that CSR should remain a voluntary concept, and I will not make any 
proposals that would risk undermining that principle. But this certainly does not 
exclude a role for the Commission in facilitating joint work between stakeholders in 
the field of CSR, whenever it can add value. And let me be clear – defining CSR as a 
voluntary concept does not mean that its boundaries are fixed once and for all – 
regulation and CSR while being mutually exclusive are dynamic and evolving. CSR in 
twenty years will certainly encompass some other commitments than it does today.205 
[Emphasis added]
The Commission has retreated from any form of regulation and continues to ignore calls 
from both civil society and the European Parliament to consider alternatives to 
voluntarism.  For example, the European Parliament suggested in its 2007 Resolution  that 
the Commission step back from pure voluntarism and adopt a hybrid or third way 
approach.206  Wouters and Hachez in their Study for the European Parliament view the 
Parliament’s proposals as a ‘mixed approach’ which ‘would encourage corporations to take 
voluntary CSR initiatives, but which would also comprise binding rules allowing for 
holding corporations accountable in diverse ways.’207
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To that end, the European Parliament proposed an enhanced framework which emphasises 
business accountability and responsibility, stating that it is:
convinced that increasing social and environmental responsibility by business, linked 
to the principle of corporate accountability, represents an essential element of the 
European social model, Europe's strategy for sustainable development, and for the 
purposes of meeting the social challenges of economic globalisation.208
  
Furthermore, it proposed the clarification, strengthening and integration of existing 
initiatives209 as well as calling on the Commission to implement ‘a mechanism by which 
victims, including third-country nationals, can seek redress against European companies in 
the national courts of the Member States.’210  Improved functioning of OECD National 
Contact Points in EU States is also recommended.211
In addition, the European Parliament advocated that further consideration be given to the 
creation of an EU Ombudsman for CSR ‘to undertake independent enquiries on CSR-
related issues at the request of companies or any stakeholder group.‘212 While this may 
offer a means for ensuring transparency, it is difficult to see how effective a CSR 
Ombudsman might be in the face of serious human rights abuses by business actors and is 
unlikely to offer any binding redress to individuals.  Certainly, the existing European 
Ombudsman is empowered only to investigate complaints about maladministration within 
the EU institutions and to make recommendations to resolve the complaint.213
John Ruggie has some sympathy for the ombudsman proposal but as he points out there are 
inherent flaws in an:
...ombudsman function that could receive and handle complaints. Such a mechanism 
would need to provide ready access without becoming a first port of call; offer 
effective processes without undermining the development of national mechanisms; 
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provide timely responses while likely being located far from participants; and furnish 
appropriate solutions while dealing with different sectors, cultures and political 
contexts. It would need to show some early successes if faith in its capacity were not 
quickly to be undermined. To perform these tasks any such function would need to be 
well-resourced. Careful consideration should go into whether these criteria actually 
can and would be met before moving in this direction.214
Although SGSR Ruggie is referring to a global CSR ombudsman, these weaknesses would 
apply equally to an EU specific model.
In conclusion, it is difficult to see how the EU can lay any credible claim to being a ‘Pole 
of Excellence’ in CSR.  As the European Parliament puts it, ‘CSR policies should be 
promoted on their own merits and should represent neither a substitute for appropriate 
regulation in relevant fields, nor a covert approach to introducing such regulations.‘215 In 
ten years of attempts there remains no effective EU CSR policy or accountability strategy 
and there has been no necessary shift of emphasis, by the Commission in particular, ‘from 
processes to outcomes.’216  It seems unlikely that the forthcoming ‘framework initiative’  
will substantially change the current position.217  
The EMS Forum 2010 represents a step in the right direction but it seems obvious that in 
the absence of legislative provisions within the smart mix of regulation there will be no 
redress mechanisms implemented.  In addition to voluntarily adhering to the UNGPs the 
EU institutions will also be required to have regard to current developments at the Council 
of Europe where the Parliamentary Assembly supports mandatory provisions in the 
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business and human rights domain.218  Certainly the EU cannot be described as a leader in 
the CSR field and thus as a follower, the Commission in particular will have to decide the 
extent to which it will be pushed into considering binding regulatory options in order to be 
Ruggie-compliant.  History suggests that the EU’s smart mix approach to CSR will not be 
mixed at all.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Reputational Carrots, Regulatory Sticks and the Future 
Ordering of Business and Human Rights
So how can it be that corporations can be held responsible for their 
complicity in oil spills, but not for their complicity in genocide?  How can 
corporations be held liable under European Law for 
anticompetitive behavior, but not for slavery?1
7.0 Introduction
The concluding chapter of this dissertation serves two functions.  Firstly, it provides a brief 
overview and summary of the preceding chapters.  Secondly, and more importantly it seeks 
to ‘point forward’ to the future and to offer some possible solutions to the problem of 
human rights violations by businesses identified throughout the dissertation.  It certainly 
does not purport to offer a one-size-fits-all panacea, rather it it suggests that there needs to 
be a top-down bottom-up or hybrid approach to regulating business actors which 
encompasses a variety of regulatory techniques, one of which is mandatory regulation.  
Reliance upon bottom-up human rights protection alone will not solve the problem quickly  
which is why scholars such as Koh and Zerk recognise the importance of also developing 
normative international approaches.2  Currently, there is no mandatory international 
regulation of business actors in relation to human rights standards.  Binding rules are 
essential, however, to act as a deterrent to human rights abuses as well as guaranteeing 
redress for victims because, as has been demonstrated, a self-regulatory approach on its 
own is insufficient.  What this means is that all of the current international initiatives are 
inadequate, notwithstanding their substantial and important contribution to the norm 
internalisation process.
7.1 Overview of the Dissertation
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Chapter 1 of this dissertation sets out the historical background to the long-standing 
problem of business actors violating human rights and identifies the types of actors 
involved as well as numerous instances of human rights violations.  In addition, it 
evaluates the relevant literature in the field.  It catalogues how the rise of globalisation 
coupled with dominant neoliberal economic policies have created an environment whereby 
commercial activity has been permitted to flourish, particularly in the developing world, at 
the expense of regulation protecting individuals and communities, often in host countries.  
Typologies of human rights violations committed by business actors are set out.  
Furthermore it charts the emergence of the CSR movement and its reliance on self-
regulatory mechanisms, culminating in the landmark adoption of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) by the Human Rights Council in 2011. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the reasons why voluntarism alone is ineffective and why a 
binding parallel international regulatory mechanism is necessary to act as a deterrent and to 
provide effective remedies and redress for the victims of human rights abuses by business 
actors.
Chapter 2 explains why the prevailing international legal tradition which places the State 
and respect for State sovereignty at the heart of international law has resulted in business 
actors falling through the human rights regulatory net.  A system based on States as the 
sole subjects of international law is rejected in favour of one of two options.  Firstly, a 
system of international law where individuals (and potentially legal persons) are classified 
as subjects of international law thus acknowledging the primacy of the individual as 
opposed to the State.  Such an approach would better safeguard the individual as 
Lauterpacht’s ‘ultimate subject‘ of international law as well as ensuring that business 
actors become dutyholders under international law as well as beneficiaries.  The chapter 
gives examples of how States have long regarded business actors as subjects of 
international law because they demonstrated significant elements of international legal 
personality.  Business actors have also been parties to international legal proceedings and 
their behaviour subject to the imposition of treaty provisions.  Secondly, and alternatively, 
Chapter 2 argues that a participatory approach to international law, as advocated by 
Higgins and others, which acknowledges the involvement of a variety of different actors on 
the international plane is also to be preferred to the State-centric option.  The rise of what 
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Slaughter calls global policy networks and the implementation of multistakeholder 
regulatory approaches exemplify the participatory approach in the business and human 
rights context.
Chapter 3 continues to employ Hersch Lauterpacht’s theoretical framework arguing that 
because international human rights law places the individual at the heart of the 
international legal system, human rights violations ought to be addressed irrespective of 
the perpetrator.  The chapter advocates a move away from the traditional vertical approach 
to human rights, which means that duties are imposed on States alone,3 proposing instead 
the application of a new horizontality which encompasses human rights violations by 
private business actors.  A strict public/private distinction fails to recognise that human 
rights may be violated by entities other than States and thus business actors ought to have 
direct and binding human rights obligations. The chapter also examines the historical 
development of business and human rights initiatives at the UN, specifically the UN Draft 
Code and the Norms project, and the largely political reasons for their failure.  It concludes 
with an analysis of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, arguing that 
while this denouement of SGSR Ruggie’s work is an especially significant and timely 
contribution to the canon of CSR, it is ultimately flawed because a mandatory international 
regulatory approach is rejected outright and there is therefore no guarantee of effective 
remedies, redress or punishment of wrongdoers. 
The final three substantive chapters focus on contemporary CSR efforts at the UN, the 
OECD and the European Union.  All three initiatives contribute to incremental business 
and human rights norm internalisation, for example via increased dissemination of human 
rights principles, but they lack mandatory rules.  Chapter 4 examines the UN Global 
Compact within the context of global policy networks and concludes that despite the 
weaknesses inherent in a voluntary initiative, the UNGC has a lot to offer in terms of 
grassroots development and dissemination of business and human rights principles.  As a 
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policy network it is a good example of an international level multistakeholder approach to 
business and human rights, however, the chapter also notes that as a voluntary project the 
UNGC has the potential to be exploited for marketing purposes or ‘bluewashing’ rather 
than functioning as a truly effective mechanism for preventing human rights violations.  It 
must be borne in mind, however, that the UNGC was conceived as a leadership platform 
for the purpose of creating policy dialogues and was never intended to function as a 
sanctions body.  Nevertheless, the basic accountability mechanisms which are in place are 
of limited impact and the UNGC has a serious problem with corporate non-compliance.
Chapter 5 examines the long-established OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 
which underwent a revision in June 2011.  While recognising the strides made in 
expanding the human rights provisions of the Guidelines and the important role played by 
some States in administering them, nevertheless, they are of limited impact especially in 
terms of punishment and remedies.  This is demonstrated by way of case studies, in 
particular decisions made under the UK Specific Instance Procedure and others, which 
again illustrate the difficulties inherent in a non-mandatory regime, specifically the lack of 
redress and the potential for reoffending.  The chapter also criticises the OECD adhering 
States for failing to seize the opportunity to radically reform the Guidelines, in particular, 
failing to require the restructuring of all National Contact Points.  Consequently the 
meagre nature of the successes of this top-down - bottom-up regulatory system simply 
strengthens the argument for a binding international framework.
Chapter 6 critically evaluates the European Union’s approach to CSR noting that it has 
been slow to put in place any form of regulatory framework and thus can be described as a 
regulatory wasteland in this field.  In particular, the Commission has been reluctant to 
embrace a hybrid approach to regulation and has remained resolutely attached to the 
business case for voluntarism, to the extent that it sought to exclude civil society from the 
regulatory debate.  The influence of the business community is especially apparent in the 
EU context, in  particular the desire to maintain CSR as a voluntary process.  Nevertheless, 
as a participant in the broader, global and contemporary CSR paradigm the EU must begin 
to adopt a hybrid regulatory strategy in order to be compliant with the UN Guiding 
Principles.  Indeed, the European Parliament has repeatededly indicated its support 
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mandatory regulation.4  There is certainly scope for the EU to champion and implement 
CSR standards in a variety of ways, for example through internal public procurement 
mechanisms or external relations policy.  What is clear is that at present the EU is lagging 
behind both the UN and OECD in relation to addressing the issue of business and human 
rights and EU CSR practice must change if the organisation wishes to be regarded as a 
leader in the field.
7.2 Pointing Forward: The Future of Business and Human Rights
What do the foregoing examples in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 say about the current state of 
regulation of business and human rights and what are the regulatory options for the future?  
There is no doubt that the international community of States, supported by the  business 
community, has been consistently unwilling to put in place a binding international legal 
regime in order to regulate the behaviour of business in relation to human rights.  The 
failure of both the UNCTC Draft Code and the Norms project to produce legislative 
provisions demonstrates this admirably.  Most recently we have witnessed the revision of 
the OECD Guidelines and the birth of the UN Guiding Principles, neither of which have 
resulted in new mandatory rules, and in the case of the UNGPs represents a step backwards 
in terms of the weakened interpretation of States’ human rights responsibilities.5  It is clear, 
therefore, that while there has been a paradigm shift in attitude towards the role and 
responsibilities of private business actors, and indeed a corresponding shift towards third 
way or new governance regulatory approaches,6 there remains a marked reluctance to 
create normative rules.  
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accessed 29.8.11];  See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1936 (2010) on 
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5 Infra at Section 3.3.3.1.
6 See discussion infra at Section 4.0.
It is important to note, however, that this dissertation does not argue solely for hard legal 
solutions, rather it recognises the limitations of what Teubner calls the ‘proceduralism’7 of 
the traditional legal paradigm and therefore proposes a new governance paradigm where 
hard and soft regulatory options complement each other.  Leading new governance 
scholars Trubek and Trubek argue that the ‘shift to ‘proceduralism’ in legal regulation, in 
which the law simply structures procedures for conflict resolution or problem-solving,’8 
justifies a move towards alternative and softer modes of regulation as an adjunct to 
normative mechanisms.  The move towards softer forms of regulation also fits with Koh’s 
promotion of norm internalisation as the key to human rights advancement.9
Within the business and human rights paradigm,  a consistent narrative is being promoted 
which tells us that the days of the ‘voluntarism versus hard law‘ dichotomy are over.10  
This is true, but only in the sense that the possibility of establishing mandatory rules seems 
to have been removed from the equation by States and international organisations, as well 
as by Ruggie, frequently at the behest of the business community and notwithstanding the 
references to judicial remedies in the UNGPs.11  Ruggie’s ‘smart mix’ of regulation is 
likely to remain a figment because on the whole, outside of civil society, there seems to be 
little desire for mandatory rules, thus all endeavours are likely to remain voluntary.  
Indeed, Chapter 3 demonstrates Ruggie’s own opposition to a treaty solution.12  
It seems evident, therefore, that what we are witnessing is not a hybrid, third way, new 
governance or smart-mix regulation, it is maintenance of the legal and economic status quo 
because the essence of the hybrid regulatory approach is that it recognises the value of 
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7 G.Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ 17 Law & Soc’y Rev.  239-286 
(1982-1983) at 266.
8 D.M. Trubek & L.G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and 
Transformation’ 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 539 (2006-2007) (hereinafter ‘Trubek & Trubek’) at 548.
9 See generally Koh note 1.  On norm internalization see H.H.Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?’ 74 Ind. L. J. 1397-1417 (1999) at 1409; H.Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’ 35 Hous. L. 
Rev. 623-681 (1998).  For a riposte to Koh’s theory of norm internalization see T.M.Franck, ‘Dr. Pangloss 
Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh's Optimism: Commentary’ 35 Hous. L. Rev. 683 
(1998-1999). 
10 See discussion infra at Sections 3.3.3.2, 3.2.1.2.3 and 3.3.3.3.
11 Infra Section 3.3.2.3.
12 See e.g. infra Section 3.2.1.2.3.  See also infra Section 7.2.2.
combining both soft and hard regulatory options.13  Trubek and Trubek describe situations 
where new governance mechanisms and law operate ‘in the same policy domain’ as 
‘coexistence’14 and where the systems merge into a ‘new hybrid process’ as 
‘transformation.’15
7.2.1 Coexistence and Transformation: Possibilities for a Truly Hybrid 
Approach to  Business and Human Rights 
As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, NGOs and labour organisations have argued 
consistently for a hard law approach to business and human rights, in addition to indicating 
their willingness to also embrace and participate in soft law initiatives.  This reflects a true 
hybrid or new governance approach to regulation and acknowledges the positive aspects of 
the process of human rights norm-internalisation and socialisation through soft law 
mechanisms.  States and business actors, on the other hand, appear to remain largely 
entrenched in their support for voluntarism alone.  Current business and human rights 
initiatives nonetheless demonstrate a shift away from traditional State-centric regulatory 
approaches (e.g. the UNCTC) with many of the softer new governance techniques being 
utilised, as highlighted in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  The use of more flexible soft law 
mechanisms are themselves integral to a new governance model of regulation and the 
UNGPs, UNGC and OECD Guidelines all encourage participation through 
multistakeholder structures, crucial for hybridity.  Other examples include the increasing 
use of low level decision making, or subsidiarity, such as the UNGC’s Local Networks, 
and the sharing of best practice generally.16  Nevertheless, the initiatives lack the vital new 
governance element of complementary hard regulation.17
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15 Ibid at 544.
16 Ibid at 6.
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There is, however, scope for a truly third way of CSR regulation which would harness both 
hard and soft regulatory approaches.  What would this third way look like in the business 
and human rights context?  For the purposes of this analysis, three interconnected 
possibilities can be identified.
One possibility is the creation of ‘mix and match’ regulatory structures that bring together 
elements of voluntarism and hard regulation.18  Legislative measures could be combined 
with non-binding measures.  For instance, a binding legislative obligation could be 
imposed upon firms to comply with their own voluntary codes of conduct.19  The content 
of the codes of conduct would thus be determined by business actors themselves.  
Nevertheless, litigation would be available as a strategy to enforce compliance with those 
obligations that firms chose to take upon themselves.20  This kind of ‘immanent critique’ 
would respond to the criticism that voluntary codes of conduct are no more than empty 
promises.  Another possibility would be to embed soft CSR standards within public 
procurement provisions, an option which has been considered by the EU.21
A second possibility is to use transparency requirements to promote compliance with 
human rights standards.  Firms could be obliged to report publicly on what they have done 
to comply with CSR standards.22  These standards might be internally produced, by firms 
themselves, or created externally, either by non-enforceable legislative or other regulatory 
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21 See e.g. Communication from the Commission Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business 
Contribution to Sustainable Development, at 5, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002): http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0347:FIN:EN:PDF [last accessed 29.10.11].
22 See e.g. UN Global Compact Integrity Measures, www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/integrity.html 
[last accessed 28.10.11].
instruments, or by a participatory mechanism bringing together all of the relevant 
stakeholders (see below).  A system of peer review, or external review by an international 
organization, or regional or national regulatory body, could provide an assessment of the 
reports.  Examples of best practice would be made available for firms to draw upon in the 
future.  Practices of ‘naming and shaming’ and league tables could induce firms to improve 
their CSR ratings, for reasons of image, and ‘good business sense.’23   Some of these 
transparency elements are evident in the processes of the UN Global Compact, although as 
discussed in Chapter 4, its reporting system in particular is deeply flawed and some form 
of review or assessment mechanism is required to increase its effectiveness.
Alternatively, a system could be built on a participatory model. A participatory model 
would involve business, legislative authorities, and civil society. No single actor therefore, 
would have control over the creation of standards. All stakeholders would be involved in 
securing adherence to human rights standards. The standards themselves would be 
developed through an on-going dialogue between the relevant stakeholders, resulting in 
(provisional) statements of CSR good practice. The stakeholders would also monitor 
adherence to these non-binding norms, for instance through the practice of peer review, 
‘naming and shaming’ and league tables outlined above. Such a system might be supported 
by legislative instruments that obliged the relevant parties to ‘come to the table’ and 
negotiate. A ‘penalty default’ 24 of an enforceable CSR obligation might underpin such an 
approach, and ensure that it would be in the interests of all stakeholders to participate.  
While existing business and human rights initiatives have adopted some elements of a 
participatory model in terms of norm development, there are nonetheless ongoing concerns 
about the marginalisation of civil society within the processes.25  This is notwithstanding 
Ruggie’s extensive efforts to include civil society in the drafting of the UNGPs.
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Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ 99 Yale Law Journal 87 (1989), in the context of contract 
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25 See e.g. discussions infra at 3.3.3.2 and  6.2.
While it is clear that while new governance techniques have been adopted by various 
organisations and initiatives, the business and human rights paradigm cannot yet be said to 
have been ‘transformed’ into a truly hybrid regulatory system because of the lack of 
binding normative provisions.   
7.2.2 Towards Transformation: The Need for an International 
 Normative Framework
As established in Chapter 1, Berle and Dodd recognised that corporations have societal 
responsibilities beyond their duties towards shareholders.26  They took the view that 
corporate actors owe obligations to their employees and to the communities in which they 
operate, among others, by virtue of their membership of society.  It is clear that the 
international community is moving slowly towards this view, at least in principle, as it has 
become increasingly evident that business actors are capable of violating human rights 
standards in their own right and in complicity with States.  This is evidenced by the 
unanimous acceptance of the UNGPs by the Human Rights Council in June 2011.  What is 
also apparent, however, is that States are simply unwilling to move towards a binding 
international legal system where business actors can be held legally responsible for their 
human rights abuses.  The proliferation of codes of conduct, both private and industry-
based, leaders’ fora, and certification schemes supported by States demonstrate a strong 
preference for voluntary self-regulation as opposed to an overarching normative regulatory 
architecture.  This seems to send out a very clear message that human rights violations by 
business are insufficiently significant to warrant greater legal protection, in terms of 
providing redress, punishment and deterrent.
It is indisputable that the Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines and the UNGPs, offer 
much in the way of dissemination of information and education about human rights abuses 
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and standards, which is key to any strategy of human rights protection, but they also offer 
little in the way of remedies or redress for individual human rights abuses, nor do they seek 
to punish wrongdoers.  Nevertheless such activities represent a further step towards Koh’s 
internalisation of human rights norms.  Koh writes that he has :  
long argued in favour of a transnational legal process approach whereby techniques of 
process are used to internalize into transnational actors – here, multinational 
corporations – standards of right and wrong behaviour.27
The UNGC and the OECD Guidelines are part of such a transnational legal process.  The 
same can be said of the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs), in that they are seeking to 
inculcate human rights standards among all business actors, but where they fall down is in 
the failure to insist upon direct binding duties with binding remedies and punishments as 
an adjunct to the voluntary standards.  Arguably the UNGPs do not meet Ruggie’s own 
standards as set out in the original ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework or indeed his 
stated aim of creating a regulatory smart-mix. While there is much to commend the 
UNGPs in terms of the elaboration of the due diligence principle, for example, and the 
reference to judicial remedies, Ruggie has been careful to avoid the imposition of any form 
of mandatory international rules with the emphasis on national approaches.  The UNGPs 
cannot therefore lay claim to being a regulatory hybrid which is what seems to be implied 
by the term ‘smart-mix.’.
Furthermore, Ruggie has consistently made clear his distaste for a business and human 
rights treaty through his heavy-handed criticisms of the UN Norms28 as well as public 
statements where he has indicated his disinclination to pursue the treaty option:
negotiations on an overarching treaty now would be unlikely to get off the ground, 
and even if they did the outcome could well leave us worse off than we are today.29
He cites three reasons for his opposition:
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First, treaty-making can be painfully slow, while the challenges of business and 
human rights are immediate and urgent. Second, and worse, a treaty-making process 
now risks undermining effective shorter-term measures to raise business standards on 
human rights. And third, even if treaty obligations were imposed on companies, 
serious questions remain about how they would be enforced.30
Ruggie states that advocates of the treaty approach have not adequately answered these 
questions31 but they are largely procedural issues and should not be used as a barrier to the 
creation of a normative framework.  Ruggie also expresses concerns about human rights 
treaty processes resulting in normative documents which represent the lowest common 
denominator.  While this is probably true, surely failing even to consider a normative 
framework is also pandering to the lowest common denominator: the ‘result will not be 
worth it, therefore we will not even bother‘ approach to international regulation.  It seems 
to amount to a rather defeatist attitude towards international law and what it may or may 
not achieve.  Ruggie is right that soft measures may be the most efficient response to 
address the problem of human rights violations by business actors in the short term but that 
does not preclude normative options in the longer term.  Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that softer approaches will give quicker results.  It is also difficult to see how launching a 
parallel and complementary normative approach would undermine existing soft initiatives.  
Ruggie is not a lawyer and perhaps sees no value in the law but as Allott notes the value of 
law is broad and appealing:
law defeats the passage of time by retaining choices made in a society’s past, in a 
form – the law – which can take effect in a society’s future. the law which is retained 
from society’s past takes effect in society’s present, as the law is interpreted and 
applied in the light of actual circumstances, and so helps to make society’s future. the 
law carries the past through the present into the future. the law offers to society 
stability in the midst of ceaseless change, and change-from-stability as new human 
circumstances demand new human choices . . . law is a wonderful, and insufficiently 
appreciated, human invention.32 
While there is no doubt that Ruggie’s concerns about the limitations of the international 
legal process are genuine and difficult to resolve, nevertheless, the UNGPs would have 
been an ideal opportunity to make a recommendation for the creation of binding 
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‘Allott (2002)’) at 134 para. 5.7.
international obligations as a medium to longer-term goal.33  Contrary to Ruggie’s view, 
such a recommendation could coexist quite happily with regulatory soft options and would 
have offered a genuinely transforming regulatory smart mix.  A top-down - bottom-up 
approach which involves the international community, individual States, business actors, as 
well as civil society, would also help to address the issue of what Ruggie describes as the 
‘math’ i.e. the sheer numbers of business actors involved.34  
There is also a danger that attempts to ‘Ruggie-proof’ the commercial policies of business 
actors will result in corporate lawyers seeking to achieve the lowest possible levels of 
human rights compliance by their clients as opposed to raising the bar.  To be effective, 
norm internalisation must be accompanied by a sort of corporate ‘inner morality’ which 
demands the adoption of higher standards, notwithstanding any duties imposed, in this case 
the duty to respect human rights and take care to ‘do no harm.‘  This is in essence an 
application of Lon Fuller’s thesis on the morality of aspiration versus the morality of duty.  
That is, the pursuit of ‘excellence’ or how society ought to be, versus the imposition of the 
most basic preconditions necessary for an ‘ordered society.’35    As Fuller puts it ‘the 
morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at 
the bottom.’36  Thus demands for the regulation of business and human rights require more 
than a simple exhortation to ‘do no harm:’
To meet these demands human energies must be directed towards specific kinds of 
achievement and not merely warned away from harmful acts.37
An aspirational approach to business actors’ human rights obligations is to be preferred 
because a morality of duty condemns the individual and her human rights to the lowest 
possible standards of protection.  Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties of implementing 
aspirational rights, notions of corporate ‘inner morality’ run into difficulties because 
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obviously corporate entities have ‘no soul to damn’ which brings us to another significant 
problem, that of separate legal personality.
7.2.3 Souls to Damn and Bodies to Kick: The Responsibility of 
 Owners and Managers
The legal fiction of the separate legal personality of the corporation has led to a disconnect 
or a distance between the people who own and manage companies and the people and 
communities where they do business.  This dehumanisation occurs irrespective of the size 
of the business, because as has been demonstrated, human rights violations are committed 
by some of the largest enterprises in existence, such as Royal Dutch Shell discussed in 
Chapter 1, and by small companies with only one or two directors, such as Afrimex which 
was discussed in Chapter 5.  Incorporation of a business creates a legal entity separate and 
‘veiled’ from those who own and manage the company. What is crucial is that the fiction 
protects the owners and managers from personal responsibility even where human rights 
abuses occur.38  It is suggested that lifting the veil of incorporation, which insulates those 
responsible for making the decisions which intentionally or unintentionally result in human 
rights violations, would moderate corporate behaviour significantly.  It is morally 
repugnant that a legal entity, created by humans, should be permitted to harm other human 
beings with impunity.  It is even more abhorrent when it is considered that legal systems 
will lift or pierce the veil of incorporation in order to identify, for example, fraudulent 
behaviour by managers and owners.
In order for business enterprises to be good international citizens, a human rights ethos 
must be respected by the citizens who own and manage them.  Human rights abuses are not  
physically perpetrated by companies, which are merely legal constructs, rather they are 
committed by those who work for the companies, the employees, managers and sub-
contractors.  One possibility for dealing with this, therefore, is to adopt the management 
responsibility model used in the IG Farben, Flick, Krupp, and Roechling decisions of the 
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Nuremberg Tribunals.  As highlighted in Chapter 1, the NMT convicted leading members 
of the Vorstand or board of management.39  The rationale was that as companies have no 
body to kick nor a soul to damn then it made sense to punish those who ran the business 
and made the day to day decisions which resulted in the human rights violations, in these 
cases, crimes of aggression, crimes against peace, spoilation, and using forced labour.  In 
other words, the corporate veil was lifted because the individuals were utilising the 
‘instrumentality’ of the companies to commit the abuses.  Furthermore, international law 
already recognises that individuals are capable of committing human rights abuses under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,40 so extending the principle to the 
managers of a business would not require some great theoretical shift.   There are 
numerous national precedents where courts have lifted the corporate veil where there is 
suspicion of fraudulent behaviour and exploitation of the corporate entity.41  A court could 
easily be empowered to lift the corporate veil in order to identify and punish owners and 
managers when a corporate device is being misused for the purposes of insulating from 
responsibility those individuals committing human rights abuses.  The creation of personal 
liability would be likely to have a strong deterrent effect.
7.3 Are the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights the 
 Solution?
What hope is there that the UN Guiding Principles will resolve the various problems 
outlined throughout this dissertation?  In essence the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
framework which underpins the UNGPs adheres to a traditional conception of international 
law, that is, one where the subject-object dichotomy still prevails.  Under the current State-
centric system of international law, it is self-evident that States have the primary 
responsibility for protecting human rights but such an approach is arguably too formalistic 
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and in addition ignores the reality of power.  It allows States a ‘get out.’  For example the 
UK has stated its position clearly: 
The UK agrees that certain treaty provisions may impose an express or implied duty 
on States to protect against non-State human rights abuses.  However, it does not 
consider that there is a general duty to protect under the core UN human rights 
treaties, nor that such a duty is generally agreed to exist as a matter of customary 
international law.42
States and others also engage in a circular argument which goes something along the lines 
of: business actors were not participants in the creation of international human rights 
instruments (because they are not subjects of international law), therefore, they ought not 
to be subject to those human rights obligations and we, as States, do not wish to consider 
them as subjects of international law.43  Nevertheless ‘many treaties and international 
instruments do impose substantive duties upon corporations’44 in a more general context, 
so why not in relation to human rights? 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation makes clear that business actors are active and powerful 
participants on the international stage, wielding tremendous economic and political power 
in both developed and developing States.  Thus States ought to exercise careful authority 
over them on behalf of their citizens.  Nevertheless, there is an insistence that business 
entities need only respect human rights standards which implies a passivity on their part 
and in turn supports the argument that they exist as mere objects under international law.  
This is apparent in the UNGC, the OECD Guidelines and now the UNGPs, none of which 
impose a binding human rights obligation on business actors.  Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation, however, demonstrate that business actors may be considered subjects of 
international law, or at least participants in it, and therefore ought to be categorised as 
dutyholders.  Human beings need protection from abuse, no matter the source, whether it is 
a State, an individual or a business.  International law has created international regulatory 
mechanisms to deal with human rights abuses committed by States and to a certain extent, 
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individuals, specifically via the Statute of the ICC.45  Why, therefore, should corporate 
business actors be excluded?  It is becoming increasingly difficult to justify their exclusion 
because a State-centric system of international law values maintenance of the theoretical 
and practical status quo over individuals and in so doing permits misbehaviour by business 
entities to continue with impunity.  Such a system represents a ‘legal positivism’ that 
assumes:
law should be viewed not as the product of an interplay of purposive orientations 
between the citizen and his government but as a one-way projection of authority, 
originating with government and imposing itself on the citizen.46
When such a State-centric ‘authority-based view of society’ is permitted to flourish, it:
‘tend[s] to make all society seem to be essentially a system of authority, and . . . to 
make societies incorporating systems of authority seem to be the most significant 
forms of society, at the expense of all other forms of society, including non-patriarchal 
families, at one extreme, and international society, at the other.’47
This results in an international system which alienates individuals because it ‘seems to be 
the business of a foreign realm, another world, in which they play no personal part.’48  It 
also creates a system where the interests of the State and commercial actors trump those of 
individuals and international law is (mis)directed in such a way as to protect that 
arrangement.  States have become the primary actors in all matters, ‘forgetting’ that they 
exist solely to serve the human beings who created them and resulting in a ‘tail wagging 
the dog’ scenario.
7.4 What of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 2011?
The OECD, in its May 2011 update of the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, has 
wasted a golden opportunity to strengthen the role of its National Contact Points and thus 
enhance the ‘remedy’ aspect of the OECD system. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a specific 
human rights chapter, linkage with the Ruggie Protect, Respect and Remedy framework, 
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and a clear emphasis on the due diligence principle is to be welcomed,49 albeit cautiously.  
Notwithstanding these positives, the update does not go far enough.  In particular, the 
amendments will make little difference to preventing the behaviour of rogue business 
actors in the vein of Afrimex.  While UK, Dutch and Norwegian NCPs and SIPs are far 
from perfect as highlighted in Chapter 5, they at least offer a glimpse of a system whereby 
transnational business actors can be held publicly accountable for their actions in host 
States even if they cannot be punished, whereas many of the other NCPs ‘grossly under-
perform.’50  The OECD has disappointed by failing to establish consistent standards for 
NCPs and an uneven NCP architecture remains in place.  As Amnesty International 
highlights, the NCPs have been in place for more than ten years, giving ample time for a 
great deal to be ‘learnt about what works and what does not  work’ in relation to their 
structure and functioning.51  What seems clear therefore is that there is insufficient will on 
the part of Adhering States to put in place a truly effective redress mechanism.  The 
majority of NCPs lack transparency, they offer no remedy for the victims of human rights 
violations and all lack any punishment or deterrent effect.
 
7.5 The Limitations of Reputational Carrots and The Need for 
 Regulatory Sticks
Experience shows that there are some businesses for which reputation is tremendously 
important but what of those businesses who ‘fly under the radar’ as Ruggie puts it?  What 
of companies like Afrimex, discussed in Chapter 5, which seek to continue doing business 
while ignoring basic standards of behaviour?  Such commercial actors will never respond 
to reputational carrots.  They are too far removed from consumers to attract negative 
publicity let alone to care about or be affected by boycotts.  They will never be persuaded 
that being ethically ‘good’ is also good for business.  Indeed there is empirical evidence to 
suggest that boycotts have little impact on the behaviour of even the most prominent 
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companies because of their limited economic effect.52  Given these facts, how therefore 
should the international community deal with rogue businesses?
States, of course, will reiterate that it is the responsibility of States to protect against 
human rights abuses, and there is no question that the primary responsibility for human 
rights protection does rest with States.  Allowing private business actors to fall within the 
scope of international human rights law does not diminish the obligations of States, rather 
it acknowledges that there are others actors which are capable of violating human rights 
norms.  Of course, States must not be permitted to escape liability for their own failures, 
but if commercial entities are capable of committing human rights abuses then it makes 
sense to hold them to account for their actions in addition to, and irrespective of, the role of 
the State.
To achieve that accountability, the international community must insist that business actors 
act in a socially responsible manner no matter where they do business.  Furthermore, there 
must be an acknowledgement that commercial entities are, at minimum, participants in the 
global community and as such their behaviour ought to comply with the normative 
standards established by the global community.  It is unacceptable to allow business actors 
to act with impunity in relation to human rights  because they did not participate in the 
drafting of a treaty or because a positivist interpretation of international law concludes that 
they are merely objects of international law.  Such arguments fail to recognise that the 
individual is at the heart of international law as argued in Chapter 3.  It is therefore the role 
of States to protect individuals from abuse, not simply as the legal guardians of human 
rights treaties, but as legislators and policy-makers.  Protecting individuals from human 
rights abuses includes creating systems of accountability and responsibility for those who 
do wrong, as well punishing them.  Existing initiatives, such as the Global Compact and 
the OECD Guidelines, while laudable and certainly effective at disseminating information 
and educating business about human rights, provide little in the way of redress for 
individuals affected by human rights abuses.  The UNGPs sidestep the issue by devolving 
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the responsibility to legislate and to create judicial remedies to individual States.  Of 
course, dissemination and education play an important role in preventing human rights 
abuses but these initiatives cannot stop human rights abuses from continuing once they are 
occurring, nor can they punish the wrongdoers and thus act as a deterrent.  Therefore, in 
addition to soft regulatory mechanisms, national judicial and non-judicial remedies, a 
binding international regulatory framework ought to be implemented.  
7.6 The Prospect for International Regulation
...if there is power there must be responsibility.53
There is no question that States are the main abusers of international human rights 
standards.  Modern international human rights law developed as a reaction to the excesses 
of States and a catalogue of contemporary examples demonstrate the urgent need to 
implement and enforce human rights principles against the worst State offenders.  It has 
not been the purpose of this dissertation, however, to deflect responsibility for human 
rights abuses from States to non-State actors, specifically business entities.  Rather, this 
dissertation has established that commercial entities are capable of violating human rights 
in their own right, as well as in complicity with States, and that the international initiatives 
which have developed to address the issue of business and human rights have limited 
impact in terms of preventing, stopping or remedying these abuses given the lack of 
enforcement, punishment, deterrent and individual redress mechanisms.
It should be borne in mind that international human rights law sets out the minimum 
standard of behaviour expected of States and there is nothing to prevent States from 
adhering to higher standards of behaviour, indeed many human rights are aspirational in 
nature.  This is especially true in relation to economic and social rights, such as the right to 
health and the right to housing, which require financial outlay by the State.  So, for 
example, the rights contained within the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights are to be ‘progressively realised’ by States, a principle designed to take 
account of developmental differences between industrialised and developing nations.  Thus 
some States are able to provide sophisticated, multi-layered levels of healthcare , for 
example, whereas the poorest nations may struggle to offer its citizens the most basic 
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primary healthcare.  Nevertheless, a rich State may be violating its obligations under the 
ICESCR if it does not actively seek to ‘progressively realise,’ i.e. improve, the right to 
health it affords, and a poor State may be complying with its human rights duties by the 
provision of emergency healthcare only because only that is within its particular 
developmental narrative.
The international community cannot deny that private business actors are involved in 
human rights violations.  From Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta to the activities of ‘off 
the shelf’ companies in the DRC, from the textile sweatshops in developing nations around 
the globe, to Total turning a blind eye to the use of forced labour in Burma/Myanmar, 
businesses of all shapes, sizes and legal formats are engaged directly in human rights 
violations and are actually doing harm or are failing to engage in adequate due diligence as 
regards their relationships both with States and other businesses within their supply chain.  
These are facts and it is hard to see how soft approaches would have changed the 
behaviour of these companies.
There is an undeniable timidity on the part of States in addressing this issue.   If the 
international legal system is truly State-centred then States ought to be able to control 
miscreant objects of international law such as private business actors.    As constructs of 
society why should they not act as agents for an ethical global society?  The responses are 
that the sole purpose of business is to make profit; that it is not the job of business to save 
the world; that business actors did not participate in the establishment of human rights 
norms and thus ought not to be bound by them; and that it is the State’s role to address the 
extraterritorial behaviour of its nationals.  To which the reply must be, firstly, the mantra 
that the sole responsibility of business is to make profit is a self-fulfilling neo-liberal 
maxim that no longer enjoys universal acceptance.  It has long been established that 
business actors have, or at least ought to have, additional responsibilities to a variety of 
stakeholders, not least their employees and the communities in which they operate.  
Secondly, this is no plea for private business actors to save the world.  Rather it is a plea 
for the international community to take a look at the participants on the international plane, 
to acknowledge that non-State actors are capable of wielding immense power and, in turn, 
that they are capable of abusing that power.  States are understandably concerned about the 
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rolling back of State power but in failing to properly regulate the behaviour of private 
business actors, further human rights violations are inevitable.  Thus the international 
community is contributing to a situation whereby developing nations in particular are often 
rendered powerless or complicit in human rights abuses.
States are right to highlight the major deficits in State adherence to international human 
rights standards but by refusing to extend human rights obligations to business actors in a 
formal manner, States are clinging to an archaic system of international law which protects 
State sovereignty at the expense of individuals who experience human rights abuses as a 
result of commercial activities.  The international community may be unable or unwilling 
to address the crimes committed for the reasons outlined in Chapter 1.  For example, a host 
State may be reliant on foreign direct investment and beholden to neoliberal 
conditionalities imposed by the IMF or World Bank.  A home State may similarly be 
unwilling to challenge the neoliberal paradigm because of a political adherence to such 
economic policies by its elected government.  Of course this reluctance becomes apparent 
in policy-making and negotiations at the UN, OECD, EU and elsewhere.
If international standards of behaviour were established, then it would become increasingly 
difficult for business actors to ‘bottom feed.’  It would create an ever more level 
international playing field for commercial activities and developing nations would be not 
be fearful of losing foreign direct investment because the same normative framework 
would be applicable in all States.  The incentive to do business in a country with lower 
standards would thus disappear.  In the same way, therefore, that States are encouraged to 
put in place laws protecting investors in order to create a safe commercial environment, so 
too should there be laws which guarantee a safe environment for individuals and 
communities.  Indeed Koh argues that the creation of a level human rights playing field via 
a treaty would actually contribute to a stable investment and commercial environment for 
business actors, because:
Corporations…need a safe harbor: certainty that conduct in which they self-
consciously and thoughtfully engage will not automatically expose them to domestic 
human rights lawsuits.54
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Industrialised nations are in no position to preach to rogue States which consistently abuse 
human rights if they are willing to export business actors who also pay scant regard to 
minimum standards of behaviour to local populations.  As discussed in Chapter 1, many of 
the most powerful transnational business enterprises are headquartered in developed States, 
and frequently operate double standards in relation to their minimum expected behaviour.  
Activities which would not be tolerated or which might be illegal in an industrialised 
nation take place with impunity in countries with less effective regulatory provisions. 
The implementation of normative standards for business actors is possible.  So for 
example, an international regulatory approach to corruption and bribery has been 
successful, with the internalising of ‘standards of right and wrong behaviour’ in business 
actors taking place.  Koh elaborates:
In 1977…Congress passed a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which imposed certain 
standards on US corporations through domestic civil and criminal legislation.  Then, 
as now, alarmists claimed that the chance of liability would cost US corporations 
billions and slash foreign direct investment.  But the fact that US corporations were 
subjected to these legal constraints soon made them advocates for an OECD Bribery 
Convention, which is now functioning and becoming internalized into the law of the 
member nations.55
Koh expresses the hope that a similar approach could be successfully applied to human 
rights abuses.
If the UNGP approach is to be effective then the requirement of effective remedies cannot 
be ignored.  It is simply not enough to rely on business actors to regulate themselves or for 
States to individually implement the normative standards proposed by the UNGPs.  The 
past two decades have demonstrated that self-regulation does not work because some of 
the worst cases of human rights abuses by business actors have occurred during an era of 
voluntarism typified by codes of conduct and industry self-regulatory initiatives.  Thus the 
need for a deterrent ought not to be underestimated. Even where the most egregious human 
rights violations take place companies such as Blackwater/Xe do their best to circumvent 
the reach of the voluntary initiatives, by refusing to submit to scrutiny processes despite 
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having earlier indicated that they would.56  Others such as Afrimex simply feign 
participation in and adherence to the processes, as described in Section 5.5.3.
What would be the outcome of an international legal system that recognised that legal 
persons have obligations under international law, specifically in relation to human rights?   
At minimum, institutional mechanisms could be put in place with periodic monitoring and 
reporting functions as well as fostering ‘critical thinking and best practices, advice and 
support’ and ‘standard-setting for human rights impact assessments.’57  It is to be hoped 
that mandatory punishments would have a substantial deterrent effect and that business 
actors would refrain from violating human rights.  Furthermore it would offer the victims 
of human rights abuses redress.  As Koh says, ‘international legislative developments’ are 
‘[w]hat we need most now.’58  
The international community has settled into a complacency, exemplified by the UN 
Guiding Principles, whereby there is a belief that human rights cannot be protected by 
international regulatory mechanisms and therefore they are not even attempted.  It may be 
difficult to create international legislation and indeed, the outcome of a treaty process may 
not even be very good law.  Nevertheless, a world where there is at least an attempt to 
legally reign in the abuse of power by business actors in order to protect and defend human 
beings is better than a world which sits back and forgets that both States and business 
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actors are human creations and are subject to human will.  If States continue to resist 
mandatory international regulation of business and human rights then it simply lends 
credence to Allot’s devastatingly pessimistic conclusion that: 
...the only constant in human social history is the ruthless self-protecting of social 
privilege. The only human right which is universally enforced is the right of the rich 
to get richer.59
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